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Abstract
Media forensics is a quickly growing research field struggling to gain the same acceptance as traditional
forensic investigation methods. Media forensics tasks such as proving image manipulations on digital
images or audio manipulations on digital sound files are as relevant today as they were for their analogue
counterparts some decades ago. The difference is that tools like Photoshop now allow a large number
of people to manipulate digital media objects with a processing speed far beyond anything imaginable in
times when image, audio or video manipulation of analogue media was a hardware- and labour-intensive
task requiring skill and experience.
Currently, there exists a large number of research prototypes but only a small number of accepted
tools that are capable of answering specific questions regularly arising in court cases, such as the origin
(source authenticity) of an image or recording, or the integrity of a media file. The reason for this
discrepancy between the number of research prototypes and the number of solutions accepted in court
has to be sought in the very nature of most judicial systems: Judges have to distinguish between valid
bases for evidence and expert testimonies on the one hand, and ‘junk science’ on the other hand. In
most cases, this distinction reflects a long and cumbersome process that relies on support from the
respective scientific communities.
Statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is a powerful methodology that has received a lot of attention in
academia and industry since the 1930s. In many application fields, it makes possible efficient solutions
for classification-based problems, such as the decision whether an e-mail is spam or not. Many current
media forensics methods already implement SPR to solve very specific classification or decision prob-
lems.
This thesis introduces an SPR-based solution concept for audio signal analyses that leave the narrow
tracks of such specific forensic methods. Instead, a general-purpose audio forensics concept is discussed,
providing the basis for the verification of different authenticity and integrity aspects of audio signals.
From the wide range of potential application scenarios that can be used to illustrate the significance of
such an approach, audio steganalysis (the detection of hidden communication channels in audio data)
and microphone forensics are chosen here to represent one research field focussed on integrity and one
focussed on source authenticity.
The introduction of such a currently unavailable generalised approach does not solve the issue of making
all current SPR-based audio forensics analyses acceptable in court. This goal would be far too ambitious
for a PhD project. But the author considers it to be an important step in helping the discourse between
judges on the one hand and researchers working on media forensics approaches on the other hand. A
positive outcome of this discourse will improve the chances of forensic science passing hurdles such as
the Daubert criteria used by judges to keep ‘junk science’ out of their courtrooms.
The three research challenges for this thesis are:
• Is there a generalised SPR approach (i.e. an adaptable solution concept) for media forensics that
can be used for addressing multiple audio forensics investigation goals?
• How can the usefulness of application scenario specific instantiations of a generalised audio foren-
sics approach be measured?
• Can instantiations of the generalised audio forensics approach be used to adequately implement
the application scenarios of audio steganalysis and microphone forensics?
In order to address these challenges, detailed methodology, concept and design considerations are made,
leading to an approach that is highly flexible (i.e. considers components like classification algorithms
to be exchangeable off-the-shelf products), deterministic, verifiable (integrating feature selection as a
means of plausibility verification for the classification process) and easily adaptable to different applica-
tion scenarios. Furthermore, the possibility of assessing the usefulness of implementations of application
scenario specific instantiations of the introduced concept is discussed against the background of the
Daubert criteria.
iii
The two instantiations of the introduced generalised approach selected as examples illustrate the in-
stantiation process and the corresponding performance assessment. In the substantial empirical in-
vestigations performed in audio steganalysis, detection performances similar to those presented in the
state-of-the-art in specialised audio steganalysis solutions are achieved. For the microphone forensics
scenario, the approach introduced here is assumed to outperform the current state-of-the-art, as it
shows similar detection performances while overcoming context limitations from which most of the
specific approaches suffer.
Despite the progress made in both application scenarios, which illustrates the significance of the intro-
duced approach, it has to be admitted that the results discussed here still fall short of the ultimate (yet
for a PhD thesis unrealistic) goal of providing audio forensic solutions acceptable for court proceedings.
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Deutschsprachige Version des Abstract
Medienforensik ist ein derzeit schnell wachsendes Forschungsfeld, welches anstrebt, eine a¨hnliche Akzep-
tanz wie etablierte forensische Disziplinen zu erlangen. Aufgaben der Medienforensik, wie beispielsweise
der Nachweis von Manipulationen an digitalen Bild- oder Tondaten, sind heute im selben Umfang rele-
vant, wie es a¨hnliche Techniken fu¨r Fotomaterial oder analoge Tontra¨ger zuvor waren. Der Unterschied
zu diesen liegt in der Verfu¨gbarkeit von Werkzeugen wie zum Beispiel Photoshop, die den Durchsatz
bei Manipulationen erho¨hen, wa¨hrend gleichzeitig das beno¨tigte Know-how sinkt.
Derzeit gibt es eine Vielzahl von prototypischen Lo¨sungen aus der Forschung, welche in der Lage
wa¨ren, spezielle Fragestellungen der Medienforensik, wie zum Beispiel den Nachweis der Herkunft
(Quellenauthentizita¨t) oder der Integrita¨t, zu fu¨hren. Allerdings gibt es nur wenige solche Lo¨sungen,
die auch vor Gericht Bestand haben. Der Grund fu¨r diese Diskrepanz liegt in der Natur der meis-
ten Rechtssysteme: Richtern obliegt es, zwischen geeigneten Grundlagen fu¨r die Beweisfu¨hrung und
pseudowissenschaftlichen Ramschwissenschaften zu unterscheiden. Zumeist geht der Zulassung einer
wissenschaftlichen Methode im Gericht ein langwieriger Zulassungsprozess voran, bei dem die Richter
auf die Zuarbeit der entsprechenden Forschungsbereiche angewiesen sind.
Statistische Mustererkennung (SPR, engl.: statistical pattern recognition) ist eine sehr ma¨chtige Me-
thodik, die seit den 1930er Jahren in Forschung und Industrie eine starke Akzeptanz erfa¨hrt. In vielen
Bereichen ermo¨glicht sie effiziente Lo¨sungen fu¨r klassifikationsbasierte Probleme, wie zum Beispiel die
Frage, ob eine E-Mail Spam ist oder nicht. Viele aktuelle Ansa¨tze der Medienforensik nutzen diese
Methodik fu¨r die Lo¨sung spezieller Klassifikations- oder Entscheidungsprobleme. In dieser Dissertation
wird ein SPR-basiertes Lo¨sungskonzept vorgestellt, welches die ausgetretenen Pfade hochspezialisierter
forensischer Methoden verla¨sst und ein Universalwerkzeug fu¨r unterschiedliche forensische Analysen der
Authentizita¨t und Integrita¨t von Audiodaten darstellt. Aus dem umfangreichen Pool an mo¨glichen
Einsatzszenarien fu¨r ein solches Universalwerkzeug werden hier zwei Beispiele zur Illustration der Prax-
isrelevanz des vorgestellten Ansatzes vorgestellt. Dabei handelt es sich um die Audiosteganalyse (die
Erkennung von verdeckten Kommunikationskana¨len in Audiodaten) und die Mikrofonerkennung. Durch
diese Auswahl wird jeweils eine Lo¨sung fu¨r die Verifikation der Integrita¨t von Audiodaten und eine
Lo¨sung fu¨r die Verifikation der Quellenauthentizita¨t betrachtet.
Die Einfu¨hrung eines solchen, derzeitig fehlenden, generalisierten Ansatzes wird nicht automatisch alle
derzeitig auf statistischer Mustererkennung basierenden Verfahren der Medienforensik fu¨r Audiodaten
vor Gericht verwertbar machen. Dies wa¨re ein viel zu ambitioniertes Unterfangen fu¨r eine einzelne Dis-
sertation. Allerdings betrachtet der Autor die hier durchgefu¨hrten Arbeiten als einen wichtigen Schritt
im Diskurs zwischen Richtern einerseits und Forschern im Bereich der Medienforensik andererseits. Ein
positiver Ausgang dieses Diskurses sollte die Chancen dafu¨r erho¨hen, dass Forschungsergebnisse erfol-
greich die Hu¨rden nehmen, welche von Richtern genutzt werden, um Pseudowissenschaften aus den
Gerichtssa¨len fernzuhalten (zum Beispiel die Daubert-Kriterien der US-Rechtsprechung).
Die drei wissenschaftlichen Herausforderungen, die in dieser Arbeit aufgegriffen werden, sind:
• Gibt es einen generalisierbaren SPR-Ansatz (d. h. ein anpassbares Lo¨sungskonzept) im Bereich der
Medienforensik, welcher verwendet werden kann, um mehrere unterschiedliche Untersuchungsziele
der forensischen Audiodatenanalyse zu erfu¨llen?
• Wie kann die Nu¨tzlichkeit der Instantiierungen eines solchen generalisierten Ansatzes fu¨r praktis-
che Untersuchungen in unterschiedlichen Anwendungsszenarien bewertet werden?
• Ko¨nnen solche Instantiierungen genutzt werden um ada¨quate Lo¨sungen fu¨r die Anwendungsszenar-
ien der Audiosteganalyse und der Mikrofonforensik zu erzeugen?
Um Antworten auf diese Fragen zu finden, werden Methodik, Konzepte und mo¨gliche Designs detailliert
betrachtet. Diese fu¨hren zu einem Ansatz, welcher hochgradig flexibel (d. h., Komponenten wie zum
Beispiel Klassifikationsalgorithmen werden als leicht austauschbare Elemente angesehen), determinis-
tisch, nachvollziehbar (durch Nutzung von Merkmalsselektion fu¨r die Verifikation der Plausibilita¨t im
Klassifikationsprozess) und fu¨r unterschiedliche Einsatzzwecke leicht adaptierbar ist.
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Des Weiteren wird vor dem Hintergrund der Daubert-Kriterien diskutiert, wie die Nu¨tzlichkeit von In-
stantiierungen eines solchen generalisierten Ansatzes bewertet werden kann.
Fu¨r die beiden beispielhaft ausgewa¨hlten Anwendungsszenarien werden sowohl der Instantiierungsprozess
durchgefu¨hrt als auch die Leistungsfa¨higkeit entsprechend bewertet. Fu¨r das Anwendungsszenario der
Audiosteganalyse werden dabei in den umfangreichen empirischen Analysen Ergebnisse erzielt, welche
a¨quivalent zu denen spezialisierter Ansa¨tze aus dem aktuellen Stand in Forschung und Technik sind.
Fu¨r die Mikrofonforensik kann fu¨r den hier vorgestellten Ansatz angenommen werden, dass er leis-
tungsfa¨higer ist als die derzeit existierenden spezialisierten Alternativen, da er bei vergleichbaren Erken-
nungsraten geringere Einschra¨nkungen bezu¨glich aufgenommener Inhalte aufweist.
Trotz der wissenschaftlichen Erfolge, die fu¨r beide Anwendungsszenarien erzielt werden, sei an dieser
Stelle erwa¨hnt, dass die hier erzielten Ergebnisse immer noch weit davon entfernt sind, dem schlussend-
lichen Ziel jeder forensischen Methode – der Gerichtsverwertbarkeit – nahezukommen. Dies zu erreichen
wa¨re ein Ziel, welches fu¨r eine Dissertation viel zu hoch gesteckt ist.
vi
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Introduction and Motivation
Trust in digital-born or digitised media strongly depends on their source as well as their content. If we
receive the media object from a source we trust, we also tend to trust the information that is contained
within the object. The reason is that we assume that the source has authenticated the information and
that it vouches for the integrity of the data object – otherwise we would have no trust in this source.
If the content is too implausible we might override our initial trust assumption for the source. This is
very well illustrated by the example of the Ztohoven nuclear bomb prank: On June 17th, 2007 viewers of
a Czech television channel, watching a web cam program monitoring weather in various Czech mountain
resorts, could see something that appeared to be a nuclear explosion taking place in the Krkonose or
Giant Mountains in the northern part of the Czech Republic. This prank (the explosion was obviously
not real, even though it looked realistic) was implemented by the Czech prankster group Ztohoven by
manipulating the web cam data stream. It won its authors the 2007 ‘NG 333’ prize for young artists by
Pragues National Gallery together with a cash prize of 333,000 Czech Koruna (at that time about US$
18,350). In the criminal investigation following the event, a court cleared the members of Ztohoven of
charges, but several members had to pay a fine of 50,000 Czech Koruna each (US$ 2,400) for tampering
with a television broadcast.
This example shows that, in an information society working on digital information objects which are
much easier to manipulate than their analogue counterparts, we need (security) mechanisms to estab-
lish trust in information regardless of its origin. This trust is especially based on the authenticity and
integrity of digital objects. The assurance of authenticity and integrity in media is directly linked to
trust and therefore to the value of the information.
That the question of authenticity and integrity is not only limited to what we can see in images or on
TV, but is also relevant for the domain of audio signals considered in this thesis is very well illustrated
by the Watergate Tapes (a.k.a. the Nixon White House tapes or the Nixon’s Watergate tape) example.
In [Maher10], the official 87-page forensic report [Bolt74] on this prominent historical example, also
known as the ‘18 1/2 minute gap’, is summarised as follows:
“The watershed event for audio forensics was arguably the 1974 investigation of a White
House conversation between U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Chief of Staff H.R.
Haldeman recorded in the Executive Office Building in 1972. Investigators discovered that
the audio recording contained an unexplained section lasting 18 1/2 minutes during which
buzz sounds could be heard but no discernable speech sounds were present. Due to the
highly specialized nature of the technical evidence, [the] Chief Judge [...] appointed a
special Advisory Panel on White House Tapes to give expert advice to the court. The
advisory panel consisted of six technical experts, [...], with the court’s direction ‘[...] to
study relevant aspects of the tape and the sounds recorded on it’ [Bolt74]. [...] The
advisory panel performed a series of objective analyses of the tape itself, the magnetic
signals on it, the electrical and acoustical signals generated by playback of the tape, and
the properties of the recording equipment used to produce the magnetic signals on the tape.
Analysis included observation of the audio signals as well as magnetic development of the
domain patterns and head signatures on the tape. Ultimately the panel determined that the
18 1/2-minute gap was due to several overlapping erasures performed with a specific model
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of tape recorder that differed from the device that produced the original recording. The
panel’s conclusion was based primarily on the characteristic start/stop magnetic signatures
present on the subject tape.”
In this example the integrity violation proved by the advisory panel via means of source authentication,
led to the resignation of U.S. president Richard M. Nixon, a historic event without precedent. But
modern day audio recording and audio manipulation do no longer impose head signatures to the record-
ings. In [Davis12], Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Greg Stohr report upon a case of digitally tampered audio
recordings of a statement by U.S. president Barack H. Obama’s top Supreme Court lawyer, Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli, in the U.S. Supreme Court. The tampered material, which was used in a
Republican Party Internet advertisement to attack president Obama’s health-care law, shows how easily
digital audio manipulations can nowadays be applied to influence the public opinion. This case of audio
material tampering was evident even without a sophisticated forensic analysis. In contrast to the Water-
gate Tapes example, it was a rather sophisticated manipulation, but the original material is available to
the public, and therefore proving the manipulation was easy. The interesting question is: How many au-
dio signal manipulations altering the outcome of court cases or the public opinion have gone unnoticed?
Besides the questions on source authenticity and integrity illustrated above, another hot topic to be
addressed in the context of this thesis is the issue of growing importance of digital steganography.
Steganography (from ancient Greek: steganos graphein – in English: covered writing; see [Wo¨lfel11]
or [Fridrich09]) is the art and science of hidden communication. Its counter-science is steganalysis,
attempting to detect the existence of hidden communications in observed communication channels.
History is full of descriptions of steganographic methods from all epochs: the Ancient Greek, the Mid-
dle Ages, European Renaissance, the World Wars, the Cold War era, etc. In his most influential book
‘The Codebreakers’ ([Kahn1996]), David Kahn illustrates how steganography and cryptography (as well
as their counter-sciences steganalysis and cryptanalysis) have been used as alternatives for confidential
communication throughout the times. With the emergence of the digital age, the 1990s also saw the
emergence of new digital steganographic methods, followed by the need for corresponding counter-
methods (i.e. for steganalysis methods).
Despite the facts that no statistics exist on the actual usage of digital steganography, its relevance is
illustrated by such facts as Hollywood studios taking up the idea for their spy movies, it making its
way into contemporary popular literature (e.g. Tom Clancy’s ‘Dead or Alive’, [Clancy12]) and its usage
being strongly advertised in Jihadist newsletters (see [Givner-Forbes07]).
Regarding the issue of trust connected to such authenticity and integrity questions, this thesis elabo-
rates two perspectives on forensic sciences, the information technology (IT) perspective and the society
perspective:
The place of forensics in IT-security:
The notion of trust in information technology (IT) encompasses three different components: a se-
curity component, a safety component and a non-technical component, which combines all human
influence factors for a trust assumption (i.e. our own experiences, knowledge, fears, etc.). From these
three components, only the IT-security is directly in the focus of this thesis.
Following the notation Matt Bishop established for IT-security in [Bishop03], security can be seen as a
process that is governed by security requirements (expressed in the form of security aspects), secu-
rity policies (as control mechanisms) and security measures or security mechanisms (which actually
implement security and which therefore can be classified based on the addressed security aspects). Re-
garding the definition of security aspects, different conflicting models exist (cf. for example [Bishop03]
and [Eckert11]). Authenticity and integrity, the small selection of the established security aspects con-
sidered in this thesis, nevertheless are conceptually present in most of all these models. Regarding
authenticity, two distinct concepts exist, entity authenticity and data authenticity [Kiltz08]. The first
one, which is outside the scope of this thesis, establishes the genuineness of human entities (e.g. users in
a system) and non-human entities in the sense that an entity is really who it claims to be. Mechanisms
here are for human entities either single factor authentication using knowledge (e.g. passwords), posses-
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sion (e.g. authentication via smart cards) or biometric characteristics (see e.g. Ross et al. [Ross06] and
Vielhauer [Vielhauer05]), or multi-factor authentication (combinations of the single factor authentica-
tion possibilities). For non-human entities (e.g. processes or devices), authentication measures include
for example the usage of (unique) device identifiers (e.g. media access control (MAC) addresses of
network interface cards), vendor identifiers and serial numbers for CPUs, etc.). Data authenticity, as
the second and for this thesis relevant facet of authenticity, is sometimes also called source authentic-
ity. It is the assessment of the origin, genuineness, originality, truth and realness of (digital) data objects.
Data integrity in computer science and telecommunications refers to the integrity of resources. In-
tegrity requirements describe how the integrity of the system can be ensured (prevention), or it reports
if the resource, for example information, has been altered or manipulated (detection) or they enable the
system to be recovered into a consistent state (recovery). Integrity is therefore the quality or condition
of being whole, complete and unaltered. It also refers to the consistency, accuracy, and correctness of
data [Kiltz08].
Regarding the measures and mechanisms that implement IT-security, and here especially authenticity
and integrity, we have to distinguish between active mechanisms (e.g. digital watermarking (see e.g.
Cox et al. [Cox08] and Dittmann [Dittmann00]) or steganography (see e.g. Fridrich [Fridrich09])) and
passive mechanisms. While active mechanisms introduce a priori changes to objects for protection
(e.g. to ensure authenticity and/or integrity or to implement a channel for hidden communication),
their passive counterparts work without modification of the protected data. The latter include mech-
anisms that have to be applied prior to an expected incident (like cryptographic hashing, perceptual
hashing, encryption, etc.) as well as forensics, a concept for security mechanisms that can be applied a
posteriori. The forensic sciences can be divided into many distinct sub-categories, such as crime scene
forensics and IT-forensics. Only IT-forensics is relevant for this thesis. In this field, a distinction is
usually made between the focus on systems (e.g. hard drive or network forensics) and the focus on
media objects (media forensics).
In this thesis, considerations focus on passive, forensic security mechanisms aiming to establish trust in
audio material. The motivation for this media forensics approach is nicely summarised in a statement
from Oermann et al. [Oermann05] (which itself is based on a quotation from the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language [Flexner87]):
“The motivation of our work is determined through its forensic background. The word
‘forensic’ is defined as ‘pertaining to, connected with, or used in courts of law or public
discussion and debate.’ (The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second
Edition – Unabridged. Random House, Inc., New York, 1987; [Flexner87]). Hence, the
term forensic audio may be defined as the application of audio knowledge, technologies
and methodologies to questions of civil and criminal law or public discussion and debate.
Forensics imply the assurance of integrity and authenticity of information.”
The role of forensics in the human society
One of the oldest and most respected forensic sciences is fingerprint analysis. Since being established
in the 19th century, it has been used worldwide to solve criminal cases by matching latent fingerprint
traces found e.g. at crime scenes to samples acquired from suspects. But even an established practice
like fingerprint analysis has to face new challenges once in a while. One extremely influential challenge
has been the amendment of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in the year 2000 as a result of
the two ground-breaking cases Daubert3 and Kumho Tire4. This amendment to the FRE led during
a short time after its instalment to several court cases, where the presiding judge refused to allow the
admission of fingerprint analysis results in court (see [SWGFAST11]).
The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST), a highly
respected, non-profit expert group for fingerprint analysis acknowledged and supported by the American
3Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. United States Court 509 U.S. 579, 1993.
4Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1999.
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Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), the International Association for Identification (IAI)
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), draws the following conclusions for forensic scientists
from the Daubert and Kumho Tire cases in [SWGFAST11]:
“[...] the definition of science, the scientific method, and scientific evidence can no longer
be used as loosely as experts have been doing. It is no longer sufficient to call yourself a
forensic scientist in order to be considered a scientist. It is no longer sufficient to say that
something is a subject of forensic science in order for a court to agree that it is dealing
with science. Simply saying it does not make it so. The courts may, and many will, require
the experts to show that they know what the scientific method consists of and provide the
scientific basis for their conclusions. By the same token, each discipline will be judged by
its own standards and upon its own experience. [...] It also means that forensic scientists
can no longer expect to rely on the fact that courts have long accepted and admitted
evidence of their expert conclusions. The court can relitigate the admissibility of a certain
type of expert evidence if a litigant can make a credible argument that there has been no
previous scientific inquiry of the validity of the assumptions on which a forensic field has
long rested. Decades of judicial precedent no longer preclude reviewing whether existing
precedent satisfies Daubert and Kumho Tire.”
This summarising statement from a forensic specialist group trained (and providing training) for giving
expert testimony in U.S. courts - notably the busiest judicial system in the world – defines the re-
quirement for the investigation of the fitness of all forensic methods: potential success in the
struggle for admissibility in court.
Up until today, the consideration of forensic compliance, e.g. to the so called Daubert criteria (see
section 2.2), has been grossly neglected in the field of media forensics. The main reason for this fact
has to be sought in the current practice of implementing myriads of highly specialised approaches for
very narrow application scenarios. This leads to a wide landscape of forensic tools and approaches, most
of them promoted by only one person or one research group. Naturally, very few of these approaches
will ever see the necessary field penetration and acceptance that would be necessary for passing the
hurdle set by the Daubert case arguments (or Daubert criteria).
Some application scenarios (like e.g. image steganalysis) are beginning to see approaches that achieve
at least some degree of generalisability, but approaches that span different application scenarios are
still amiss in the field of media forensics. Regarding the focus of this thesis, the author considers it
necessary to strive for application scenario spanning, generalised forensic approaches. Those could, on
the one hand, be easily adapted to fit the needs of specific application scenario. On the other hand,
they might more easily reach the widespread acceptance required to be admissible in court. Within this
thesis, one such adaptable, general-purpose approach is introduced. Even though the work described
here cannot alone achieve the introduction and implementation of a truly universal, Daubert-compliant
audio forensic approach, it is intended to lay the foundation for a process aiming at this distant goal.
Therefore, it is intended to facilitate the understanding between the IT and the society perspectives of
forensics summarised above. The intended benefit of this is that it allows these two to better under-
stand each other: On one hand, it shows IT-security researchers working on the development of forensic
methods a precise picture of the compliance requirements installed by the society; on the other hand,
it is intended to help non-technicians to understand the challenges that researchers in IT-security face.
Structure of the following sections, composing the rest of chapter 1
The following section 1.1 presents a more detailed view on the topics discussed in this thesis as well as
on the associated terminology. With audio steganalysis and microphone forensics it introduces the two
specific media forensics application scenarios considered here in order to be solved by the application
of statistical pattern recognition (SPR) techniques. Based on this, the addressed research challenges
are identified in section 1.2. In section 1.3 the corresponding objectives are derived from the research
challenges. Section 1.4 gives a brief summary of major outcomes of the thesis, followed in section 1.5
by the description of the outline of this thesis.
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1.1 Brief reflections on the state-of-the-art for audio forensics
approaches relevant for this thesis
This section is dedicated to a brief description of the scope of this thesis and the corresponding state-
of-the-art in current scientific work, to facilitate the understanding of the research gap addressed as
well as the objectives and contributions described in the following sections. More detailed analyses of
the state-of-the-art relevant for this thesis are presented in chapter 2.
According to a well-established definition (cf. [Goodman07]) given in [Palmer01], forensics is:
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection,
validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of dig-
ital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions
shown to be disruptive to planned operations.”
This thesis focuses on a special part of the huge field of forensics, the area of IT-forensics or, more pre-
cisely, on selected topics of the sub-discipline of media forensics for audio signals. The investigation
goals considered in this thesis are special problems of either integrity verification by manipulation
detection or device/source authentication.
In this thesis only two application scenarios from the vast field of media forensics - audio steganalysis
and microphone forensics - are considered for integrity (both application scenarios) and authenticity
(microphone forensics) investigations.
Audio steganalysis, which has the goal of detecting audio file manipulations by steganography (i.e.
steganographic message embedding), can be considered in this field to be a rather well researched and
published domain, having gathered a large number of scientific publications since the early 1990s. In
general, the field distinguishes between universal, blind steganalysis (which assumes that it is pos-
sible to construct one detector that is able to successfully perform steganalysis for all steganography
approaches possible in one application domain) and application specific steganalysis (a.k.a. targeted
steganalysis; specialised detection approaches that focus on one specific steganographic technique or
tool). Since the boundaries between steganography and digital watermarking are blurred (see Cox
et al. [Cox08]), steganalysis can also be used to perform statistical analyses on the detectability or
security of digital watermarking schemes.
In comparison to audio steganalysis, microphone forensics, aiming primarily at the authentication of the
recording source (i.e. microphone) for digital audio signals, is a rather young and immature research
field. It is one goal of this thesis to strongly improve the degree of maturity of this field.
Regarding the basic methodology applied in the state-of-the-art work in these fields to implement au-
dio forensics performing security mechanisms, it can be stated that most of them are based on pattern
recognition (PR). Pattern recognition focuses on enabling machines to distinguish between classes of
objects while ignoring any background (or noise) influences. If the different sub-types of PR approaches
(template matching, statistical pattern recognition, neuronal networks, etc.; cf. [Duda01]) are consid-
ered, for steganalysis the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is currently by far the dominating PR
sub-type. The audio steganalysis approach introduced in this thesis also follows this methodology. In
contrast, in the start-of-the-art in microphone forensics, all currently existing approaches perform tem-
plate matching (which, in comparison to SPR, uses a simpler method to represent the decision basis
for classification – instead of complex statistical modelling, it uses templates, usually a set of candidate
elements, to represent the classes to be distinguished). The result of this choice is that all state-of-
the-art approaches in this field show severe content limitations in their applicability. Therefore, a new
SPR-based microphone forensics approach is established within this thesis to overcome these limitations.
The detailed analysis of the state-of-the-art in both application scenarios (see sections 2.5 and 2.6)
shows that most of the research work done in this field concentrates on selected aspects of the pattern
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recognition pipeline rather than acknowledging the whole process. Summarising this research work, it
has to be stated that currently no generalised approaches exist for implementing a wide range of audio
forensic applications scenarios. Instead, selected tasks are addressed by specific solutions, which hardly
seems to be efficient.
To advance the current state-of-the-art in research, this thesis introduces a general-purpose approach
for audio forensics that could easily be adapted to fit the needs of specific application scenarios. It is
signal processing based (instead of being based on information theory), using with SPR an established
technique for solving decision problems. The intended goal is to offer an alternative to using a myriad
of highly specialised tools that are hardly capable of keeping up with the evolution speed of today’s in-
formation society. Furthermore, such a general-purpose approach might more easily gain the necessary
field penetration and acceptance required to pass the hurdle set by the Daubert criteria.
Figure 1.1 shows the introduced general-purpose approach as an abstract descriptor of a forensic audio
authenticity or integrity verification mechanism.
Figure 1.1: Abstract descriptor of a forensic audio authenticity or integrity verification mechanism
The core part of this general-purpose approach – the forensic analysis method – is implemented in
this thesis by a statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline. It consists of signal processing
and pattern recognition components which operate in two different operational modes: training (or
model generation) and application (or testing). If the SPR pipeline is split into functional entities,
the following main components emerge: pre-processing (increasing the distance between the pattern
and the background), feature extraction (information reduction by projection of the signal onto a
pre-defined feature space) and training or classification (the generation of classifier models or the
application of these models to assign a class to the pattern within the signal). In contrast to other
work (e.g. [Vielhauer05]), the signal acquisition is not considered here to be an integral part of the
actual pattern recognition pipeline. Instead, it is one component in a more complex signal preparation
block (implementing the blue box labelled ‘input’ in figure 1.1) that feeds into the pattern recognition
process. This is necessary due to the performed plausibility considerations (see below), which consider
influences to the signal generation process as well as the persistence of the patterns under selected
post-processing operations. The evaluation (performed on the output of SPR-driven forensic analyses)
encompasses in this thesis considerations on:
• The detection performance of the implemented SPR processes,
• The plausibility (incl. the sensitivity of the implemented processes against malicious or non-
malicious attacks)
• The forensic conformity (within this thesis considered to be equivalent to the Daubert standard,
the requirements for forensic compliance in U.S. federal level judicial matters)
Classification accuracy is the most commonly used metric in data mining and pattern recognition to
characterise the detection performance in PR problems. It describes the performance of recognition
systems such as classifiers by computing in supervised applications the ratio between true decisions and
the number of overall decisions in closed-set evaluations.
Regarding the issue of plausibility testing, the results generated by the application of machine learn-
ing strategies lack the intuitive verification that usually accompanies human decision-making processes.
Therefore, additional effort has to be invested after the application of strategies like SPR to establish
whether the results of the automated process are reasonable. In practice, this means to establish that
the patterns trained and detected are really the patterns that the user wants to distinguish between and
6
1.2. The research challenges addressed in this thesis
that side-effects as well as external influence factors are known for the pattern recognition process5.
Therefore, the plausibility of the application of PR mechanisms in a forensic application scenario is
directly linked to the trust we place into the decisions (and training basis) of corresponding PR-based
security mechanisms.
Furthermore, if such a forensic security mechanism sees field application, it will have to deal with
countermeasures – so called attacks or anti-forensics. Therefore, the author considers it important to
include selected countermeasures or attacks into the plausibility considerations within this thesis.
Apart from these considerations on efficiency (i.e. detection performance and plausibility), all forensic
methods should aim at fulfilling some form of forensic conformity. The requirements considered within
this thesis for forensic methods are imposed by the Daubert standard, a set of rules defined in the
1990s by the United States of America Supreme Court based on [USC93]/[USCA95]. This standard is
regarding the trust in, or the admissibility of, expert witnesses’ testimony as evidence in legal proceedings
(for detailed explanations see e.g. the explanations on the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702
in [LLI11]). Although the Daubert standard is only mandatory for United States of Americas federal
legal proceedings, it is widely regarded as a good (if not the best established) set of recommendations
for judges on how to evaluate the usefulness of scientific (as well as non-scientific) expert testimony
(see e.g. [HC-STC05]). A more detailed analysis of the Daubert standard and its relevance for this
thesis is given in section 2.2.
1.2 The research challenges addressed in this thesis
The research challenges addressed in this thesis can be summarised in the following three questions:
(a) Is there a generalised statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach (i.e. an adaptable solution
concept) for media forensics that can be used for addressing multiple audio forensics investigation
goals?
(b) How can the usefulness of application scenario specific instantiations of a generalised audio forensics
approach be measured?
(c) Can instantiations of the generalised audio forensics approach be used to adequately implement
the application scenarios of audio steganalysis and microphone forensics?
Although there exists a huge variety of implementations of classification algorithms (as the core part
of any SPR implementation), no universal approach can currently be found in the state-of-the-art for
forensic analyses of audio signals. All existing approaches are closely modelled on very specific inves-
tigation goals. This means that in this field no investigations have yet been performed, whether it
is possible to achieve with generalised approaches a detection performance equivalent to application
scenario specific approaches.
This gap in the current state-of-the-art is addressed in this thesis, because the introduction of gen-
eralised approaches – universal tools that can be easily adapted to solve specific problems (like audio
steganalysis or microphone forensics) – would be an important step towards efficiency (in terms of
forensic compliance) in audio media forensics.
For building a generalised statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based mechanism for audio forensics, the
5A classifier tends to learn the simplest pattern described by the features extracted from the set of signals under
observation. A rather renowned story in the data mining community to illustrate this fact tells of scientists in a military
project trying to train a neural network to classify images as containing either tanks or trees. The story is summarised
in [Bersano-Begey97] as follows: scientists present pictures of trees and pictures of tanks to the neural network to train
it. After sophisticated pre-processing of the images, these are fed in a neural network and, after considerable training, the
network is able to classify each image correctly. However, when it is tested on other images, the network seems to classify
every image as trees, even when it contains a tank. After careful study the scientists finally resolve the mystery: in all
the images used in the training, those containing trees were always taken in broad daylight, while those containing tanks
were always taken in a darker setting! Thus, the network had learned to distinguish the (trivial matter of) differences in
overall light intensity rather than recognising the presence of tanks.
Sometimes, this possibly apocryphal story is told claiming to aim at the distinction between American and Russian tanks.
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following main open research issues are addressed in this thesis: definition of a useful general-purpose
(i.e. not specifically designed for one application but suitable to cover a number of different usage
scenarios) audio feature set, investigation of methods for classifier selection, evaluation set designs for
plausibility testing and forensic conformity considerations.
1.3 The research objectives for this thesis
For the considerations in thesis, it is necessary to extend the detail of the considerations on the abstract
descriptor of an audio authenticity or integrity verification mechanism, as it is described above in fig-
ure 1.1. Its three main methodical and conceptual components (or ‘building blocks’) for the required
investigations reflect the research challenges specified in the previous section, as shown in figure 1.2.
Ordered according to the corresponding research challenge, these ‘building blocks’ are: The forensic
analysis method, represented by the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline (research chal-
lenge (a)). The output, or more precisely, the corresponding evaluation methodology and concepts
for generating interpretable output, is the concern of research challenge (b). The input, i.e. the signal
preparation, is in this thesis a synonym for the considered application scenario for forensic audio signal
authenticity and integrity verification. Together with the corresponding evaluation considerations, it
addresses research challenge (c).
Figure 1.2: The ‘building blocks’ or major methodical and conceptual components for the investigations performed
in this thesis
The goals of this thesis are to perform investigations that allow answering the three research challenges
specified in the previous section. These challenges are, in reflectance of the ‘building blocks’ shown
in figure 1.2, translated into the following, more specific research objectives: Analyses on whether a
generalised statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach for forensic audio signal analysis is possi-
ble (research objective 1), which performance indicators are useful (research objective 2) and how the
generalised SPR approach can be used to implement selected specific application scenarios (here, au-
dio steganalysis and microphone forensics; resulting in research objectives 3 and 4). These research
objectives can be more closely specified as:
• Research objective 1: In order to introduce a generalised approach, the objective is to analyse
the state-of-the-art in both selected application scenarios (audio steganalysis and microphone
forensics) and to discuss the existing alternative solution principles. The important questions
are: Which existing methods and concepts can be used for the intended approach? Which
methodological and conceptual deviations have to be made in this thesis from the paradigms
currently used in the state-of-the-art?
It is assumed here that the necessary deviations from the established paradigms are less severe in
the case of audio steganalysis (where SPR is already applied as the predominant principle) than
for the much younger research field of microphone forensics (which is currently mostly addressed
by template matching approaches). This assumption has to be verified.
The research effort to answer the questions imposed by this research objective has to include
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considerations on a new high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature
set as well as considerations on concepts for feature and classifier selection. Considerations on
conceptual components of the SPR process which only aim at the performance enhancement in
already established processes (e.g. the detection performance enhancing effect of pre-processing or
the design of application-specific classification algorithms) are considered to be outside the direct
scope of this thesis and are therefore reserved for future research. Also, a complete (mathematical)
formalisation of the process is reserved for further work.
The investigations on this objective contribute to the answer for research challenge (a) ‘Existence
of a generalised SPR approach for audio forensics’.
• Research objective 2: The alternatives presented as main performance indicators in the state-of-
the-art (ranging from classification accuracy to correlation-based schemes for template matching
approaches) for both application scenarios are analysed here. The main question is: Whether
the main performance indicator currently used for describing the detection performance in both
application scenarios (the classification accuracy) is suitable for comparable performance mea-
surements? In case the answer to this question is negative, alternatives that allow for a direct
comparison between different classification-based solutions have to be discussed.
A further question regarding the performance of SPR-driven audio forensics mechanisms is:
Whether further performance indicators apart from the detection performance are required for
the evaluation of such schemes?
The investigations on this objective contribute to the answer for research challenge (b) ‘Applicable
performance measures’.
• Research objective 3: The following two audio forensic application scenarios are considered
within this thesis:
– The well established application scenario of audio steganalysis – in order to validate the prac-
tical performance of the resulting application scenario specific instantiation of the introduced
general-purpose approach
– The sparsely researched application scenario of microphone forensics – in order to validate
the practical performance of the resulting application scenario specific instantiation and to
see whether this solution can overcome the restrictions of the current template matching
based state-of-the-art in this field
When applying the general-purpose audio forensics SPR approach introduced in this thesis to
these application scenarios, the following question has to be answered: How do suitable investi-
gation setups have to be designed?
The practically achieved results of the application scenario specific adaptations have to be com-
pared against the performance of the corresponding state-of-the-art approaches.
For audio steganalysis, the investigations include (see section 4.3) the following application sce-
nario specific intrinsic influences: Number of feature vectors in training, balancing of error rates
in a two-class setup, suitable classifiers (from a preexisting portfolio provided by WEKA, suitable
features, content selection as well as content dependent and independent training and testing, and
two-class vs. multi-class setups. Investigations on influences outside the SPR process for audio
steganalysis are: Embedding domain and algorithm identification, influence of the key scenario
in steganography and selected common audio post-processing operations (MP3 conversion and
de-noising).
For microphone forensics, the investigations include (see section 4.3) the following application
scenario specific intrinsic influences: Number of feature vectors in training, suitable classifiers
(from a preexisting portfolio provided by WEKA), suitable audio features and the influences of
using content selection as well as content dependent and independent training and testing influ-
ences the detection performance in microphone forensics. Investigations on influences outside the
SPR process for microphone forensics are: The recording environment, microphone orientation,
mounting of the microphone, selected common audio post-processing operations (normalisation,
MP3 conversion and de-noising), as well as playback recording and composition attacks.
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All investigation results on this objective contribute to the answer for research challenge (c)
‘Adequate implementation of mechanisms for the chosen application scenarios’.
• Research objective 4: The goal behind the comparison of the two application scenario specific
instantiations is to show the prospects and current limitations of the introduced general-purpose
audio SPR forensics approach. The question behind this objective is: How large are steps required
to adapt the general-purpose approach to a specific application scenario, like the two exemplary
chosen for this thesis? The investigation results produced here are a further contribution to
the answer for research challenge (c) ‘Adequate implementation of mechanisms for the chosen
application scenarios’.
1.4 Summary of the main contributions of the thesis
The main thesis contributions to the addressed research challenges are summarised in figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Overview of the main contributions of this thesis
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As a first, necessary contribution a common methodology and solution concepts for SPR-based au-
dio forensics are described. The methodological work on this step includes a thorough analysis of the
state-of-the-art in the two selected application scenarios of audio steganalysis and microphone forensics.
Based on this analysis, a general-purpose SPR-based methodology is introduced.
From the general-purpose methodology, solution concepts are derived. The concepts fit the three major
‘building blocks’ of signal preparation, the SPR pipeline and the evaluation. The main parts of the
research work on these major ‘building blocks’ are focused on the second and third component, the
SPR pipeline and the evaluation.
Regarding the introduction of a general purpose audio statistical pattern recognition (SPR)
forensics approach for multiple audio forensics application scenarios, this thesis focuses on two main
concepts: a universal, high-dimensional audio feature set (here with 590 segmental features computed
for frames of the audio signal) and a classifier selection approach for the variety of existing classification
methods.
The high-dimensional feature set proposed and applied here contains time-, frequency- and cepstral-
domain features capable of handling the patterns used in different audio forensics analyses (as shown for
audio steganalysis and microphone forensics within this thesis). Nevertheless, the thesis investigations
show feature selection concepts are required for the adaption to the application scenario.
The existence of large numbers of different classifiers (like in the WEKA data mining environ-
ment [Hall09] used extensively within this thesis) as well as the thesis results which show that the
choice of a wrong classifier leads to low detection performances, result in the proposal of concepts for
application scenario specific classifier selection.
For the evaluation, the classification accuracy, as the major performance indicator used in the
state-of-the-art in this research field, is replaced by other, more suitable performance indicators. The
reason for this step is that the accuracy does not allow for a direct comparison between different clas-
sification problems or solutions. Within this thesis it is substituted by simplified Kappa statistics6.
This metric, which is used in the WEKA [Hall09] implementation, is derived from Cohen’s Kappa
(cf. [Cohen60], [Carletta96]). So far, the usage of this detection performance indicator is uncommon in
the research field of media forensics. Its introduction to the considered research field is deemed neces-
sary in this thesis because it facilitates direct comparison between different classifiers and classification
problems.
In addition to the metric for detection performance, plausibility indicators are proposed here. These
indicators include statements on: statistical significance, fitting (consideration of different influences in
the signal generation process) as well as deceivability (persistence of the patterns under selected attacks
like audio signal post-processing operations or anti-forensics).
Furthermore, considerations on the forensic conformity of audio forensic methods under are presented.
In this thesis, the requirements for forensic conformity or compliance are considered to be imposed to
forensic methods by the assumedly most active legal system currently existing – the U.S. legal system.
This assumption on the necessity of compliance is a rather novel approach for the two considered ap-
plication scenarios (from the current state-of-the-art in research on this field, only the electric network
frequency (ENF) approach [Grigoras03] for microphone forensics developed by Catalin Grigoras makes
in [Grigoras09] some steps in this direction) as well as the whole field of academic research on media
forensics. The thesis contributions in this field include the proposal of a scheme for the discussion of
the forensic compliance of audio forensic methods. Unfortunately, this scheme cannot be turned into
a metric for performance measurement or estimation, since the foundation of these considerations (the
Daubert standard) is currently not codified, i.e. it is a set of verbally described requirements which
leave room for the judicial interpretation required in any specific court case.
6In short, the used Kappa statistic κ measures the agreement of prediction with the true class (i.e. the agreement
normalised for chance agreement) in the range [−1, 1]. A value of κ = 1 indicates perfect agreement and κ = 0 indicates
chance agreement for the overall classification. Negative values for κ imply the choice of a classifier model trained for a
different classification problem. For a complete description of the used Kappa statistics see section 4.1.4
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Since both application scenarios considered are strongly different, the considerations are accompanied
by an identification of the need for application scenario specific deviations from the introduced general-
purpose methodology and concepts.
For the instantiation of the general purpose audio SPR approach for audio steganalysis, the
thesis shows:
• The instantiation of the generalised SPR process for steganalysis follows within this thesis the
general trend in this research field. The practical results for steganalytical detection (based on
the introduced detection performance indicator) strongly vary between the different data hiding
algorithms used in the steganalysis evaluations. Results for the Kappa statistics between κ = 0
and κ = 1 show that there are algorithms in the set under evaluation which result in a very high
detection performance for the used audio features, while other algorithms are not (or only barely)
detectable with the same setup. This means that the capability of detecting the usage of data
hiding algorithms by application of pattern recognition techniques is strongly dependant on the
strength of the pattern imposed by the embedding function of the algorithm under investigation.
• The plausibility results show, that the SPR-based audio steganalysis seems to be negatively influ-
enced by other audio signal processing operations. Therefore, if its application as a specialised in-
tegrity verification mechanism is considered, the implementation of the mechanism should undergo
extensive plausibility evaluations against other audio signal modifications (encoding, re-sampling,
etc.) that are likely in the considered application field. Furthermore, if specific counter-forensics
methods have to be expected, these should also be integrated into the evaluation process.
• The research results for detection performance and plausibility imply in their combination that,
for application specific steganalysis, a reliable detector for selected algorithms might be imple-
mentable (if the embedding process generates a statistically significant footprint as a pattern in
the computed audio features), but that this result cannot be achieved in general. There will
always be some information hiding (IH) algorithms where no reliable detection is possible under
any constraints or where counter-forensics can be successfully applied to obliterate the embedding
pattern.
• The implications of the Daubert-compliance driven evaluation lead to the realisation that the
current practice in steganalysis is merely aiming at detection of steganographic traffic. It is
therefore only the first stage of a two-phase process that would be required under Daubert
considerations to aim for admissibility in court. The second phase would be the verified detection
necessary to bind the steganalysis result to a law case (by clarifying who sent which message
to whom), which is in this thesis described as the ‘ideal steganalysis process’. Addressing this
second phase is outside the scope of this thesis, because it would require a reliable detection,
which cannot be guaranteed with the rates of detection errors presented here.
In respect to the instantiation of the general purpose audio SPR approach for microphone
forensics, the investigations show:
• In microphone forensics, the need for the newly introduced approach is explained by the strong
context dependency of the current, mainly template matching driven approaches in this rather
young and so far sparsely researched application scenario. Here, the instantiation of the gener-
alised SPR approach for microphone forensics proposed within this thesis is considered a method
to overcome this context dependency. The potential implication of this contribution for a foren-
sic investigation is a larger number of recorded audio signals that might successfully undergo
source authentication and integrity verification, i.e. it will also work even if no ENF traces, clear
reverberation-patterns or other requirements of the alternative approaches in this field are met.
• The results achieved show a very good authentication performance in small scale evaluations
(results with values for the introduced detection performance indicator Kappa statistics close to
κ = 1 for ideal setups with different microphones and ideal content; significant (using a Kappa to
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statistical confidence mapping based on the work of Landis and Koch [Landis77]) results with κ
up to 0.767 for plausible setups with sets of identical microphones and a wide range of recorded
content).
• The considerations on the plausibility indicators for the investigations performed show a high
degree of resilience of the introduced approach regarding common audio signal post-processing
operations (like MP3 conversion or normalisation). Traces of the recording patterns imposed by
the original microphone are shown to survive to some extend a playback recording procedure.
• For the integrity verification results, the introduced approach also shows its potential for the
detection of compositions of audio material recorded with different microphones. Based on the
seminal results on this matter presented here, future work will have to establish how reliable means
for audio signal integrity verification can be achieved using the SPR-based approach proposed in
this thesis in combination with the state-of-the-art in this field (especially the ENF-based work
from [Rodr´ıguez10]).
• The implications of the Daubert-compliance driven evaluation show the current work is still a long
way from being fit for court. It has to be admitted that the size of the experiments performed
might still lack generalisability, but the detection performances achieved in evaluations on sets of
identical microphones are very promising.
The thesis contributions regarding the comparison of the two application scenario specific instanti-
ations show that these two application scenarios, despite being completely different in their application
goals, share strong similarities when it comes to the possible solution approaches. Both can be projected
onto a detection or pattern recognition problem and can therefore be solved in similar ways.
The investigations performed in both application scenarios follow a sound evaluation methodology.
Regardless of the theoretical merits of the introduced evaluation methodology, the performed investi-
gations have to face severe limitations in practice. For audio steganalysis, where the number of freely
available embedding algorithms is rather small, the evaluations within this thesis are improved in their
significance by including digital audio watermarking algorithms in the evaluation set, boosting the num-
ber of algorithms under evaluation from 5 to 9. For microphone forensics, the evaluations are limited
in terms of set sizes and compositions by the quantity and quality of the lab equipment available. For
both application scenarios, the results achieved within this thesis allow for some generalisation, but
future research will have to find suitable approaches to establish a wider test base using the evaluation
methodology proposed here. That such an extension of the test base is already possible in selected
forensic application scenarios is demonstrated in [Goljan09]. The benefit of this extension would be the
possibility to present answers for Daubert hearings that carry the required statistical significance, as
shown impressively for Jessica Fridrichs PRNU-based digital camera forensics approach in the law case
United States of America v. Nathan Allen Railey 7, where this image forensics approach successfully
passed the Daubert hearing.
It has to be mentioned here that the applicability of the proposed general purpose audio statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) approach is not limited to the two chosen application scenarios. In fact, it
could be transferred to further forensic research topics which share the same essential characteristics,
like e.g. voice recognition, speech recognition, speaker recognition, audio coder verification, gunshot
characterisation, audio signal quality verification, etc. Future work will have to investigate the effort
required for the adaptation to these additional application scenarios.
Apart from these contributions to the specific research objectives formulated, general and specific open
questions and challenges are summarised in chapter 8, outlining future work in this field. For the specific
open questions regarding classifier benchmarking and information fusion8, first solution ideas that have
been developed in the context of this thesis are already presented in section 8.2.
7United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, August 2nd, 2011 – For a short summary of the
relevant part of the proceedings see: http://blog.al.com/live/2011/07/expert witnesses link camera t.html
8Within the context of this thesis, information fusion is considered to address the question of how to combine different
decision or expert systems. For more details on fusion see section 8.2.2
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1.5 Thesis outline
The complete thesis consists of 8 chapters and 3 appendices. It is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the required fundamentals in and for audio steganography, audio steganalysis and
microphone forensics. If the ‘building blocks’ metaphor and the application scenario specific forensic
investigation introduced in section 1.3 are re-used here, then the basics for all these building-blocks and
application scenarios are addressed within this chapter. To facilitate understanding, chapter 2 begins in
sections 2.1 and 2.2 with descriptions on the application goals of forensics and the evaluation of forensic
methods regarding their fitness in (U.S.) legal proceedings (i.e. the compliance to the Daubert standard).
Section 2.3 presents the audio signal and signal processing basics that are required for the understanding
of the application scenarios, while section 2.4 gives brief summaries on pattern recognition in general
and statistical pattern recognition as its sub-category to be applied within this thesis. Sections 2.5
and 2.6 give comprehensive summaries of the state-of-the-art in both considered application scenarios
(audio steganalysis and microphone forensics).
Figure 1.4: Outline of the thesis
Figure 1.4 displays the outline of the chapters 3 to 7. As shown in this figure, chapters 3 and 4 contain
the introduction of the general-purpose audio statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach and the
designs for its implementation within this thesis. Its application to two selected application scenarios
and their comparison are addressed in chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Chapter 3 develops the methodology and concepts for the investigations performed within this the-
sis. In sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the methodology considerations for both selected application scenarios
are introduced and compared with the corresponding principles presented in the state-of-the-art (sec-
tions 2.5 and 2.6 respectively). On this basis, section 3.1.3 performs a comparison between those two
application scenario specific solutions and derives the methodology for the general-purpose approach
introduced here to address research challenge (a) ‘Existence of a generalised (SPR) approach for audio
forensics’ as well as research objective 1.
Section 3.2 projects the methodology considerations into investigation concepts. Here, first a set of
common concepts is formulated in section 3.2.1, followed by descriptions on application scenario specific
concept extensions in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
Section 3.3 introduces the concept applied in this thesis to use the Daubert standard as general means
of results discussion for forensic methods. This is done for two reasons: one hand it leads to the
definition of investigation tasks for the practical investigations on both application scenarios,
on the other hand it contributes to research challenge (b) ‘Applicable performance measures’ and the
corresponding research objective 2, by specifying requirements for such performance measures.
The section 3.4 performs a restriction of the considerations within this thesis to narrow down the focus
of the practical investigations.
In chapter 4 the experiments performed within this thesis are outlined. This chapter is divided into
common design decisions for both application scenarios (section 4.1) and application scenario specific
adaptations to the common designs (sections 4.2 and 4.3). Within the descriptions of the common
design criteria, the two core components of the prototype used for the practical investigations, the
feature extractor and the classification mechanisms are discussed.
The chapters 5 and 6 contain summaries of the results achieved while applying the introduced audio
forensics approach to audio steganalysis (chapter 5) and microphone forensics (chapter 6). Those re-
search results address research objective 3, as defined in section 1.3.
Chapter 7 performs a comparison of the performances achieved for both application scenarios and
compares these with the performance achieved by state-of-the-art approaches. This is done to show
that two exemplary chosen instantiations of the introduced general-purpose approach are performing
adequately. Thereby, research challenge (c) ‘Adequateness of the introduced approach’ as well as re-
search objective 4 are addressed.
The chapter 8 performs a brief summary of the work presented and draws the necessary conclusions
in regard to the defined research challenges and objectives. Furthermore, it contains descriptions of
ongoing and future research that is outside the focus of this thesis but builds on the foundations laid here.
The appendices contain details about the audio features used in within this thesis (appendix A, starting
on page 189), the experimental setups for the audio steganalysis application scenario (appendix B,
starting on page 197) and the experimental setups for the microphone forensics application scenario
(appendix C, starting on page 201).
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Thesis Fundamentals and Summary of Related Work
In this chapter the fundamentals required for the development of the methodology, concepts and designs
in chapters 3 and 4 are discussed.
The chapter begins in section 2.1 with an introduction on forensics and media forensics. This is followed
in section 2.2 by an analysis of the most prominent requirement for forensic methods – the admissibility
in court – which is in this thesis considered to be synonymous with the compliance to the Daubert
standard as established within the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702. These judicial
considerations are used in the following chapters as one component of the set of performance criteria
developed for the investigations.
Section 2.3 summarises required basics on audio signals, while section 2.4 recapitulates the required
basics on the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) process pipeline.
The analyses on the current state-of-the-art in the two chosen application scenarios audio steganalysis
and microphone forensics are performed in sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively.
2.1 Forensics in the context of this thesis
This section provides an extension to the rather brief introduction of forensics in general and media
forensics as presented in section 1.1 above.
In [Palmer01] IT-forensics or digital forensic science is defined as being:
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection,
validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of dig-
ital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions
shown to be disruptive to planned operations.”
In the scope of this thesis this definition is extended to encompass also analogue sources. Usually, the
focus in forensic investigations is set to legal proceedings (or “relating to courts of law” – the Oxford
Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2012). Nevertheless, recent works, like [Rekhis07] or [Kiltz09],
also focus on the usage of forensics in the general investigation of security related incidents. Kiltz
et al. [Kiltz09] extend the scope of forensics in their considerations by including besides maliciously
caused incidents also hardware failure or software errors. The original considerations in the forensic
model by Kiltz et al. only include computer and network forensics, but they can also be applied for
media forensics, as done within this thesis. Their forensic model (as described in [Kiltz09]) consists
of three main aspects: a phase driven description of the forensic process, the classification of forensic
methods into classes and a classification scheme for forensically relevant data types. Using their ter-
minology, the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based forensic mechanisms considered within this
thesis would fall into the category of explicit means of (intrusion) detection and would have to be
deployed in the phase of strategic preparation of the forensic process to facilitate online investigations
by an passive security mechanism, as they are considered here, or in the data investigation phase for
post-mortem or a posterior analyses. The considered data types would be raw (audio) data as input
and hardware data (for the application example of microphone forensics) or details about data as output
data of the mechanisms.
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The investigation goals in media forensics are usually either device/source authentication or in-
tegrity verification by manipulation detection.
Before digital audio signals mostly superseded analogue audio signals as the normal output of record-
ing pipelines in the late 1990s, forensic audiotape analysis (see e.g. [Bolt74]) was used to establish
whether a recording on a tape is an original or a copy and to find out whether a recording was made
on a given recorder (i.e. to authenticate the recording source). When electronic equipment is used
to record an audio signal on tape, it captures not only the intended signal but also the idiosyncrasies
and characteristics of the recorder itself [Grigoras03]. Tape recorders left start, stop and pause signa-
tures coming from record and erase heads. Koenig [Koenig90], Pellicano [Pellicano90], Dean [Dean91],
Molero [Molero01] and others have shown that by combining waveform, spectral analysis and magnetic
patterns analysis, the forensic audio examiner was in most cases able establish the originality of a ana-
logue recording and/or authenticate the recording.
But in the digital world, with digitally recorded audio signals, no recorder idiosyncrasies and character-
istics are left behind, but instead other phenomena become usable for the authentication of recorded
signals. For the forensic research on digital audio (which if the selected media for this thesis) authen-
tication found in literature pursuit different investigations, such as:
• Speech recognition (human speech as well as specific content) as well as forensic speaker recog-
nition [Neustein11]
• MP3 encoder detection (Bo¨hme and Westfeld [Bo¨hme04]): aims for the identification MP3
encoders by artefacts left in the encoded data stream
• Quality estimation for MP3 files (e.g. [Yang09], [D’Alessandro09])
• Double compression of audio signals (e.g. [Yang10]): were a detection of double compressed
speech signals is performed based on compression artefacts
• Gunshot analysis (e.g. [Maher06], [Maher07])
• Microphone forensics (or rather recording setup authentication)
Within this thesis, from this list only the application scenario of microphone forensics is considered for
the performed concept, design and empirical investigation work on source authentication. The trust
placed in sensor data is a necessary condition for most sensor-based systems. This trust is in many
cases based on a trust assumption on the source. With microphone forensics (as a specialised form of
sensor forensics) a passive security mechanism is considered here that evaluates a posterior the source
authenticity of an analogue source for audio data.
Regarding the potential for audio integrity verification by manipulation detection, examples for dif-
ferent audio forensics investigations that can be identified today are:
• Deletion detection for segments in MP3 files ([Yang08], [Yang12]): In their papers the authors
introduce a format conversion dependent method for locating forgeries (insertions and deletions)
in MP3 files by time-domain based analyses of encoder frame offsets.
• Steganalysis (also known as stegoanalysis) is the counter-science to steganography, like crypt-
analysis is to cryptography. Steganography, as the art or science of hidden communication, is a
historical concept transferred from an ancient Greek origin (the transcription from ancient Greek:
steganos graphein does in English mean: covered writing; see [Wo¨lfel11] or [Fridrich09]) into
today’s digital world. While it was originally ([Wilkins41]) considered as a preferable alternative
to communication encryption, modern business and warfare rely on cryptographic means instead
of steganography to ensure confidentiality. Communication hidden by steganographic means is
nowadays considered relevant mostly in application scenarios that originate from espionage or
terrorism. Considering this, together with the large number of existing steganography tools for
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various digital data formats (see [Fridrich09]), a strong need can be identified to implement
steganalysis tools as security mechanisms that detect the usage of steganography in observed
environments.
• Audio composition detection: Using the authentication approach of microphone forensics to
determine whether an audio signal shows the characteristics of only one or multiple sources – in
the latter case a composition attack has to be assumed [Kraetzer11].
Within this thesis, only the last two application scenarios (audio steganalysis and microphone forensics
as a method for audio composition detection) are considered for the concept, design and empirical
investigation work on audio integrity investigations.
It has to mentioned that the consideration of steganalysis as an integrity verification or manipulation
detection problem is rather non-intuitive since the counter-science to a confidentiality addressing security
mechanism is considered, but here the focus is narrowed down to the problem of detecting steganography
(or data hiding in general) that has been performed by cover modification instead of cover synthesis
or cover selection. Therefore, the problem to be solved can be reformulated as: Does an audio data
object originate from a ‘natural’ source or was it maliciously modified by steganographic means?
2.2 The Daubert standard and its relevance for this thesis
This section introduces one of the major evaluation criteria for forensic methods: the Daubert stan-
dard – or, to be more precise: the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702 and
the (so called) Daubert criteria. The U.S. law case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) [USC93] / [USCA95] or short ‘Daubert’, has encouraged in U.S.
federal jurisdiction a trend toward greater judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence. This is of importance
for this thesis because Daubert has also to be considered for forensic evidence. The Daubert standard
consists of a set of rules for the admission of expert testimony (i.e. the interpretation of evidence by
experts) defined in 1995 by the United States of America Supreme Court. Compliance to this standard
is considered within this thesis as the target for every forensic approach, including the two exemplary
methods for media forensics considered here.
In sections 2.5 and 2.6 the so called Daubert criteria, introduced in the following subsections, are
used to assess the state-of-the-art in the two chosen application scenarios. In chapter 3 these criteria
are integrated into the evaluation methodology for this thesis and in chapter 7 they are applied in
performance assessment of the developed solutions for the two application scenarios and for comparison
to the performance of the alternative approaches summarised in the state-of-the-art.
2.2.1 Rules governing the interpretation of forensic results in court
The usage of forensic SPR-driven security mechanisms, as proposed within this thesis, implies the in-
tention to use the output of these methods in legal proceedings (i.e. in court). The author has no
background in law to completely evaluate the whole set of legal challenges to the admissibility of traces
or even evidence that is generated in this way, but some basics on this matter have to be discussed
here, because this admissibility would be the ultimate benchmark for every forensic method.
All legal considerations presented here are based on freely available material concerning the U.S. legal
system at the federal level. The U.S. legal system one of the most active in the world with large numbers
of trials involving all kinds of forensic investigations being held every day. As a result, within this legal
system strict rules for the integration of the results of forensic investigations have been established.
These rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)9, define the framework within which evidence can be
admitted into court. Even if these rules are in their original form only applicable on U.S. federal level,
9These rules constitute a ground-breaking law reform in U.S. federal law, specifying strict general rules instead of only
relying on constitutional rights and precedents. They were approved by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress passed
the FRE in 1975. The FRE became effective for all U.S. federal courts on July 1st, 1975.
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their concepts for handling forensic data have, to the best of the author’s knowledge10, influenced many
other judicial systems worldwide.
In general, forensic results, like the ones considered within this thesis, have to be interpreted by ex-
perts to the court. The reason for this lies in the assumption that any judge (or jury) will lack the
expert knowledge to completely interpret the findings of a forensic investigation on his/her own and
that therefore expert testimony is strictly required in court proceedings11. If the expert’s opinion helps
the fact finder in understanding the significance of factual data, then the expert witness is essential for
the case and its opinion evidence is admissible.
Using the terminology of U.S. jurisdiction, the trial judge acts as a form of ‘gatekeeper’, assuring that
scientific expert testimony truly proceeds from reliable (or scientific) knowledge. Considerations on
relevance and reliability require the trial judge to ensure that the expert’s testimony is ‘relevant to the
task at hand’ and that it rests ‘on a reliable foundation’. According to [SWGFAST11], the primary rules
that are relevant for the presentation of forensic evidence in court (i.e. that apply to expert witnesses)
in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are FRE rule 702 (“Testimony by Experts”) and FRE rule 703
(“Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts”).
In the year 2000 FRE rule 702 (“Testimony by Experts”) stated (see e.g. [LLI10a]; FRE as amended
April 17th, 2000, effective December 1st, 2000): “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” In 2011 FRE rule 702 was slightly amended12.
When analysing this rule, it can be seen that regarding the admissibility of an expert, the judge has to
establish whether the following four points are met:
• Qualification of a witness as expert: First, a witness has to qualify as an expert. For the
description of the involved process for U.S. legal system see e.g. [SWGFAST11] or [Jackson08].
The conclusion of this process is that the presiding judge decides whether the witness may offer
opinion testimony13 as an expert.
• Type of knowledge considered: The first seven words of FRE rule 702 specify different types
of knowledge that an expert can offer. The question is which kind of knowledge is generated by
the media forensics methods considered in this thesis? According to [SWGFAST11] this question
is addressed by the U.S. supreme court in the original precedent Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999) [USC99]. In this case the court states that the same
evaluation criteria used in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) [USC93] to determine whether testimony offered as scientific knowledge is
reliable should also govern the admissibility of testimony for the “technical” and “other specialized
knowledge” [LLI10a] types of knowledge addressed in FRE rule 702. Therefore, distinguishing
between science, applied science, technology, or experience-based expertise is not required.
10Important notice: The author has absolutely no legal training. All legal considerations made within this thesis are
therefore layman’s interpretation of freely available material, which are made to the best of the author’s knowledge. If the
content of this thesis is intended to be used in any legal proceedings, the reader must consult appropriate legal counsel
for the corresponding jurisdiction.
11A good summary of the role science and scientists in the resolution of legal disputes is given in [Jackson08].
12FRE rule 702 as amended by the United States Supreme Court Apr. 26, 2011, (eff. Dec. 1, 2011) now reads: “A
witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” This amendment was made to improve the readability of the rule and has, for this
thesis, no influence on its interpretation.
13The judge can also define/limit the extent to which the expert is permitted to testify.
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• Who is addressed by the expert: Basically, there are two entities the expert has to convince.
First, the judge, to get admitted in pre-trial hearings, and second the ‘fact finder’ (the “trier of
fact” in FRE rule 702 [LLI10a], either a jury in normal cases or a judge in non-jury trials) at the
trial itself. In the context of this thesis only the first entity is relevant.
• Qualification: Any expert has to testify upon the five criteria listed in FRE rule 702 “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education” [LLI10a]. This information helps the judge to decide
whether an expert can be admitted to trial in a specific case and helps the ‘fact finder’ (i.e.
usually the jury) to assign corresponding weights to each expert’s testimony in the decision
process.
If these four points are established, the judge determines for the case whether an expert is qualified to
testify under FRE rule 702. The April 2000 (effective December 2000) amendment of FRE rule 702
includes three further requirements which must also be met. The goal of these additional requirements
is to make it easier to present effective scientific and technical expert testimony whenever such evidence
is warranted and provide a basis for the exclusion of opinion testimony that is not based on reliable or
mature methodology. These additional requirements are ([LLI10a]): “[...] if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” In April 2011
another requirement was added to this list ([U.S. Congress11]) “[...] the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue [...]”.
These four requirements from FRE rule 702 are translated into the following evaluation criteria for
forensic investigations within this thesis ([LLI10a]):
• FREC0: “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”
• FREC1: The investigation (which leads to the corresponding expert testimony) is “based upon
sufficient facts or data”
• FREC2: The investigation is based upon “reliable principles and methods”, preferably scientific
methodology and knowledge14
• FREC3: The methods are applied “reliably to the facts of the case”
In the notes on FRE rule 702 published by the Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School in
December 2010 ([LLI10b]) the current regulations regarding the interpretation of this rule for U.S. fed-
eral courts are summarised as follows: “Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with
the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, [...]”. The main result
of this amendment, the so called Daubert hearings, is discussed in section 2.2.2.
The second important rule regarding expert testimony is FRE rule 703 (“Bases of an Expert’s Opinion
Testimonys”; see e.g. [U.S. Congress11]). Since it is not directly relevant for this thesis, it is discussed
in less detail here. Basically, this rule specifies the two different types of testimony experts are allowed
14For the possible legal differentiation between accepted reliable principles and methods on one hand and scientific
methodology on the other hand see the discussion on the admission or rejection of expert testimony given by dactyloscopic
experts of the FBI in the case United States of America v. Plaza, Acosta, and Rodriguez (United States District Court,
E.D. Pennsylvania, March 13, 2002). In this case the presiding judge in the Daubert hearings initially prohibited the
prosecution to call dactyloscopic experts in front of the jury, arguing that these are, despite being certified practitioners
in the century old practice of latent fingerprint comparison, no scientific experts and have therefore to be excluded under
the Daubert criteria. The judge also identified other ‘flaws’ in the dactyloscopic methods, which seemed to him in to be
in conflict with the Daubert criteria. In further hearings in this case the FBI (and the scientific and legal experts it was
able to present) could establish that dactyloscopy is a reliable method and that certified practitioners (despite being no
scientists) can be admitted as experts in court.
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to offer in court. The first is the testimony about first-hand knowledge. Here, the expert acts as a fact
witness, testifying on observations made in examining evidence – which is the important component of
this rule within this thesis. The second permitted type is the testimony based on reports or examinations
made by others.
The remaining Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) regarding opinions and expert testimony (rule
701 “Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses”, rule 704 “Opinion on an Ultimate Issue”, rule 705 “Dis-
closing the Facts or Data Underlying an Expert’s Opinion” and rule 706 “Court-Appointed Expert
Witnesses”; see [U.S. Congress11]) are of little relevance for this thesis and are listed here only for
the sake of completeness. For a detailed analysis of the relevance15 of these additional rules in the
presentation of forensic evidence via expert testimony see [SWGFAST11].
Regarding other federal rules that might be generally relevant for the presentation of forensic results
by an expert [SWGFAST11] lists the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rules 401 (“Test for Relevant
Evidence”), 402 (“General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence”), 403 (“Excluding Relevant Evidence
for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons”) and Article X16 (“Contents of Writings,
Recordings, and Photographs”) as well as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 16 (“Discovery
and Inspection”).
FRE rule 401 demands that the evidence be relevant to the case at hand. It defines relevant evidence
as “[...] has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;”
and “[...] the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” (see [U.S. Congress11]). FRE rule
403 allows a judge to exclude certain relevant evidence as a matter of judicial discretion. The rule
states (see [U.S. Congress11]): “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
FRE rule 402 completes the matter on admissibility by simply stating that “Irrelevant evidence is
not admissible.” (see [U.S. Congress11]). FRE rules 1001 through 1008 address the contents of
writings, recordings, and photographs. These rules set forth the definitions and requirements regarding
what constitutes originals or duplicates and the admissibility of each, even if the original is lost or
destroyed (see [U.S. Congress11]). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 16 section G (“Expert
Witnesses”) specifies the need to provide accurate information on the witness’ qualifications and a
written summary of the testimony that is intended to be used under FRE rules 702, 703 or 705
(see [U.S. Congress10]).
2.2.2 Daubert challenges to forensic methods
Regarding the second and third point of the list given above in section 2.2.1 in the analysis of FRE rule
702 (‘Type of knowledge considered’ and ‘Who is addressed by the expert’) it has to be summarised
that if something is declared to be ‘science’ in regard to FRE rule 702 then the criteria for the evalu-
ation of scientific methods introduced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) [USC93] have to be applied by the judge to make the expert prove this declaration. These
criteria and their relevance for this thesis are discussed in this section.
In 1923 the court in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) made a first suggestion how
to proceed with the admission of expert testimony based on novel forensic techniques. The court in
Frye suggested [U.S. Congress23]: “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
15Mostly the mechanisms in FRE rule 701 intended to prevent the introduction of an expert as a lay witness and the
possibility for experts to state upon ‘ultimate issue’ in FRE rule 704(a).
16This article focuses on the documents that are intended to be used in court. It is obvious in the context of this thesis
that any documentation of the forensic processes must comply with the highest imaginable standards for the integrity
and authenticity of the evidence. Such matters as a complete and documented chain of custody, evidence security from
the time it is initially received to the time it leaves the laboratory and a documentation of the analysis steps that allows
for a complete reproduction of the results are crucial for ensuring that evidence will be admitted in court.
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the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.” In Frye (or the Frye standard as it is also referred to) the court
concluded that the polygraph test that was intended to be used in this case could not be admitted
because it lacked the required general acceptance in the corresponding research fields. Prior to this
seminal ruling in Frye, according to [SWGFAST11], the competence of an expert was equivalent to his
success in real life. In [SWGFAST11] it is summarised as: “If a person earned a living selling his or her
knowledge in the marketplace, then that person would be considered an expert who could testify at
trial. Although not very sophisticated, this early principle of ‘marketplace acceptance’ (a concept we
might in the post-Daubert parlance equate to some early form of peer review) served the law in a more
or less acceptable manner for a great number of years.”
The Frye standard was in 1975 partially replaced by the newly introduced Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (FRE). As might be noticed from the discussion of the FRE in section 2.2.1 above, they
contained in the original version no special rule that, when dealing with ‘scientific’ evidence, novel or
otherwise, ensured that science-based testimony is reliable and, therefore, admissible. Therefore all
evidence was considered admissible if relevant, provided its use in court was not outweighed by “unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence”, as stated in FRE rule 402 [U.S. Congress11].
The next relevant step in legal developments on expert testimony (and therefore the means of intro-
ducing forensic sciences into court) occurred in 1993, when the U.S. Supreme Court made another
ground-breaking decision on expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) [USC93]. Daubert was in 1999 followed by another important court case, Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). Both Daubert and Kumho Tire arose out of civil
lawsuits. An extensive and intelligible summary of the proceedings in the Daubert cases (original and
the affirmation in the U.S. Court of Appeals) is presented in [SWGFAST11]. The main point of interest
for this thesis is that the court unanimously held that Frye did not survive the enactment of the FRE.
In interpreting FRE rule 702, the court in Daubert stated that if the admissibility of scientific evidence
is challenged, it is the function of the trial court to act as ‘gatekeeper’ to determine whether prof-
fered opinion evidence is relevant and reliable. The U.S. Supreme Court specified several flexible and
non-exclusive criteria (the so called Daubert criteria or Daubert standard) to guide other courts when
they have to consider in deciding whether a scientific field is sufficiently reliable to warrant admission
of opinion evidence. As a further important milestone, in 1999 in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999) the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Daubert criteria of proof of reliability to
all forms of expert opinion testimony (i.e. scientific, applied science, technological, skill and experi-
ence). Also, the court in Kumho Tire made it clear that the list of Daubert criteria was meant to
be helpful and is not a definitive checklist but rather a flexible, non-exclusive recommendation. As a
result no attempt has been made in US law to ‘codify’ these specific criteria. Other U.S. law cases
have established that not all of the specific Daubert criteria can apply to every type of expert testimony.
The outcome of Daubert and Kumho Tire led in April 2000 to the amendment of FRE rule 702 de-
scribed in section 2.2.1. The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technol-
ogy (SWGFAST) draws in [SWGFAST11] the following conclusions for forensic scientists from Daubert
and Kumho Tire: “It means that the definition of science, the scientific method, and scientific evidence
can no longer be used as loosely as experts have been doing. It is no longer sufficient to call yourself a
forensic scientist in order to be considered a scientist. It is no longer sufficient to say that something
is a subject of forensic science in order for a court to agree that it is dealing with science. Simply
saying it does not make it so. The courts may, and many will, require the experts to show that they
know what the scientific method consists of and provide the scientific basis for their conclusions. By
the same token, each discipline will be judged by its own standards and upon its own experience. [...]
It also means that forensic scientists can no longer expect to rely on the fact that courts have long
accepted and admitted evidence of their expert conclusions. The court can relitigate the admissibility
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of a certain type of expert evidence if a litigant can make a credible argument that there has been no
previous scientific inquiry of the validity of the assumptions on which a forensic field has long rested.
Decades of judicial precedent no longer preclude reviewing whether existing precedent satisfies Daubert
and Kumho Tire. Long-recognized forensic disciplines have been and are being challenged, with more
to come.”
This summarising statement, from a forensic expert group trained (and providing training) for court
appearances as expert witnesses, defines the requirement for the investigation of the fitness of the
exemplary selected statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based forensic methods considered in this the-
sis. The actual evaluation criteria applied for the investigations to be performed here are the criteria
FREC0, FREC1, FREC2 and FREC3 specified in section 2.2.1 above as well as the criteria introduced
by Daubert for the so-called Daubert hearings.
The specific criteria, explicated by the Daubert court and used within this thesis as evaluation criteria
for forensic investigations, are [LLI10b]:
• DC1: “whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested – that is, whether
the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability”
• DC2: “whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication”
• DC3: “the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied”
• DC4: “the existence and maintenance of standards and controls”
• DC5: “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community”
While the criteria DC2 to DC5 are self-explanatory (including the fact that publication in DC2 means
‘open publication’), DC1 is summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method)
must be empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”.
The Daubert criteria are widely accepted in the classical field of the medical forensics (see e.g. [Lally03],
[Fulero09] and [Pinkl09]). It also can be, and is, applied in the much younger field of IT-forensics (see
e.g. [Meyers04], [Nelson10]). It has to be admitted that the field of media forensics, which is the focus
of this thesis, is still lacking maturity in this regard. Here, only very specific methods applied in this
field already fulfil the Daubert criteria sufficiently. Overviews over the more mature techniques in this
field are given in [Bijhold07] and [Daeid10].
Regarding digital camera forensics (as one of the most mature research fields in media forensics) a major
breakthrough can be seen in the law case United States of America v. Nathan Allen Railey (United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama17, August 2nd, 2011). In the Daubert
hearings of this case, the method of digital camera authentication based on intrinsic characteristics of
its image acquisition sensory developed by Jessica Fridrich and her group (see e.g. [Goljan09]) got ac-
cepted for the first time as forensic evidence. The FBIs Forensic Audio, Video, and Image Analysis Unit
(FAVIAU) established in the Daubert hearings that this approach meets all necessary criteria (DC1 to
DC5) and the presiding judge furthermore decided that this evidence (or more precisely the FBI expert
testimony based on this media forensic analysis) also meets the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702
criteria (FREC0 to FREC3). This is an important success for the whole research field of media forensics.
Considering the methods for audio material collected in [Bijhold07] by forensic experts from the Nether-
lands Forensic Institute, the German Bundeskriminalamt and the United States of America Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Digital Evidence Laboratory, the two relevant research fields are, on one
hand, forensic audio analysis and, on the other hand, speaker identification. While the latter is outside
the scope of this thesis, the former, which looks into authentication, speech enhancement, transcription
17For a short summary of the relevant part of the preceedings see:
http://blog.al.com/live/2011/07/expert witnesses link camera t.html
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of linguistic content / disputed utterance examination, and the analysis of non-speech events, lists with
the electric network frequency (ENF) approach ([Grigoras09]) exactly one method for the authentication
of digital audio material. This, in conjunction with the fact that the ENF analysis method can only be
applied under rather specific circumstances, boldly underlines the current immaturity of this research
field and the necessity of the investigations performed in this thesis.
In [SWGFAST11] an extensive and intelligible review of Daubert hearings regarding challenges to the
admissibility of friction ridge individualisations (‘fingerprints’) for forensic identification of human beings
is presented. This review is addressing all Daubert criteria for this forensic field as well as further concerns
raised by judges in Daubert hearings. Despite the fact that the two exemplary selected statistical pattern
recognition (SPR) based audio forensic methods discussed within this thesis are far away from having
the same degree of maturity as the decades old practice of fingerprint verification, this methodology
of analysing a forensic method is transferred to this thesis. The combination of the criteria directly
derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702 (FREC0 to FREC3; see section 2.2.1) and
the criteria explicated by the Daubert Court (DC1 to DC5) is referred to within this thesis as the
Daubert criteria. They are used in the investigations on the two selected application scenarios as
performance indicators for an estimation of their currently achieved forensic compliance.
2.3 Selected fundamentals on audio signals
An audio signal, as it is perceived by a human listener, is a representation of pressure variations in
air. Usually only pressure variations in the frequency range of 20 to 20,000 Hz are considered as being
‘audible’ since this is the (idealised) range of human hearing. An audio signal can be visualised in dif-
ferent forms, reflecting different transform domains. The most common forms are time-domain (which
is the natural domain for audio signals) and frequency-domain representations of the signal. The latter
is most often generated in audio by using Fourier transforms.
Digital audio signals are either ‘born digitally’, e.g. as MIDI18 files or, more commonly, generated as
analogue signals and recorded by microphones as shown in figure 2.1 below. The case of digitally
born audio signals is neglected for the remainder of this thesis for two reasons: first, because it is
less common than the case of recording and second, because it violates the basic assumptions for the
two considered application scenarios, being that intrinsic traces of the used microphone are present for
microphone forensics and that plausible (i.e. complex) covers are chosen for steganography in the audio
steganalysis application scenario.
Figure 2.1: Natural audio signal lifecycle
Possible signal generation and projection processes can include human speech, instrumental music,
environmental noise, loudspeaker projections, etc. After generation / projection the signal is subject
to environmental shaping (e.g. the reverberation influence of the room) and superposition with other
18MIDI: Musical Instrument Digital Interface – an industry-standard protocol maintained by the MIDI Manufacturers
Association (MMA, http://www.midi.org). It aims at enabling electronic musical instruments (synthesizers, drum ma-
chines, etc.), computers and other electronic equipment (MIDI controllers, sound cards, samplers) to communicate and
synchronise with each other, either directly via cable connections or via MIDI-files. MIDI initially made no provision for
specifying timbre. I.e. every MIDI synthesiser had its own methods for producing the sound from MIDI instructions. This
situation was solved by the introduction of the General MIDI reference set in 1991, which created a standard set of 128
default sound types (piano, organ, guitar, strings, etc.) for sound generation.
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audio signals. In the third step shown in figure 2.1 the signal is recorded by a microphone, introducing
the intrinsic traces to the signal that is used for microphone identification within this thesis. In the
recording transmission the still analogue signal is transferred as voltage variations from the microphone
to the analogue-to-digital-conversion device (A/D converter). In this transit the signal is prone to
electromagnetic distortions. Finally, the signal is low-pass filtered, sampled and quantised by the A/D
converter. Also, if stereo microphones or multi-microphone arrays are used, the two- or multi-channel
signal is composed. In most cases the signal generated by the A/D converter is in PCM19 format. For
storage the signal is either kept in this high-resolution format or compressed into other formats like
MP320.
For the remainder of this thesis the performed pattern recognition observations are mostly restricted to
uncompressed (never compressed) PCM signals with a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz with a resolution of
16 Bit in quantisation (CD-quality). This is done because it is the most common uncompressed end
user format and sees wide-spread end user usage through its employment in the CD Audio standard as
well as in DVDs and on Blu-Ray discs.
2.3.1 Audio signal representation
The nature of audio signals (or sound) is described by Pressnitzer et al. [Pressnitzer00] as follows: “A
vibrating body creates in the surrounding air the propagation of a pressure wave, in the same manner
that to agitate an object on a surface of water provokes the propagation of wavelets. This is the
physical reality of sound, the variation of acoustic pressure over time, and this reality is unique. It
can, nevertheless, be represented in different ways according to the information that one wishes to
emphasize.”
Various representations for audio signals (or sound) can be found in daily use. They differ in many
aspects and no representation is capable of displaying all characteristics of a sound perceived. Some
of the most commonly used representations come in the form of music scores or various analogue or
digital audio signal representations. Especially for the latter, a large set of different presentation forms
can be identified in literature, e.g. time-domain, frequency-domain, time-frequency or psychoacoustical
representations. Within this thesis the focus for the considerations of audio signal representations is
limited to the two most common ones: the time-domain and frequency-domain representations. In the
following two sub-sections the nomenclature used within the thesis for these two basic representations
is introduced.
Digital audio signals in time-domain
Time-domain representations of audio signals are trying to directly capture the physical reality of sound.
Therefore, this presentation is most likely to be considered the ‘natural’ domain for audio signals.
As shown in figure 2.2 a sampled and quantised digital audio signal is fully represented by k arrays of
audio samples Sk(nT) where T is the sample-time (T = 1/fsample with fsample being the sampling
frequency; see Shannon-Nyquist Theorem [Shannon49]), n is the index of a sample in the corresponding
array (n ∈ N; 1 ≤ n ≤ streamlength; streamlength being the overall number of audio samples in
19PCM: Pulse-Code Modulation – is one method invented by Alec Reeves in 1937 to time- and amplitude discretely
representation of sampled analogue signals. It is the standard format for digital audio in computers and various Blu-
ray, compact disc (CD) and Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) formats. A PCM stream is a digital representation of an
analogue signal, in which the magnitude of the analogue signal is sampled regularly at uniform intervals, with each sample
being quantised to the nearest value within a range of digital steps. For a more detailed explanation of the Pulse-Code
modulation see [U.S. Congress05].
20MP3: The MPEG standard MPEG-1 (and MPEG-2) Audio Layer 3 is more commonly referred to as MP3. It is a
patented digital audio encoding format using lossy data compression. It is a common audio format for consumer audio
storage, as well as a de facto standard of digital audio compression for the transfer and playback of music on digital
audio players. Compressed representations, like MP3, usually employ redundancies in the perceived signal to reduce the
storage space required. This can be done either lossy (e.g. in MP3) or lossless (e.g. Free Lossless Audio Codec (FLAC) -
the Free Lossless Audio Codec http://flac.sourceforge.net/) and normally operates in a trade-off between storage space
requirement and audio quality.
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the signal) and k is the number of audio channels that exist in parallel within the signal. Therefore, k
is usually either 1 (mono audio signals) or 2 (stereo).
Figure 2.2: Time-domain representation of the audio signal Sk(nT) for the case k = 1 (mono) – x-axis: sample
index, y-axis: sample value as amplitude
For the purpose of audio signal analysis, each of the k arrays, representing the sample stream for one
audio channel, in Sk(nT) is first framed and then windowed. As shown in figure 2.3 in the fram-
ing, by the definition of a frame size w and an overlap o (w, o ∈ N; o < w), the sample stream
Sk(nT) for each audio channel is split into framecount frames S¯ki where i is the frame-index (i ∈ N;
0 < i ≤ framecount). For given values for the frame size w and offset o the number of resulting
complete frames can be computed for a sample stream of size length as framecount = b lengthw−o c with
a rest of length mod (w − o) samples.
Considering the frame size and the overlap between the frames, the start sample for each frame is at
position (iw − o(i− 1)− (w − 1)) T and the last sample in the frame is at (iw − o(i− 1)) T.
A further processing step applies a windowing function (a.k.a. analysis window) win() to the frames
S¯ki , producing the sampled, quantised and windowed digital audio signal S
k
i = S¯
k
i win(w). The choice
of windowing function is strongly dependant on the intended post-processing. For signal process-
ing operations sophisticated windowing functions like Hamming or Hann [Blackman59] windows are
used. In signal analysis, like in this thesis, often a rectangular window (also known as Dirichlet win-
dow [Kumar10]) is used, which actually leaves the signal unmodified21.
This time-domain notation for audio signals allows for considerations on feature extraction as required
for the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based application examples within this thesis. As explained
in detail in section 2.4.2 these features are either computed globally (over the complete signal, or for
each audio channel independently), locally (for individual data samples) or segment-wise (here for win-
dows of the audio signal). All three different types of features are supported by the introduced notation
for audio signals. If it is necessary for computation operations like e.g. feature extraction to access
individual samples in a window Ski , these samples are denoted in the following as s
k
i,j , where i is the
frame-index as above, k is the channel and j is the sample-in-the-frame index (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w).
21In this case Ski and S¯
k
i are equivalent.
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Figure 2.3: Framed digital audio signal Ski for the case k = 1 (mono) – the overlap between consecutive frames in
this example is set to 20%, every second frame is marked with yellow background colour
Digital audio signals in frequency-domain
The frequency-domain representation of an audio signal is usually generated by the application of a
Fourier transform to the time-domain audio signal. The coef -band spectrum (coef = bw2 c), as the real
output of the Fourier transform, of a window Ski of the audio signal is denoted here by Y
k
i = FT(S
k
i ).
An important note for the computations performed here is, that the the spectrum used is an absolute
spectrum (i.e. every coefficient has a value of 0 or larger). If it is necessary for computation operations
like e.g. feature extraction to access individual coefficients in the spectrum Y ki of a window S
k
i , these
coefficients are denoted in the following as yki,h, where i is the frame-index as above, k is the channel
and h is the coefficient-in-the-frame index (h ∈ N; 1 ≤ h ≤ coef).The phase component of the audio
signal, as the second output of the transform, is irrelevant for this thesis.
The frequency-domain representation is required within this thesis, amongst other reasons, to perform
a sophisticated context modelling for the microphone forensics application scenario. This context
modelling of the influence factors in the recording process is performed in section 2.3.2.
2.3.2 Audio signal generation
For the work within this thesis two different types of audio signals have to be considered especially.
These two types are: first, audio signals generated in microphone recordings, and second, the au-
dio files generated by modification based audio information hiding. For the first type, previous work
as [Oermann05] and [Kraetzer07c] postulate and demonstrate that the recording source (here the com-
bination of the used microphone and attached recording equipment as a sensory unit) leaves a statistical
imprint in the audio material, which can be used for source authentication. For the second type, the
modification based audio information hiding, previous work (e.g. [Fridrich09]) illustrates that the mod-
ifications performed change the statistics of the audio material, which can be used for implementing
steganalysis for this kind of material. Nevertheless, the implementation of a security mechanism requires
sophisticated context modelling for the determination of possible influence factors for the problem at
hand. Such context modelling for the two application scenarios considered in this thesis is presented
below.
Context modelling for microphone recordings
A frequency-domain based context model describing the audio recording process is the one initially
presented in [Kraetzer11] and generalised and extended in [Kraetzer12b]. In frequency-domain the
different influence factors in the recording process can be modelled much easier than in time-domain.
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The resulting model helps to understand the exact influences to the audio signal during the steps of the
recording process and is therefore of importance especially for the considerations on microphone forensics
within this thesis. In [Kraetzer11] it is assumed that the signal projection happens via loudspeaker. The
more generalised model presented in [Kraetzer12b] shows how other forms of generation of the recording
input could be covered by a slightly adapted context model.
As shown in [Kraetzer12b], an audio recording process within this thesis is described using a pipeline
which consists of five segments.
Figure 2.4: Recording process pipeline – context model (based on [Kraetzer12b])
Audio signals can be considered as either continuous or discrete signals in time- or frequency-domain.
For the context modelling for the microphone recordings a frequency-domain representation of the
signals is considered here, because it is more appropriate for the modelling of the analogue influence
factors than a time-domain representation. Let a function S˜(t) denote the analogue audio signal in
time-domain, thus Y˜ (f), its representation in frequency-domain could be easily achieved by a Fourier
transformation as shown in equation 2.1:
Y˜ (f) = FT
(
S˜(t)
)  2.1
In Figure 2.4 Y˜P (f), Y˜E(f), Y˜R(f) and Y˜T (f) denote the analogue audio signals after each processing
segment, while the output of the analogue-to-digital conversion process YC(f) and its time-domain
counterpart S(t) computed via inverse Fourier transform as S(t) = FT−1(YC(f)) denote the final
audio signal as the result. Due to the fact that for microphone recordings the number of recorded
channels per microphone k is usually22 equal to 1, the signal S(t) is thereby equivalent to Sk(nT)
introduced above.
If a loudspeaker is used as the sound source, the processing operations within the recording pipeline
can be modelled as follows:
Y˜P (f) =
∑
ndriver
l∫
u
Fdriver(f)Y˜ (f)df +Nls(f)
 2.2
A typical loudspeaker consists of multiple drivers ([Davis97]), as individual electrodynamic drivers pro-
vide quality performance over at most about three octaves. Equation 2.2 simulates the process of a
loudspeaker with ndriver different ‘drivers’ playing the audio signal. Depending on different driver types
(full-range, subwoofer, woofer, mid-range or tweeter), the upper and lower frequency values (u and l)
range, and the amplifying function Fdriver(f) could be simplified into a constant amplifying factor in
ideal circumstances. Furthermore, Nls(f) denotes the (thermal) noise that the loudspeaker generates
in the playback signal.
After the audio signal is generated by the sound source, it is usually distorted by various environmental
factors before it reaches to the microphone. There are mainly three aspects of such distortions: reflec-
tions, reverberation and addition of environmental noise. As introduced by [Pawera03], there are three
types of reflections. The short-term reflections, which arrive at the microphone only fractionally later
(0.8 to 20 ms) than the direct sound, produce discolouration. The medium-term reflections, with delay
times of usually more than 40 ms, enhance the volume of the direct sound. The long-term reflections,
22Stereo or multi-channel recordings are generated using more than one microphone.
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with delay times longer than 80 ms, create echoes. If there exist multiple long-term reflections in the
sound field and the reflections reach an energy intensity equal to the one of the direct sound, the
reverberation is triggered. Equation 2.3 describes all three distortions as follows:
Y˜E(f) = e
∫
f
D(f)Y˜P (f)df ∗ Freverb(f) +Nenvi(f)
 2.3
In equation 2.3, D(f) denotes the discolouration function resulting from short-term reflections, e de-
notes the enhancement factor imposed by medium-term reflections, and the convolution with Freverb(f)
simulates the possible distortion from the echoes and / or reverberation [Takala92]. The consistency of
this convolution is the characteristic verified for an audio recording in the forensics approach presented
in [Malik10].
When the recording process is accomplished in an anechoic environment, then Freverb(f) can be con-
sidered as an constant value of 1. The possible distortion caused by environmental noise is denoted by
Nenvi(f) in the equation.
Y˜R(f) =
∫
h
Fmic(f)Y˜E(f)df +Nmic(f) +NENF (f)
 2.4
Equation 2.4 simulates the process of a microphone collecting the signal. In this equation Fmic(f)
denotes the frequency response function of the microphone, Nmic(f) denotes the thermal noise that
the microphone generates, and NENF (f) denotes the electric network frequency (ENF) influence (which
is the characteristic used for the ENF approaches to recording setup forensics, see e.g. [Grigoras07]).
We assume for our approach that the specificity of a microphone is decided by the characteristics
(Fmembrane(MembCharacteristics)) of the membrane in the microphone with its unique vibration
behaviour and interaction with the other parts of the microphone. Other influences to be considered
here are the orientation of the microphone to sound sources, the microphone mounting and possible
aging phenomena of the microphone. These influences are modelled within our context model as
multiplicative influences Or (orientation), Mount (mounting and Age (aging). So far no sophisticated
model exists for the estimation of these influences; therefore we assume them to be Gaussian distributed
with a mean of 1 and a small variance – which would, for these multiplicative influences, imply that
they have only a very small influence. Thus Fmic(f) can be considered as a function as follows:
Fmic = Finf (Or,Mount,Age)Fmembrane(MembCharacteristics)
 2.5
Usually Nmic(f) can be considered as a constant as it contributes a rather minor influence on the
recorded signal compared to Fmic(f).
This modelling of the microphone response is independent from the actual microphone type (condenser,
electrets, pietzo, etc.; see [Pawera03]). The type only determines the strength of the influences.
Y˜T (f) =
∫
h
Ftran(f)Y˜R(f)df +Ntran(f)
 2.6
Equation 2.6 describes the distortion caused by the signal transmission. Here, Ftran(f) denotes the
possible non-linear distortion during the transmission of the signal from the microphone to recording
device. The component Ntran(f) denotes the thermal noise coming from the transmission environment.
YC(f) =
fsample∫
0
Fsamp(f)Y˜T (f)df +Nquan(f) +Nthermal(f)
 2.7
The equation 2.7 summarises the process of analogue-to-digital (A/D) conversion and storing the audio
as an audio file. In the equation fsample denotes the sampling frequency (a.k.a. Nyquist frequency),
Fsamp(f) the sampling function, Nquan(f) denotes the quantisation noise, and Nthermal(f) the thermal
noise of the A/D device. As a last step in the modelling, the signal is projected back into time-domain
S(t) = FT−1(YC(f)).
The Sampling Theorem [Shannon49] states that continuous-time signals can be fully represented with
discrete-time samples of the signal, if we sample the signal often enough, i.e. using a sampling frequency
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(fsample) at least twice as high as the highest frequency in the sampled signal.
Therefore, for a sufficiently high sampling frequency (e.g. 44100 Hz for CD-quality audio material)
the signal S(t) can be fully represented by a stream S(nT) of nT samples, where T is the sample
time (T = 1fsample ) and n the sample index n ∈ N ([Bosi03]). Following the sampling operation, a
quantisation step is performed by the mapping of continuous amplitude values of the signal into codes
that can be represented with a finite number of bits R (also called quantisation range). This thesis only
focuses on scalar and uniform quantisation (the mapping of an amplitude value is not influenced by
previous or following amplitude values and equally sized ranges of input amplitude are mapped onto each
code) for the considered audio signals, further quantisation types are discussed in detail in [Bosi03]. The
quantisation transforms the time-discrete but continuous-amplitude samples to a stream of time- and
amplitude-discrete samples S(nT). For further processing this stream is usually split into the individual
audio channels k, framed and windowed as described above in section 2.3.1. A good reference on
further details on A/D conversion is [Robin00].
Context modelling for modification based audio information hiding / audio steganalysis
The context modelling for modification based audio information hiding is much simpler than the context
modelling for microphone forensics. The influence of the embedding of a data hiding scheme is here
modelled as:
ST k(nT) = EmbedAlg(C
k(nT), key,message, strength)
 2.8
In equation 2.8 the embedding function EmbedAlg() for a data hiding algorithm Alg is supplied with
the following inputs: Ck(nT) denoting the cover object (a digital audio signal), the embedding key
key, the message embedded (message) and the embedding strength strength. The output of the
embedding is the steganogram ST k(nT) as a digital audio signal.
The task of the steganalysis is then to decide whether an audio signal Sk(nT) is a (unmodified) cover
object Ck(nT) (e.g. a microphone recording of some speech) or a steganogram ST
k(nT).
More extensive context modelling on modification based steganography, which strongly exceeds the
requirements for this thesis, is presented e.g. in [Winkler11].
2.4 Selected fundamentals on (statistical) pattern recognition
A pattern, from the French patron, is a type of theme of recurring events, objects or characteristics.
Therefore, the pattern is the basis which allows the classification of objects or events into distinct classes
or sets.
If using a definition given by Bebis [Bebis06], then pattern recognition (PR) is in general the study of
how machines can observe their environment, learn to distinguish patterns of interest from their back-
ground signals and make sound and reasonable decisions about categories of the patterns. Therefore
the key objectives in pattern recognition are to process the sensed data to eliminate noise, perform a
suitable information reduction (by feature extraction), hypothesising the models that describe each class
population and, given a sensed pattern, choosing the best-fitting model for the assignment to the class
associated with the model. In short: Pattern recognition is the act of taking in raw data, processing it
into features and taking an action based on the ‘category’ (or class) of the pattern [Duda01].
In literature (cf. [Duda01], [Bebis06]) the following five distinct classes of pattern recognition approaches
are considered:
• Syntactic pattern recognition utilises the structure of the patterns. Instead of carrying an
analysis based strictly on quantitative characteristics of the pattern, here the interrelationships
between the primitives (the components which compose the pattern) are emphasised. Typical
patterns which are subject to syntactic pattern recognition research are therefore characters,
fingerprints, chromosomes, etc. The analogy between the structure of some patterns and the
syntax of a language which has a solid theoretical basis is a very attractive one. In [Friedman99]
it is stated that: “By introducing concepts like a formal grammar and a language the design
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syntax classifiers is enabled, so that these can classify a given pattern presented as a string of
symbols. In general, given a specific class, a grammar whose language consists of patterns in this
class is designed. For an unknown new pattern a syntax classifier analyses the pattern (a string)
in a process called parsing and determines whether or not that string belongs to the language
(class).”
• Template matching can be subdivided into two approaches: feature-based template matching
and global template-based matching. The feature-based approach uses features, such as edges or
corners in image analysis, and distance based solutions as the primary match-measuring metrics
to find the best matching template for a candidate input. Since this approach does not consider
the entirety of the training objects and the candidate input, but only extracted features, it is
generally more computationally efficient when working with larger digital objects than the global
template-based approach.
The global template-based approach uses the entire template with generally a sum-comparing
metric (e.g. using cross-correlation [Cole04]).
• Training patterns of various classes overlap often, for example when they originate from similar
statistical distributions. In this case a statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach is ap-
propriate, particularly when the various distribution functions of the classes are known. If these
distributions are not known they must be approximated using the training patterns. Sometimes
the functional form of these distributions is known and one must only estimate its parameters.
However, in some applications even the distribution’s form is unknown and must (approximately)
be found. The model for a pattern may be a single specific set of features, though the actual
pattern sensed has been corrupted by some form of noise.
A statistical classifier must also evaluate the risk associated with every classification which mea-
sures the probability of misclassification. Statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is focussing on the
statistical properties of the patterns (generally expressed in probability densities) this approach
receives the most attention in [Duda01] and is the one most widely considered in the chosen
application fields for this thesis.
• In contrast to the statistical approach the structural pattern recognition approach tries to
describe the structure of objects that intuitively reflects the human perception. The features
become primitives (sub-patterns), fundamental structural elements, like strokes, corners or other
morphological elements.
Next, the primitives are encoded as syntactic units from which objects are constructed. As a result,
objects are represented by a set of primitives with specified syntactic operations. For instance,
if the operation of concatenation is used, objects are described by strings of (concatenated)
primitives. [Pekalska05] states: “The strength of the statistical approach relies on well-developed
concepts and learning techniques, while in the structural approach, it is much easier to encode
existing knowledge on the objects”.
• The neural network pattern classification (also known as neural pattern recognition or neural
net approach) is considered a close descendant of SPR despite its somewhat different intellectual
pedigree. It assumes as other approaches before that a set of training patterns and their correct
classifications is given. The architecture of the network which includes input layer, output layer
and hidden layers can be very complex. It is characterised by a set of weights and activation
functions which determine how any information (input signal) is being transmitted to the output
layer. The neural network is trained with training patterns and adjusts the weights until the
correct classifications are obtained. It is then used to classify arbitrary unknown patterns.
The considerations within this thesis are restricted to statistical pattern recognition (SPR) and template
matching, because these two classes of pattern recognition approaches appear to be the most significant
ones in existing media forensics approaches, the two application scenarios considered in this thesis. For
more detailed information about the mentioned classes of pattern recognition approaches the author
refers to literature focussing on this topic like e.g. [Duda01], [Friedman99].
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Since the processes for template matching and SPR are very similar23 one general (but simplified)
pattern recognition pipeline can be presented for both these classes. Figure 2.5 shows this general
pattern recognition pipeline. The process is generally divided into two phases: First, the phase of
reference data acquisition, processing and storage and second the assignment of a class to candidate
signals based on the knowledge generated in the first phase.
The first phase is most often called training phase but it is also known in specific application scenarios
as training, registration phase, enrolment, etc.; the second phase is commonly called testing but also
for this phase different names like classification, field application or authentication can be found in
specific application scenarios.
Figure 2.5: General pattern recognition pipeline (simplified)
The three basic operations performed in the training phase are pre-processing, feature extraction and
the reference data set generation. Depending on the kind of PR used (here supervised statistical pattern
recognition (SPR), clustering or template matching) the output of the reference generation operation
is either called a model (for supervised SPR), a template (in template matching) or a set of clusters in
clustering.
In the testing the same pre-processing and feature extraction operations are performed like in training.
Based on the training output (the statistical model, the set of templates or the set of clusters) the
assignment of a class to the candidate signal is performed. As stated already above for figure 2.5 this
general pipeline is a simplified projection of the actual processed employed in practise. In the following
sections this simplified pipeline is extended by additional operations required for this thesis like feature
selection.
If the correct class labels of the candidate signals in testing are known they can be used to evaluate
the accuracy achieved in the assignment of the classes for the candidate signals. If they are not known
(as in most industrial applications of pattern recognition based solutions) an appropriate number of
tests should be performed prior to field deployment of such a solution to investigate its performance in
normal conditions expected for the application scenario and under extreme conditions to establish trust
into this solution.
It has to be noted at this point, that certain publications assign further additional blocks to this
pipeline. The most common additional blocks are: the signal acquisition (see e.g. [Vielhauer05]), which
is in this thesis assigned to the conceptual entity of signal preparation outside of the pattern recognition
problem, and the segmentation (see e.g. [Duda01]), which, if it would be required within is thesis,
would be considered here to be part of the pre-processing.
23In fact template matching is so close to SPR that some authors consider them to be one class of pattern recognition
techniques, with template matching covering the cases with the simplest expression of the class statistics in the model
– the explicit description of a PDF by explicitly naming all associated instances – a that allows for an equally simple
classification by distance-based classifiers.
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2.4.1 Pre-processing
The task of pre-processing is to address two distinct topics. First, it could be used to maximise the
distance between pattern and noise. In [Duda01] noise is defined in very general terms as: “[...] any
property of the sensed pattern due not to the true underlying model but instead to randomness in the
world or the sensors. All non-trivial decision and pattern recognition problems involve noise in some
form.” Therefore it has to be clearly stated that noise is neither the intra-class nor the inter-class
variance in the objects to be classified. So, the pre-processing does not enable the distinction between
the different classes but only makes it easier. The pre-processing can either be content-based (analysing
the syntax and or semantics of the content) or content-insensitive.
The second function of the pre-processing is to prepare the signal by transforming it into the input
format expected by feature extraction operation, e.g. by windowing (see the considerations on digital
audio signals in time-domain in section 2.3.1).
2.4.2 Feature extraction
Statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is generally feature based. The features originate from a feature
extractor, whose purpose is to reduce the data (in this thesis audio data) into a d-dimensional feature
space by measuring certain pre-selected properties. These features (or, more precisely, the values of
these features) are then passed to a classifier that evaluates, with a model based decision boundary
(or sometimes a simple threshold), the evidence presented and makes a decision as to the class of the
object under evaluation.
There exist two completely distinct approaches for feature design: features are either especially de-
signed for an application scenario, which, despite the fact that it is sometimes also called intuition-based
feature design, usually requires strong domain knowledge, or the features to be used are transferred
from other, similar signal processing domains.
The two general types that are most commonly considered in this context in literature (e.g. [Shyu98])
are local and global features. Local as well as global features are either determined content based or
without higher-level content analysis. A good example for content based local features is the determi-
nation of minutiae in fingerprint images; an example for local features computed without higher-level
content analysis could be the colour-value distance between one pixel and the next in a row in an image.
For content based global features an example could be the existence of a specific object (e.g. a dolphin)
in an image; an example for global features computed without higher-level content analysis could be the
entropy of a complete signal. It is obvious that the global features perform the strongest information
reduction, while especially the local features computed without higher-level content analysis provide
very little information reduction.
As an in-between for local and global features a third class, the segment-wise computed features (also
known as segmental features or intra-window features) can be determined. They could be considered
as being a global feature (e.g. entropy) applied only to a segment of the whole signal or as the evaluation
of local features for a whole segment (e.g. the number of colour-value changes in and image block).
Also this segmental approach to feature computation is often employed when features are extracted
in a transform domain representation of the original signal (e.g. in frequency-domain representations
of audio or image signals) since many established domain transforms are working segment-wise (a.k.a.
window-wise). In terms of information reduction are the medium between local and global features.
2.4.3 Feature selection
Because the addition of irrelevant or even confusing features often confuses pattern recognition systems
they should be removed prior to classification to optimise the classification accuracy achieved. At the
same time a reduction of the dimensionality of the feature space results in a decreased computational
complexity24, this is equivalent to an increased classifier throughput (or a lower cost in a cost-based
24It should be mentioned at this point that feature selection itself might be a computational complex task which easily
outweighs simple classification problems.
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benchmarking). An additional result of this process, especially in scientific applications, is that it results
in less complex, more easily interpretable representation of the target concept and therefore the basis
of the problem.
This process of selecting the significant features for a problem is called feature selection (or attribute
selection). Its integration in the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline is shown in figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Statistical pattern recognition pipeline – pre´cised and extended from figure 2.5
Following the methodology proposed for feature selection by [Witten05] the best way to select features
would be a manual selection based on a deep understanding of the learning problem and the actual
meaning of the features. Since the required knowledge is not always available different approaches for
automatic feature selection are available.
For this exist two fundamentally different approaches for scheme-independent feature evaluation: The
first one is using filters on the feature set to find the most promising features and the second one is
using a classifier in a wrapper to identify the significant features. The problem with both approaches
is according to [Witten05] the lack of a universally accepted measure of ‘relevance’, which is in this
thesis represented by using the influence on the achieved classification accuracy.
A simple approach for the filter approach would be the evaluation of subsets of features until one is
found that distinguishes all instances uniquely. This can easily be done using exhaustive search begin-
ning with an empty set, although at tremendous computational costs. Additionally this approach faces
problems from bias and a strong tendency for overfitting (see [Witten05]).
For the wrapper method a simple approach would be to employ quite stable classifiers like decision
trees to identify the significant features and discard insignificant or distracting ones (which would, if
they were used at all, be used very far down in the tree). The set of significant features could then be
used in classifiers which react notoriously bad to irrelevant features, like e.g. nearest-neighbour methods.
In every feature selection approach the feature evaluator or feature set evaluator is accompanied by
a search method which navigates the evaluator though the feature space, since exhaustive search is
impractical on all but the simplest problems. Details on different search methods like forward selection
or backward elimination can be found in [Witten05]).
More advanced methods for feature evaluation like e.g. symmetric uncertainty [Witten05], principal
component analysis (PCA; [Lu07]) or random projection [Blum06] based methods allow not only for
the removal of irrelevant or even confusing features but also eliminate redundancies in the set. The
first uses entropy and joint entropy between features and performs then a correlation-based feature
selection. The PCA transforms the data linearly into a lower-dimensional space with the drawback of
being very computational expensive (the time taken to find the transformation is cubic in the number of
attributes). The random projection is projecting the data into a subspace with a predetermined number
of dimensions. Random projections are computationally much cheaper than PCA-based methods but
normally show worse accuracy than those employing PCA. For more details on basic and advanced
methods for feature selection see e.g. [Witten05] chapters 7.1 and 10.8.
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Another approach, that has to be mentioned here as a possible extension to the introduced scheme,
is the usage of methods form analytical statistics (e.g. variance analysis or factor analysis) to deter-
mine the suitability of features.
Regarding the implementation of feature selection methods, there already exist multiple applicable
software solutions that can be used for performing feature selection. One such tool that has to be
mentioned in this context, because it is used to implement feature selection within this thesis is the
renowned open source data mining suite WEKA [Hall09]. For details on the various filter- and wrapper-
based feature selection mechanisms implemented in WEKA see [Hall09].
2.4.4 Classification
Within practical investigations performed in this thesis the considerations on the assignment of the
class to the candidate signals are limited on supervised statistical pattern recognition (also known as
classification) and unsupervised statistical pattern recognition (clustering).
Regarding the nature of the classification process and its relation to the preceding feature extrac-
tion [Duda01] states the following: “The conceptual boundary between feature extraction and classifi-
cation [...] is somewhat arbitrary: an ideal feature extractor would yield a representation that makes the
job of the classifier trivial; conversely, an omnipotent classifier would not need the help of a sophisti-
cated feature extractor. The distinction is forced upon us for practical, rather than theoretical reasons.
Generally speaking, the task of feature extraction is much more problem and domain dependent than
is classification, and thus requires knowledge of the domain.”
Hence, classification is, in most general terms, the task of recovering the model25 that generated the
patterns for each class. In this process the application of different classification techniques might be
useful depending on the type of candidate models themselves.
The first question to be answered in a pattern recognition (PR)-based solution approach is always the
question for the type of problem at hand (i.e. classification problem identification). The types of
problems to distinguish between are: single-class, two-class and multi-class. While the first is mostly
suitable for anomaly or outlier detection, the two-class classification is employed where either only
two classes have to be distinguished or where a complex classification is split into a larger number of
two-class classifications. The multi-class classifiers are the ones which propose most often the na¨ıve
solution approach for pattern recognition problems found in practical applications. The answer to the
question to which class a problem belongs determines which classification algorithms can be applied to
the solution of the problem.
A closely related question is the question whether the actual classes are explicitly known for all samples
in the classification process (classification) or not (clustering). The answer to those questions is directly
influencing the set of algorithms available as choices for implementing a solution to a practical problem.
To the knowledge of the author no agreed upon strategy for classifier selection exists in the research
field of data mining. It seems to be common to establish the suitability of classifiers empirically.
The approach pursued in this thesis is based on this assumption and performs a brute force testing
through a large set of available classifiers. Since the number of implemented classifiers (and different
possible parametrisations for those) found as standalone implementations and in data mining suites is
extremely high, the author restricts the set of choice for this thesis to the set of classifiers implemented
in the renown data mining software suite WEKA26 (version 3.6.1; [Hall09]) and their default parameters.
Based on the general idea that different classification techniques might be useful depending on the type
of candidate models themselves, methodologies for the evaluation of those different classification tech-
25Statistical pattern recognition (SPR) uses models, which are typically mathematical in form, to describe the classes.
26WEKA is open source and freely available for download, accepted in scientific communities with pattern recog-
nition tasks, platform independent and easy to automate for a large number of test. Additionally, due to the
form of its implementation, it can be combined with external (reliable) time measurement mechanisms to determine
the cost of an operation. It is comparable in functionality and usability with commercial suites like IBMs SPSS
Modeler (http://www-142.ibm.com/software/products/de/de/spss-modeler) or other open source solutions like Orange
(http://www.ailab.si/orange/).
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niques become a requirement. These evaluation or benchmarking methodologies are already a necessity
when using individual classifiers but they become even more important in the prospect of information
fusion on the output of different classification techniques.
Two general concepts from decision theory (the science which includes as the most prominent sub-field
the pattern classification) to be mentioned in this context are the cost and risk of such a decision.
The cost of the application of pattern recognition can be expressed as a function of its computational
complexity. In [Duda01] it is stated on this subject: “[...] we may ask how an algorithm scales as a
function of the number of feature dimensions, or the number of patterns or the number of categories.
What is the trade-off between computational ease and performance? In some problems we know we
can design an excellent recognizer, but not within the engineering constraints. How can we optimise
within such constraints?”
Closely associated to the cost of the application of a pattern recognition approach is the notion of its
risk. In [Duda01] it is stated on this subject: “We should realize that a classifier rarely exists in a
vacuum. Instead, it is generally to be used to recommend actions (put this fish in this bucket, put
that fish in that bucket), each action having an associated cost or risk. Conceptually, the simplest
such risk is the classification error: what percentage of new patterns are called the wrong category.
However the notion of risk is far more general, as we shall see. We often design our classifier to rec-
ommend actions that minimize some total expected cost or risk. Thus, in some sense, the notion of
category itself derives from the cost or task. How do we incorporate knowledge about such risks and
how will they affect our classification decision? Finally, can we estimate the total risk and thus tell
whether our classifier is acceptable even before we field it? Can we estimate the lowest possible risk of
any classifier, to see how close ours meets this ideal, or whether the problem is simply too hard overall?”
Generalisation is the handling of objects in testing, which are outside the model defined by the training
samples, i.e. novel patterns. In most cases a complex model (i.e. represented by a complex decision
boundary) will not provide a good generalisation since it tends to overfit – to closely match the partic-
ular training samples, rather than some underlying characteristics (e.g. the probability distributions of
the categories) or true model.
In most PR problems, however, the amount of data that can be obtained easily for training is often quite
limited. For other pattern recognition problems it might be easy to obtain training examples which
as a consequence might lead to overly excessive model sizes which result in to complex classification
operations. Therefore, one of the most important questions in pattern classification is how to optimise
the trade-off between the complexity of the decision boundary on one hand and generalisation and
overfitting on the other hand.
This problem can be translated in practise with the question: How should one design training sets for
the derivation of classifier models suitable to solve the pattern recognition model at hand?
A problem, often contributed to classification, but actually inherent with the general problem of pattern
recognition is the so called curse of dimensionality. The problem is the exponential growth of the
volume of the d-dimensional space or hyper-volume in which the classifier model is created as a func-
tion of dimensionality [Bellman61]. By this exponential growth, problems tend to become intractable
as the number of the dimensions increases. To rephrase this general mathematical problem for pattern
recognition (PR) problems, it can be said that: the training of models from a finite number of data
samples in a high-dimensional feature space requires an enormous amount of training data to ensure
that there are several samples with each possible combination of values.
To consider this problem from a practical side would mean to address the Hughes effect27 (or Hughes
phenomenon; named after Gordon F. Hughes) established in [Hughes06]: With a fixed number of train-
ing samples, the predictive power would be reduced by increasing the dimensionality.
Regarding the implementation of classification methods, there exist multiple applicable software solu-
tions that can be used for performing feature selection. Two of these solutions, which are used within
27Not to be confused with the similarly named, but completely unrelated, Hughes effect in electromagnetism named
after Declan C. Hughes.
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this thesis, are libSVM28 [Chang11] and WEKA [Hall09]. While libSVM implements different support
vector machines as classifiers, WEKA is a large open-source data mining suite with 74 supervised clas-
sification methods and 8 clustering algorithms implemented (figures for version 3.6.1). For details on
the various classifiers implemented in WEKA see [Hall09].
2.5 State-of-the-art in audio steganography and audio steganal-
ysis
The goals and requirements for audio steganalysis (or steganalysis in general) cannot be described
without considering, at least to some extent, also the goals and methods of steganography. As intro-
duced in section 1.1 steganography is the art and science of hidden communication. Steganalysis as its
counter-science is supposed to detect these hidden communication attempts. Regarding the security
aspects addressed, steganography focuses on the confidentiality of communications, while steganalysis
is considered within this thesis as a mechanism aiming at reliable integrity verification of audio data
against steganographic modifications. Steganalysis can be implemented either as a security mecha-
nism protecting a communication channel against un-allowed modification (the online or warden setup)
or a security mechanism that performs a-posterior forensic analyses on communication channel traffic
records.
The following overview includes in section 2.5.1 a brief summary on general steganographic charac-
teristics and considerations on the security of steganographic schemes. These descriptions include: a
summary on the three existing basic approaches to perform steganography, the steganographic channel
model, two existing theoretical methods to model steganographic security and a notion on the practical
security of steganographic schemes.
Based on these facts an identification of the state-of-the-art in steganalysis is performed in section 2.5.2.
The considerations in this section include some required considerations on the extend of recent stegano-
graphic research and the extreme diversity in audio steganography approaches, which is then put in
contrast to the number of available audio steganography tools and the (nearly non-existent) diversity
in (audio) steganalysis approaches. These considerations are accompanied by a brief discussion of the
different existing sets of goals for steganalysis and the possible setups (online as well as forensic) that
can be imagined. Existing field studies for this field are discussed as well as the results achieved un-
der laboratory conditions, followed by a brief indication on the numbers of available (commercial and
non-commercial) steganalysis toolsets/steganalysis detectors. At the end of this section, for the sake
of completeness a standard-like end-user guide on steganalysis (or rather steganalytical benchmarking
of steganographic tools) is summarised.
The section 2.5.3 summarises the principal methodologies and basic concepts used in steganalysis. It is
oriented on the design of a statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline and contains considerations on:
the patterns observed, the input signals, pre-processing, feature design and selection, template or model
sizes. The descriptions are made considering the most dominant pattern recognition (PR) approach in
this field (statistical pattern recognition (SPR)) and different classification approaches. The section is
concluded by observations on empirical evaluations and performance indicators.
2.5.1 General steganographic characteristics and the security of stegano-
graphic schemes
According to [Fridrich09], one of the most widely accepted text-book references on steganography, there
exist three different basic approaches to perform steganography: In steganography by cover se-
lection, the sender in the communication scenario has access to a set of different classes of media
objects that can be used to establish the steganographic communication (covers) and both, the sender
and the receiver, share a communication channel as well as a codebook that assigns a meaning to each
class. In steganography by cover synthesis the sender creates the cover so that it conveys the desired
message. In the third, and until today most studied steganography paradigm, the steganography by
28An open source library for support vector machines, available from: http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/˜cjlin/libsvm/
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cover modification, the sender modifies cover objects to embed the message. The main difference
between the first two and the last basic approach is that only the last one introduces (by the required
modifications) potentially changes to the original source characteristics for the cover objects. Only
this modifying approach to steganography, which is used by the majority of existing steganographic
approaches [Fridrich09] is considered in this thesis.
Another basic differentiation between steganographic channels is discussed in [Gianvecchio07]. There,
the authors distinguish covert storage and covert timing channels. Within this thesis only the first
are considered. The latter type, focussing on the timing-behaviour of systems (e.g. the response times
of a web server), is completely outside of the scope of this thesis.
Figure 2.7 shows the composition of the typical steganographic channel for steganography by cover
modification.
Figure 2.7: Elements of the steganographic channel for steganography by cover modification (based on [Fridrich09])
The two main functions in the steganographic channel model are the embedding and extraction func-
tions. The first is usually parametrised with a cover (or set of covers), a stego key and the message(s)
to be transmitted. It has to be made explicit here that in many practical steganography schemes/tools
the messages are also encrypted prior to their embedding. The output of the embedding is then referred
to as the stego object. The extraction function requires the appropriate key for retrieval and the stego
object to extract the message. What is not shown in figure 2.7 is the fact that usually an attacker
is modelled on the channel between the embedding and detection processes. This attacker, who is
supposed to perform steganalysis, is assumed to work under compliance to Kerckhoffs’ principle29 and
is either modelled as passive (simply reading and analysing the channel) or active (modifying the objects
transmitted on the channel). This thesis is focussed on the passive attack scenario and here especially
on cover-stego-attacks (for an analysis of the different attack scenarios, i.e. models for starting knowl-
edge that can be applied, in steganalysis see e.g. [Franz00]).
A simple audio steganography channel modelling is introduced as part of the context modelling in
specific audio signal generation application scenarios in section 2.3.2. More detailed considerations
on steganographic channel modelling can be found in [Winkler11], where e.g. possible pre-processing
operations for the embedding are integrated into the modelling.
According to [Fridrich98], there exist three major basic properties to describe information hiding al-
gorithms based on cover modification: their detectability, the capacity and the robustness. The de-
tectability is sometimes termed transparency or also security of a steganographic scheme. The capacity
29I.e. the attacker has complete knowledge of all algorithms/methods used for communication, the security of the
scheme therefore relies only on the used key; see [Katzenbeisser00], [Kerckhoffs83].
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describes the message size that can be embedded. In most cases this is done in relation to the cover
size (e.g. in Bit per pixel). The robustness is describing the difficulty to remove hidden information
from the stego object. These three properties are generally considered to be mutually competitive; it
is not possible to optimise a scheme for all three properties at the same time. This competitiveness
requires them to be optimised for each implementation of an application scenario.
For this thesis the detectability of a steganographic scheme is its most important property, since it is
the one directly addressed by steganalysis. Nevertheless, due to the relationship between the three char-
acteristics, the other two show also influence the process of steganalysis: A longer message (a higher
capacity required) implies that more changes have to be made in the embedding, which in most cases
is equivalent to a higher probability of detection. Also, an increase of the robustness of a scheme (e.g.
by performing error-coding on the message) most often influences the statistical detectability, since it
often increases the message length.
In a heuristic way the detectability can be described as the capability of resisting a steganalytical inves-
tigation, which is in many publications considered to be equivalent to the security of the steganographic
scheme30.
Theoretical considerations on steganographic security
There are two different approaches in literature how to theoretically describe steganographic se-
curity, the information-theoretic and the complexity-theoretic approach. Despite the fact that this
thesis is focussed on the practical security of steganographic schemes, the two theoretical approaches
are briefly summarised below and compared, based on the descriptions given in [Fridrich09]. In this
comparison it is emphasised that the information-theoretic approach is by far the most widely accepted
approach in the theoretical investigation on the security of steganographic schemes.
Information-theoretic approach to steganographic security: Based on the definition of information-
theoretic security, it should be impossible for an attacker to design a steganalysis method for a perfectly
secure steganography scheme that can reliably distinguish between cover and stego objects. Following
the argumentation by Christian Cachin ([Cachin04]), the goal of steganography can be reformulated as
constructing a steganographic scheme that assures that the distribution of the stego objects Ps is as
close as possible to the distribution of the covers Pc as possible. Thus, it would be hard for an attacker
to reliably decide whether an observed candidate object is drawn from the covers or from the stego
objects, even if he has access to the steganographic scheme as postulated by Kerckhoffs’ law. Therefore
the distance between the Pc and Ps can be used as a measure for the security of a steganographic
scheme. In [Cachin04] the Kullback-Leibler divergence [Kullback59] is used as a similarity measure
between Pc and Ps.
If the Kullback-Leibler divergence is equal to zero the steganographic scheme is perfectly secure31. If
the Kullback-Leibler divergence for a steganographic scheme is smaller than a value  then the scheme
is called -secure. If two steganographic schemes are compared in this approach, then the one with the
smaller  is to be considered more secure.
In [Cachin04] steganalysis is constructed as a hypothesis test32 with the null-hypothesis being that a
candidate object is an unmodified cover and the alternative hypothesis is that the candidate object is a
stego object. This binary classification leads to four possible outcomes: true positive (TP) statements
when a cover object is correctly identified as a cover object, true negative (TN) statements when a
stego object is correctly identified as stego object, false positive (FP, a.k.a. statistical type I error or
false alarm) when a cover object is wrongfully identified as a stego object, and false negative (FN,
statistical type II error or missed detection) when a stego object is wrongfully identified as a cover.
30In [Fridrich09] one example is presented where the un-detectability is not equivalent to steganographic security. In this
example the sender makes a digital photography of its secret message (steganography by cover synthesis) and attaches
the image to an e-mail sends it to the recipient. Since the image is a plausible cover object for the source of senders
images (its digital camera) an automatic steganalysis mechanism would not detect the presence of the message, while it
would be obvious for a human warden.
31Perfectly secure steganographic systems are therefore most likely based on the basic steganographic approaches of
cover synthesis or cover selection (where the stego objects follow Pc).
32Generally in literature on information theoretic approaches to steganalysis (like [Cachin04] or [Ker07b]) it is assumed
that steganalysis is a binary problem, i.e. there exists only one embedding method and it is known.
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Other publications, like [Ker07b] extend this information-theoretic approach from Cachin, e.g. by includ-
ing considerations on the effect of long-term repeated steganalysis to the security of a steganographic
scheme as well as considerations on the relationship between cover size and safe embedding capacity.
Nevertheless, the feasibility of this information-theoretic approach to describing steganographic security
strongly depends on the assumption that there is a reliable probabilistic model for the cover objects (i.e.
for Pc). However, as shown in [Bo¨hme08] it is for most media types (including audio) it still not clear
how to describe and estimate Pc and Ps in practice. The second problem of the information-theoretic
approach is the fact that it by definition ignores complexity issues. In this sense it is concerned only
with the possibility of constructing an attack rather than its practical realisation.
Complexity-theoretic approach to steganographic security: To address the lack of considera-
tions on the complexity of attacks to stego systems, i.e. the feasibility of such attacks, Hopper et
al. [Hopper02] as well as Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas [Katzenbeisser02] introduced in 2002 indepen-
dently from each other complexity-theoretic definitions of steganographic security. To summarise these
approaches it can be said that they are based on two common principles:
First, the requirement to know Pc, established for the information-theoretic approach described above, is
replaced by a much weaker assumption. For the complexity-theoretic approaches instead the availability
of two oracles is assumed. The first of these oracles samples from the set of covers according to their
distribution over the cover channel, the second oracle is returning stego objects generated by using an
unknown key.
Second, the security of the steganographic system is then established by means of a probabilistic game
between the warden in the prisoners’ problem scenario and an external referee called ‘judge’. The
warden is enabled to train for some time using the cover oracle and is then asked by the judge to
distinguish between outputs of the two oracles. The steganographic system is considered secure in the
complexity-theoretic sense, if the detection accuracy of the warden minus the probability of guessing
correctly in this scenario is close to zero and therefore negligible.
Practical considerations on steganographic security
Regarding the practical security of steganographic schemes, which is the part of the considerations
on steganographic security that is relevant for this thesis, it can be assumed that it follows generally the
same path like for symmetric cryptography33. There, schemes like the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
or the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cannot be proven to be secure, but are considered to be so
as long as nobody is able to produce an attack to these schemes that is faster than a brute-force search
for the key and as long as they provide an adequate key space size. The design of these cryptographic
methods is the result of a long-term cyclical interplay between cryptographers and cryptanalysts. Digital
steganography cannot be considered as being a field of research that is as mature as digital cryptography,
but nevertheless it takes the same path of development as its more mature counterpart34. Theoretical
models, like the described information-theoretic and complexity-theoretic approaches to steganographic
security, and existing practical attacks give the designers of steganographic systems ideas necessary to
design new generations of algorithms or schemes (e.g. [Orsdemir08]).
Therefore, in practice the security of a steganographic scheme is often understood neither in the
information-theoretic sense nor in the complexity-theoretic sense but rather as the inability to practically
construct a reliable steganographic detector using existing attacks or modifications thereof [Fridrich09].
The approach in this thesis, to constructing a media security mechanism which is capable of performing
steganalysis for audio material, is following exactly these practical considerations.
Regarding the evaluation of steganalytic approaches, similar to cryptanalysis, different attack scenarios
are defined, based on the assumed starting knowledge for the attack. Here, one the most widely used
attack scenarios are the so called ‘cover-stego-attacks’, which assume the analysis performing entity to
33The majority of the steganographic approaches existing today are of a symmetric nature. Asymmetric ap-
proaches like [Craver98], [Guillon02] or the Publimark tool (developed and maintained by G. Guelvouit, see
http://www.gleguelv.org/soft/publimark/index.html) are rather uncommon.
34For example see the Break Our Steganographic Scheme (BOSS) open contest organised by Toma´sˇ Pevny´, Toma´sˇ
Filler and Patrick Bas between September 9th and December 15th, 2010 (see http://boss.gipsa-lab.grenoble-inp.fr).
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have access to marked and unmarked versions of the same file for the training of the detector. This
scenario is compliant with Kerckhoffs’ principle which would allow the analyser access to the embedding
algorithm so that he can use any key he wants to generate his own marked versions of any training set
he would like to use. Other attack scenarios would be more restrictive in modelling the capabilities of
the analyser. They are omitted here, because they violate the sound reasoning imposed by Kerckhoffs’
principle.
Besides the attack scenarios, also different goals for the steganalysis can be defined. The most promi-
nent of these goals is the detection of the hidden communication. Besides this goal sometimes very
specific secondary goals are defined like the determination of the embedding strength or payload size
(see e.g. [Ker04]). Also, application specific steganalysis goals might arise from specific steganography
approaches, like e.g. information pooling in the in the case of Andrew Kers batch steganography and
pooled steganalysis [Ker07a].
In [Fridrich09] two main classes of steganalysis approaches are identified. These two classes are the
statistical steganalysis and the system attacks. The first, which is the class which is in the focus
of this thesis, performs statistical analyses to detect the presence of a message embedded into a cover
object. The second class, which is excluded from the considerations within this thesis, is looking for tell-
tale information about the usage of steganography, which do not originate directly from the embedding
process. An example for the latter class would be the usage of SARCs Steganography Analyzer Artifact
Scanner (see http://www.sarc-wv.com/products/stegalyzeras/), which claims to be able to detect the
download and installation of over 1000 steganography tools on Microsoft Windows machines.
Nissar et al. perform in [Nissar10] a slightly different distinction. They consider a classification of ap-
proaches into statistical steganalysis and signature steganalysis. The few existing examples that
can be found in literature for the latter class are mostly limited to the detection of specific (in most
cases older and less sophisticated) steganographic tools under rather specific embedding conditions.
Examples for such signature steganalysis are approaches like the visual steganalysis by Westfeld and
Pfitzmann [Westfeld99] or the small number of approaches summarised in [Nissar10]. Due to their spe-
cific focus and the associated low generisability, these signature steganalysis considerations are excluded
from this thesis.
If the statistical analyses approach to steganography is considered, there can be two sub-classes identi-
fied: targeted (a.k.a. application specific) and blind (a.k.a. universal) steganalysis. The first is building
on Kerckhoffs’ principle, i.e. it assumes knowledge about the steganography algorithm (or at least the
embedding strategy) that was potentially used. The blind steganalysis in contrast is building on the
assumption that absolutely no knowledge about the potential usage of steganography is given. The
communicating parties might or might not use steganography. Even if they were using steganography,
the techniques used would be unknown to the steganalysis performing observer.
If statistical steganalysis is to be performed ‘in the field’, [Fridrich09] describes the corresponding setup
as the process of “forensic steganalysis”. This practical forensic steganalysis process is considered
in [Fridrich09] to encompass the following six steps:
1. “Identification of web sites, Internet nodes, or computers that should be analyzed for steganog-
raphy.”
2. “Development of algorithms that can distinguish stego images from cover images.”
3. “Identification of the embedding mechanism, [...]”
4. “Determining the steganographic software.”
5. “Searching for the stego key and extracting the embedded data.”
6. “Deciphering the extracted data and obtaining the secret message (cryptanalysis).”
In this process blind (step 2) as well as targeted steganalysis (steps 3 to 5) are integrated into the
larger scheme. Besides the fact that this process model for practical steganalysis illustrates very well
the actual complexity of the problem, it can be used to define steganalytical success levels that
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could be achieved. Similar to cryptanalytic performance levels (like unconditionally secure vs. com-
putationally secure cryptography) such success levels achievable with existing steganalysis approaches
could be used in practice to model the security of a steganography algorithm. In early publications
like [Katzenbeisser00], an attempt to perform steganalysis on a steganographic scheme was considered
successful if the existence of hidden information can be detected. Unfortunately, this first step of the
forensic steganalysis (or lowest steganalytical success level) is of very limited use under the consideration
of the Daubert standard.
As highlighted in section 2.2, the 2011 amendment of rule 702 (“Testimony by Experts”) of the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) states [U.S. Congress11]: “A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if: (a) the experts scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” These requirements, which are within this
thesis translated into the evaluation criteria FREC0, FREC1, FREC2 and FREC3, imply that the mere
detection of the presence of hidden information by steganalysis is of no relevance as long as it cannot
directly be tied to the case. To do so, the entities involved into the steganographic communication
with their roles (sender, receiver), the message content communicated as well as communication related
metadata (e.g. time of the message embedding, time of the transmission, etc.) should be established.
Therefore, acceptable success levels for steganalysis under Daubert (and FRE) considerations would
have to include every step in the forensic steganalysis process described above. This would include,
amongst others, the successful message extraction and decryption (if encrypted, which has to be as-
sumed due to the fact that many modern steganographic tools include strong encryption).
This forensic steganography setup can also act as a basis for steganography or steganalysis bench-
marking, by using the steganalytical success levels for the comparison of the performance of different
steganography or steganalysis schemes. While for simple steganographic algorithms and appropriate ste-
ganalysis techniques it might be possible to successfully achieve all six steps of the forensic steganalysis
process, sophisticated steganographic approaches will show extreme resilience against success. Besides
the fact that the sixth step in the process might actually mean strong ciphers like AES or even uncondi-
tionally secure one-time pads, also other parts or this process would prove to be extremely burdensome.
A good example would be the determination of the used payload size (depending on the implemen-
tation of the steganalysis process, this has to be performed either in step 2, 3, 5 or 6). Andrew Ker
summarises the general consensus35 in this field in [Ker07b] as: “All a steganalysis method can ever
hope to do is to detect changes in the cover, rather than the payload itself, and the existence of adap-
tive source-coding techniques (e.g. [Fridrich06]) mean that the number of changes is not necessarily
proportional to the payload size.”
Besides the forensic (or oﬄine) setup, which is in the focus of this thesis, also an alternative approach to
steganalysis has to be mentioned: in the so called online setup (or warden scenario), the steganalyser
would be used to monitor a communication channel for the usage of steganography and in case a hidden
channel is detected it would initiate an action, e.g. terminate the channel. Obviously, in this second
approach different goals and requirements would have to be formulated. The goal would be limited to
the detection of the presence of a steganographic pattern in blind or targeted steganalysis. The steps
3 to 6 from the forensic steganalysis process described above would not be necessary. Regarding the
requirements, the approach would most likely have to be real-time capable, which make this approach
also difficult to implement in practice.
Summarising the considerations made here on steganographic schemes and their security, it has to
be highlighted that the basic approach of steganography by cover modification dominates this field
in research and corresponding literature. The practical considerations on security of steganographic
35Despite this generalisation, there exist a number of scientific publications (e.g. [Ker04]) which perform something
like quantitative steganalysis on simpler (i.e. non-adaptive) techniques to estimate the embedded payload size. It has to
be stated here that this form of analysis is outside the scope of this thesis.
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schemes, to be used within this thesis, are here a synonym for statistical detection and a successful
performance in forensic steganalysis. A successful application of steganalysis as a forensic method under
consideration of the Daubert criteria would require forensic process to be successfully completed, tying
the outcome of the steganalysis directly to the case at hand.
2.5.2 Identification of the state-of-the-art in (audio) steganalysis
To understand the research work currently going on in steganalysis, again some additional light has to
be shed on steganographic research. In the last few years there have been hundreds of scientific pub-
lications on digital steganalysis published every year. An recent statistic published in [Fridrich09] states
that in the IEEE publications alone in 2008 more than 200 papers have been published that contain in
their keywords either ‘steganography’ or ‘steganalysis’ – considering the facts that the market share of
the IEEE on scientific publications in this field is not so overwhelming and that the search criteria ap-
plied do not include ‘data hiding’ the estimated number of unreported publications might be far higher.
Another statistics presented in [Johnson08] and [Johnson98] reports for 2007 alone more than 450 newly
released steganographic software applications or new versions of such software. Even though most of
the steganography publications and tools focus on digital images (an estimated 56%, see [Fridrich09])
also digital audio material is considered by a fairly large share of approaches (an estimated 14.8%).
When analysing this fast-growing research field, nearly all tools implement steganography by cover
modification.
The number of scientific publications on steganography has grown so fast and numerous that by
2005 a new class of scientific publications in this field emerged in a large quantity: survey papers on
steganography and steganalysis. While a majority of these publications like [Cheddad10] and [Li11]
focus on image steganography (and steganalysis), others, like [Bandyopadhyay08], consider a wider
range of media including audio. Some, like [Jayaram11], [Nosrati12] and [Santhi12], focus entirely
on audio steganography. In [Meghanathan10] the authors claim to perform “the first comprehensive
survey” on audio and video steganalysis algorithms.
Existing audio steganography approaches and tools
From the existing literature, the different audio steganography approaches36 existing can be roughly
grouped in three classes:
• Time-domain (or natural domain; see the considerations on time-domain signals in section 2.3.1)
approaches
• Transform domain37 approaches
• Application format specific approaches
In time-domain embedding, the audio signal is directly modified. The most common approach is least
significant bit (LSB) modification, where only the last (least informative) bit is changed in each byte
(see e.g. [Bender96], [Katzenbeisser00]). Another early example is the echo hiding approach, which
adds an echo to the original signal to represent a bit from the secret message [Gruhl96]. In an original
echo hiding system, an attenuated and delayed copy of the original signal is added to itself, whereby
the actual delay determines the secret bit. For small delays, the human ear cannot distinguish between
the original signal and an echo. [Erfani07] propose a method for a more transparent echo hiding, where
the embedding transparency is investigated at the sender. This way, the sender can decide whether
an echo can be introduced and with which parametrisation. Hence, the signal distortion is minimised.
36Approaches that simply append their data to an audio file like in the case of the tool Data Stash (produced by
Skyjuice Software, Singapore; http://www.skyjuicesoftware.com/software/ds info.html) are in this thesis not considered
to be audio steganography approaches.
37Common transforms for audio material are: the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) which converts the signal in
frequency coefficients and corresponding phases, the discrete cosine transform (DCT), which converts the signal by using
a representation relying on two sets of frequency coefficients, and further, the discrete wavelet transform (DWT), which
transforms the audio signal into multiple frequency bands, supplying detail and approximation coefficients.
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Beside the echo, another important musical effect in time-domain is the reverberation. The scheme
from Nian et al. [Nian06] uses reverberation characteristics to represent a bit from the secret message.
In this approach two different artificial reverberation impulse responses, which are indistinguishable for
a human listener, are used to represent the ‘0’ and ‘1’ bits of the transmitted secret message.
An example for transform domain embedding could be modifying the phase information after a DFT
with a phase coding algorithm (e.g. Bender et al. [Bender96]; Kruus et al. [Kruus03]). After the mod-
ifications, all data has to be translated back to time-domain for transmission. Another approach for
transform domain embedding is the spread spectrum approach (e.g. [Matsuoka06]). Here the main
idea is to spread a representation of a steganographic signal with an originally low bandwidth over one
or multiple larger frequency bands. In general, algorithms working in a transform domain are more
complex than those working directly with the time-domain signal.
In the application format specific approaches, specific audio file or data stream format characteristics are
exploited to perform the steganographic embedding. For example Tian et al. [Tian09] construct three
different embedding schemes employing the characteristics of a G.729a codec, while Aoki in [Aoki08]
implements a steganographic system which exploits the actual representation of audio samples in the
G.711 µ-law signed linear Pulse-code modulation (PCM) (PCMU) technique.
Most curiously, the huge number of different audio steganography approaches presented in scientific
papers does not manifest itself into tools. There exist only a very limited number of available audio
steganography tools. An analysis of the two large web-repositories on steganography tools gives the
following figures:
• http://www.stegoarchive.com (last updated in January 2006):
– For Windows: 12 audio out of 50 (from these 12 are 4 commercial only)
– For Java implementations: 1 out of 11,
– For Mac 1 out of 3
– For Linux 3 out of 23
• http://stegtools.jjtc.com/ (publicly updateable list of steganographic tools as of Nov. 14th,
2010):
– 14 out of 105 tools are audio steganography schemes (6 out of these 14 are commercial
products)
Existing audio steganalysis approaches and tools
Considering the diversity in audio steganographic schemes found in literature, one would assume that
the steganalysis approaches as the counter-science would show the same diversity. But this assump-
tion is wrong. Except from some very few candidates (e.g. Westfeld and Pfitzmanns steganalysis using
visual attacks [Westfeld99]) nearly all perform statistical pattern recognition (SPR) – see the summary
on audio steganalysis techniques presented in [Meghanathan10].
Furthermore, most publications on steganography and steganalysis (e.g. [Li11]) trivialise the latter into
a simple two-class decision problem: either a data object is an unmodified cover or a stego object. The
normal way in literature to tackle this decision problem is to use supervised classification, first, to train
classifiers and, second, to compute the classification accuracies on known good (cover) and known bad
(stego) samples in artificially constructed evaluation sets with known classes for all objects. It is true
that such SPR-based approaches might be efficient for solving the steganalysis problem, but in practical
application it is less trivial (due to the facts that more one steganography tool exists and that most
of these tools allow for different parametrisations, influencing the pattern generated by the message
embedding) and to achieve reliable and plausible results is much harder. Most recent publications
on steganalysis (e.g. [Fridrich09]) acknowledge the need for formulating the steganalysis problem as a
multi-class problem.
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A further interesting point to be mentioned in the context of this thesis is the mismatch between
research and development/application of (commercial) tools in the field of steganalysis. For other
communication based threat scenarios in IT-security, like viruses/malware or email spam, a large range
of commercial detectors is available. But in steganalysis, it contrast to the hundreds or even thou-
sands of research publications focussing on this topic, only few open source or research demonstrator
steganalysers are found together with an even smaller number of commercial steganalysis detectors.
Most of the research demonstrators, like for example the Steg IDS38 written by Angela D. Orebaugh
at George Mason University in Fairfax (Virginia, USA) are still lacking maturity.
Also, for those few commercial tools available the focus of application is in many cases not statisti-
cal steganalysis but instead on system attacks39. In the context on this thesis it has to be explicitly
mentioned that the number of available tools for audio steganalysis is much smaller than for image
steganalysis. In fact it is limited to a small number of research prototypes.
Existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning the operation of methods
In general, forensic steganalysis setups would need to fulfil the criteria of the Daubert standard (see
section 2.2). Here, a strong discrepancy can be seen in the state-of-the-art in this field: The stan-
dard requires that the existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning the operation of
methods. But yet such standards, or even a significant number of field studies for this field, are missing.
One of the extremely rare examples, where steganalysis is applied in large scale field evaluations and is
reported upon in scientific publications, is the work of Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman in [Provos02].
In their paper, the authors criticise current state-of-the-art in steganalytical approaches at the point of
time of their publication (like [Farid01] and [Fridrich00]) as being practically infeasible, due to faulty
basic assumptions (two-class problem description and statistical overfitting to the training sets). In
contrast to these publications Provos and Honeyman construct a multi-class SPR-based image ste-
ganalysis detector called Stegdetect. Each candidate image is considered to be member of one of
four classes, either it is an unmodified cover image or it is the result of the application of one out of
three different steganographic tools (JSteg, JPHide and OutGuess 0.13b) which have been amongst
the state-of-the-art at this point of time. Stegdetect is then applied blindly (without knowledge about
the true class) to two million images downloaded from eBay auctions and one million images obtained
from USENET archives. As a result, Stegdetect implies that over 1% of all images seem to have
been steganographically altered (mostly by JPHide) and therefore contain hidden messages. Based on
these findings, Provos and Honeyman describe in [Provos02] also a second tool called Stegbreak for
plausibility considerations, i.e. for verifying the existence of messages hidden by JPHide in the images
identified by Stegdetect. Their verification approach is based on the assumption that at least some of
the passwords used as embedding key for the steganographic embedding are weak passwords40. Based
on this assumption, they implement for Stegbreak a dictionary attack using JPHide’s retrieval function
and large (about 1,800,000 words) multi-language dictionaries. This attack is applied to all images that
have been flagged as stego objects by the statistical analyses in Stegdetect.
To verify the correctness of their tools, Provos and Honeyman insert tracer images into every Stegbreak
job. As expected the dictionary attack finds the correct passwords for these tracer images. However,
they do not find any single genuine hidden message. In their paper, they offer four possible interpreta-
tions of this result, either: a) there is no significant use of steganography on the internet, b) they have
been analysing images from sources that are not used to carry steganographic content, c) nobody uses
steganographic systems that could be found with their detector, or d) all users of steganographic systems
carefully choose passwords that are not susceptible to dictionary attacks. Even though the result of this
large scale investigation is negative, the methodology and concepts behind the work in [Provos02] are
remarkable. Even more so, since they also perform throughput considerations (throughput for Stegde-
tect is given in Kilobit of images per seconds; the throughput for Stegbreak is given in words per second
38See: http://www.securityknox.com/Steg project.pdf
39The SARC steganalyser (see http://www.sarc-wv.com/products/stegalyzeras/) claims to detect the download and
installation of over 1126 steganography applications on Microsoft Windows computers.
40This reasoning is built on statistics presented for weak and strong passwords in [Klein90].
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for the dictionary attack) for their analysis tool-chain, something that is also strongly amiss in most
steganalysis publications.
Not exactly a field study, but lab studies (or closed-set experiments) to be mentioned in this context
are [Kharrazi05] and [Kharrazi06]. These publications do not only present classification accuracies com-
puted in image steganalysis benchmarking but also look into plausibility and complexity/throughput
issues. With these additional considerations they are much closer to fulfilling the Daubert criteria as
well as the necessities for practically applied steganalysis than most other publications in this field.
In [Kharrazi06] Kharrazi et al. evaluate seven different steganographic embedding techniques against
three established universal image steganalysis techniques on a cover data set of 100,000 randomly col-
lected JPEG grey-scale images of medium image quality. In their investigations, which are relevant
for the plausibility required in forensic application scenarios for steganalysis, they consider the effect
of different image properties (size, texture and source) as well as post-processing operations (compres-
sion and re-compression) on the performance of steganalysis techniques. Regarding the throughput
analysis, which would be important for an online setup for steganalysis, Kharrazi et al. present fig-
ures (in hours) for the embedding time required by the different steganographic algorithms as well as
the classifier times (training plus testing) in cross-validation on a given test set size and a given machine.
As a third research effort to be mentioned in this context, the BOSS (Break Our Steganography System;
see http://exile.felk.cvut.cz/boss/BOSSFinal/) was the first large scale, scientific and public challenge
on image steganalysis. This challenge, which has to be considered to be somewhere in between a field
study and a large lab experiment, was organised between September 2010 and January 2011 by Toma´sˇ
Pevny´ (University of Binghamton, USA), Toma´sˇ Filler (Technical University of Prague, Czech Republic)
and Patrick Bas (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Lille, France). The provided material
in the BOSS included: training databases containing cover- and stego images, the embedding algorithm
as tool and as algorithm description and a test set of 1,000 images of which it was unknown whether
they were cover or stego images. So far the setup is compliant to Kerckhoffs’ principle and might be
considered a plausible field study for steganalysis performance in application specific steganalysis. What
reduces the BOSS into the category of an experiment under laboratory conditions are the facts that: the
ratio between cover and stego objects was known to the attackers for the test set (the type of each image
(cover or stego) was chosen according to a Bernoulli process with equal probabilities for cover and stego
objects), the embedding rate was fixed for all stego objects (0.4 BPP) and that an oracle existed telling
upon submission the accuracy41 achieved. These conditions made the setup less realistic than the setup
used by Provos and Honeyman in [Provos02]. In summary of this largely popular challenge, for which
the log files have shown participation from 96 different researchers or research groups in the world, it
has to be stated that the best detection accuracy achieved in this evenly distributed two-class classifi-
cation setup has been 80.3% (see the official ranking on http://exile.felk.cvut.cz/boss/BOSSFinal/; for
a detailed description of the best performing steganalysis approach see [Fridrich11]) – a performance
which would without doubt lead to the exclusion by any judge of the used steganalysis result in forensic
testimony.
In comparison to the three studies summarised above, the majority of the steganalysis research is
much further away from the requirements on the existence and maintenance of standards and controls
concerning the operation of methods. This is especially true for the field of audio steganalysis. This
fact is strongly supported in [Meghanathan10] where the authors attribute the current immaturity of
audio steganalysis to “the existence of advanced audio steganography schemes and the very nature of
audio signals to be high-capacity data streams”.
Figures on achieved detection performances
As mentioned above, most scientific publications trivialise steganalysis into a simple two-class decision
problem and focus on reporting classification accuracies for supervised classification obtained under
targeted steganalysis evaluation setups. The reported detection performance (i.e. in nearly all cases
41Including mechanisms to prevent the solving of the challenge by simple iterative guessing and checking.
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the classification accuracy), achieved under laboratory conditions, is often close to 100%. On the
other hand, there exist information theoretic proofs that perfectly secure (i.e. statistically undetectable)
steganography systems can exist (see e.g. [Herrera-Joancomarti07], [Katzenbeisser00]). The neces-
sary proofs are not repeated here, but it has to be stated that such a perfectly secure steganographic
system is hardly practical since a steganalyser would become sceptical when intercepting the random
messages required for establishing the security. These two contradicting facts – good performance in
targeted steganalysis under laboratory conditions for practical steganography schemes on one hand and
the proof for the potential existence of perfectly undetectable steganography on the other hand – show
how far away steganalysis in general is from ever becoming a Daubert-conform media forensics approach.
Regarding the performance of steganalysis on terms of throughput, which would be sine qua non for
any online application scenario for steganalysis but is also of importance for any forensic investigation42,
it has to be stated that except for a selected few (e.g. [Provos02], [Kharrazi06]) hardly any scientific
publication looks into this factor. Nevertheless, some authors include considerations that aim directly
or indirectly at the reduction the complexity of the classification task and thereby the improvement of
the throughput. A good example for this class of publications is [Miche06] where the authors perform
a feature selection in a statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based steganalysis approach.
Besides the tool-driven perspective on achievable detection performances, a completely different view
on the plausibility of stenography and steganalysis is presented in [Givner-Forbes07]. Here, not the
forensic considerations of the Daubert standard are in the focus of the evaluation of steganalytical
method, but instead instructions are given for potential end-users on how to evaluate the actual
security of existing steganographic tools. Following the instructions, it is simple to identify all tools that
are not compliant with Kerckhoffs’ principle. Furthermore, basic techniques are explained that allow
estimating the perceptual and statistical impact of steganography by modification for steganographic
tools. Also, the influence of strong encryption prior to embedding and other considerations to achieve a
higher degree of communication security (i.e. making successful steganalysis much harder) are discussed.
Summarising the state-of-the-art in steganalysis as presented in this section, it has to be said that most
of the work found in literature so far is limited to investigations on the performance against individual
steganographic algorithms (i.e. steganalytical benchmarking of steganography approaches), not on con-
siderations as a global forensic security mechanism that could be implemented and applied online as a
tool or in forensic investigations. The majority of approaches are statistical pattern recognition (SPR)
based and the complete research field of audio steganalysis is far away from showing any compliance to
the Daubert standards. Additionally, it has to be mentioned again in this summary that, while there are
virtually hundreds of scientific papers published on audio steganography and steganalysis, the number
of actually available audio steganography and steganalysis tools is extremely small.
2.5.3 Principal methods and concepts employed in the state-of-the-art in
audio steganalysis
For the different sets of goals for steganalysis (application specific steganalysis, universal audio ste-
ganalysis and steganography or steganalysis benchmarking) and the possible setups (online- as well
as forensic) the following methodology considerations are currently made by the stat-of-the-art: The
patterns observed in nearly all existing steganalysis approaches are the modifications made in the
embedding process of steganography by cover modification schemes. As highlighted in section 2.5.2,
the majority of the approaches are driven by statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based detectability
analysis. Therefore, the input in most approaches is under lab conditions generated training and test
sets of cover and stego objects. The only noticeable exception to be mentioned here is the work by
Provos and Honeyman in [Provos02], where the test set is ‘taken from the wild’ instead of being an
artificial construct (see section 2.5.2).
42In theory a forensic analysis might be unbound in time and invested effort, but in practical forensic investigations,
e.g. by police investigators, the time and effort that can be allocated for one case is usually strongly limited.
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For the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based approaches, the evaluated pre-processing oper-
ations include in most cases windowing, due to the fact that most feature extractors include also
transform domain features.
Some authors also use more sophisticated pre-processing to generate the supposedly ‘unmarked’ refer-
ences required to build the classifier models. Examples to be mentioned here are the work of Xue-Min
Ru et al. [Ru05] where the references are reconstructed via linear predictive coding, benefiting from
the very nature of the continuous wave-based audio signals or from O¨zer et al. [O¨zer03] as well as
Avcibas [Avcibas06] by using a de-noising functions. Besides the pre-processing required for these
self-generated reference signal based approaches, some other approaches found in literature employ
even more complex pre-processing operations. An example for such an approach is the work by Micah
K. Johnson et al. [Johnson05], where the authors use the pre-processing to perform a dimensionality
reduction of the signal by application of a principal component analysis in training to generate a low
dimensional linear basis. In the pre-processing in testing the analysed signal is projected onto the linear
basis.
Regarding feature design approaches that can be applied to audio steganalysis, two main approaches
can be identified here: Intuition-based feature design, which to be successful requires expert knowledge
on the domain covered, or the transfer of features from other (similar) problem domains.
For the intuition-based feature design, a good example would be the usage of LSB features to detect
LSB steganography, like in [Dittmann05] where the impact of LSB modification-based features (LSB-
ratio and LSB-change ratio) are used to implement a steganalysis system. Another interesting approach
in this class is proposed in [Johnson05] where the root mean square errors between frequency-domain
representations of the signal and their projections onto a linear basis formed by a principal component
analysis (PCA) form an error distribution from which the first four statistical moments are used as
feature vector.
To design features for one application field by transfer of concepts from other problem domains is also
a rather common methodology. An example in audio steganalysis that should be mentioned here is the
usage of Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) based features in [Kraetzer07a]. These features
originate in biometric speaker recognition and are transferred successfully from their original application
domain to audio steganalysis. In case of the MFCCs, these features have been further developed and
extended due to their good performance in audio steganalysis. Examples for feature sets derived from
the original MFCCs are the band-pass filtered version (FMFCCs) introduced in [Kraetzer07a] and the
2nd order derivative MFCCs from [Liu09].
In general, the resulting features from these design approaches could be either local features, global
features or segmental features (see section 2.4.2) with or without using higher-level content analysis.
It has to be noted that for audio signals with their high data rate the usage of local features is rather
uncommon. Instead segmental features are used in most cases.
Regardless of which feature design approach is applied and which kind of features is generated, subse-
quent feature selection (see section 2.4.3) should be used to validate the significance of all elements
in the feature vector and, if necessary, eliminate insignificant features. Results of applied feature selec-
tion in steganalysis, like e.g. [Miche06], show that it is often possible to reduce the complexity of the
classification problem at hand by feature reduction while at the same time maintaining the same or at
least similar classification accuracies.
Regarding the resulting template or model sizes, the impact of the steganographic embedding is
usually represented either as feature vectors extracted from the audio signal or as completely trained
statistical model. The first case is more likely since it allows a dynamic adaptation of the detector (e.g.
by adding/enrolling new steganographic algorithms). The latter case, the storage of trained models,
is less flexible but would be faster in field application since the necessary and time consuming process
of generating a classifier model from the feature vectors has already been performed. Especially in
an online setup, the latter alternative would be much preferred due to the performance (throughput)
requirements of such a setup. Here, a bank of detectors (one for each algorithm that might be used)
trained as two-class detectors would be the most likely scenario.
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If the feature vectors are used to represent an algorithm, then the number of feature vectors and their
dimensionality define the size of the model size. If trained models are used for the representation of
algorithms then the size is determined by the input used in the model generation process and the way
the classifier model is represented/stored.
In general it has to be mentioned that the model sizes tend to be rather large (due to the high di-
mensionalities of the feature spaces used and the large number of windows that have to be considered
for representing the wide range of possible audio signals sufficiently) despite no figures on the exact
model sizes are presented in literature. An interesting exception from the large model sizes rule is
presented in [Johnson05] where the size is reduced by the performed dimensionality reduction of the
signal considered and the resulting extremely small feature vector dimensionality.
As mentioned in section 2.5.2, the majority of the steganalysis approaches found in literature follows the
pattern recognition (PR) approach of statistical pattern recognition (SPR). Regarding the closely
related question of the classification approaches to be used, there are two different schools of thought
found in literature: modelling the steganalysis as a two-class classification problem, which is done by the
majority of authors, or describing practically applied steganalysis as a multi-class classification problem.
For the first approach for practical applications a set of specifically trained (i.e. application specific) ste-
ganalysis detectors would be operated in a parallel setup. The classifiers of choice for most publications
that follow this trend are classical two-class classifiers like e.g. support vector machines (SVMs). For
the latter (universal) approach a multi-class classifier is used e.g. in [Provos02] for assigning one input
candidate to exactly one class out of a set of predefined classes (here steganographic tools/schemes).
The multi-class approach is assumed to show problems if it comes to the scaling of this approach.
Especially for a large number of classes (steganographic embedding schemes) to be distinguished, the
high dimensionality of the feature space required to represent all these embedding impacts together with
the large number of training samples for statistically significant models will make the model extremely
complex. As a result the classification based on this model would be rather slow.
In contrast to such a complex model, a network of two-class classifiers might be easier to construct and
maintain. It would feature the trends in modern computing machines, i.e. multi-processor / multi-core
as well as parallel-, grid- and cloud-computing. Also the integration of new steganalysis tools to the
repository of the steganalysis toolset would be much easier – in case of the multi-class approach such a
scaling would result in the necessity to update the complex ‘global’ model. It is imaginable that future
work on steganalysis might combine networks of two-class classifiers with multi-class classifiers, e.g. to
use the first ones to identify the embedding method/domain (e.g. time-domain LSB replacement) and
the latter ones to identify the actual tool that was used to embed the data.
When steganalysis is considered to be a forensic security mechanism solving a data integrity verification
problem, it would have to undergo extensive empirical evaluations to meet the Daubert requirements
(see section 2.2) connected to forensic investigations. Problems arise for steganalysis in this context
especially from three major points of the Daubert factors: the number of existing empirical investiga-
tions, the error rates associated to the methods have to be known (precisely and plausibly) and the
current lack of standards and controls concerning the (implementation and) operation of steganalytical
methods.
Regarding the first and second of these points, so far only one large-scale ‘in field’ empirical investiga-
tion is known to the author for the entire field of steganalysis. Besides the investigation of Provos and
Honeyman in [Provos02], which had to be concluded with a rather unsatisfying end (no steganographic
message was successfully extracted from three million images under suspicion), hundreds of publications
exist on detectability benchmarking for steganography algorithms, where detection accuracies close to
100% are presented under lab conditions. The plausibility of these steganographic detectability bench-
marking approaches is so far not completely addressed. Only few publications so far (e.g. Kharrazi et al.
in [Kharrazi06], see section 2.5.2) consider the impact of typical, non-malicious signal post-processing
operations. An even smaller number of publications considers active countermeasures against steganal-
ysis (as discussed e.g. in [Orsdemir08]) in their work.
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Regarding the performance indicators required in the necessary empirical evaluations, so far the
(classification or matching) accuracy dominates in the existing literature. It is used extensively in the
supervised classifications performed in steganographic setups under lab conditions. Few authors use
in their publications other metrics such as the precision and the ROC (the Receiver Operation Char-
acteristic curve of a transmission system; see [Li11]), the AUR (area under ROC; see [Kharrazi06]),
specific points on the ROC curve (see [Fridrich09]) or a combination of accuracy and false-positive
rate [Johnson05].
The only existing scientifically published upon real life steganalysis [Provos02] has no suitable detection
performance indicators for the performed ‘in the wild’ study, but analyses the throughput of the system.
Similar throughput analyses are performed by Kharrazi et al. in [Kharrazi06], where the authors present
figures (in hours) for the embedding time required by the different steganographic algorithms as well
as the classifier times (combined and training and testing) in cross-validation on a given test set size
and a given machine.
Summarising the principal methods and concepts employed in the state-of-the-art in audio steganalysis,
is has to be mentioned that statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based two-class classification setups
in closed-set experiments dominate the research in this field. Promising extensions to such setups (like
work on information fusion) are as rare as the usage of advanced, comparable performance metrics
or the considerations required for forensic setups (e.g. plausibility analyses), which are considered a
necessarily within this thesis.
2.6 State-of-the-art in microphone forensics
This section summarises the state-of-the-art in the application scenario of microphone forensics. The
existing alternative approaches are identified and their basic principles, prospects and constraints are
described in detail. This is done to build the basis for the development of the methodology for this
thesis in chapter 3 and to allow in section 6.5.2 for comparisons between the existing state-of-the-art
and the newly developed approach for microphone forensics.
Parts of this section build upon basics introduced in section 2.2 and 2.4.
The goals for microphone forensics, as it is considered within this thesis, can be described best by
the specification of the addressed security aspects and the considered media data: The addressed
security aspects are: reliable, a-posteriori source authenticity and integrity verification43 of (never com-
pressed) PCM encoded audio recordings in CD quality, without side-information on the signal. This
translates to a security mechanism solving the source authentication problem, which is the main task
in microphone forensics.
The following overview over the state-of-the-art approaches for microphone forensics is generated based
on four different types of activities:
1. An analysis of corresponding publications registered in the well established Digital Forensic
Database (DFD)44
2. An analysis of the deliverables of the EU FP7 research project REWIND45 (REVerse engineering
of audio-Visual content Data)
3. A review of the few currently existing survey papers compiled by criminal investigators and re-
searchers on this field, starting with early works like [Owen88], [Bijhold07] and [Maher10] (which
still put a strong emphasis on analogue audio signals). The later surveys considered in the prepara-
tion of this overview of the state-of-the-art (e.g. [Brixen07], [Rumsey08], [Koenig09], [Tibbitts09],
43Here: Verification of consistency of global (i.e. recording source intrinsic and content independent) phenomena against
audio stream composition from multiple sources.
44http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/ farid/dfd/index.php/topics – maintained by Hany Farid at the Computer Science
Department of Dartmouth College (Hanover, NH, USA)
45http://www.rewindproject.eu/
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[Maher10] and [Gupta12]) mostly, or entirely, focus on forensic audio signal analysis on digital
signals.
4. An intensive search on additional microphone forensics related publications not covered by the
first three types
Currently46, according to the information gathered from these sources, the existing approaches in this
field can be classified into three classes: side-information based authenticity and integrity analyses using
the electric network frequency (ENF) of a recording setup, content-based consistency analyses on local
phenomena found in the time-domain representation of a recording and a microphone response based
pattern recognition. In the following section 2.6.1 the current state-of-the-art approaches for these
three classes are introduced in detail. The principal methodologies and basic concepts are compared
in section 2.6.2. The structure of this section is based on the design of a pattern recognition (PR)
pipeline for statistical pattern recognition (SPR) or template matching and contains considerations on:
the patterns observed, the required input signals, pre-processing, feature design and selection, template
or model sizes. The descriptions are made under the consideration of the most dominant pattern
recognition approaches applied in this field and the different classification approaches. The descriptions
are concluded by observations on the assessment under the Daubert criteria and performance indicators.
2.6.1 Identification of the state-of-the-art in microphone forensics
The oldest and most widely published-upon approach for microphone forensics is the electric network
frequency (ENF) based approach [Grigoras03]. It is based on the realisation that, when digital
equipment with an AC power supply (i.e. is not battery powered) is used to record an audio signal, the
50/60 Hz47 ENF as well as its harmonics become part of the recorded signal. The reason for this is
that digital equipment normally lacks ideal voltage regulators and perfect shielding.
The investigations in [Grigoras03] on the ENF show that is displays variations in the form of fluctuations
of up to ± 0.6 Hz. Its spectrogram shows that the ENF with these fluctuations is a continuous function.
The microphone (or rather digital recording setup) forensics approach in [Grigoras03] proposes to con-
stantly measure the ENF within a power grid and store its development over time in a reference
database. This registered ENF is then used as side information on the influence imposed to recording
equipment by this electronic phenomenon and therefore for assessing the authenticity and integrity of
digital audio/video evidence (see e.g. [Grigoras07]). Selected state-of-the-art publications on ENF-based
microphone forensics are [Cooper08], [Grigoras05], [Grigoras07] and [Nicolalde09]. Newer publications
like e.g. [Rodr´ıguez10] shift the focus from authentication of audio signals towards precise integrity
verification on the basis of ENF discontinuity analysis.
The complete electro-physical requirements for this approach are summarised in a corresponding
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) standard ([Grigoras09]). The core func-
tionalities of this approach can be summarised as a pre-registration (template generation) for the ENF
at the recording location, extraction of ENF-related features from the recorded signal and a correlation
based template matching of the feature vector against the pre-registered ENF side-information.
However, some existing drawbacks of the approach are limiting its field application:
1. This approach does not work for the devices which use direct current (DC) power supply, such as
typical handheld recording devices (either audio only or audio and video, like in video cameras)
or mobile phones, which are powered by batteries.
2. In [Brixen08a] it is implied that certain types of microphones are immune to electromagnetic
fields (and their changes). In combination with point 1 above, recordings by such microphones
would not show any ENF traces (neither from the recording equipment nor picked-up from the
surrounding environment).
46As of October 2012
47In most parts of the world either 50 or 60 Hz electric network frequencies are used, depending on the national
regulations.
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3. As described in [Grigoras09], the standard approach requires a precise database documenting ENF
features at all possible recording locations for the authentication. Constructing such a database
requires tremendous work, and as the ENF features might change due to even the slightest
adjustment of the power supplying devices, the database would need constant update.
4. The database-based authentication works for devices powered by normal public power supply, yet
it does not work if the recording location uses its own power source or uninterruptible power
supply, which is not monitored by sensors connected to the forensic database.
5. It is shown in [Grigoras09] that the approach does not work well with the recorded evidence after
lossy encoding, such as GSM or MP3 encoding.
6. The approach would work fine with common speech recordings as the ENF is usually outside of
the bandwidth occupied in the signal spectrum by human speech, however if the signal has strong
frequency components in the frequency band covering the ENF (e.g. background music), it is
highly probable that the approach would fail.
7. It does not allow for the authentication of legacy content for which no ENF template exists.
For a more complete analysis of the ENF approach for source authentication the author refers to
[Grigoras09], [Brixen08a] and [REW11].
The second class of approaches to be mentioned here is the time-domain and local phenomena
based evaluations. In 2010 Malik and Farid [Malik10] described a technique to model and estimate
the amount of reverberation in an audio recording by correlation based template matching. Because
reverberation depends on the shape and composition of a room, differences in the estimated reverber-
ation can be used in a forensic setting for location-based authentication (and/or integrity verification
against composition of audio material from multiple source recordings). The computed consistency of
the reverberation behaviour can be considered as a special kind of global feature, even though it is based
on local phenomena. However, it might not be extractable in each recording, since it is strongly content
dependant. Additionally, there exist a wide range of environments which do not display the required
constant reverberation behaviour (e.g. any outdoor recording location as well as crowded places). Thus,
the application of this approach is seriously limited, or as summarised by [Gupta12]: “Currently, this
measure has been successfully applied to synthesized audio with assumptions that cannot be fulfilled by
most real-world signals. Thus, it needs to be generalized for a wider range of applications.” Its appli-
cation is further hindered by signal post-processing operations (e.g. blind de-reverberation) performed
in many application scenarios, like audio / video conferencing, hands-free telephone, etc – see [REW11].
The third alternative approach is the microphone response based pattern recognition (PR) ap-
proach. In 2005, Oermann et al. indicated in their theoretical work [Oermann05] that an identification
of a microphone as source of a recording might be possible, based on the observation that two differ-
ent microphone cause noticeable differences in the recorded spectra of the same sound. It has to be
mentioned here that the authors of [Oermann05] performed no practical implementation of their idea.
A practical realisation and evaluation of this approach can be found in the work by Daniel Garcia-Romero
and Carol Espy-Wilson in [Garcia-Romero10], where the authors develop a GMM based template match-
ing to implement automatic acquisition device identification on speech recordings. The main motivation
behind their source authentication work is the realisation that the determination of the microphone
would improve the performance of speaker recognition approaches. In their evaluations with two sets
each comprising of eight microphones48 they achieve classification accuracies higher than 90 percent.
If these results would be generalisable, this would allow for a reliable selection of microphone-specific
speaker recognition models and thereby would assumedly result in an increase of the performance of
the subsequent speaker recognition.
The most interesting part of the approach by Garcia-Romero et al. is the generation of the template
for each microphone, which allows for an extremely compact and recording length independent repre-
sentation of the microphone response based recording influences. The main drawback of this approach
48A low quality set of eight telephone handsets and a normal quality set of microphones.
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is that, while it assumedly works quite well on speech signals, it is determined to fail on other, more
complex audio signals. Publications like [Dufaux01] and [Moncrieff06] show (for foreground and back-
ground audio signals respectively) that, for audio complex signals, even complex GMM (with a high
number of Gaussian components) do not succeed in adequately solving the high diversity of the signal.
Another (but less severe) drawback of this approach is that it does not allow for integrity verification
by any means due to the extreme information reduction in the template generation process.
Another practical realisation and evaluation of the microphone response based pattern recognition ap-
proach is the work of Malik and Miller in [Malik12]. In this paper the authors perform threshold based
template matching using first- and higher-order statistics of estimated Hu moments to implement mi-
crophone authentication. Unfortunately, the paper lacks the necessary detail in the description of the
setup of the performed practical investigations which does not allow the reader to speculate on the
plausibility of the 100% detection accuracy reported for a test set of 8 microphones.
The author of this thesis is currently not aware of any further alternatives in literature addressing
this research field. Nevertheless, besides these three existing classes of alternative approaches for
microphone forensics, there exists scientific work in fields that can be considered to be closely related
to microphone forensics, mainly in benchmarking and quality assurance, e.g. in microphone impulse
response and distortion measurement (see for example [Farina00]). Nevertheless, none of this work
is currently capable of authenticating individual recording sources / microphones. Therefore these
publications are excluded from the scope of this thesis.
2.6.2 Principal methods and concepts employed in the state-of-the-art in
microphone forensics
For solving the source authentication problem, the patterns observed in the recorded material by the
three existing practical approaches introduced in section 2.6.1 are expressed explicitly as templates.
Regarding the pattern analysis it has to be stated that the input for all three classes of approaches is
different:
• The electric network frequency (ENF) approach requires for the authentication an audio recording
and the previously registered ENF templates. The ENF templates have to be extracted from the
power grid by using a special purpose sensor. For integrity verification it is implied (but only
recently evaluated to some extend, see e.g. [Rodr´ıguez10]) that only the audio file would be
required.
• For Malik and Farid’s ([Malik10]) time-domain and local phenomena based evaluations only the
audio file is required for integrity verification. For authentication the reverberation behaviour in
the recording would have to be matched against a database of previously registered reverberation
templates.
• For the microphone response based template matching approach by Garcia-Romero et al.
([Garcia-Romero10]) the forensic authentication requires at least recordings from the evaluated
microphone for training (generation of the template) as well as recordings from a statistically sig-
nificant number of other microphones, because the matching in their publication is not performed
on a distance metric and threshold basis, but by using support vector machines (SVMs). Under
ideal circumstances for the forensic authentication the investigator has access to the evaluated
microphone and can make the reference recordings in a controlled environment. As already men-
tioned in section 2.6.1 no means of integrity verification are possible for this approach.
In Malik and Miller [Malik12] a threshold-based template matching is performed. Since no ‘world
model’ is created here, the approach would only need samples from the microphone to be verified
and a suitable threshold. It would not necessarily require a significant number of samples from
other microphones to perform its task.
The pre-processing currently used in microphone forensics is either content-based as in the approach
of Malik and Farid (where the content is analysed for portions of the time-domain signal where the
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reverberation can be extracted) or content-insensitive like in the ENF-based approach or the micro-
phone response based template matching approach by in [Garcia-Romero10]. For the ENF approaches
the pre-processing is performed by band pass filtering (see [Brixen08b]). For the microphone response
based template matching the pre-processing consists of a simple windowing (in [Garcia-Romero10] with
Hamming windows of a length of 20ms with 50% overlap; in [Malik12] with Dirichlet windows of a
length of 4s with 50% overlap).
Regarding feature design approaches that can be applied to microphone forensics, two main ap-
proaches can be identified here: Intuition-based feature design, which to be successful requires expert
knowledge on the domain covered, or the transfer of features from other (similar) problem domains.
For the intuition-based feature design, a good example is the correlation-based feature of Malik and
Farid [Malik10] use for their approach. It is computing the consistency of local phenomena (here the
reverberation behaviour) within one file.
To design features for one application field by transfer of concepts from other problem domains is also
a rather common methodology. Examples in microphone forensics can be seen in the ENF-based ap-
proach, where the used global feature (the consistency of the ENF artefacts extracted from a recording
with the original ENF for the recording position and time supplied to the verification as side informa-
tion) originates from evaluations on electromagnetic compatibility and sampling problems in electrical
engineering. Another good example for the feature transfer from one domain to another is the usage
of the GMMs by Garcia-Romero et al. in [Garcia-Romero10], where the concept originates in biometric
speaker recognition. In the work of Malik and Miller ([Malik12]) the used scale invariant Hu moments
are transferred to this problem from the domain of image analysis.
The resulting features from the ENF approach are local features (ENF value at a given sample point).
The features for Malik and Farid’s approach from [Malik10] can be considered on two different logical
levels: either, as a special form of segment-wise computed complex feature using higher-level content
analysis (the reverberation behaviour in portion of the time-domain signal where the reverberation can
be extracted), or as a global feature (a typical reverberation behaviour for a complete audio file and its
consistency for this file). For the approaches of Garcia-Romero et al. ([Garcia-Romero10]) and Malik
and Miller ([Malik12]) the features are first computed segment-wise and then merged into one global
feature template.
Regardless of which feature design approach is applied and which kind of features is generated, subse-
quent feature selection (see section 2.4.3) should be used to validate the significance of all elements
in the feature vector and, if necessary, eliminate insignificant features. For the ENF approaches such a
feature selection is performed in [Brixen08b] where the author has to summarise the usability of the ENF
features as: “In praxis, approximately 40-60% of the digital recordings in question contain traceable
ENF”. For the time-domain and local phenomena based evaluations of Malik and Farid in [Malik10],
feature selection operations are not published jet, but it has to be assumed that the features show similar
usefulness as the estimation of Eddy B. Brixen on the ENF feature. In [Garcia-Romero10] Garcia-Romero
et al. perform for the intermediate features a wrapper-based selection on different speech recording sets
to show that their approach of using GMMs and the choices made in implementation and parametri-
sation are justified for this kind of audio material and the evaluated microphones. In [Malik12] the
authors show scatter plots of their features and compare these visually, deriving the statement that: “It
can be observed [...] that there are significant inter- as well as intraclass variations [...]”
Regarding the resulting template or model sizes, Grigoras reports in [Grigoras05] a template size of
7384.68 MB for 365 days per monitored power grid. The template here scales linearly with the recorded
time. For the Malik and Farid approach in [Malik10], no exact figures exist for the template size,
but the template is assumed to consist of several kilobytes of audio signal per microphone/recoding
location (i.e. reverberation pattern) combination – under the assumption that the combination displays
a constant reverberation behaviour (see section 2.6.1). For the microphone response based template
matching approach by Garcia-Romero et al. no precise template size is mentioned in [Garcia-Romero10],
but it is of a fixed length (“This procedure results in a fixed-length template to represent variable-length
speech recordings.” [Garcia-Romero10]) and is has to be assumed that it is relatively small, since it
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only depends on the number of used Gaussian components. For [Malik12] also the template sizes are
assumed to be rather small, due to the high abstraction of the audio signal.
Based on the observed pattern and the feature vectors used, a suitable pattern recognition (PR)
approach has to be chosen. In the field of microphone forensics, all existing practical approaches in-
troduced in section 2.6.1 are implementing template matching. All use characteristics which must be
clearly separable from the recorded content for these approaches to work (see the descriptions on the
content limitations for the three approaches in section 2.6.1).
Closely following the question on the used pattern recognition (PR) approach is the question about
the classification approaches to be used. In general, the main problem in microphone forensics is
source authentication. Therefore, it is a classical multi-class classification problem assigning one input
candidate to exactly one class out of a set of predefined classes. For the template matching based
approaches in microphone forensics, this multi-class classification problem is either solved fast and effi-
ciently by correlation-/distance-based classification ([Malik10]), by distance-based multiple hypothesis
testing [Malik12], or, in case of the work of Garcia-Romero et al. ([Garcia-Romero10]), by using a
matrix of fast linear SVMs with one model for each partition.
Regarding the performance indicators required in empirical evaluation, so far the (classification
or matching) accuracy dominates in the existing literature. It is used in the supervised classifi-
cations/matchings performed in the ENF analyses and in the evaluations by Garcia-Romero et al.
([Garcia-Romero10]) as well as in [Malik12]. Malik and Farid in [Malik10] do not use any performance
indicator, since this publication does not perform any empirical evaluations on their concept.
For the work on the ENF approach considerations on its plausibility are found in the existing literature
– most prominently published by E.B. Brixen (see e.g. [Brixen08b] and [Brixen08a]). For the other two
classes of approaches presented above, the usage of plausibility indicators is completely missing in the
literature. Common audio signal post-processing operations (like normalisation, blind de-reverberation,
etc.) as acknowledged by [REW11] are completely ignored in the evaluations performed. Due to the
inherent insensitivity of template matching approaches to counter-forensics or anti-forensics methods,
it has to be assumed that all these approaches are furthermore very easily affected by such targeted
attack methods.
Regardless of the approach chosen to implement microphone forensics since the target output is a
forensic security mechanism solving a source authentication problem, it should undergo an assessment
under the Daubert criteria as they are summarised in section 2.2. Table 2.1 shows the authors
assessment of the existing approaches introduced above for the state-of-the-art in this field.
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Table 2.1: Using the Daubert criteria (see section 2.2) for assessment of the existing microphone forensics ap-
proaches
electric network
frequency (ENF)
time-domain local
phenomena (rever-
berations)
microphone response based pattern
recognition
Initial publication: Initial publication: Initial publication: Initial publication:
[Grigoras03] [Malik10] [Garcia-Romero10] [Malik12]
FREC0: the expert’s
scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowl-
edge will help the trier of
fact to understand the
evidence or to determine
a fact in issue
criteria, that cannot be answered in general, because they are related to the
specific court case under consideration
FREC1: the investiga-
tion is based upon suf-
ficient facts or data
FREC2: the investi-
gation is based upon
reliable principles and
methods, preferably sci-
entific methodology and
knowledge
Rather ma-
ture, considered
in [Bijhold07]
Only a concept not
tested
Pattern recognition
/ template match-
ing
Pattern recognition
/ template match-
ing
FREC3: the methods
are reliably applied to
the facts at hand
criterion, that cannot be answered in general, because it is related to the specific
court case under consideration
DC1: “whether the ex-
pert’s technique or the-
ory can be or has been
tested”
yes, large scale
tests (see
e.g. [Grigoras05])
no yes, limited closed-
set experiments
(two sets with eight
microphones each)
yes, limited closed-
set experiments
(one set with eight
microphones)
DC2: “whether the
technique or theory has
been subject to peer re-
view and publication”
Publication count:
>20
Publication count:
1
Publication count:
1
Publication count:
1
DC3: “the known or po-
tential rate of error of
the technique or theory
when applied”
for ideal circum-
stances the error
rate for authentica-
tion is known, for
integrity verification
it is not known
under non-ideal
circumstances (see
e.g. [Brixen08b])
or even under the
assumption of
counter-forensics
the rates are not
known
no only for two small
sets and under ideal
(speech only) cir-
cumstances
only for a small set
and under ideal (en-
vironmental noise
generated with a
12-inch fan only)
circumstances
DC4: “the existence
and maintenance of
standards and controls”
European Network
of Forensic Science
Institutes (ENFSI)
Forensic Speech
and Audio Anal-
ysis Working
Group (FSAAWG)
guidelines on ENF
analysis in foren-
sic authentication
of digital evi-
dence [Grigoras09]
no no no
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
electric network
frequency (ENF)
time-domain local
phenomena (rever-
berations)
microphone response based pattern
recognition
DC5: “whether the
technique or theory has
been generally accepted
in the scientific commu-
nity”
supporting argu-
ments: large num-
ber of publications
and citations, ap-
plied also for video
recordings, docu-
ment [Bijhold07]
compiled by forensic
experts from dif-
ferent police forces
for an INTERPOL
Forensic Science
Symposium – op-
posing arguments:
context dependency,
does not work for
DC powered de-
vices, [Brixen08b]:
“In praxis, approx-
imately 40-60% of
the digital record-
ings in question
contain traceable
ENF”
supporting ar-
guments: none
known – oppos-
ing arguments:
context depen-
dency, [Gupta12]:
“Currently, this
measure has been
successfully applied
to synthesized audio
with assumptions
that cannot be
fulfilled by most
real-world sig-
nals”. [REW11]:
hindered by com-
mon signal post-
processing oper-
ations (e.g. blind
de-reverberation)
performed in many
application sce-
narios, like audio
/ video confer-
encing, hands-free
telephone, etc
supporting argu-
ments: none known
– opposing argu-
ments: context
dependency (speech
only)
supporting argu-
ments: none known
– opposing argu-
ments: only tested
with one kind of
recording content
(environmental
noise generated
with a 12-inch fan)
Regarding three of the four criteria that are derived directly from the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
rule 702 (FREC0, FREC1 and FREC3) no statement can be given here, since these are investigation
related criteria, that cannot be answered in general. For FREC2 it can be stated that only the ENF
method has currently reached a degree of maturity that allows assigning a certain reliability. For this
reason it is the only method for the authentication of digital audio material considered in [Bijhold07].
For the first of the criteria that is derived from the Daubert standard (DC1) it has to be said that only
the ENF approach so far underwent substantial empirical testing (see table 2.1).
All approaches have been published upon (Daubert criterion DC2) in reviewed conference proceedings
or journals, but only for the ENF approach so far a larger number of scientific publications by different
authors from different research organisations exist.
Regarding the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied (DC3) the
following has to be stated for the approaches:
• For authentication purposes the accuracy achieved in the experiments performed by Grigoras on
the ENF approach is close to 100%, even on large test sets. For the integrity verification no
figures are given, yet. What has been neglected in the empirical evaluations on this approach
so far is an analysis of its content dependency, especially on the fact whether the ENF can be
extracted from every kind of recording. This has to be doubted for music, because the frequency
band in which the ENF is present would in this case also contain part of the recorded content
(see e.g. [Brixen08b]). Also common audio signal post-processing operations like de-noising or
MP3-conversion are assumed to disable any ENF based authentication or integrity verification
attempt.
• The approach of Malik and Farid [Malik10] is at the point of the submission of this thesis only a
concept lacking any empirical evaluations. Here evaluations on the context dependency as well
as the required environmental conditions for a stable/usable reverberation behaviour would be
necessary. This approach is assumed to be robust against simple audio signal post-processing op-
erations like de-noising or MP3-conversion (although this is not explicitly mentioned in [Malik10].
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• The approach by Garcia-Romero et al. in [Garcia-Romero10] is evaluated on two sets of eight
microphones each and shows on these test sets an accuracy better that 90%. Nevertheless,
here also investigations on the context dependency seem necessary. The same holds true for the
approach presented by Malik and Miller in [Malik12].
The question about the existence and maintenance of standards and controls (DC4) can only be an-
swered positively for the ENF approach. Here, the performed evaluations and the applicability of this
approach are substantiated by the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) Forensic
Speech and Audio Analysis Working Group (FSAAWG) guidelines on ENF analysis in forensic authen-
tication of digital evidence [Grigoras09].
For the hard to assess DC5 (the acceptance in the scientific community), only supporting and opposing
arguments can be summarised here. For the ENF approach there exist a lot of supporting arguments
(the large number of publications form different authors, the large number of citations – amongst others
in [Malik10], the fact that it is also applied for video recording forensics, the document [Bijhold07] com-
piled by forensic experts from different police forces for an INTERPOL Forensic Science Symposium).
Although it is hard to find explicit formulations on opposing arguments in existing literature, it has
to be said that the ENF approach is constricted by the fact that it does not work for DC powered
devices and its (recording) content dependency (both factors summarised in [Brixen08b]: “In praxis,
approximately 40-60% of the digital recordings in question contain traceable ENF”). In general E. B.
Brixen is performing rather critical analyses on the applicability of ENF based authentication in his pub-
lications (see e.g. [Brixen08b] or [Brixen08a]). Regarding the general approach of Malik and Farid (as
presented in [Malik10]) several publications like [Gupta12] or [REW11] propose opposing arguments (see
table 2.1). For the microphone response based pattern recognition approaches, neither supporting nor
opposing arguments can be identified so far in literature. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned here that
they are assumedly also strongly affected by their (recording) content dependency (see section 2.6.1).
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Methodology and Concepts
This core chapter of this thesis presents on one hand the methodology and on the other hand the
concepts for the introduced statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based general-purpose approach for
audio forensics. The methodology is considered in this thesis to encompass the principles of methods,
rules, and postulates employed by a discipline. From these abstract basic principles the concepts –
abstract ideas for solutions – are derived. While a common methodology for addressing both application
scenarios is presented, the concepts have to discuss the required application scenario specific adaptations
for the authentication and integrity verification work in audio steganalysis and microphone forensics.
The theoretical considerations made in this chapter are used as basis for the development of evaluation
designs – the practical (solution) plans – in chapter 4.
Figure 3.1: Integration of the content of chapter 3 into the thesis context
Figure 3.1 shows a rough sketch of the linking between this chapter and the rest of the thesis. Besides
the fact that obvious parts are missing (e.g. the fundamentals chapter 2, which is relevant for every
other part of the thesis, the summarising chapter 8 and the appendices) also a low level of detail is
used in the display and naming of chapters as well as sections. The intention here is to summarise the
importance of this chapter within the thesis context:
• First, based on the research objectives specified in section 1.3, the abstract methodology (the
analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline) for answering
those research objectives is presented in section 3.1. This is done by combining the methodologies
employed in the corresponding state-of-the-art for both considered application scenarios with new
constructs required for addressing the research objectives defined in section 1.3.
• Second, based on the general methodology, a concept, an abstract idea for answering the ques-
tions raised by the research objectives (and the research challenges they build upon – see sec-
tion 1.2), is postulated in section 3.2. Here, a common concept for both application scenarios
is introduced in section 3.2.1, before application scenario specific concept modifications are dis-
cussed for audio steganalysis (section 3.1.1) and microphone forensics (section 3.1.2).
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The analysis of methodology and concepts presented here, is strongly motivated by the Daubert
criteria FREC2 (“the investigation is based upon reliable principles and methods, preferably
scientific methodology and knowledge” adapted from [U.S. Congress11], see section 2.2) and
DC1, which is summarised in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method) must be empirically
testable, falsifiable and refutable”.
For audio steganalysis, most of the work in the state-of-the-art is SPR-based, but as stated
in section 2.5.3 the existing research still lacks currently the degree of maturity that would be
required to pass a Daubert hearing as a forensic method. This motivates the effort invested within
this thesis into the investigations on audio steganalysis, hoping that this effort might bring the
whole field of research closer to that goal.
To draw a resume on the state-of-the-art in microphone forensics, as it was presented in sec-
tion 2.6, regarding the applicable methods, all different alternative methods that currently exist
in scientific literature implement some form of template matching. By their nature, these exist-
ing approaches suffer from severe limitations mostly regarding the availability and extractability
of the required features (see section 2.6.1 on these limitations). As a consequence, within this
thesis a new, SPR-based approach for microphone forensics is introduced, which is more generally
applicable, i.e. which is less affected by constraints like the existing approaches.
• As the third part in this chapter, in section 3.3 the research objectives presented in section 1.3
are specified more precisely into investigation tasks for practical investigations. This is done by
using the criteria of the Daubert standard (as discussed in section 2.2).
• In the fourth and last part of this chapter, in section 3.4 the scope of the methodological and
conceptual considerations is restricted. This delimitation of the work performed has to be
done because, even within the context of a PhD thesis, not every aspect of a complex solution
strategy can be developed to cover every possible detail.
The methodology and concepts developed in this chapter are resulting in chapter 4 in tangible design
layouts for the investigations including precise descriptions of evaluation setups and used parametrisa-
tions.
3.1 Methodology for the general-purpose audio forensics statis-
tical pattern recognition approach
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed
by the discipline of statistical pattern recognition to solve the two chosen forensic application scenarios.
Therefore, this section focuses on the methodology behind the investigations that are made in this
thesis to address the research questions formulated for a general purpose approach addressing both
application scenarios.
The state-of-the-art for both application scenarios, as it is presented in sections 2.5 and 2.6, is re-
considered and compared here, to act as the basis for the development of concepts for the investi-
gations in section 3.2. The purpose of this is to address two main scientific points of the Daubert
standards: first, the fact that all forensic methods have to be derived from scientific methods and
second, to pave the way for the concepts and designs in the following sections, which aim to establish
a good picture on the important question of the error rates that have to be associated with the methods.
3.1.1 Introduction of the principles for audio steganalysis applied in this thesis
The work on steganalysis presented in this thesis is focussing on the most prominent basic approach for
performing steganography, i.e. steganography by cover modification. Furthermore, audio signal based
storage channels are the only covert channel type considered. These specifications are typical for re-
search on audio steganalysis49.
49Audio steganography is usually considering audio files and therefore automatically excludes covert timing channels.
Steganography by cover synthesis or cover selection are rather uncommon in this field.
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The authors of [Nissar10] point out that there exist only two possible solution alternatives for ste-
ganalysis under these assumptions: what they call “signature steganalysis” and “statistical steganaly-
sis”. While signature steganalysis might work in case of very poor information hiding algorithms (like
Data Stash, see below), it will fail against sophisticated, Kerckhoffs-compliant, context-adaptive IH
approaches. Nissar et al. underline this realisation in [Nissar10] by stating: “From the knowledge of
the methods reported in this paper we infer that statistical steganalysis techniques, in any domain, are
more robust and give promising results than signature steganalysis.” Also, the system attacks described
in [Fridrich09] are excluded from the considerations within this thesis, being side-channel attacks that
aim on avoiding an analysis of the audio signals.
Therefore, statistical steganalysis remains the only plausible alternative for the steganalysis con-
siderations within this thesis.
As highlighted in section 2.5, this realisation is consistent with the majority of the current research
work in audio steganalysis. The most widely used approach for implementing statistical steganalysis
is actually the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) also considered within this thesis. It allows the
implicit description of the statistical descriptions of the classes to be distinguished (here, most likely
unmodified covers and steganograms) by providing corresponding training samples as representative
candidates for each class. The alternative here would be an explicit specification of the class statistics
(e.g. via explicit, mathematical specification of the PDFs for each class) but this is uncommon because
it would require an extremely precise domain-knowledge for the signals considered for analysis, which
hardly exists for any any media format. Other PR approaches besides SPR (like e.g. template matching,
see section 2.4) are unlikely to succeed for audio steganalysis, due to the high complexity of the cover
signal and the assumedly small embedding impact.
In case the assumption made above that audio files are the signal under analysis would be changed to
the case of audio data streams, an possible alternative might arise with anomaly detection from the
field of change detection. This approach, which would also be feature-based like SPR, might be used
to ‘learn’ the typical channel characteristics for an audio stream and, given suitable features, detect
deviations (anomalies), like onset of an steganographic embedding, in the stream. This process would
be similar to an one-class classification approach and would have the advantage that it does not require
an explicit or implicit description of the possible anomalies. The downside of this idea is again the
highly dynamic nature of audio signals in combination with the assumedly small embedding impact,
which assumedly makes this approach also implausible for practical steganalysis.
Regarding the performance metrics, it is implied in the analysis of the state-of-the-art performed in
section 2.5.3 that so far the classification accuracy dominates in the existing literature. This choice suites
the pre-dominant two-class setups for steganalysis benchmarking, but is unsuitable for the multi-class
setups made necessary by the forensic steganalysis process. In this thesis, with the Kappa statistics, a
more suitable metric is introduced to steganalysis, which allows for a better comparison of classification
results achieved on problems of different (class-)dimensionality.
Following the requirements established for forensic compliance in the Daubert standard (see sec-
tion 2.2), in an ideal application of steganalysis as a forensic method all organisational, personnel
related and technical issues would be addressed. This means that all evaluation criteria (FREC0,
FREC1, FREC2 and FREC3 as well as DC1, DC2, DC3, DC4 and DC5) defined in this thesis on basis
of the Daubert criteria and the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rule 702 would be
addresses. It has to be stated here that the criteria FREC0, FREC1 and FREC3 cannot be addressed
within this thesis, since they have to be decided by a judge on a per-case basis. Instead the focus within
this thesis is limited to the criteria that aim to establish whether steganalysis is the reliable product of
sound ‘scientific methodology’.
In contrast to the application scenario of microphone forensics, where the forensic nature of the meth-
ods concerned is evident, for steganalysis the forensic application is still a rather neglected perspective.
The small number of publications on forensic setups for steganalysis (e.g. the older Provos and Hon-
eyman [Provos02] and the newer [Fridrich09]) is still by far outnumbered by publications performing
steganalysis benchmarking (i.e. simply measuring the achieved detection performance under lab condi-
tions).
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In this thesis, the forensic application of steganalysis is the main focus of the considerations. To develop
a suitable concept for this forensic application, below the ideal forensic audio steganalysis process is
idealised as a Daubert standard conform, forensic process model for steganalysis. This generalisation
is performed on basis of the forensic steganalysis process from [Fridrich09] (see the summary on this
process in section 2.5.1). Since this ideal process turns out to be highly infeasible in practice, is then
replaced for the considerations in this thesis by a concept for the construction of practical steganalysis
processes under consideration of the Daubert criteria.
The ideal forensic audio steganalysis process
Based on the forensic steganalysis process from [Fridrich09], in figure 3.2 the audio steganalysis process
is modelled as an ideal Daubert standard conform, forensic process.
Figure 3.2: Audio steganalysis as an idealised, potentially standard conform, pattern recognition driven, forensic
process
In this ideal forensic audio steganalysis process the audio signals would undergo steganalysis in a pat-
tern recognition pipeline, followed by decision verification and the required reporting (e.g. in form of an
expert testimony in court). The complete process would be accompanied by a documentation which
would have to fulfil all requirements to forensic documentations (completeness, chain of custody, re-
producibility, etc.).
A more detailed version of the signal processing, pattern recognition and decision verification phases in
this idealised process is presented in figure 3.3. In this figure the pattern recognition pipeline for audio
steganalysis shown in figure 3.2 is split into its two components, the training phase and the application
(or testing) phase. The naive assumption on the relationship between these two phases would be that
they are performed strictly sequentially: first the steganalyser models are trained and then they are
applied in field investigations. In a less naive setup the candidate audio signals to be examined in
field application would be first analysed for genre, quality and other semantic properties. The result of
this analysis would be used to perform a content based selection of the audio material to be used for
training. This potential relationship between the candidate audio signals and the training selection is
shown in figure 3.3 with a dashed line.
The decision verification phase serves the purpose of tying the result of the steganalysis to the case at
hand (see section 2.5.1). If this connection cannot be achieved, the judge would have to dismiss the
expert testimony based on the steganalysis findings as not relevant for the case. Therefore success in
this phase would be relevant to achieve acceptable success levels for steganalysis under Daubert (and
Federal Rules of Evidence rule 702) considerations.
A projection of the six steps of the forensic steganalysis process from [Fridrich09] (see the summary on
this process in section 2.5.1) to figure 3.3 would result in the following mapping: Steps 1 to 4 (i.e. iden-
tification of the observed channel, blind universal steganalysis, identification of the embedding strategy,
and determination of the steganographic software) would be covered by the training and application
phase. In practice they would be implemented by a network of consecutively executed pattern recog-
nition pipelines, each focusing on specific tasks, like the identification of the embedding mechanism
or the identification of the software used. The steps 5 and 6 ([Fridrich09]: “Searching for the stego
key and extracting the embedded data” and “Deciphering the extracted data and obtaining the secret
message (cryptanalysis)”) be performed in the verification phase.
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Figure 3.3: Detailed description of audio steganalysis as an idealised, Daubert standard conform, pattern recognition
driven, forensic process in case of a single expert system (non-fusion case); the required parametrisation
of the individual steps is neglected in this visualisation for the training and application phases
The closest realisation to this detailed, idealised process shown in figure 3.3 is the work of Provos
and Honeyman in [Provos02] (see section 2.5.2). In their publication the authors have shown that the
verification phase is actually the hard part in this process. In fact it involves three hard problems: the
hidden data extraction (which has to be 100% reliable since the next step would automatically fail
otherwise), the decryption of message that have been encrypted prior to embedding (see section 2.5.1)
and the message validation.
The first might be possible, since the steganalysis system might identify the used steganographic scheme
during the classification process and based on the knowledge of the scheme and with an estimation
of the used parameters short cut attacks (e.g. dictionary attacks like tested in [Provos02] might be
plausible). The second is equivalent to the cryptanalysis problem in a Kerckhoffs-compliant setup.
Since hard encryption is nowadays easy to obtain50 this part is extremely difficult to realise. In case
the extracted data was not encrypted or the encryption was successfully broken the message validation
renders the message into some format that can be used as evidence in the forensic process. Depending
on the type of message communicated, this step might impose another set of problems to the forensic
process. In case the message is not in an intuitive form (e.g. an ASCII text) or a well known standard
format (e.g. a JPEG image), appropriate mechanisms for its interpretation have to be found (as shown
by Provos and Honeyman in [Provos02]).
Summarising the facts presented on the ideal forensic audio steganalysis process, it has to be admitted
that it can be applied successfully only in very rare cases. One of the few examples that can be
50See e.g. http://www.aescrypt.com/ for an open source AES 256-bit stand alone encryption/ decryption tool or
programming libraries like Botan (http://botan.randombit.net/).
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mentioned here is Data Stash51 v1.1b and v1.5. In his system attack analysis52 on this commercial
tool – which unfortunately never made it into a scientific publication but can be easily reproduced by
everyone – Guillaume Tena performed successfully all three steps of the verification phase: the hidden
data extraction (Data Stash simply appends the data to be ‘hidden’ after the end of the cover file), the
decryption (it uses the cryptographic algorithm Blowfish, but only to encrypt the key for access control
purposes) and the message validation (the message is a ZIP compressed data container with a typical
ZIP header and without a password defined).
Nevertheless, despite this existing example, which shows that the ideal steganalysis process can be
performed successfully under certain, rather severe, circumstances, it has to be assumed that this is
only valid for countering a very small number of steganographic tools. In general, this ideal process is
infeasible; the main reasons have to be sought in the reliable message extraction, decryption and message
validation parts. Therefore, the methodology for this thesis has to focus on a practical steganalysis
process instead of the ideal one.
The practical steganalysis process
The practical steganalysis process considered in this thesis shifts the goal from the complete forensic
steganalysis process (see section 2.5.1 and the considerations on the ideal forensic audio steganalysis
process above) to a mere reliable and practically applicable detection in targeted steganalysis in a foren-
sic setup. This is equivalent to restricting the focus of the investigations to steps 2, 3 and 4 (blind
universal steganalysis, identification of the embedding strategy, and determination of the steganographic
software) of the process model introduced in [Fridrich09].
In terms of achievable Daubert-compliance this automatically means basically two things: first, shifting
the focus of the forensic mechanism that leads to the expert testimony from establishing communication
contents to the pure fact that a communication took place, and second, weakening the link to a case
(Daubert-standard criterion FREC0).
Before the methodology to be used for the investigations in this thesis is designed the terms ‘reliability’
and ‘practicability’ have to be pre´cised. For this, first the BOSS contest as described in section 2.5.2
is reconsidered: simplified, it is a Kerckhoffs’ compliant two-class setup with an oracle returning the
classification accuracy for each steganalysis attempt. The basic assumptions within this contest are
rather idealised, an object is either a cover or a stego object. If it is a cover, it would be a natural cover,
i.e. authentic with a specific cover source model (in BOSS a digital camera), if it is a stego object, then
it is modified by exactly one steganographic algorithm (in BOSS the algorithm called HUGO) using one
fixed parametrisation. This is more a steganalytical detection benchmarking of the HUGO algorithm
(with a fixed parametrisation) than practical steganalysis. In practice, aiming for forensic analyses or
the observation of communication channels ‘in the wild’, the investigators would face different problems
in audio steganalysis:
• There are more classes than unmodified, natural covers. While it might be plausible that images
are used as they are generated, for other media, including audio signals, this is rather unlikely.
Here, the signals usually undergo rather extensive signal modifications (e.g. by filtering operations,
mixing, compression, etc.) prior to any release. Therefore, a class of ‘modified’ covers exist that
does not behave consistent to any source statistic. The consequence, which has to be drawn,
is that non-malicious signal modifications have to be considered in the setup of any steganalysis
investigation.
• Digital objects like images are either stego objects or covers. For time-discrete media, like audio
signals, it might be necessary not to consider the complete media object but instead to analyse
parts of the object individually, for only few sections of the data (i.e. some segments of an audio
stream) might have been modified. As a consequence, a focus has to be set on the development
of segmental features as basis for the statistical pattern recognition based analysis.
51http://www.skyjuicesoftware.com/software/ds info.html
52See: http://www.guillermito2.net/stegano/datastash/index.html
66
3.1. Methodology for the general-purpose audio forensics statistical pattern recognition
approach
• In practical application a multi-class setup is more likely than the two-class modelling for ste-
ganalysis – the steganographic channels to be detected would assumedly be created using differ-
ent steganographic tools with varying parametrisations. This means that based on the idea of
universal steganalysis, multi-class approaches or a fusion-based framework or application specific
detectors should be considered.
• ‘In the wild’, there exists no oracle to tell us how well or accurate our detector is performing.
Therefore metrics should be designed that allow for performance estimation, as a first step to
fulfil the part of the Daubert criteria that focuses on the error rates of a forensic scheme. This
performance estimation should focus primarily on the accuracy, but it should also consider the
throughput of the detector, which is paramount for any online setup but also crucial for many
forensic steganalysis application scenarios.
For considering the reliability and practicability for the practical audio steganalysis process, as they
are considered within this thesis, the following basic assumptions for the methodology in practical
audio steganalysis for this thesis are made:
1. The considerations are restricted to the detection of steganography by modification (in a single file
scenario – ignoring other, less common, potential setups like e.g.batch steganography [Ker07a]).
The focus lies on the mere detection of the hidden communication. Other potential goals, like
e.g. payload size estimations are outside the scope of this thesis.
2. The message extraction, decryption and validation from the idealised steganalysis process (see
the description of the ideal forensic audio steganalysis process above) are excluded from the
considerations here.
3. All considerations are made on the basis that statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based ap-
proaches are used to implement the steganalysis (see section 2.5.2).
4. The true distribution of covers and stego objects in real life application scenarios are not known.
Based on these assumptions, the reliability tries to access the question: How can the detector perfor-
mance be estimated if there exists no way to measure it? I.e. bereft of the oracle telling us the detector
performance, how can we be sure that we are not simply guessing ‘in the wild’? These questions, es-
pecially if they aim for statistical generalisability, have to take into account the existence and influence
of non-malicious signal modifications.
Regarding the practicability, we have to mainly look into the question: Is it feasible to expect a ste-
ganalysis result (in the form of a detector response) within a certain amount of time? This throughput-
focussed questing is, due to its own complexity, outside the direct focus of this thesis. It is complicated
by the potential alternatives that exist for the setup of the steganalysis system (single detector ver-
sus fusion-based framework and two-class versus multi-class) and the complexity of the models used
in the classification. The model complexity strongly depends on the chosen classifier and amount of
data used in training (including the material representing non-natural covers created by non-malicious
signal modifications). Initial ideas that arise from the work within this thesis for answering parts of the
practicability problem are presented in section 8.2.
Solution methodology for the audio steganalysis performed within this thesis
Here, an instantiation of the practical steganalysis process is performed. Regarding the methodology
applied in this thesis for audio steganalysis, the methodology is split into three ‘building blocks’ (see
figure 1.2 in section 1.3). The following basic principles are used within this thesis to implement these
three blocks (signal preparation, statistical pattern recognition (SPR) and evaluation):
In the signal preparation, the patterns observed are the subtle impact caused by a steganographic
embedding in an audio file. The input required for the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based
steganalysis performed here requires cover audio material as well as stego files for different stegano-
graphic algorithms in statistically significant numbers for the training of statistical models. Here, we
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could distinguish between two application modes: oﬄine and online forensic setups. In the first case an
investigator is performing steganalysis after an incident. In an ideal case he would have no restrictions
on the computational complexity to spend on the case and he can analyse the signals under investigation
regarding their genre, quality and other semantics and select the training material accordingly. In the
second case, the online forensic setup, a steganalysis mechanism is operated like a malware detector to
observe under real-time constraints a communication channel. In this case, the statistical models for
the detection process have to be generated in advance, in the worst case on large, multi-genre set to
cover a large number of potential contexts, if the channel content characteristics are not known.
Regarding the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) block, the pre-processing currently used in
audio forensics is either content-based or content-insensitive. The considerations within this thesis are
restricted to the latter. Content-based, or better content-analysis based pre-processing would be an
extremely powerful, but equally complex methodology extension, which is due to its inherent complexity,
reserved for future work.
Regarding feature design approaches that can be applied to audio steganalysis, both main approaches
identified in section 2.4.2 are applied here: Intuition-based feature design, which to be successful re-
quires expert knowledge on the domain covered, or the transfer of features from other (similar) problem
domains.
Feature selection (see section 2.4.3) is used to validate the significance of all elements in the feature
vector and, if necessary, eliminate insignificant features. This is included into the investigations per-
formed here for two different reasons: on one hand it has the potential to increase the performance (in
terms of throughput) of the classification and on the other hand it allows for the generation of domain
knowledge because the identification of significant features also derives by implication also knowledge
about the characteristics of the patterns classified.
The development of new feature selection strategies is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, existing
implemented techniques to perform feature selection are chosen from the established open-source data
mining suite WEKA.
Regarding the resulting model sizes, it has to be assumed that they are very large, due to the large
numbers of feature vectors required to sufficiently represent a multi-genre audio context. In case the
audio genre used or the algorithm(s) to be detected can be narrowed down, smaller model sizes could
be achieved.
Regarding the used classification approaches, forensic steganalysis is generally a classical multi-class
classification problem assigning one input candidate to exactly one class out of a set of predefined
classes. For performance reasons it might be wise to split this multi-class problem into a grid of two-
class classification problems.
The development of new classification techniques is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, exist-
ing implemented supervised and unsupervised classification techniques are chosen from the established
open-source data mining suite WEKA.
For the evaluations, all approaches for audio steganalysis introduced in the state-of-the-art lack com-
parable (detection) performance indicators, a consequent consideration of plausibility issues as well
as assessment under the Daubert criteria in their original literature. Within this thesis, a suitable
detection performance indicator is introduced to the field of steganalysis and the introduced practical
audio steganalysis approach undergoes plausibility considerations as well as an assessment as a forensic
method. This assessment uses the Daubert criteria, as they are summarised in section 2.2, to summarise
the potential forensic performance of the scheme. Special focus in the necessary investigations is put on
the Daubert criterion DC1, which is summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique
(method) must be empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”.
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3.1.2 Introduction of the principles for microphone forensics applied within
this thesis
The work on microphone forensics presented in this thesis is focussing primarily on the source authen-
tication aspect of this application scenario. Investigations on the second possible aspect, the integrity
verification for recorded material, are considered here to be secondary concerns.
Source authentication for microphone recordings, looking for device specific influences to the recorded
material, is a classical pattern recognition (PR) problem. As such it is approached in the currently
established state-of-the-art in this field by the application of template matching based approaches (see
section 2.6). Within this thesis, an alternative methodology to the currently established template match-
ing based approaches is developed. In this section the methodology for this new approach is introduced,
to act as a basis for the conceptual descriptions in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. The new approach uses
statistical pattern recognition (SPR) to perform source authentication as well as integrity verification.
The main difference between template matching and SPR pattern recognition sub-disciplines lies in the
representation of the classification model: while in template matching the feature values that belong to
one class are represented explicitly in the model, in SPR these are represented implicitly by statistical
models. This fact usually makes SPR-based solutions more complex but also more tolerant to noise
influences or strong intra-class variances. The latter reason is considered by the author to be a good
motivation to implement a SPR-based microphone forensics approach.
The approach developed within the scope of this thesis can be considered, like the works of Garcia-
Romero et al. in [Garcia-Romero10] and of Malik and Miller in [Malik12], as a realisation of the
theoretical work of Oermann et al. in [Oermann05] on patterns intrinsic to the microphone response
function. Besides the fact that it is more generalisable in its application than the existing approaches (it
does not rely on the existence of local phenomena (like e.g. reverberations) or helper data (like electric
network frequency templates) and it also works for other recorded content, not only speech signals) it
can also be used to actually generate domain knowledge and thereby can answer still open research
questions. Such knowledge, which can be answered by explorative statistical pattern recognition (a.k.a.
data mining), might be for example the influence of the individual components in the recording process
(see the context modelling for microphone recordings done in section 2.3.2).
Besides template matching and SPR no further alternative solution approaches for forensic record-
ing source authentication seem to be feasible. Other pattern recognition (PR) sub-disciplines (see
section 2.4), are by their very nature unsuitable to solve the problem of detecting the subtle traces /
pattern imposed by the microphone in such extremely dynamic content.
For the secondary aspect of integrity verification, the author would consider the application of (feature-
based) anomaly detection to be the only possible alternative to PR-based approaches53.
For considering the reliability and practicability for the practical microphone forensics process, as they
are considered within this thesis, the following basic assumptions for the methodology in practical
microphone forensics for this thesis are made:
1. The term ‘microphone’, as used within the practical investigations, describes the whole hardware
setup that is connected to the A/D converting device, i.e. the actual microphone, its mounting
apparatus, the connecting cables, any pre-amplifier or phantom-power generator as well as the
input of the A/D converter. If one of these components is exchanged (except for the mounting
apparatus, which is considered in the practical investigations as a variable influence factor) the
new setup is, in the context of the thesis, considered as a new ‘microphone’.
2. Acquiring large numbers of correctly labelled audio recordings is an extremely time consuming
and burdensome task. Therefore, here the same assumption is made as in [Garcia-Romero10]
and [Malik12] that the practicability of the microphone forensics approach can be shown by using
test sets of small size but of suitable composition.
3. It is assumed that SPR-based approaches are, due to their higher flexibility, are better suited to
cope with changing influences in the recording process than template matching based approaches.
53In fact that approach is applied by Grigoras in [Grigoras07] to implement the ENF-based integrity verification by
searching for anomalies in the first-order derivative of the ENF-component of an audio signal.
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Thereby, the introduced method is assumedly less content dependent that its template matching
counterparts in the state-of-the-art.
Based on these assumptions, the reliability tries to access the question: How can the forensic per-
formance of the approach be estimated if there exists no way to measure it? This is in microphone
forensics closely related to the question: How have suitable test sets to be designed? These questions,
especially if they aim for statistical generalisability, have also to take into account the existence and
influence of non-malicious signal modifications.
Like with audio steganalysis, in depth investigations on the practicability of the approach introduced
here are outside the direct focus of this thesis. Initial ideas that arise from the work within this thesis
for answering parts of the practicability problem are presented in section 8.2.
Solution methodology for the microphone forensics performed within this thesis
Regarding the methodology applied in this thesis for microphone forensics, the methodology is split into
three ‘building blocks’ (see figure 1.2 in section 1.3). The following basic principles are used within this
thesis to implement these three blocks (signal preparation, statistical pattern recognition (SPR) and
evaluation):
In the signal preparation, the patterns observed in the recorded material are the subtle traces left
by the microphone response and the device characteristic noise introduced by a microphone or more
precisely a recording setup in a recording. These patterns (the frequency response function Fmic(f) of
the microphone and its thermal noise Nmic(f) see the context modelling for microphone recordings in
section 2.3.2) are here expressed implicitly as statistical models by the microphone response based SPR
approach.
The input required for the microphone response based SPR approach the forensic authentication re-
quires at least recordings from the evaluated microphone as well as recordings from a statistically
significant number of other microphones for training of a statistical model. This is due to the fact
that here a kind of ‘world model’ is created for the training of the classifier. This has to be placed
in contrast to the template matching based approaches described in the state-of-the-art, were local
models are created that not only allow to tell in matching which template is the closest but also allow
for an measurement or estimation of the distance to the closest template. If this minimal distance would
be larger than a definable threshold, the system could decide that all templates are too far away and
that therefore the verification sample does not belong to any of the enrolled devices. With the ‘world
model’-centric SPR approach this would not happen. Here, all possible classes in an application scenario
would have to be presented in training and the classification always assigns one of these classes to the
verification sample. Therefore, for microphone forensics it is necessary to include in the investigation
concepts and designs suitable setups for the training input (i.e. using sets of identical as well as different
microphones). At this point it has to be explicitly mentioned that it is feasible to assume that for the
purpose of a forensic authentication the investigator has access to the device under investigation (here,
the evaluated microphone) and can make the reference recordings in a controlled environment.
Regarding the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) block, the pre-processing currently used in
microphone forensics is either content-insensitive or content-analysis based. Due to the complexity
of the latter, only content-insensitive pre-processing is used in the investigations on the microphone
response based statistical pattern recognition approach developed within this thesis.
Regarding feature design approaches that can be applied to microphone forensics, two main ap-
proaches identified in section 2.4.2 are applied here: Intuition-based feature design, which to be suc-
cessful requires expert knowledge on the domain covered, or the transfer of features from other (similar)
problem domains.
An example for intuition-based feature design in this thesis is the usage of a (frequency domain) his-
togram as part of the feature set to be evaluated. This is motivated by known global phenomena,
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in this case the intrinsic frequency response (see the context modelling for microphone recordings in
section 2.3.2) of the microphone, which is a fact known to any expert in the field of audio recording
processing and which is publicly described by microphone manufacturers for their products.
To design features for one application field by transfer of concepts from other problem domains is
also a rather common methodology. Here, on the example of the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCCs), features that originate in biometric speaker recognition are transferred successfully to micro-
phone forensics.
The resulting features from these design approaches can be either local features, global features or
segmental features (see section 2.4.2) with or without using higher-level content analysis. Within this
thesis the local features are removed from the performed considerations due to the fact that their usage
would result in extremely complex and practically infeasible classifier models. Also higher-level content
analysis is excluded from the consideration within this thesis and reserved for future work.
Feature selection (see section 2.4.3) is used to validate the significance of all elements in the feature
vector and, if necessary, eliminate insignificant features. This is included into the investigations per-
formed here for two different reasons: on one hand it has the potential to increase the performance (in
terms of throughput) of the classification and on the other hand it allows for the generation of domain
knowledge because the identification of significant features also derives by implication also knowledge
about the characteristics of the patterns classified.
The development of new feature selection strategies is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, existing
implemented techniques to perform feature selection are chosen from the established open-source data
mining suite WEKA.
Regarding the resulting model sizes, it has to be assumed that they are significantly larger than the
template sizes for the three existing approaches from the state-of-the-art. In case of the microphone
response based statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach the microphones are represented either
as feature vectors extracted from the audio signal or as completely trained statistical model. The first
case is more likely since it allows a dynamic adaptation of the authentication system (e.g. by chang-
ing the pre-processing routines, adding new features to the feature space, exchanging the classifier,
adding/enrolling new microphones, etc.). The latter case, the storage of trained models, is less flexible
but would be faster in field application since the necessary and time consuming process of generating
a classifier model from the feature vectors has already been performed. If the feature vectors are used
to represent a microphone then the number of feature vectors per class and their dimensionality define
the size of the template. If trained models are used for the representation of microphones then the
template size is determined by the input used in the model generation process and the way the model
is generated, represented and stored by the classifier.
The actual size of the training set should be large enough for the chosen SPR-based approach, since
it cannot distinguish intuitively between context imposed phenomena and microphone-intrinsic charac-
teristics of the recording. Without sufficient training of a statistical model on suitable training sets of
statistically significant size and based on relevant features, it would never be able to tell which kind of
influence was responsible for the actual sample values within a window of an audio signal because the
same microphone output could be the result of different microphones under different input signals and
environmental conditions. Within this thesis a variation of the number of training samples is used to
allow for initial estimations on required model sizes.
Regarding the used classification approaches, in general, the primary goal in microphone forensics is
microphone authentication. Therefore it is a classical multi-class classification problem assigning one
input candidate to exactly one class out of a set of predefined classes. The development of new clas-
sification techniques is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, existing implemented supervised and
unsupervised classification techniques are chosen from the established open-source data mining suite
WEKA.
For the evaluations, all approaches for audio steganalysis introduced in the state-of-the-art lack com-
parable (detection) performance indicators, any consideration of plausibility issues and, with the
exception of the electric network frequency (ENF) based approaches, assessment of the (potential)
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forensic compliance under the Daubert criteria in their original literature. As one result, the per-
formance of the different approaches is hardly comparable, due to the different dimensionalities of the
investigated multi-class problems. Within this thesis, a directly comparable metric is introduced to this
field. In section 8.2.1, first ideas on a throughput based performance based metric are discussed. Fur-
thermore, first selected plausibility considerations are made for the introduced SPR-based microphone
forensics approach. These plausibility considerations focus on the resilience of the microphone patterns
imposed in the recording process against common audio signal post-processing operations. Also, the
introduced microphone forensics approach undergoes an assessment as a potential forensic method.
This assessment uses the Daubert criteria (as discussed in section 2.2) to summarise the potential
forensic performance of the scheme. Special focus in the necessary investigations is put on the Daubert
criterion DC1, which is summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method)
must be empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”.
3.1.3 Comparison of the principles for the two application scenarios and gen-
eralisation into a general-purpose approach
Table 3.1 compares the similarities and differences regarding the main methodology for addressing the
two application scenarios considered within this thesis.
Table 3.1: Brief comparison of the similarities and differences in the methodologies considered in this thesis for
audio steganalysis and microphone forensics
Aspect Audio steganalysis Microphone forensics
Signal preparation
patterns observed impact of the embedding of mes-
sages (steganography by modifi-
cation), influenced by degrees of
freedom in cover selection and
embedding
microphone response based
traces from the recording source
(the microphone) – influenced
by degrees of freedom in the
recording process
security aspect con-
sidered
integrity verification (against
steganographic embedding by
the implicit verification of con-
sistency of local or global phe-
nomena or by detection of the
violation of source intrinsic prop-
erties of the cover)
primary source authentication
and secondary integrity verifica-
tion (against composition of au-
dio data from different sources)
setups oﬄine forensic (content selec-
tion for training data based on
semantics of the material under
investigation) and online foren-
sic (large, multi-genre set to
cover a large number of poten-
tial contexts) instantiations of
practical steganalysis
(oﬄine) forensic / investigator
has access to the microphone(s)
Pattern recognition
pattern recognition
approaches
SPR, two-class and multi-class
classifications
SPR, multi-class classifications
pattern recognition
and classification
pipeline
pre-processing: content-insensitive
feature design: Intuition-based feature design and transfer of features
from other (similar) problem domains
feature selection strategy: combination of existing feature selectors
from the established open-source data mining suite WEKA
classification: existing techniques are used from the established open-
source data mining suite WEKA
Evaluation
detection perfor-
mance indicators
detector reliability based on multi-class setups (Kappa statistics)
plausibility selected, common audio signal post-processing operations are used to
emulate robustness challenges to the detector or the usage of anti-
forensics
forensic conformity discussion on the basis of the Daubert criteria
scale of the evalua-
tions
large-scale, representative,
multi-genre evaluations
small-scale investigations – lim-
ited by the available physical
recording setups
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As shown in the two separate methodology sections 3.1.1 (audio steganalysis) and 3.1.2 (microphone
forensics), the patterns observed in these two SPR application scenarios strongly differ, both having
different degrees of freedom in the creation process that influence the pattern as well as the noise com-
ponent in the signal. In steganalysis, the patterns observed are imposed to the audio material by the
embedding of messages in steganography by modification based applications. The audio steganalysis
in this case is considered here as being an integrity verification mechanism under consideration of the
steganalysis as a malicious integrity violation. Microphone forensics focuses primarily in the authen-
tication of a recording source based on traces resulting from the individual response functions. The
consistency of these traces can also be used to verify the integrity of a recording under the expectance
of composition attacks.
In the state-of-the-art in audio steganalysis, the most suitable solution method is considered to be sta-
tistical pattern recognition (SPR). In this thesis, this approach is transferred to the field of microphone
forensics, where the current state-of-the-art so far focussing on the application of template matching
(see section 2.6). The reason to do so is the fact that through the more complex (statistical) way of
presentation of the basis for classification decisions (i.e. the classification model) the decision becomes
more flexible and less content dependant. It is the assumption of the author that thereby one of the
major shortcomings of the state-of-the-art approaches – the strong context dependency – might be
overcome.
Regarding the dimensionality of the classification problem at hand, the opinions are divided for audio
steganalysis. While some authors (e.g. [Provos02]) strongly argue against the modelling as a two-class
problem, the majority of publications follow exactly this modelling approach. Both considered major
directions (two-class and multi-class classification) are reflected within the considerations in this thesis.
Microphone forensics is intuitively a typical multi-class identification setup and handled in this thesis ex-
actly this way. The author is aware of the fact that the state-of-the-art approaches in this field perform
with distance-based template matching actually a projection onto a linear search in the template space.
A simulation of a similar projection of the introduced SPR-driven multi-class approach onto a sequence
of two-class problems might be interesting, because it shifts parts of the overall complexity from the
models to the numbers of classifications, which might directly affect the scalability and throughput of
the mechanism. Nevertheless, due to the inherent complexity of this alternative it is considered to be
outside the scope of this thesis and is reserved for future work.
Regarding the setups considered, steganalysis could either be forensic or online – especially the second
option having rather severe implications on the training of the classifiers, while microphone forensics is
a classical forensic setup. This has to be adequately reflected in the evaluation designs.
For both application scenarios similar pattern recognition and classification pipeline setups can be ap-
plied. Regarding the pipeline setup, it has to be repeated here that the design and implementation of
new feature selectors and classifiers is outside of the scope of this thesis, since for these two blocks
of the pipeline already suitable solutions exist. Instead, effort is invested in considerations on how to
perform feature- and classifier selection.
The performance indicator used within this thesis focuses on comparability of the results. Therefore,
the usually used classification accuracy is here replaced by Kappa statistics.
Regarding the plausibility considerations, they are within this thesis considered to be an integral part
of the evaluation scheme for forensic methods. This is not entirely uncommon in steganalysis (see
e.g. [Orsdemir08]), but for microphone forensics only in the work on the ENF approach considerations
on its plausibility are found in the existing literature – most prominently published by E.B. Brixen
(see e.g. [Brixen08b] and [Brixen08a]). For the other two classes of microphone forensics approaches
presented in section 2.6, the usage of plausibility indicators is completely missing in the literature.
Common audio signal post-processing operations (like normalisation, blind de-reverberation, etc.) as
acknowledged by [REW11] are completely ignored in the evaluations performed. Due to the inherent
insensitivity of template matching approaches to counter-forensics or anti-forensics methods, it has to
be assumed that all these approaches are furthermore very easily affected by such targeted attack meth-
ods. Here, selected, common audio signal post-processing operations are used to emulate the necessary
robustness challenges to the detector or the usage of anti-forensics.
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For the discussion of the forensic compliance, the evaluation criteria FREC0 to FREC3 and DC1 to DC5
derived from the FRE rule 702 and the Daubert challenges are used as they are described in section 2.2.
Regarding the evaluation and comparison of the introduced approaches the following points have to be
highlighted as limitations imposed by the introduced methodology:
For the setup and the associated performance evaluation under the consideration of the Daubert cri-
teria also important would be the verifiability. In this regard both application scenarios strongly differ:
for steganalysis the approach by Provos and Honeyman in [Provos02] with its consecutive detection
and (dictionary-based) message retrieval, decryption and validation shows that a verification of the
forensic scheme is theoretically possible. This procedure (although highly infeasible for a universal ste-
ganalysis detector) would be an implementation of the ideal forensic steganalysis process described in
section 3.1.1.
For such a posteriori verification of the result in microphone forensics, of the state-of-the-art approaches
most do present no general alternative that can be used for independent verification: electric network
frequency (ENF) approaches would fail because two microphones recording at the same time and seg-
ment of the power grit will show the same ENF pattern, the approach of Malik and Farid [Malik10] would
show the same reverberation behaviour for two microphones in the same room and the approach intro-
duced in [Garcia-Romero10] would fail in this regard for non-speech signals. Only the work of [Malik12]
might present such a means for independent verification (see section 2.6.1). The combination (fusion)
with this approach is an interesting topic reserved for future work.
Another point that influences the concepts is the scale of the empirical evaluations that is possible.
In audio steganalysis all evaluations are strictly software-based and therefore for large scale empirical
investigations, given the required software (here implementations of the embedding functions) is avail-
able. In microphone forensics the whole evaluations are hardware (microphone) based, therefore only a
strongly limited number of recording setups can be considered within this thesis.
To draw a resume on the comparisons between both application scenarios, it can be stated that despite
the huge differences between the two chosen application scenarios – especially regarding the patterns
observed and addressed security aspects – they seem to provide a suitable ground for the introduction
of a useful general-purpose statistical pattern recognition (SPR) driven audio forensics approach.
Figure 3.4: Projection of the abstract descriptor of a forensic audio authenticity or integrity verification mechanism
into the general-purpose SPR approach for this thesis (incl. identification of the research challenges
relevant for each of the three ‘building blocks’)
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Figure 3.4 shows the projection of the abstract descriptor of a forensic audio authenticity or integrity
verification mechanism (as discussed in section 1.1) into the general-purpose statistical pattern recog-
nition (SPR) approach for this thesis. The three ‘building blocks’ in the abstract descriptor find their
individual counterparts in the main components of the introduced general purpose approach. The cen-
tre parts of the methodology considerations are, on one hand, the formulation of the two application
scenarios as practical detection problems to be solved by statistical pattern recognition and, on the other
hand, the decisions for the realisation of the SPR to rely on already existing classification algorithms
while introducing a new high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature set as well
as suitable approaches for feature and classifier selection.
Further methodology considerations for this thesis are: the closed set modelling of the application sce-
narios using relevant as well as significant problem representation (i.e. sets of audio material) as well
as the extension of the performance evaluation to include, besides the usual detection performance,
also plausibility as well as forensic compliance considerations. The work done on research objective 4
identifies the prospects and current limitations of the introduced general-purpose audio SPR forensics
approach as an important instrument for future research in both application scenarios as well as for the
adaptation of the introduced general-purpose approach to further application scenarios.
Based on the summary given above on the principles for the two chosen application scenarios, the
following structure to be used in the following concept and design sections can be derived: First,
addressing the degrees of freedom in the creation of the signals (influencing the intrinsic patterns
and the noise), second, composition and parametrisation of the SPR pipeline, and third, performance
metrics. This structure is applied in sections 3.2.1 (focussing of common concepts), 3.2.2 (specific
concepts for audio steganalysis) and 3.2.3 (specific concepts for microphone forensics) respectively. In
chapter 4 the sections also use this basic structure, but extend the second point (the parametrisations
of the SPR pipeline) into the individual steps in this pipeline.
3.2 Concepts for the introduced general-purpose approach
Within this section the methodology considerations from section 3.1 are projected into investigation
concepts considering the research objectives formulated in section 1.3.
Figure 3.5 below shows the placement of the concept or the conception phase in a statistical pattern
recognition (SPR) pipeline. It is located on a meta-layer influencing each and every component in the
pipeline as well as co-located decisions like evaluation goals and training- and test set designs.
In general, the conception phase addresses the same three distinct parts or ‘building blocks’ as intro-
duced in section 1.3. As shown in figure 3.5, these parts are: first, the concepts for generating suitable
audio training and test sets (reflecting the degrees of freedom in the signal generation process and the
influences to patterns and noise), second, the concepts for managing the influence factors in the SPR
pipeline and third, the evaluation considerations.
For the descriptions of the conceptual decisions made for these three ‘building blocks’, this section is in
the following sub-divided into the common concepts for both considered application scenarios on one
hand (section 3.2.1) and the identification of application scenario specific concepts on the other hand
(sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 respectively). This inversion of the sequence employed in the previous sections
for the descriptions (first applications scenario specific considerations, followed by generalisations) is
performed to prevent unnecessary redundancy in the descriptions.
3.2.1 Common concepts for audio steganalysis and microphone forensics
The first set of major conceptual considerations is focusing on the signal preparation, i.e. on the degrees
of freedom in the generation of investigation conditions. This reflects directly the requirements
imposed by the Daubert criteria DC1 (short: ‘empirically testable’, see section 2.2.2) as well as DC3
(short: ‘error rates’) and can be roughly translated for SPR-based schemes as the specification of
suitable training and test sets. Within this thesis practical investigations based on closed-set experi-
ments are performed to evaluate the suitability of the instantiations of the introduced general-purpose
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Figure 3.5: General statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline – conception phase (extended from figure 2.5)
approach for the two selected application scenarios. Here, it is required to generate evaluation sets that
are representative for the application scenario as well as statistically significant. While the representa-
tiveness has to be ensured in the test set design, the significance has to be verified in the investigations.
Regarding the input considered by the application scenarios, this thesis focuses on (never compressed)
PCM-encoded audio recordings sampled and quantised with CD quality (44.1 kHz, 16 Bit – see sec-
tion 2.3). For the considerations in audio steganalysis, stereo signals taken from audio CDs are used
as cover signals. In case of the recordings in microphone forensics the mono signals generated by the
microphones are used. In the investigations performed, the correct class labels for all audio signals
under consideration are made available.
The second set of important considerations for the common concepts for both application scenarios
is regarding the implementation of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) signal processing
pipeline, as presented in section 2.4 and shown in figure 3.5 above.
Based on the methodology considerations presented in section 3.1, the decision is here to focus in
the development and implementation work accompanying this thesis on feature extraction and use for
feature selection as well as classification already existing software solutions (mainly the established open
source data mining suite WEKA [Hall09]), integrated into own investigation strategies.
As described in section 2.4.1, pre-processing is used to enhance the classification performance, not
to enable the successful classification. Therefore the pre-processing applied within this thesis is in the
essence restricted to the framing and windowing required for the window-based processing of audio
material in feature extraction. The usage of more sophisticated pre-processing operations to enhance
the detector/classifier performance is reserved for future work.
To address and implement the feature extraction, here our own audio feature extractor labelled AMSL
Audio Feature Extractor (AAFE) is developed. In this feature extractor segmental and global features
are considered as they are introduced in section 2.4.2. For this thesis it is decided to discard local
features as well as higher-level content analysis based features from the considerations. The reason for
not considering local features is the small information reduction they provide. For audio signals, which
contain in CD-quality 88,200 16 Bit samples per second, the number of computed local features would
quickly exceed the practically processable set sizes for statistical pattern recognition based classification
approaches. Regarding content analysis it is decided to restrict the consideration to low-level (syntacti-
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cal) features and to reserve higher-level (semantical) content analysis based approaches for future work.
The features used follow both concepts for feature design introduced in section 2.4.2. Therefore, some
of the features are designed intuitively by using the domain knowledge of the author, while others are
transferred from other audio signal processing domains.
As pointed out in the introduction of the methodology for this thesis in section 3.1.3, the design and
implementation of new feature selection methods and classifiers is outside of the thesis’ scope. In-
stead, from the set of established solutions for these two blocks of the pipeline, suitable candidates are
selected using selection strategies designed within this thesis.
The third major set of conceptual considerations question is focusing on the evaluations ‘building
block’. After the analysis of the detection performance metrics used applied in the state-of-the-art in
both application scenarios and their shortcomings, it is decided to introduce a new performance metric
to these two fields. The benefit provided by this new metric, which is derived from Cohen’s Kappa, is to
allow for a fair evaluation of the performance in multi-class setups. A variation of the number of training
samples and the impact to the achieved classification accuracy is used to allow for initial estimations on
required model sizes, which allows some first estimations on the scalability of the introduced solutions.
Investigations on training- and test set sizes, context selectivity for training and test sets and
context dependency for training- and test set generation are of importance to show, in compliance
to the Daubert standard (criterion DC3 short: ‘error rates’), under which constraints the performed
evaluations show statistically significant results.
The number of evaluations performed for plausibility investigations is limited to a practically feasible
number – the idea is here to establish the concepts and reserve more detailed analyses for future work.
For the investigations on the forensic compliance, a first concept derived from the Daubert criteria is
introduced. It is highly infeasible to assume that a single PhD-thesis can explore and promote a forensic
approach to such an extent that it would be accepted as fully compliant under these requirements.
Therefore, here merely the concept is established and first required investigations are performed to
outline the roadmap for addressing the question of forensic compliance for the two selected application
scenarios as well as similar tasks.
3.2.2 Special concept extensions for audio steganalysis
In this section the necessary deviations from the common concepts, as they are summarized in sec-
tion 3.2.1, are described for the application scenario of audio steganalysis. The goal for this application
scenario is the implementation of the practical steganalysis process as described in section 3.1.1.
Concepts for data hiding
One important conceptual decision made in the signal preparation for this application scenario within
this thesis is to rely on the usage of real algorithms for the embedding instead of embedding strategy
simulations. The main drawback of this decision is the dependence on the availability of audio steganog-
raphy tools or algorithms. As already mentioned in the analysis of the corresponding state-of-the-art
(see section 2.5.2) there is only a small number of algorithms for audio steganography freely available.
Therefore, the decision is made here to use audio steganography as well as audio watermarking algo-
rithms to create an evaluation setup which might allow for some degree of generalisation.
Generally, steganalysis (by cover modification) and digital watermarking are two technically very similar
disciplines, which can be summarised under the term data hiding. Nevertheless, the general objectives
of steganography and digital watermarking are completely different. In [Cox08] this difference is illus-
trated as follows: in watermarking the embedded information is always some kind of metadata related
to the cover object (owner/buyer information, producer information, integrity verification information,
annotations, etc.) while in steganography the message should have no contextual correlation to the
cover (instead it is just a message in a hidden communication). Despite these conceptual differences,
the changes that audio steganography and watermarking algorithms impose to audio signals are very
similar. Therefore, steganalysis (or the statistical analysis of potential cover objects) can be used to
perform integrity verification against modification based data hiding operations.
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Of a huge importance for the investigations performed are the basic assumptions for the training of
statistical models for classification. Within this thesis, the trends in the state-of-the-art are followed
in this regard and the possibility of so called ‘cover-stego-attacks’ is assumed in the forensic setup
considered here. This means that the forensic examiner has access to the steganographic algorithms
that are potentially used (i.e. a Kerckhoffs compliant setup) and is capable of generating stego objects
from cover objects of his choice. This allows an adaptation of the classifier model to be used to the
context of the observed channel. In this thesis a multi-genre setup (coverage of a wide set of possible
cover contents) is compared with a very specific audio channel (speech only setups, like e.g. in VoIP
telephony sessions).
Influence factors in the chosen SPR pipeline for audio steganalysis
For this application scenario the conceptual deviations from the common concepts, as presented in
section 3.2.1 are only marginal: For pre-processing and feature selection no deviations exist.
For the design of the extracted features specialised considerations for intuitive designs have to be made.
Here, the characteristics of the used algorithms as well as their embedding domains and strategies
should be analysed for potential features. An example for such an intuitive feature development is
the computation of LSB ratios and change rates to detect classical LSB-replacement based embedding
strategies.
Regarding the classification, two-class as well as multi-class setups are considered.
Performance metrics and the assessment under the Daubert criteria for audio steganalysis
The main difference between the performance considerations for audio steganalysis and microphone
forensics is the fact, that for the latter all error classes have assumedly the same significance, while for
the former the different error classes have in practice strongly different significance. This can be easily
illustrated for a two-class setup simply deciding whether an object is a stego object or an unmodified
cover; here missed detections are a question of the security level, while falls alarms are a matter of
cost. Therefore, appropriate performance metrics for steganalysis should also consider the different
error classes (e.g. statistical Type I and Type II errors in the aforementioned two-class setup).
While the detection accuracy is right now the dominant performance metric in this field, it is replaced in
this thesis by the Kappa statistics, a metric that fulfils the requirements of comparability and applicabil-
ity for two-class as well as multi-class setups (implied as being required by Provos et al. in [Provos02]).
Regarding the assessment under the Daubert criteria, for steganalysis multiple cases should be consid-
ered: on one hand, either for the verified detection (ideal steganalysis process) or simply the detection
(practical steganalysis process), and on the other hand for universal steganalysis (multi-class setup) or
algorithm specific steganalysis (two-class setup). The second evaluation dimension in steganalysis would
be the question of detection (practical steganalysis process) versus verified detection (ideal steganalysis
process). Regarding this question, the verified detection (i.e. the message extraction, decoding and
decryption parts) is considered to be outside the scope of this thesis.
3.2.3 Special concept extensions for microphone forensics
Building upon the common concepts for both application scenarios, as presented in section 3.2.1, this
section identifies the concept extensions necessary to adapt the general methodology of statistical pat-
tern recognition (SPR) based forensic mechanisms to the application scenario of microphone forensics.
The Daubert standard requires that a method “must be empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”
(see [USC93]), has been tested (criterion DC1) and that the attached error rates are known or estimated
(criterion DC2). Derived from the methodology for this thesis, the concept to address these require-
ments is based on the recording process context model (as presented in section 2.3.2) and on targeted
modifications on selected components in this process as well as on the statistical pattern recognition
pipeline, that allow the estimation of the influence of these modifications.
The following points address: First, the degrees of freedom in the creation of the signals (influencing
the intrinsic patterns and the noise) in signal preparation, second, parametrisations for the SPR pipeline,
and third, evaluation considerations.
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Degrees of freedom in the recording setup
The degrees of freedom in the recording setup in signal preparation are described extensively in the
context model of the microphone recording pipeline in section 2.3.2 of this thesis. The investigation
concept regarding these degrees of freedom is to perform a number of targeted modifications to allow
for an estimation of their impact to the SPR-based microphone forensics approach introduced here.
At this point it has to be explicitly mentioned that it is feasible to assume that for the purpose of a
forensic authentication the investigator has access to the device under investigation (here, the evaluated
microphone) and can make the reference recordings in a controlled environment.
For reason of practicability the numbers of targeted modifications is limited to a feasible number.
Furthermore, that only a limited number of recording hardware setups is available to the author. Nev-
ertheless, the setups have to trying to achieve some form of generalisability even with a strongly limited
set of recording setups (see table 3.1 in section 3.1.3). The main concepts to achieve such generalis-
ability are the usage of different types of microphones, sets of identical microphones, different kinds of
recorded content and (for specific investigations) the limitation of undesired side-effects by using ideal
recoding environments (i.e. a soundproof, anechoic chamber).
Based on the conceptual, design and evaluation work performed within this thesis, future work should
extend the analysis of the influence of the degrees of freedom in microphone forensics, either with a
systematic evaluation of large numbers of hardware setups or by simulation of different influences.
Influence factors in the chosen statistical pattern recognition pipeline for microphone forensics
Next to the degrees of freedom in the recording setup, the second set of influence factors to the
chosen SPR-based microphone forensics approach contains the components in the SPR pipeline and
their parametrisations.
Each of the processing operations in this pipeline imposes its own impact factors to the overall result.
Like for the degrees of freedom in the recording process, for reasons of practicability in the evaluations
within this thesis some of those of influence factors undergo targeted modifications to evaluate their
impact, while the remaining are kept constant.
Those influence factors chosen for targeted modification are:
• The used feature set as output of the feature extraction and feature selection
• The choice of classifiers in model generation and classification
• Training- and test set sizes
• Context selectivity for training- and test set generation
• Context dependency between training and test set
Of those influence factors, the impact of different features / feature sets as well as the influence of the
choice of classifiers are the most important ones.
Since the beginning of his work on this microphone forensics approach in 2007, the author continually
enhanced the used feature extractor AMSL Audio Feature Extractor (AAFE) with new segmental and
global features without higher-level content analysis. As described in section 3.1.2 for the applicable and
applied feature design approaches, some of them are especially designed for microphone forensics, while
others are designed for other application areas (e.g. audio steganalysis) of the universal audio feature
extractor used. Special focus shall be cast here on the spectrogram features designed in [Dohnal08] and
modified for usage in this thesis in [Buchholz09]. These features have been designed with the purpose
to reflect the well-known characteristics of the microphones regarding the intrinsic frequency response
curves, and, as a consequence, they result in a very good performance for this purpose in [Buchholz09].
Nevertheless, it is shown in this thesis that they are outperformed by features which are motivated by
other application areas of the AAFE and transferred into the domain of microphone forensics. For the
practical evaluations on microphone forensics performed in this thesis the process of feature selection is
strongly integrated into the concept. The feature selection serves a dual purpose: First, it identifies
suitable and unsuitable features for microphone forensics and thereby generate domain knowledge on
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the corresponding problem domain. Second, it improves the throughput of the security mechanism by
a reduction of the classification times required, while at the same time keeping the same accuracies.
For the choices on classification methods no specific considerations are made within this thesis (see
the common concepts as summarised in section 3.2.1).
The influence factors selected above for targeted modification are in the opinion of the author the ones
which are strictly required to show that the microphone forensics approach introduced here actually
works. All other existing influence factors are choices normally made with the aim of improving an
already working approach. Since this thesis (and the accompanying conference and workshop papers)
shows that the selected approach is working, those remaining factors are mere options to further improve
the performance – their optimisation is reserved for future work. They are conceptually selected here
to be kept constant. Examples for this class of influence factors are: the pre-processing alternatives
(incl. different window sizes or windowing functions, etc.), classifier parametrisations, etc.
Performance metrics and the assessment under the Daubert criteria for microphone forensics
As summarised in section 3.1.2 for the currently applied methodologies in microphone forensics, the
(classification or matching) accuracy is right now applied as the dominant performance metric in the
state-of-the-art. The need of more appropriate performance metrics is highlighted for both application
scenarios is section 3.2.1. For microphone authentication (which is a classical multi-class) the selection
or introduction of new performance metrics is an even stronger necessity than for audio steganalysis
(which could be modelled as a series of two-class classifications).
Furthermore, a new metric is required for the integrity investigations for recording composition (or
mesh-up) detection. Here, with the Relative Frequency Ratio (the ratio of the number of observations
in a statistical category to the total number of observations) a fundamental analysis method is borrowed
from analytical statistics to be used as an appropriate metric.
Regarding the plausibility and estimation of the error rates – as requested by the Daubert criteria –
specific investigations on (malicious or non-malicious) signal modifications or attacks on the method
have to be included. Within this thesis the number of such signal modifications is limited to a set of
common audio signal operations (normalisation, de-noising, MP3 conversion) and selected application
scenario specific attacks (audio file composition and playback recording).
The general concepts for the assessment under the Daubert criteria are pre´cised here for the special
concepts applied within this thesis for microphone forensics. First, it has to be admitted that actually
two different assessments would be necessary for this application scenario. The source authentication,
as the primary task in for microphone forensics, and the integrity verification should be considered
separately as forensic methods under Daubert criteria. This would reflect on one hand the fact that
different approaches could be applied and on the other hand their different degree of maturity already
achieved. Within this thesis the focus in microphone forensics is mainly on source authentication.
3.3 Concept of using the Daubert standard for general result
discussion – definition of investigation tasks
Section 1.3 defines the research objectives for this thesis. The first three objectives can be divided into
those that focus on the introduction of a generalised statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach for
forensic audio signal analysis as well as corresponding evaluation strategies (objectives 1 and 2) and the
objective focussing on conducting the required empirical investigations on the two selected application
scenarios (objective 3). The fourth objective uses the results from objectives 1 to 3 to outline the
prospects and current limitations of the introduced general purpose audio SPR forensics approach.
The introduction of the general purpose audio SPR forensics approach (research objective 1) is
performed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The considerations on the design of suitable performance indi-
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cators (research objective 2) and the instantiation of the general purpose audio SPR approach
for audio steganalysis and for microphone forensics (part of research objective 3) are located in
chapter 4. The second part on research objective 3, the practical investigations on the application
scenarios, is addressed in chapters 5 and 6. The comparison of the two application scenario spe-
cific instantiations (research objective 4) is found in chapter 7.
Here, additional considerations are presented on the outline and limits of the practical investigations
performed within this thesis. The idea is to use the Daubert criteria (see section 2.2 and its subsections)
to outline the practical investigations by defining investigation tasks.
Considering the different Daubert criteria, it is obvious that their implications strongly differ in their
significance for this thesis. Table 3.2 summarises the criteria and their significance in regards to the
specific investigation tasks.
Table 3.2: The Daubert criteria and their significance in regards to the development of specific investigation tasks
Criterion Description / significance
FREC0
Description ([LLI10a]): “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”
Significance: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that can
be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
FREC1
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation (which leads to the corresponding expert testimony) is
“based upon sufficient facts or data”
Significance: Case specific, the only significance for this thesis arises from the fact that the term
‘sufficient’ has to be manifested into training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes.
FREC2
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation is based upon “reliable principles and methods”, prefer-
ably scientific methodology and knowledge
Significance: Chapter 2, as well as sections 3.1, 3.2 and chapter 4 of this thesis are dedicated
to establish the fact that the two exemplary selected audio forensic methods are implemented
as deterministic processes using the decades old methodology of statistical pattern recognition
(SPR). Besides the task to show that the application scenarios can actually be solved by SPR,
no further tasks are derived from this criterion.
FREC3
Description ([LLI10a]): the (forensic) methods are applied “reliably to the facts of the case”
Significance: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that can
be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
DC1
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested
– that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for
reliability”; summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method) must be
empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”
Significance: This criterion imposes the most important task to the practical investigations
performed within this thesis: Establish within which limits the proposed media forensic methods
can give plausible results.
DC2
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication”; with “publication” meaning ‘open publication’
Significance: This criterion is not translated into tasks but instead requires the author to interact
with the scientific community relevant for the chosen application scenario. To address this cri-
terion this thesis is submitted for (peer) review, as have been the accompanying conference and
journal papers. The review comments received from the latter have helped shaping the described
approaches as well as their evaluations.
DC3
Description ([LLI10b]): “the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied”
Significance: This criterion requires the investigations for DC1 to be accompanied by a reliable
measurement of error rates achieved.
DC4
Description ([LLI10b]): “the existence and maintenance of standards and controls”
Significance: The task that would be derived from this criterion would be the compilation of
the work into standards together with or within a standardisation body. This complex process is
outside the scope of this thesis.
DC5
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community”
Significance: This criterion is similar to DC2 in its meaning and in the fact that it is not translated
into tasks.
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Based on table 3.2 the following investigation tasks are derived here for practical investigations on
the two application scenarios considered within this thesis:
A) Empirical ground truth: show that the application scenarios can actually be solved by statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) – derived from FREC2. This task also includes an estimation on what
‘sufficient’ means in terms of required training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes –
derived from FREC1.
B) Investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influences to the SPR
process – derived from DC1 and DC3.
C) Investigations on influences outside the SPR process on the performance of the scheme –
derived from DC1 and DC3.
Investigation task A documents of refutes whether the introduced general-purpose approach (or more
precisely: application scenario specific instantiations thereof) can be used to successfully address mul-
tiple audio forensics investigation goals. Therefore, a positive result for this task does answer research
objective 1 (which extends research challenge a) – see section 1.3) and builds the ground truth for
research objective 3 (which extends research challenge (c)).
Investigation tasks B and C extend the considerations on the two exemplary selected forensic application
scenarios and therefore contribute to the answers for research objective 3. The answers given here allow
an assessment on how adequately the application scenarios can be implemented with the introduced
approach (research challenge c)).
Besides these tasks, which are addressed individually for the two exemplary chosen application scenarios,
a summary and comparison is formulated as an additional task:
D) Summary and comparison of the results for both application scenarios.
The answers generated by fulfilling this task addresses the question about performance metrics that
allow for a comparison between different application domains – research objective 2 (which extends
research challenge (b), see section 1.3) – as well as the questions on limitations of the introduced
general-purpose audio SPR forensics approach raised by research objective 4.
Based on these task descriptions (as extensions or pre´cising statements for the research objectives
formulated in section 1.3), the corresponding investigation designs for both application scenarios are
described in detail in chapter 4. The investigation tasks A) to C) are elaborated in more detail for the
audio steganalysis application scenario in section 4.2. The corresponding practical investigations are
pr presented chapter 5. For the microphone forensics application scenario, they are elaborated in more
detail in section 4.3 and the corresponding practical investigations are presented in chapter 6.
Task D) is addressed in chapter 7.
3.4 Restriction of the considerations within this thesis
In this section the scope of the methodological and conceptual considerations is restricted. This
delimitation of the work performed has to be done because, even within the context of a PhD thesis,
not every aspect can be developed to cover every possible detail.
Outside the scope of the thesis are considerations on:
• Work on the design of new audio pre-processing, feature selection methods and classification
algorithms – statistical pattern recognition is used here as a kind of ‘off the shelf’ product.
• Detailed reflections on information fusion (here, the combination of different forensic mechanisms)
– due to the complexity this task imposes of the confidence (considering the distance to a complex,
combined decision threshold) estimation for the combined output.
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• Work on benchmarking of audio forensic tools – Even though some steps are made into this direc-
tion (e.g. in the design of selection schemes for feature and classifier selection) benchmarking work
would require a much wider test base. In the evaluations performed within this thesis the authors
aim is to achieve some form of (statistical) generalisability. The design and implementation of
fair benchmarking strategies would go beyond what is feasible within this thesis.
• Estimation of the achievable security levels and the precise error rates for the introduced audio
forensics methods – these considerations would require extensive benchmarking (see the point
above).
• Detailed juristic analyses – Since the author possesses absolutely no legal training, all legal con-
siderations made within this thesis (especially on the Daubert standard) are therefore layman’s
interpretation of freely available material, which are made to the best of the author’s knowledge.
The intention behind the work on forensic compliance performed here is to derive a performance
metric for research in the field of audio forensics. If the content of this thesis is intended to be used
in any legal proceedings, the reader must consult appropriate legal counsel for the corresponding
jurisdiction.
• A complete (mathematical) formalisation of the media forensic process – Some of the work
performed within this thesis (e.g. the microphone recording context model) are backed by a
complete mathematical formalisation, these formalisations are restricted to the absolute minimum,
because a complete formalisation of the whole process is outside the scope of this thesis.
Based on the investigation tasks defined in section 3.3, the extent of the practical investigations con-
ducted within this thesis is here narrowed down as follows:
Audio steganalysis
Regarding the investigation task A) ‘Empirical ground truth’, the size of the set of evaluated information
hiding algorithms is strongly limited. Selected investigations are performed on a set of nine different
algorithms. The majority of the investigations are performed with a subset of three different algorithms
that show the worst, the best and an average detection performance.
The investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influences to the statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) process (investigation task B)) are limited primarily to the relevant features
and the performance of existing classifiers (taken from the data mining suite WEKA [Hall09] version
3.6.1) in their default parametrisations. Parameter optimisation operations for the classifiers or other
possible performance enhancing operations like pre-processing operations are omitted here.
For the investigation on influences outside the SPR process on the performance of the scheme (inves-
tigation task C)) the embedding domain, the key scenario used in the steganographic embedding and
content dependant training and testing are addressed here. Other possible influence factors, like e.g.
the embedding strength or variations of other embedding parameters are reserved for future work. The
number of plausibility considerations is here limited to a small number of audio signal post-processing
operations.
Microphone forensics
Because this application scenario is hardware driven and the amount of available hardware is limited only
to a small number of practical test setups (with between 4 and 7 different microphones) are considered
here. To achieve at least some level of confidence in the results for investigation task A) ‘Empirical
ground truth’, two sets of four identical microphones each are used in the investigations on intra-class
detection performance.
The considerations on investigation task B) are for microphone forensics the same as presented above
for audio steganalysis.
Regarding the investigation on influences outside the SPR process on the performance of the scheme
(investigation task C)) only specific influences are tested here. These include ten different recording en-
vironments, different orientations and mountings of microphones, selected source types (human speakers
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versus exactly one loudspeaker) and content dependency for ten different reference signals. Other po-
tential influence factors, like e.g. used pre-amplifiers, cable, etc are reserved for future work. For the
plausibility considerations, the influences of normalisation, MP3 conversion, de-noising and playback
recording on the introduced are evaluated. The performed small scale investigations on composition
detection focus on four different attack scenarios, which might easily extended in future work.
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Investigation Designs – Considerations for the
Practical Evaluations
In this chapter the abstract methodology and concept considerations from chapter 3 are transferred
into precise evaluation setups. The layout of the description follow the same flow already used for the
descriptions of the concepts in section 3.2: first the considerations on the aspects (here designs) that
are common for both considered application scenarios are discussed and then, in the second part of this
chapter the scenario specific design considerations are made.
As an important point in the scenario specific design considerations also a task and restriction in-
terpretation for each application scenario is performed on basis of the (abstract) definition of
investigation tasks in section 3.3 and the corresponding restrictions postulated in section 3.4.
4.1 Common designs decisions for audio steganalysis and micro-
phone forensics
The design decisions have to precise the conceptual considerations made in section 3.2 and its subsec-
tions in eight important points:
• Input format and patterns observed
• Pre-processing applied
• Feature extraction and the construction of the feature space
• Feature selection
• Classification approaches
• Detection performance indicators
• Plausibility indicators
• Forensic compliance considerations
Regarding the first, the second, the seventh and the eights point of this list, only a small refinement is
necessary in comparison to the conceptual considerations:
As already stated in section 3.2.1, the input format considered in both application scenarios is PCM
encoded audio signals sampled and quantised with CD quality (44.1 kHz, 16 Bit – see section 2.3). In
the audio steganalysis application scenario, the cover signals are either taken from commercial audio
CDs or specifically recorded in this format for the investigations performed here. Therefore, it can
be ensured that these signals have never been compressed. For microphone forensics, the recordings
are directly made in this format to ensure that no additional processing artefacts (like re-sampling or
re-quantisation noise) are impairing the investigations performed.
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The patterns observed in audio steganalysis are created by the embedding with different information
hiding (IH) algorithms (see section 4.2.1 below). For the microphone forensics investigations (except
where explicitly stated otherwise in section 4.3.1) the same reference sounds are recorded in parallel by
all microphones in a test set. This is done to ensure that the differences in the recordings are really
originating from characteristic transfer functions of the different sources (i.e. microphones or micro-
phone pre-amplifier combinations) rather than from changing environmental conditions.
The influence of pre-processing operations is restricted within this thesis to the absolute minimum. As
already described in the conceptual considerations in section 3.2.1, the universal pre-processing consists
of the framing and windowing required for the window-based processing of audio material in feature
extraction.
The plausibility indicators used exemplary within this thesis are selected signal post-processing oper-
ations which are common in audio signal handling. The operations used here are: MP3 encoding (with
a bit rate of 128kBit/s using the Lame codec54), de-noising (here by re-quantisation for 16 Bit to 8 Bit
and back to 16 Bit) and normalisation (up to -3dB of the maximum possible signal level).
Using these post-processing operations, it is possible to show how plausible the achieved detection
results are in cases where such a post-processing was applied instead of a steganographic embedding
or where the microphones recording characteristic was overlaid by such post-processing influences.
For the forensic compliance considerations the table 3.2 introduced in section 3.3 is re-used in a slightly
modified form. Instead of the significance of each of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and Daubert
criteria it contains in the summary of evaluations the progress made within this thesis towards fulfilling
that criterion.
For the remaining four points, the following subsections specify the design decisions made to precise
the conceptual considerations.
4.1.1 The feature extractor and feature space used
The AMSL Audio Feature Extractor (AAFE) used for feature extraction within this thesis was in 2006
/ 2007 intended to be used in a dedicated audio steganalysis software called AMSL Audio Steganalysis
Toolset (AAST). The AAST never saw any field application, but the AAFE, as one of its core compo-
nents, remains in usage and is used in this thesis as the universal audio feature extractor applicable in
both application scenarios. The AAFE (or parts of the extractor) is also used by some other researchers
in the field of audio steganalysis (e.g. by Qingzhong Liu of the Sam Houston State University of Texas,
in the USA, see [Liu09] and [Liu11]).
Since the beginning of the PhD project reflected within this thesis, the AAFE was constantly improved
by the author. For the practical investigations presented in chapters 5 and 6, three versions of this
audio feature extraction software are of importance:
• AAFE v.1.0.3 (with its 63 dimensional feature vectors) introduced in 2007 in [Kraetzer07a],
• AAFE v.1.0.4 (with a 98 dimensional feature vector) introduced in 2008 in [Kraetzer08a],
• AAFE v.2.0.5 (with 590 segmental and 17 global features) introduced in 2010 in [Kraetzer10]
Table 4.1 compares the feature set compositions extracted by AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
The detailed feature descriptions for all features are given at the end of the document (page 189) in
the appendix “Appendix A: Audio Features used in AAFE”.
54http://lame.sourceforge.net/
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Table 4.1: Comparison between the feature set compositions extracted by AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5
(considerations for the default window size of 1024 samples)
AAFE v.1.0.3 (C/C++) AAFE v.1.0.4 (C/C++) AAFE v.2.0.5 (MATLAB)
Remarks 63 features; first used
in [Kraetzer07a]
98 features; first used
in [Kraetzer08a] – extends
v.1.0.3
590 segmental and 17 global fea-
tures; first used in [Kraetzer10]
– reimplementation of the AAFE
in MATLAB
Segmental time-domain time-domain time-domain
features sfev empirical variance sfev empirical variance
sfcv covariance sfcv covariance
sfentropy entropy sfentropy entropy sfentropy entropy
sfLSBrat LSB ratio sfLSBrat LSB ratio sfLSBrat LSB ratio
sfLSBflip LSB flipping rate sfLSBflip LSB flipping rate sfLSBflip LSB flipping rate
sfmean mean of samples in time
domain
sfmean mean of samples in time
domain
sfmean mean of samples in time
domain
sfmedian median of samples in
time domain
sfmedian median of samples in
time domain
sfmedian median of samples in
time domain
sfzero cross rate zero-crossing-
rate
sfenergy energy
sfRMS amplitude RMS ampli-
tude
frequency-domain frequency-domain frequency-domain
sfformant ∗ 11 formant describ-
ing features
sfformant ∗ 11 formant describ-
ing features
sfBark 1, · · · , sfBark 24 24
band Bark scale spectrogram
sfsp centroid spectral centroid
sfsp flux spectral flux
sfsp rolloff spectral roll-off
sfsp bw spectral bandwidth
sfsp smoothness spectral
smoothness
sfsp irregularity spectral irreg-
ularity
sfsp entropy spectral entropy
sfsp base freq base frequency
sfspec 1, · · · , sfspec 512 512-bin
linear spectrogram
frequency-domain frequency-domain frequency-domain
sfMFCC 1, · · · , sfMFCC 28 28
Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients
sfMFCC 1, · · · , sfMFCC 28 28
Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients
sfMFCC 1, · · · , sfMFCC 13 13
Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients
sfFMFCC 1, · · · , sfFMFCC 28
28 filtered Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients
sfFMFCC 1, · · · , sfFMFCC 28
28 filtered Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients
sfFMFCC 1, · · · , sfFMFCC 13
13 filtered Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients
sfd2FMFCC 1, · · · ,
sfd2FMFCC 13 13 second-
order derivative FMFCCs
sfd2FMFCC 1, · · · ,
sfd2FMFCC 13 13 second-
order derivative FMFCCs
Global fea-
tures
gfzcr total total zero-crossing-
rate
gfentropy AV E average entropy
gfLSBrat AV E average LSB ra-
tio
gfLSBflip AV E average LSB
flipping rate
gfmean AV E average mean
gfmedian AV E average median
gfzero cross rate AV E average
zero-cross-rate
gfenergy AV E average energy
gfRMS amplitude AV E average
RMS amplitude
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.1 – Continued
AAFE v.1.0.3 (C/C++) AAFE v.1.0.4 (C/C++) AAFE v.2.0.5 (MATLAB)
gfsp centroid AV E average
spectral centroid
gfsp rolloff AV E average spec-
tral roll-off
gfsp bw AV E average spectral
bandwidth
gfsp smoothness AV E average
spectral smoothness
gfsp irregularity AV E average
spectral irregularity
gfsp entropy AV E average spec-
tral entropy
gfsp base freq AV E average
base frequency
gfsp flux AV E average spectral
flux
The segmental features sf∗ are computed for one window Ski of the sampled, quantised and windowed
digital audio signal (window index i and channel index k). The global features gf∗ are computed over
the window-stream of a complete channel k of the input audio signal.
4.1.2 The feature selection performed
For the implementation of the feature selection here five different feature evaluators are used from the
WEKA portfolio, together with the search method ‘Ranker’ (sorting the features by the merit displayed
in the single feature evaluations). These used five feature evaluators are ChiSquaredAttributeEval, Fil-
teredAttributeEval, InfoGainAttributeEval, OneRAttributeEval, SymmetricalUncertAttributeEval from
WEKA version 3.6.1. This selection covers filter functions as well as wrapper-based feature selection
approaches. For a description of the evaluators see [Witten05].
The output of all five feature evaluators is fused on a per feature basis by computing the arithmetic
mean of the ranks returned. The final ranking is obtained by re-sorting the features by this output.
The feature ranking investigations are accompanied by estimations on the true dimensionality of the
feature space for each classification problem. To this purpose WEKAs implementation of a principal
component analysis (PCA) is used to transform the feature space given into a lower-dimensional feature
space containing at least 95% of the original information. The dimensionality of this lower-dimensional
space is then assumed to be close to the true dimensionality of the problem, i.e. number of non-correlated
components derivable from the AAFE feature set for a given classification problem.
4.1.3 The classification algorithms used
For the classification, existing algorithm implementations provided by WEKA (version 3.6.1) are used.
These can be divided into the two major classes of clustering and supervised classification techniques.
Clustering
WEKA (version 3.6.1) provides eight different clustering algorithms (weka.clusterers.* ). These are:
cobweb, DBScan, EM, FarthestFirst, FilteredClusterer, MakeDensityBasedClusterer, OPTICS and Sim-
pleKMeans. If these clustering algorithms are used within this thesis, except for the number of expected
clusters no deviation from the default parametrisation is made. All algorithms are used in ‘classes-to-
clusters’ evaluation mode to enable the computation of detection performances. Since the algorithms
are applied in this thesis in a black box view, a detailed discussion of their construction principles is
omitted here. For such information the author refers to [Witten05].
Alternatively to the complete naming scheme, an abbreviated form is used in this thesis, omitting the
prefix ‘weka.clusterers.’ (e.g. SimpleKMeans instead of weka.clusterers.SimpleKMeans).
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(Supervised) classification
In WEKA (version 3.6.1) 74 different supervised classification algorithms (weka.classifiers.* ) are imple-
mented. These are grouped into the following eight classes:
• weka.classifiers.bayes.* (Bayesian classifiers): BayesNet, ComplementNaiveBayes, DMNBtext,
NaiveBayes, NaiveBayesMultinomial, NaiveBayesMultinomialUpdateable, NaiveBayesSimple, Naive-
BayesUpdateable
• weka.classifiers.functions.* : LibLINEAR, LibSVM, Logistic, MultilayerPerceptron, MLRM, RBFNet-
work, SimpleLogistic, SMO
• weka.classifiers.lazy.* : IB1, IBk, KStar, LWL
• weka.classifiers.meta.* (Meta-classifiers): AdaBoostM1, AttributeSelectedClassifier, Bagging,
ClassificationViaClustering, ClassificationViaRegression, CostSensitiveClassifier, CVParameterS-
election, Dagging, Decorate, END, EnsembleSelection, FilteredClassifier, Grading, GridSearch,
LogitBoost, MetaCost, MultiBoostAB, MultiClassClassifier, MultiScheme, OrdinalClassClassifier,
RacedIncrementalLogitBoost, RandomCommittee, RandomSubSpace, RotationForest, Stacking,
StackingC, Vote
• weka.classifiers.mi.* : CitationKNN, MISMO, MIWrapper, SimpleMI
• weka.classifiers.misc.* : FLR, HyperPipes, VFI
• weka.classifiers.rules.* (rule-based classifiers): ConjunctiveRule, DecisionTable, DTNB, JRip,
NNge, OneR, PART, Ridor, ZeroR
• weka.classifiers.trees.* (tree-based classifiers): BFTree, DecisionStump, FT, J48, J48graft, LAD-
Tree, LMT, NBTree, RandomForest, RandomTree, REPTree, SimpleCart
Alternatively to the complete naming scheme, an abbreviated form is used in this thesis, omitting the pre-
fix ‘weka.classifiers.’ (e.g. NaiveBayes or bayes.NaiveBayes instead of weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes).
Giving descriptions of these classification schemes, their basic methods of operation and their differ-
ences takes up about half of the 500 page textbook [Witten05]. To repeat any of these considerations
does not add any value to this thesis, because the algorithms are applied here in a black box view
as an ‘off-the-shelf’ product. Within all evaluations, they are used with their default parametrisation
(see [Witten05]).
4.1.4 Detection performance indicators used
As pointed out in the analysis of the state-of-the-art in research on the chosen two application scenarios
(see sections 2.5.2 and 2.6.2 respectively), the accuracy (i.e. the ratio between true classifications and
all classification attempts in a supervised classification) is currently used as the main performance
indicator in both application scenarios discussed.
For the measurement of the classification gain for fair performance evaluation within this thesis it is
proposed to use the Kappa statistics κ instead of the accuracy. It is basically a single-rater version
of Cohen’s Kappa (see [Carletta96], [Gwet12] for multi-rater considerations and [Eugenio04] for single-
rater considerations derived from Cohen’s Kappa) in the range [−1, 1]. Therefore the Kappa statistic
measures the agreement of prediction with the true class (i.e. the agreement normalised for chance
agreement). Equation 4.1 shows the computation of the Kappa statistics κ for an n-class problem:
κ =
1
n
n∑
a=1
Pa − Pchance
1− Pchance
 4.1
For each of the n classes Pa is the corresponding percentage agreement (e.g., between the classifier
and ground truth) and Pchance is the probability of chance agreement. Therefore, κ = 1 indicates
perfect agreement and κ = 0 indicates chance agreement for the overall classification. Only in rare
cases negative κ values are achieved, i.e. the classification performance of a system is worse than simple
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guessing at the class. This is most likely the case when the model was trained to distinguish between
patterns completely different than the ones actually presented in the evaluations.
For equally distributed classes, Pchance for all classes is simply
1
n . For differently distributed classes
[Eugenio04] describes different methods how to calculate of estimate Pchance. For the computation of
the Kappa statistics within this thesis the WEKA implementation is used, estimating Kappa from the
distribution of the classes in the supplied test set.
By using Kappa statistics, it is possible to construct for classification-based investigations a degree of
closeness of measurements of a quantity to its actual (true) value that is exempt from the influence
of the probability of guessing correctly. Such a metric does allow for direct comparison between the
classification performances of classifiers on problems of different classes (e.g. a two-class classification
problem like the classical hypothesis testing for an assumable steganographically modified channel and
a four-class problem like steganographic algorithm identification on a set of three algorithms (plus un-
marked covers) that might have been applied).
Regarding the interpretability of Kappa, [Landis77] presents a mapping between the Kappa value and
the agreements of the different raters (see table 4.2). Within this thesis the fact is used that it is actually
known to which class a sample belongs in the evaluations performed – a rather unlikely scenario in the
normal application fields of Kappa statistics, like studies performed in clinical medicine. Based on this
realisation, here the Kappa values are mapped onto statistical confidence using the mapping defined in
table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Kappa values, agreements according to [Landis77] and the statistical confidence mapping used in this
thesis
Kappa value κ Agreement according to [Landis77] Statistical confidence mapping used in
this thesis
κ ≤ 0 No agreement Poor
0.01 ≤ κ ≤ 0.20 Slight agreement
0.21 ≤ κ ≤ 0.40 Fair agreement
0.41 ≤ κ ≤ 0.60 Moderate agreement Poor to fair
0.61 ≤ κ ≤ 0.80 Substantial agreement Fair to good
0.81 ≤ κ ≤ 1.00 Almost perfect agreement Good
The usage of Kappa in research is not without controversy. Authors like Sim et al. [Sim05] argue that:
“[...], the magnitude of kappa is influenced by factors such as [...] the number of categories [...]”.
Furthermore, Kappa is generally not easy to interpret in terms of the precision of a single observation,
because according to [Reichow11] the standard error of the measurements would be required to interpret
its statistical significance. To address this problem Sim et al. propose in [Sim05] multiple evaluations
as basis for the construction of a confidence interval around the obtained value of Kappa, to reflect
sampling errors.
Both facts (implicit influence of the number of classes as well as the standard error in the measurement)
are also considered here. In the statistical confidence mapping introduced for this thesis the first fact
should be negligible for the practical investigations, because the number of classes considered (and
therefore assumedly also their implicit influence) only varies within a rather small interval. Regarding
the second fact, here the actual classes in the investigations are actually known which solves part of this
problem. Regarding the precision, it is assumed here (based on the achieved evaluation results in initial
tests) that it is high enough to allow for meaningful investigations (i.e. the corresponding confidence
interval would be suitably small). Nevertheless, the exact precision will have to be established in future
work.
In despite of the drawbacks that might be attached to the usage of Kappa, Sim et al. [Sim05] argue
that: “If used and interpreted appropriately, the kappa coefficient provides valuable information on the
reliability of data obtained with diagnostic and other procedures [...].” – which is exactly the motivation
why Kappa is used instead of the mere classification accuracy within this thesis.
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4.2 Special task and design adaptations for audio steganalysis
The investigation tasks, that are derived in section 3.3 form the Daubert criteria, the general research
challenges and the objectives for this thesis, are here elaborated in detail for the application scenario of
audio steganalysis.
For investigation task A (“Empirical ground truth”) the investigations on large sets of audio material
marked by different information hiding (IH) algorithms are used to establish:
• Whether SPR-based audio steganalysis is actually possible with the introduced approach
For investigation task B (“Investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influ-
ences to the SPR process”) practical investigations are performed within this thesis on:
• Which influence of the number of feature vectors in training has on the detection performance?
• Whether the error rates in a two-class setup are equally balanced?
• Which classifiers (from a pre-existing portfolio provided by WEKA) are suitable to implement the
audio steganalysis?
• Which features from the high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature set
of the AAFE introduced here are suitable for audio steganalysis?
• How classification using content selection as well as content dependent and independent training
and testing influences the detection performance in audio steganalysis?
• Which results are achieved in two-class vs. multi-class setups?
For investigation task C (“Investigations on influences outside the SPR process on the performance
of the scheme”) practical investigations are performed here on:
• Embedding domain and algorithm identification
• The influence of the key scenario in steganography
• Selected common audio post-processing operations (MP3 conversion and de-noising)
The following sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 specify which design adaptations (resp. extensions) have been
made to implement the corresponding investigations.
4.2.1 Chosen parametrisations for the generation of evaluation data for audio
steganalysis
As shown in figure 2.7, the steganographic embedding usually has three input sources: the cover source,
the message source and the key source. Additionally, the IH algorithm itself might have user-specifiable
parameters that influence the message shaping or the embedding strategy.
The following decisions are made idea for the investigations performed here:
• Regarding the cover source, multi-genre and specific audio test sets (see below) are used to
compare the performance of the introduced scheme on different content types.
• The influence of the message source is outside the focus of this thesis, here only fixed mes-
sages (either ‘UniversityOfMagdeburg’ is embedded repeatedly or Goethes’ ‘Faust’ in an ASCII
representation is used as message).
• The key influence is included in the investigations performed here. A fixed-key scenario (using
the key ‘UniversityOfMagdeburg’) and a variable-key (using the MD5-hash value of the filename
for each file in a test set as the key for embedding) scenario are compared.
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• Regarding the user-specifiable parameters for the IH algorithms, here all schemes (see below) are
used with their default parametrisation.
On the following pages, detailed descriptions on used audio test sets, Information Hiding (IH) algorithms
and post-processing operations are given.
At the end of the section, a link points to the corresponding experimental setup descriptions in appendix
B (starting on page 197).
Audio test sets
As a large scale multi-genre audio test set the aats389 introduced in [Kraetzer06b] is used. It consists of
389 files classified into four main categories (music, sounds, speech and SQAM). All audio files are PCM
encoded WAVE files with 44100 Hz sampling rate, 16 Bit quantisation and 2 channels (stereo) (audio
CD format). They have an average duration of about 30 seconds. In the category music are 267 files
which are distributed into ten sub-categories (metal (20 files), pop (20), reggae (20), blues (20), jazz
(20), techno (20), hip-hop (20), country (20), synthetic (20) and classical). The sub-category classical
music (with 87 audio files) is again sub-divided into choir (8 files), string quartet (18), orchestra (21),
single instruments (19) and opera (19). The main category sounds is divided into four sub-categories
(computer generated (12 files), natural (8), silence (2) and noise (11)). The main category speech
has four sub-categories (male (24 files), female (20), computer generated (20) and sports (11)). The
main category SQAM [Waters88] contains 16 audio files (9 voice and 7 for instrumental). For more
details on this audio test set see [Lang07] where this set was extensively used for audio watermarking
benchmarking.
With testset24 a second audio test set is introduced in [Kraetzer09a] for the investigations performed.
It has the same genre structure as aats389, but contains only a single file in the audio CD format (i.e.
PCM encoded, 16 Bit quantisation, sampled at 44.1 kHz, stereo) per genre.
A third multi-genre testset used is the set ref10 described in section 4.3.1.
Further test sets used are the two speech-only testsets longfile and ahss1 containing only human speech.
The first contains only one long audio file (characteristics: duration 27 minutes 24 seconds, sampling
rate 44.1 kHz, stereo, 16 bit quantisation in an uncompressed, PCM encoded WAV-file; [Kraetzer07a])
containing only speech signals of one speaker. The latter contains ten PCM encoded speech files
with an overall duration of 65 minutes [Kraetzer08a]. The files are recorded by microphones in 16 Bit
quantisation, 44.1 kHz sampling, and mono.
Information Hiding (IH) algorithms
As described in section 3.2.2, the algorithms considered here for the practical investigations include
steganography as well as audio watermarking tools. The first are denoted as AS∗, the latter as AW∗.
Table 4.3 provides a brief description of the algorithms, which are all used within this thesis in their
default parametrisation.
Table 4.3: Information hiding (IH) algorithms used in this thesis
ID Name Ref. Description
AS1 AMSL LSBStego (ver-
sion Heutling051208)
[Kraetzer06b] A steganographic algorithm developed at the AMSL with
the intention to use it in VoIP steganography for PCM en-
coded VoIP channels. The message is embedded by this
time-domain algorithm into the LSBs of the audio sam-
ples which are not identified as silence. This algorithm is
described in detail in [Dittmann06]. Default parametri-
sation: embedding strength = 100%, silence detection
on, error correction (ECC) off
AS2 Publimark (v.0.1.2) [Dittmann06] This steganography algorithm is an open source tool,
developed by Guelvouit55. For the embedding (in time-
domain) it uses an asymetric key scenario. The algorithm
is described in detail in [Dittmann06]. Default parametri-
sation: no user parameters besides the keys and message
Continued on Next Page. . .
55http://www.gleguelv.org/soft/publimark/index.html
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Table 4.3 – Continued
ID Name Ref. Description
AS3 WaSpStego [Kraetzer07a] WaSpStego is a spread spectrum, wavelet-domain algo-
rithm, embedding ECC secured messages into PCM en-
coded audio files. The embedding is done by the modi-
fication of the signum of the lower third of wavelet co-
efficients of each block. Detection is done by correlating
the signums of these coefficients with the output of the
PRNG initialised with the same key as in the embed-
ding case. Default parametrisation: block width = 256,
embedding strength = 1%
AS4 Steghide (v.0.4.3) [Kraetzer06b] This time-domain algorithm embeds a compressed and
encrypted (Rijndael with a key length of 128 bits in ci-
pher block chaining mode) message in audio files. For
the embedding, a sequence of positions of samples in the
cover file is created for embedding, based on a PRNG
initialised with the key. A graph-theoretic matching al-
gorithm is used to find pairs of positions such that ex-
changing their values has the effect of embedding the
corresponding part of the secret data. Because most of
the embedding is done by exchanging sample values it is
implied that the first-order statistics (i.e. the number of
times a value occurs in the file) is not changed. Default
parametrisation: no user parameters besides the keys and
message
AS5 Steghide (v.0.5.1) [Kraetzer06b] Modified version of AS4. Default parametrisation: no
user parameters besides the keys and message
AW1 AMSL Spread Spectrum
Watermarking
[Dittmann06] This frequency-domain watermarking algorithm works
embeds the watermark (and ECC information) as
sequences into the frequency coefficients. Default
parametrisation: ECC on, lower frequency bound = 2000
Hz, upper frequency bound = 17000 Hz, strength =
50000
AW2 2A2W (AMSL Audio
Water Wavelet)
[Dittmann06] This watermarking algorithm works in wavelet-domain
and embeds the watermark on selected zero tree
nodes. A detailed description on the algorithm is given
in [Dittmann06]. Default parametrisation: encoding =
binary, method = ZeroTree
AW3 AMSL Least Significant
Bit Watermarking
[Dittmann06] A simple time-domain LSB watermarking algorithm em-
bedding sequentially into all LSBs of the cover. Default
parametrisation: ECC = on
AW4 VAWW (Viper Audio
Water Wavelet)
[Lang06] A wavelet-domain embedding the message into selected
wavelet coefficients. An detailed description of the algo-
rithm is provided in [Lang06]. Default parametrisation:
threshold = 40, scalar = 0.1
Post-processing operations
The MP3 conversion is one of the most widely used audio signal post-processing operations. Here, it
is applied with a common bit rate of 128kBit/s (using the LAME codec56) to show the impact of this
data reduction to the classification performance achieved in audio steganalysis.
De-noising is implemented here by quantisation to 8 Bit resolution and re-quantisation to 16 Bit.
Experimental setup descriptions
The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified in those chapers by underlined and
italic font setting (e.g. AS-D-SF-scaling). A summary of the experimental setup descriptions (identifying
training and test data, classifiers and features used) for the audio steganalysis application scenario is
given in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197). Originally, this summary was part of this
section. It has been move into appendix B to improve the accessibility of the core chapters of this
thesis.
56 http://lame.sourceforge.net/
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4.2.2 Chosen operators and parametrisations specialised performance metrics
for the pattern recognition pipeline for audio steganalysis
Figure 4.1 summarises the chosen operators and parametrisations for the pattern recognition
pipeline that are applied for the practical investigations on audio steganalysis in this thesis.
Figure 4.1: Chosen operators and parametrisations for the pattern recognition pipeline for audio steganalysis (based
on figure 2.6)
The main idea for the evaluations are: to limit the pre-processing to the absolute minimum (i.e. its
possibilities to enhance the performance of the pattern recognition is omitted here and reserved for
future work), use the same high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature set as
for microphone forensics, and combine existing feature selection and classification algorithms (provided
by WEKA) with application scenario specific selection and classification schemes. In detail this means:
• Existing information hiding (IH) algorithms are used to build a representative amount of audio
material for the investigations (see section 4.2.1).
• The influence of the number of feature vectors in training on the detection performance is inves-
tigated.
• Content selection and content dependent and independent training and testing are investigated
as influences to the SPR process
• As evaluation strategies 10-fold stratified cross-validation, percentage split and separate training-
and test sets are used
• Pre-processing is restricted to windowing with 1024 samples per non-overlapping, consecutive
frame, using Dirichlet window (see section 2.3.1).
• For feature extraction the high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature
set of the AAFE (in different version, see section 4.1.1) is used57.
57For one investigation a second feature extractor is used here. It is an audio adaptation of the RS-Analysis (Regu-
lar/Singular analysis or dual statistics) approach of Fridrich et al. [Fridrich01], [Ker04] called for the rest of this work
AudioRS. The implementation used for the corresponding tests is adapted by the author from the ImageRS incorporated
by Kathryn Hempstalk into the open source project Digital Invisible Ink Toolkit (http://diit.sourceforge.net/links.html).
In contradiction to AAFE, which is primarily an intra-window feature extractor, AudioRS is an inter-window (global)
feature extractor returning one 19 dimensional feature vector per file instead of one per window. It is only used in a very
few evaluations within this thesis Due to its rather low detection performance it was abandoned by the author.
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• Feature selection is implemented by a fusion of the feature selectors discussed in section 4.1.2.
• For classification the supervised and unsupervised classification algorithms implemented in WEKA
v.3.6.1 (see section 4.1.3) and by libsvm [Chang11] are used in their default parametrisations.
• For the classification a timeout boundary of 12 hours (=43,200s) is defined.
• For each atomar WEKA instance 1.6 GByte RAM are allocated.
• Classifier selection is performed on three representative IH algorithms.
The hardware platform for the implementation of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) solution for
this thesis is an array of workstations with a Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 CPU 3GHz with 4 GB RAM,
running Microsoft Windows XP, WEKA v.3.6.1 on Java SE 6 (32-bit Windows version) with 1.6 GByte
allocated RAM for each WEKA instance (i.e. classifier, clusterer, PCA or feature selector).
For the audio steganalysis application scenario, no specialised performance metrics are required for
the investigations in this thesis.
4.3 Special task and design adaptations for microphone forensics
The investigation tasks, that are derived in section 3.3 form the Daubert criteria, the general research
challenges and the objectives for this thesis, are here elaborated in detail for the application scenario of
microphone forensics.
For investigation task A (“Empirical ground truth”) sets of inhomogeneous (different microphones)
and homogeneous (microphones of the same brand and model) recording setups are used to establish:
• Whether SPR-based microphone authentication is actually possible with the introduced approach?
For investigation task B (“Investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influ-
ences to the SPR process”) practical investigations are performed within this thesis on:
• Which influence of the number of feature vectors in training has on the detection performance?
• Which classifiers (from a pre-existing portfolio provided by WEKA) are suitable to implement the
microphone forensics?
• Which features from the high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature set
of the AAFE introduced here are suitable for microphone forensics?
• How classification using content selection as well as content dependent and independent training
and testing influences the detection performance in microphone forensics?
For investigation task C (“Investigations on influences outside the SPR process on the performance
of the scheme”) practical investigations are performed here on the influences of:
• The recording environment
• The microphone orientation
• The mounting of the microphone
• Selected common audio post-processing operations (normalisation, MP3 conversion and de-
noising)
• Playback recording
• Composition attacks
The following sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 specify which design adaptations (resp. extensions) have been
made to implement the corresponding investigations.
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4.3.1 Chosen parametrisations for the degrees of freedom in the recording
process
Figure 4.2 summarises the chosen parametrisations for the degrees of freedom in the recording process.
Figure 4.2: Chosen parametrisations for the degrees of freedom in the recording process pipeline (based on figure 2.4)
The main idea for the investigations performed here is to focus on the microphone influence and minimise
the remaining degrees of freedom as good as possible. Using the context model for the recording process
as introduced in section 2.3.2, this means that:
• To provide control over the input (see equation 2.2) in section 2.3.2, for the majority of the
investigations fixed sets of reference signals (ref10 and ref2) are used.
• Live recordings of human speakers are used to reduce the source influence for playback detection
investigations.
• For the majority of the investigations exactly one sound source (a very precise Yamaha MSP 5
high-quality monitor loudspeaker) is used to provide a very good transmission function Fdriver(f)
and a minimal noise component Nls(f) for constant playback influences in sequential tests (see
equation 2.2).
• A fixed set of 10 different recording locations is used to provide a controlled set of different
influences on the environmental shaping (see equation 2.3).
• A (near) perfect recording is created by using an anechoic chamber for minimising e, Nenvi(f)
and the influence of the discolouration function D(f) (see equation 2.3).
• A limited number of microphone and pre-amplifier combinations are used to provide a controlled
set of different recording influences Fmic(f) and Nmic(f) (see equation 2.4; i.e. the intrinsic
characteristics used for the microphone forensics approach within this thesis) – here homogeneous
as well as inhomogeneous sets of microphones are considered (intra- vs. inter-class variance).
• Ten orientations and eight mounting alternatives are used to investigate on the impact of the
orientation and mounting influences (see equation 2.5).
• The influence factor NENF (f) (equation 2.4) has to be ignored in this thesis, due to lack of
corresponding detection and measurement hardware.
• Fsamp(f) and Nquan(f) (equation 2.7), controlled by the analogue to digital conversion, are
characteristic for audio signals in CD quality.
• The remaining influence factors (Ftran(f), Ntran(f), and Nthermal(f)) (see equations 2.6
and 2.7) are kept constant by a fixed physical setup.
• Selected common signal post-processings (de-noising, MP3 encoding and normalisation) are used
for plausibility investigations.
96
4.3. Special task and design adaptations for microphone forensics
• Four selected composition attack scenarios are used for investigations on the performance of the
introduced microphone forensics approach for integrity verification.
On the following pages, detailed descriptions on the reference signals, recording locations, microphone
and pre-amplifier combination (recording sets) and post-processing operations are given.
At the end of the section, a link points to the corresponding experimental setup descriptions in appendix
C (starting on page 201).
Reference signals
Besides live recordings (only RS16 ProbM01 and RS16 ProbM01 playback), two sets of reference files
are used in the microphone forensics experiments conducted within the context of this thesis. These
sets are ref10 and ref2 .
In ref10 a number of 10 files (see table 4.4) from the AMSL audio test set described in [Kraetzer06b]
were chosen. These reference files represent ten different classes of audio material (music (metal, pop,
techno), noise (MLS and white noise), digital silence, a pure harmonic sine at 440 Hz, recorded speech
(male and female speaker) and one sample from the SQAM files (Sound Quality Assessment Material;
see [Waters88])). All material is provided in 44.1 kHz sampling frequency, 16 Bit quantisation, stereo
and PCM coded. The reference files (and the recordings based on these references) have a duration of
30 seconds each.
Table 4.4: The set of reference files ref10 used in microphone forensics (based on [Kraetzer07c])
Test file Genre
Metallica-Fuel.wav music/metal
U2-BeautifulDay.wav music/pop
Scooter-HowMuchIsTheFish.wav music/techno
mls.wav sounds/noise
sine440.wav sounds/noise
white.wav sounds/noise
silence.wav sounds/silence
MariaG-afewboys nor.wav speech/female
andreas-D2.wav speech/male
vioo10 2 nor.wav sqam/instrumental
The files are played in every room in R* using a notebook computer and a Yamaha MSP 5 high-quality
monitor speaker and the sound is recorded by the microphones in the corresponding recording set (see
below). These microphones are in most sets (except RS7, RS8 and RS9) mounted in a fixed position
together with the notebook, the speaker and the used preamplifiers on a trolley to provide mobility for
the fixed set-up.
The set ref2 is a subset of ref10 containing only the silence and harmonic sine at 440 Hz parts.
Recording locations
Table 4.5: Microphone forensics recording locations R01, R02, ..., R10 (based on [Kraetzer07c])
Recording location R* Room number Description
R01 29R114 large office
R02 29R131 small office
R03 29R140 bathroom
R04 29R146 laboratory
R05 29R307 large lecture hall
R06 audiobox anechoic chamber
R07 outside1 quiet outside environment
R08 outside2 busy parking lot
R09 corridor long and narrow corridor
R10 stairs stone stairwell with strong echo
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Since the beginning of the practical investigations on microphone forensics reflected in this thesis, the
same set of ten recording locations (rooms, R01, R02, ..., R10) has been used. This set is described
in detail in [Kraetzer07c]. It consists of eight rooms and two outside locations of the main building of
the Faculty of Computer Science, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg. A plan of these recording
locations is shown in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Microphone forensics recording locations R01, R02, ..., R10 (taken from [Kraetzer07c])
Table 4.5 summarises the description of the recording locations, as introduced in [Kraetzer07c].
Recording sets
For the practical investigations performed in microphone forensics nine different recording sets RS* have
been created: RS1, RS2, RS4 Beyer, RS4 Rode, RS7, RS8, RS9, RS16 ProbM01, and RS16 ProbM01 -
playback. The apparent gaps in the naming scheme result from the intention of the author to remain
compliant with the naming schemes used in the paper publications accompanying this thesis (see the
introduction text in chapter 6).
A recording set is described by a microphone M∗ and pre-amplifier/soundcard combination, see table 4.6.
Table 4.6: The recording sets RS* used for microphone forensics
Identifier Microphone(s) Pre-amplifier/soundcard
RS1
M1 AKG SE 300 B Millenium Mic 1
M2 TerraTec HeadsetMaster Creative Sound Blaster USB
M3 Shure SM58 Creative Sound Blaster USB
M4 Tbone T.bone MB45 Millenium Mic 1
RS2
M2 TerraTec HeadsetMaster Creative Sound Blaster USB
M5 PUX 70TX-M1 UBC 60XLT-2 receiver connected to a Creative
Sound Blaster USB
M3 Shure SM58 Creative Sound Blaster USB
M6 T.bone MB45 Creative Sound Blaster USB
M7 AKG SE 300 B (CK93) Creative Sound Blaster USB
M8 AKG SE 300 B (CK98) Creative Sound Blaster USB
M9 AKG SC600 Creative Sound Blaster USB
RS4 Rode
M16 Rode NT6 Presonus FireStudio Project 8-port soundcard
M17 Rode NT6
M18 Rode NT6
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.6 – Continued
Identifier Microphone(s) Pre-amplifier/soundcard
M19 Rode NT6
RS4 Beyer
M20 Beyerdynamic Opus 89 Presonus FireStudio Project 8-port soundcard
M21 Beyerdynamic Opus 89
M22 Beyerdynamic Opus 89
M23 Beyerdynamic Opus 89
RS7, RS8 and RS9
M22 Beyerdynamic Opus 89 Presonus FireStudio Project 8-port soundcard
RS16 ProbM01 and RS16 ProbM01 playback
M33 Integrated microphone of an Audio Advantage Roadie USB soundcard
M34 Integrated microphone of an Audio Advantage Roadie USB soundcard
M35 Plantronics (Head-set Master) Creative Sound Blaster USB
M36 No-name head-set Creative Sound Blaster USB
M37 Beyerdynamics Opus 89 Presonus Firestudio (line-in)
M38 PUX 70TX-M1 Piezoelectric
surveillance microphone
UBC 60XLT-2 receiver connected to the record-
ing notebooks microphone input
The recording set RS1 is the original recording set from [Kraetzer07c]. It contains four different micro-
phones that are used to record simultaneously the reference signals (see above) played with a Yamaha
MSP 5 high-quality monitor speaker.
RS2 is the recording set created for [Buchholz09]. It contains seven different microphones which are
used for sequential recording (all on a Sound Blaster USB as pre-amplifier). It contains three dynamic
microphones (TerraTec HeadsetMaster, Shure SM58, and T.bone MB45), three condenser microphones
(AKG CK93, AKG CK98, and T.bone SC600), and a piezoelectric microphone (the PUX 70TX-M1).
The two sets RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer both contain a set of four identical microphones and both
recorded in parallel (time synchronous) using a Presonus FireStudio Project 8-port Firewire sound-
card. The RS4 Rode represents a homogeneous set of four Rode NT6 condenser microphones, while
RS4 Beyer is a homogeneous set of four Beyerdynamic Opus 89 dynamic microphones. Thereby, the
tests performed on RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer cover the two most common microphone types in intra-
class evaluations. The results can be assumed to be of stronger significance than those achieved on
mixed class sets like RS1 or RS2.
The recording set RS7 is recorded in the anechoic chamber (room R06), using the Beyerdynamic Opus
89 microphone M22. By this microphone two different reference sounds (a harmonic sinusoid at 440 Hz
and silence) are recorded in eight different microphone orientations, each with 45◦ offset in the xy-plane
from its predecessor, stating with the orientation directly towards the sound generating loudspeaker.
RS8 uses the same microphone as RS7 but here two microphone orientations with 180◦ offset in the
yz-plane are recorded by M22 in R06.
The recording set RS9 also records with M22 in the anechoic chamber R06. Here, two different ref-
erence sounds (a harmonic sinusoid at 440 Hz and silence) are recorded in eight different microphone
mounting positions. The distance (50cm) and orientation to the loudspeaker are kept constant in these
tests.
The recording set RS16 ProbM01 is generated by a human speaker reading a text in front of an array
of dynamic (M33, M34, M35, and M36), condenser (M37) and piezoelectric (M38) microphones. The
recordings with this set are played back using a Yamaha MSP 5 high-quality monitor speaker and the
playback is recorded with the same hardware (recording set RS16 ProbM01 playback).
For RS1, RS2, RS4 Beyer, and RS4 Rode recordings are generated in each of the 10 recording environ-
ments R01, R02, ..., R10 specified above. For RS7, RS8, RS9, RS16 ProbM01, and RS16 ProbM01 -
playback, which are used to investigate specific influence factors to the recording process, recordings
are only generated in the anechoic chamber R06.
Post-processing operations and attack scenarios for composition attack investigations
Normalisation is a fairly common audio signal post-processing operation. Since it is an amplitude
scaling operation in time domain, normalisation is considered here to be a representative for all such
operations. It is implemented here with a normalisation factor computed independently for each file in
99
Chapter 4. Investigation Designs – Considerations for the Practical Evaluations
the material under investigation.
The MP3 conversion is one of the most widely used audio signal post-processing operations. Here, it
is applied with a common bit rate of 128kBit/s (using the LAME codec58) to show the impact of this
data reduction to the classification performance achieved in microphone forensics.
De-noising is implemented here by quantisation to 8 Bit resolution and re-quantisation to 16 Bit.
Four different composition tests are performed in this thesis:
• Microphone recordings of one known microphone made in different locations composed into one
stream.
• One known microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known microphone.
• One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known microphone.
• One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different unknown microphone.
Experimental setup descriptions
The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified in those chapers by underlined and
italic font setting (e.g. Mic-01). A summary of the experimental setup descriptions (identifying training
and test data, classifiers and features used) for the microphone forensics application scenario is given
in table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201). Originally, this summary was part of this section.
It has been move into appendix C to improve the accessibility of the core chapters of this thesis.
4.3.2 Chosen operators and parametrisations for the pattern recognition
pipeline and specialised performance metrics for microphone forensics
Figure 4.4 summarises the chosen operators and parametrisations for the pattern recognition
pipeline that are applied for the practical investigations on microphone forensics in this thesis.
Figure 4.4: Chosen operators and parametrisations for the pattern recognition pipeline for microphone forensics
(based on figure 2.6)
The main ideas for the evaluations are: to limit the pre-processing to the absolute minimum (i.e. its
possibilities to enhance the performance of the pattern recognition is omitted here and reserved for
58 http://lame.sourceforge.net/
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future work), use the same high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature set as
for audio steganalysis, and combine existing feature selection and classification algorithms (provided by
WEKA) with application scenario specific selection and classification schemes. In detail this means:
• The microphones (recording sets) and recording locations are used to build a representative
amount of audio material for the investigations (see section 4.3.1).
• The influence of the number of feature vectors in training on the detection performance is inves-
tigated.
• Content selection and content dependent and independent training and testing are investigated
as influences to the SPR process.
• As evaluation strategies 10-fold stratified cross-validation, percentage split and separate training-
and test sets are used.
• Pre-processing is restricted to windowing with 1024 samples per non-overlapping, consecutive
frame, using Dirichlet window (see section 2.3.1).
• For feature extraction the high-dimensional, simple to compute, general purpose audio feature
set of the AAFE (in differend version, see section 4.1.1) is used.
• Feature selection is implemented by a fusion of the feature selectors discussed in section 4.1.2.
• For classification the supervised and unsupervised classification algorithms implemented in WEKA
v.3.6.1 (see section 4.1.3) are used in their default parametrisations.
• For the classification a timeout boundary of 60 hours (=216,000s) is defined.
• For each atomar WEKA instance 1.6 GByte RAM are allocated.
• Classifier selection is performed on two homogeneous recording sets (RS4 Rode and RS Beyer –
see section 4.3.1).
The hardware platform for the implementation of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) solution for
this thesis is an array of workstations with a Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 CPU 3GHz with 4 GB RAM,
running Microsoft Windows XP, WEKA v.3.6.1 on Java SE 6 (32-bit Windows version) with 1.6 GByte
allocated RAM for each WEKA instance (i.e. classifier, clusterer, PCA or feature selector).
Regarding the specialised performance metrics for microphone forensics, besides the κ statistics
(and accuracy ; see section 4.1.4) an extension has to be made for the integrity verification tests
using composition attacks. For these tests the change rate and the average sequence length in class
assignment of an authentication attempt are used to give an indication on the potential integrity
violation in an audio recording. The smaller the change rate and the higher the average sequence
length in the classifications, the better the classification under these circumstances (i.e. a (suitably)
trained classifier which achieves a high detection performance in authentication assigns the frames to
a consistent source).
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5
Investigations for Application Scenario 1: Audio
Steganalysis
This chapter is dedicated to the experimental evaluation of the performance of an instantiation of the
introduced general-purpose statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based audio forensics approach for
audio steganalysis. It is structured along the investigation tasks A) to C) defined in section 3.3.
The empirical ground truth requested in investigation task A) is established for the audio steganalysis
approach developed in this thesis in section 5.1. For the performed investigations, this section will show
the statistical relevance of the introduced solution approach as well as provide required knowledge for
the following evaluations.
In section 5.2 the impact of steganalysis specific influences to the statistical pattern recogni-
tion (SPR) process is considered (as part of investigation task B)) by investigations on the embedding
domain, the key-scenario used, context dependent and independent training and testing as well as the
dimensionality of the evaluation setup (i.e. modelling steganalysis as two-class or multi-class problem).
For investigation task C) (Influences to the performance of the scheme, which are outside the
SPR process) in section 5.3 the persistence of the introduced approach against selected post-processing
operations is investigated.
At the end of the chapter, the major results of the investigations performed within this chapter are
summarised in section 5.4. This summary includes a mapping of the progress made on this application
scenario to investigation tasks (as defined in section 3.3) as well as to the Daubert criteria as specified
in section 2.2 and its subsections.
As usual for a dissertation project in the field of computer science, in compliance with Daubert criterion
DC2 (“whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication” [USC93])
and to give other researchers / reviewers the chance to dispute the theory and its application (Daubert
criterion DC5 “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity” [USC93]), parts of the results presented in this chapter have been previously published in workshop,
conference proceedings, two technical reports as well as a journal publication. The corresponding papers
are (in chronological order):
• 2006:
– [Kraetzer06c] presented at the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems in
Kos, Greece, May 21th-24th, 2006.
– [Kraetzer06a] presented at the BSI-Workshop IT-Fru¨hwarnsysteme, Bonn, Germany, July
12th, 2006.
• 2007:
– [Dittmann07] technical report ECRYPT D.WVL.16 Report on Watermarking Benchmarking
and Steganalysis, 2007.
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– [Kraetzer07a] presented at the SPIE conference Security, Steganography, and Watermarking
of Multimedia Contents IV, IS&T/SPIE Symposium on Electronic Imaging, January 28th-
February 1st, in San Jose, CA, USA, 2007.
– [Kraetzer07b] presented at Information Hiding 2007, June 11th-13th, in St. Malo, France,
2007.
• 2008:
– [Kraetzer08a] presented at the SPIE conference Security, Forensics, Steganography, and
Watermarking of Multimedia Contents X. Electronic Imaging Conference 6819, IS&T/SPIE
20th Annual Symposium, in San Jose, CA, USA, January 26th-31st, 2008.
– [Kraetzer08b] presented at the 10th ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Security, September
22nd-23rd, in Oxford, UK, 2008.
• 2009:
– [Kraetzer09a] presented at the SPIE conference Media Forensics and Security XI. Electronic
Imaging Conference 7254, IS&T/SPIE 21st Annual Symposium, in San Jose, CA, USA,
January 18th-22nd, 2009.
• 2010:
– [Kraetzer10] presented at the SPIE conference Multimedia on Mobile Devices 2010, Elec-
tronic Imaging Conference 7542, IS&T/SPIE 22nd Annual Symposium, in San Jose, CA,
USA, January 18th and 19th, 2010.
• 2012:
– [Kraetzer12a] published in the journal Transactions on Data Hiding and Multimedia Security
VIII, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7228, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, ISBN:
978-3-642-31970-9, pp. 80-101, 2012.
The major results from these publications are recapitulated in the following sections, where they are
further substantiated and accompanied by additional investigations as necessary.
5.1 Establishing some empirical truth for the used audio ste-
ganalysis approach
Within this section some basic empirical results are presented, fulfilling investigations task A) as defined
in section 3.3. These basic considerations focus in section 5.1.1 on the question whether applying
statistical pattern recognition (SPR) for audio steganalysis is feasible in the first place. In the following
section 5.1.2 considerations are made on evaluation sizes (in terms of feature vectors used for training)
required to achieve reliable answers in the investigations performed. Section 5.1.3 presents investigations
on the detector on completely unmarked material, giving an indication on the tendency of the introduced
approach to generate false positive errors. In sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 application scenario specific
classifier and feature selection operations are performed with the aim of identifying suitable candidates
for the following investigations.
5.1.1 Detection performance
In [Kraetzer07a], the first publication which uses the audio steganalysis approach considered in this
thesis, in classical two-class setups (see experimental setup59 AS-Kraetzer2007SPIE-summary) κ values
between 0.142 and 0.950 (detection accuracies between 57.1% and 97.5%) are achieved. The setup for
the detection of the nine information hiding (IH) algorithms evaluated there is using AAFE v.1.0.3 (with
59The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified by underlined and italic font setting (e.g. Mic-01)
– they are resolved in appendixes B (audio steganalysis) and C (microphone forensics).
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its 63 dimensional feature vectors), a training set size of 64 feature vectors per file of the multi-genre
audio set aats389 and using another 16 feature vectors per file for testing. Table 5.1 identifies the
best Kappa values κ achieved for each algorithm in an experiment testing different sub-sets in this
feature space. The corresponding feature sets used to obtain the input for the classifications vary,
since they are a result of a first and rather coarse feature selection (AS-Kraetzer2007SPIE-summary
– see table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)). The feature sets used to achieve the results
presented in table 5.1 are for AS1 and AS5 only the time-domain features of AAFE v.1.0.3. For AS2,
AS3, AS4, AW1, AW2, AW3, AW4 the combination of time-domain features and FMFCCs shows the
best detection performance (see [Kraetzer07a]).
Table 5.1: Kappa values for the best performing detections on the nine IH algorithms in [Kraetzer07a] – setup
AS-Kraetzer2007SPIE-summary ; κ computed from the accuracies reported in [Kraetzer07a]
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
κ 0.142 0.198 0.344 0.214 0.224 0.950 0.432 0.212 0.190
The results presented in table 5.1 show for every evaluated IH algorithm a detection performance that
is better than the probability of guessing correctly (which would be equivalent to κ = 0.000). Nev-
ertheless, the detection performance strongly differs between the different IH algorithms for the used
feature set. With κ = 0.142 the lowest detection performance is achieved for the LSB steganography
algorithm AS1 (here, the silence detection of the embedding function, which is the major difference
between the embedding in AS1 and AW3, obviously has strong influence to the detectability), while
the best performance is seen with κ = 0.950 for the spread spectrum watermarking algorithm AW1.
In [Kraetzer08b], which uses the same set of nine IH algorithms, the accuracies presented in table 5.1
are confirmed by similar results using AAFE v.1.0.4 calculating 98 features and 256 windows per file
for training and 64 windows per file for testing on the multi-genre audio set aats389.
For later publications on this approach (e.g. [Kraetzer09a] and [Kraetzer10]) the mostly information
fusion and plausibility focussed investigations are narrowed down from a selection of nine IH algorithms
to a representative60 set of three algorithms (AS1, AS3 and AW1). The single classifier accuracies
achieved in these later publications (with AAFE v.1.0.4 in [Kraetzer09a] and v.2.0.5 with its 590 seg-
mental and 17 global features in [Kraetzer10]) on multi-genre audio sets are further documenting the
potential of the introduced approach of SPR-based audio steganalysis based on the usage of a general-
purpose audio feature extractor like the AAFE.
In table 5.2 a selection from the single classifier evaluations performed in [Kraetzer10] is presented.
It compares for the global features of AAFE v.2.0.5 two different evaluation strategies (10-fold strati-
fied cross-validation over 40 windows per file as well as training and testing with 40 windows per file
from aats389 for training and 40 windows per file from testset24 for testing – see experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)).
The results show, on one hand, that the chosen approach works quite well, but on the other hand, it
also quite well identifies one of the major problems of the SPR approach: the dependency of the detec-
tion performance on the availability of representative training material for the building of the classifier
model.
Table 5.2 summarises for the three exemplary selected IH algorithms AS1, AS3 and AW1 as well as
the two different evaluation strategies (10-fold stratified cross-validation as well as training and testing
with independent sets) the classification performance based on the AAFE v.2.0.5 and global features. A
more complete analysis of these evaluations is presented in the classifier selection focussed section 5.1.4.
The most significant case is seen in this table for AW1 in case of the cross-validation where out of
WEKAs (v.3.6.1) 74 classifiers 20 show a κ better than 0.8 (equivalent in this setup with accuracy
> 90%), 24 further classifiers achieve a κ between 0.6 and 0.8 and additional 7 classifiers perform
60Representative in this context means that time-domain, frequency-domain and wavelet-domain embedding strategies
are still covered, as well as the set still including steganography as well as audio watermarking algorithms.
105
Chapter 5. Investigations for Application Scenario 1: Audio Steganalysis
with a κ between 0.2 and 0.6. The best classification performance achieved in this test is κ = 0.85
(accuracy=92.68%).
The least significant result is seen for AS1 in case of the training and testing with independent sets
scenario with the best classifier achieving only κ = 0.15 (accuracy = 57.29%). The differences be-
tween the algorithms differ strongly in terms of the detectability of the algorithms. The fact, established
in [Kraetzer10], that the watermarking algorithms in the set are generally better detectable than the
steganographic algorithms, is supported here.
Table 5.2: Comparison of the detection performance achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 global fea-
tures – overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary)
10-fold strat. cross-valid. Training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3 AS1 AW1 AS3
Maximum achieved κ value 0.72 0.85 0.38 0.15 0.50 0.19
Maximum achieved accuracy 86.15% 92.68% 68.94% 57.29% 75.00% 59.38%
Performance histogram:
0.2 ≤ κ < 0.6 (60 ≤ accuracy < 80%) 2 7 40 0 40 0
0.6 ≤ κ < 0.8 (80 ≤ accuracy < 90%) 3 24 0 0 0 0
0.8 ≤ κ ≤ 1.0 (90 ≤ accuracy < 100%) 0 20 0 0 0 0
Regarding the differences between the evaluation strategies a more complex statement is presented by
the results in table 5.2. For these investigations, the cross-validation based evaluations in general show
better detection performances than the training and testing with independent sets. On a first glance,
it seems that the cross-validation is the more appropriate evaluation method because it shows more
significant results and is assumed here to be less overfitting. Nevertheless, this evaluation scenario is
rather unrealistic since it implicitly assumes access to unmarked versions of the candidate audio signals
in an investigation, which at the same point of time would make the complete steganographic process
superfluous because the investigator in this case could perform a much simpler and more reliable dif-
ference analysis. Therefore the results for the training and testing with independent sets have to be
considered in this thesis to be the more relevant – or closer to the practical constraints of a steganog-
raphy implementing security mechanism.
Equivalent to the global feature results presented above in table 5.2, in table 5.3 the classification
performance based on AAFE v.2.0.5 segmental features for detection of the three exemplary selected
IH algorithms AS1, AS3 and AW1 as well as the two different evaluation strategies (10-fold stratified
cross-validation as well as training and testing with independent sets) is presented.
Table 5.3: Comparison of the detection performance achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 segmental
features – overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary)
10-fold strat. cross-valid. Training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3 AS1 AW1 AS3
Maximum achieved κ value 0.88 0.93 0.41 0.00 0.79 0.22
Maximum achieved accuracy 94.19% 96.47% 70.36% 50.12% 89.48% 61.22%
Performance histogram:
0.2 ≤ κ < 0.6 (60 ≤ accuracy < 80%) 1 4 12 0 5 6
0.6 ≤ κ < 0.8 (80 ≤ accuracy < 90%) 0 3 0 0 31 0
0.8 ≤ κ ≤ 1.0 (90 ≤ accuracy < 100%) 4 30 0 0 0 0
For the inter-algorithm comparisons the steganographic algorithms AS1 and AS3 are again much less
detectable than the watermarking algorithm AW1, even when the cross-validation based evaluation
identifies some classifiers which achieve a κ ≥ 0.8 (an accuracy of more than 90%). If the cross-
validation and two-set training and testing results are compared the same observation can be made as
for the global features: it seems that the cross-validation is the more appropriate evaluation method
because it shows more significant results. Yet again, the training and testing with independent sets
106
5.1. Establishing some empirical truth for the used audio steganalysis approach
is considered in this thesis to be closer to the practical constraints of a steganography implementing
security mechanism. Unfortunately, using this strategy the investigations on AS1 are unable to present
any satisfactory results (κ = 0) for all used classifiers.
Comparing the global and segmental feature results (table 5.2 and table 5.3 respectively), it can be
stated that while both classes of features allow for significant classification accuracies, the segmental
features seem to outperform the global features in most cases – a more detailed analysis of the perfor-
mance of the two feature classes in audio steganalysis is presented in sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5.
Re´sume´ for this section: The investigations performed in this section can be summarised as fol-
lows: Notwithstanding the fact that all classifiers are used in default parametrisation – which has to
be assumed to be sub-optimal (a fact which would require more detailed considerations on classifier
optimisation and -generation, which are outside the scope of this thesis) – the results presented for
statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based audio steganalysis, as it is used within this thesis, can be
considered to support the assumption that SPR can indeed be used to solve this media forensics appli-
cation scenario. From the two evaluated test scenarios (10-fold stratified cross-validation and training
and testing with independent sets), the cross-validation is assumed here to be less suitable, because
it implicitly assumes access to unmarked covers, which seems to hardly feasible for audio steganalysis
cases. The strong variance in the reported detection performances implies the need for the following
sections to investigate more closely on the internal and external influences to the detection performance.
5.1.2 Influence of the number of feature vectors in training
In [Kraetzer07a] it is implied for AS1 using AAFE v.1.0.3 that larger model sizes outperform smaller
model sizes in terms of resulting detection performance. The test performed there are run on one hand
with 80 feature vectors per file (split in the ratio 64 for training and 16 for testing) and on the other hand
with 2600 feature vectors per file (comparing the test cases of 400 feature vectors per file for training
and 2200 for testing with the inverted ratio of 2200 feature vectors per file for training and 400 for test-
ing). Unfortunately, different test sets are used for these two tests (aats389 for the first vs. longfile for
the second) so that these results cannot be directly compared. Nevertheless, the results indicate an in-
crease of the classification accuracy even when the training set size exceeds 2000 feature vectors per file.
A more substantial and generalisable investigation on the scaling behaviour is performed in [Kraetzer07b]
also using the AAFE v.1.0.3 with its 63 dimensional feature vectors (see setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling
in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)). There the multi-genre test set aats389 is used
for detection performance evaluations for three different training- and test set sizes (16, 64 and 256
feature vectors per file for training and 4, 16 and 64 feature vectors per file for testing). The results of
this evaluation are summarised in table 5.4 below.
Table 5.4: Detection performance (κ values) for different model sizes, using from the 63 dimensional fea-
ture set of AAFE v.1.0.3 only the time-domain features and the FMFCCs (see experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling , results adapted from [Kraetzer07b]
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
κ value for tr.16 vs. te.4 0.032 0.210 0.273 0.195 0.196 0.869 0.408 0.183 0.115
κ value for tr.64 vs. te.16 0.129 0.199 0.344 0.213 0.217 0.950 0.433 0.211 0.190
κ value for tr.256 vs. te.64 0.244 0.244 0.459 0.244 0.241 0.982 0.497 0.220 0.278
The results presented in table 5.4 show for eight out of the nine IH algorithms a homogeneous increase
in the detection performance with an increasing training set size. Only the steganography algorithm
AS2 presents a slight exception from this rule.
The speech-only test-set longfile was used in [Kraetzer07a] to simulate the application scenario of VoIP
steganography using the steganography algorithm AS1. This simulation is extended in [Kraetzer07b]
to the other IH algorithms evaluated there (see experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling VoIP
in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)). Unfortunately the algorithms AS4, AS5, AW2
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and AW3 were not capable of marking the extremely long audio file composing the test set longfile.
In the case of AW2 the embedding process was terminated with a ‘segmentation fault’, in the case
of AW3 and AS5 the embedding function terminated with the message ‘aborted’ without generating
the marked output file. For AS4 the embedding process was aborted manually after running 40 hours
without termination or showing any form of progress. The behaviour of those four algorithms (which is
considered to be a result of the extreme file size) is marked in table 5.5 with ‘n.a.’ (result not available).
Table 5.5: Detection performance (κ values) for different model sizes, using from the 63 dimensional fea-
ture set of AAFE v.1.0.3 only the time-domain features and the FMFCCs (see experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling VoIP, results adapted from [Kraetzer07b])
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
κ value for tr.400 vs. te.2200 0.939 0.922 0.915 n.a. n.a. 1.000 n.a. n.a. 0.944
κ value for tr.2200 vs. te.400 1.000 1.000 1.000 n.a. n.a. 1.000 n.a. n.a. 1.000
The table 5.5 shows good or even perfect results for the large models used here for classification. The
only conclusion, which can be drawn from these test results, is that the ideal model size for this very
context limited evaluation seems to be between 400 and 2200 feature vectors per file for the most IH
algorithms considered. Only for AW1 this number is lower – on the pure speech content in the test
set longfile it is assumed by the author to be even lower than the size of 256 feature vectors per file
evaluated in table 5.4 for the multi-genre test-set aats389.
Therefore, these results on the longfile test-set with its speech-limited content are of high importance
for this thesis. At this model size all five IH algorithms, for which the investigation was possible, show a
detection performance of κ > 0.9 under ideal circumstances61. Therefore, this could be used as a first
recommendation for a model size for implementing a security mechanism based on a general purpose
audio feature extractor like the AAFE v.1.0.3 on known content. If the content is not known or is in its
characteristics less ideal than speech signals, a significantly higher number of feature vectors per file in
a training set reflecting the application scenario might be required. If the application scenario would be
universal steganalysis (suitably represented by the multi-genre audio set 389files) and we would take
the figure of 400 feature vectors per file from above as a rough estimation, then this would result in a
vector field of about 155,000 reference vectors for the generation of the classifier models. Considering
the feature vector dimensionality involved, this figure would present a highly computational complex
problem to any classification algorithm. Even if the model generation could be performed successfully
(which is not guaranteed with such large reference data sets) it has to be assumed that the model will
be very complex and therefore any classification using this model will be extremely slow.
In [Kraetzer08a] another investigation is performed on the application scenario of (simulated) VoIP
steganalysis. There the special purpose audio set aahs1 (consisting of 10 speech samples from different
persons with an average duration of 390s per file; see experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-VoIP
in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)) is used to extend the investigations to all nine
IH algorithms evaluated there and to an estimation of the achievable classification performance on a
more realistic multi-speaker audio set. Table 5.6 summarises the results achieved in the classification
accuracy focussed investigations in [Kraetzer08a].
Table 5.6: Detection performance (κ values) for a training-set size of 15000 vs. a test-set size of 1200 per ref-
erence file using the complete 98 dimensional feature set of AAFE v.1.0.4 (see experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-VoIP, results adapted from [Kraetzer08a])
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
κ value 0.896 0.550 0.996 0.102 0.206 1.000 0.802 0.938 1.000
If the results of table 5.6 are compared to the results presented in table 5.5 it can be noticed that
for three out of the five IH algorithms, for which results are present in both tables, the detection per-
formance for the multi-speaker set aahs1 are lower than for the single-speaker set longfile. On a first
glance, this seems to contradict the aforementioned assumption that a higher number of feature vectors
per file in a training-set should reflect into increased classification accuracy.
61Training and test material are drawn from the same source.
108
5.1. Establishing some empirical truth for the used audio steganalysis approach
On the second glance, this assumed contradiction evaporates if the differences in the investigative se-
tups AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling VoIP and AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-VoIP are taken into account. The
setups differ in three relevant points62: the extracted feature sets, the audio sets used for training and
testing and the number of feature vectors used in training.
The feature set extracted in AS-Kraetzer2007IH-scaling VoIP is a direct sub-set of the feature set ex-
tracted in AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-VoIP. The feature selection operations performed in [Kraetzer08a] as
well as in section 5.1.5 of this thesis show better results for the larger feature space – therefore it is
unlikely that this influence factor is responsible for the decrease in the classification performance.
The other two factors, the audio sets used and the number of feature vectors used in training, are most
likely both contributing to the decrease in the classification performance. On one hand, the stronger
variance in the audio material (ten different speaker characteristics instead of only one) makes the
classification problem more complex, while on the other hand the larger number of vectors in training
has to be assumed to lead to an overfitting and therefore assumedly also has also a negative effect on
the classification accuracies achieved. Unfortunately, the strength of the individual effects cannot be
estimated form the investigations performed here.
To give a more fine-granular analysis of the influence of the training set size, the setup from [Kraetzer10]
is re-used here to perform a measurement of the achieved detection performance. Figure 5.1 summarises
the detection performances achieved for step sizes ranging from 3112 feature vectors for training (equiv-
alent to 4 frames per audio file in the evaluation set or 72 seconds of audio material in total; see
experimental setup AS-D-SF-scaling) up to 24896 feature vectors (equivalent to 578 seconds of audio
material).
Figure 5.1: Detection performance (κ value) variation with training set size (experimental setup AS-D-SF-scaling)
The results for AS1 are omitted in this figure because the evaluated classifiers achieved for this algo-
rithm no detection performance other than κ = 0. As can be seen in figure 5.1, the results for AW1 are
extremely good for all tested set sizes. A small increase is visible when raising the set size from 3112
to 6224 but further increases do not show any significant effect. For AS3 obviously even the largest set
size tested is not yet large enough to achieve optimal results.
Re´sume´ for this section The classification performance achieved in SPR is, next to other character-
istics, strongly depending on the quality of the model used for classification. The quality of the model
itself depends on a number of characteristics. Amongst them is the model size, which is the focus of
this section. The model size itself directly reflects the material provided in the training phase. If this
training set is chosen too small, then the model is most likely insignificant. If it chosen too large then
the curse of dimensionality [Bellman61] will take its toll on the computation time required for training
as well as application of the model in classifications, additionally in this case a high probability of an
overfitting exists. If a wrong context is trained, due to a wrong choice of training set components, this
wrongful content adaptation will also with a high probability render the model useless.
62All other influence factors, like the classifier used, the parametrisations and embedding strengths for the IH algorithms,
etc are identical.
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The investigation results presented in this section indicate that the achieved classification accuracy
scales with increasing training set size. But a concrete optimal training set size (and corresponding
classifier model size) for all audio steganalysis approaches could not be established in the investigations
here, since such a figure is depending on too many variables. For one example specification of the
audio steganalysis problem – simulated VoIP steganography and steganalysis using the AAFE (v.1.0.3)
with a confidence / trust level of 95% correct classifications – a rough estimate is presented for five
chosen IH algorithms at 400 feature vectors per reference file, a figure which would be much too large
for the training multi-content or even general-purpose classifier models. Nevertheless, this example
specification is very idealistic as shown in the results presented in [Kraetzer08a] and does not allow for
any generalisation of this subject. Future investigations in SPR-based steganalysis should extend their
considerations on required feature set sizes for context specific training.
Based on the figure given above, the results presented here imply that general-purpose SPR performs
suboptimal in steganalysis, where optimised versions of the general SPR tool-set are required (e.g.
optimisations by feature selection and training set optimisation) will lead to more practical relevant
(confidence and throughput/complexity) steganalysers.
5.1.3 Tests on unmarked sets
Even if it is assumedly more significant if a detector fails to detect a steganographic channel present (i.e.
causes false negative errors), it has to be investigated also whether the introduced approach generated
an unnecessarily high number of false positive errors. For this reason [Kraetzer07b] presents detection
performances from two-class setups achieved in testing on completely unmarked material. The Table 5.7
summarises these results for two different feature sets (the time-domain features computed by AAFE
v.1.0.3 vs. a combination of the time-domain features and the FMFCCs computed by AAFE v.1.0.3).
Table 5.7: Detection performance (κ values) for models trained for the corresponding information hiding algo-
rithm (on marked and unmarked versions of aats389) and tested on unmarked material; results adapted
from [Kraetzer07b]; experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-unmarked
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
only time-domain features 0.101 0.292 0.631 0.791 0.791 0.636 0.802 0.263 0.320
time-domain features and
FMFCCs
0.085 0.272 0.506 0.588 0.788 0.979 0.551 0.335 0.231
Based on these detection performances, table 5.8 summarises the corresponding false positive error
rates, showing a very inhomogeneous behaviour for the different test cases, which follows the general
trend for the results presented within this thesis for the application scenario of audio steganalysis.
Table 5.8: False positive rate (FPR) for the corresponding information hiding algorithm (on marked and unmarked
versions of aats389) and tested on unmarked material; results adapted from [Kraetzer07b]; experimental
setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-unmarked
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
FPR for time-domain features 44.97% 35.40% 18.44% 10.43% 10.43% 18.20% 9.90% 36.86% 34.00%
FPR for time-domain features
and FMFCCs
45.77% 36.39% 24.71% 20.62% 10.59% 1.04% 22.46% 33.23% 38.44%
Re´sume´ for this section: The initial results, summarised here for the performance on completely
unmarked audio material, show a strong divergence in the false positive error rates achieved. The
probability of causing false alarms strongly depends on the individual detector. When steganalysis de-
tectors are introduced with sufficiently high detection performances, future work should incorporate the
false positive and false negative error rates into a fair benchmarking scheme for steganalysis detectors,
because their proportion is equivalent between the security (false negative rate) and usability (false
positive rate) of the approach.
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5.1.4 Application scenario specific classifier selection for audio steganalysis
In [Kraetzer08a], as a first classifier comparison for the approach introduced in the context of this thesis,
three different supervised classification algorithms (libSVM, weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes and
weka.classifiers.functions.MLRM) are tasked with the same classification problem. For each of the
nine data hiding algorithms evaluated there a classical two-class classification on marked and unmarked
material (ratio 1:1) is performed for the audio test set aats389 using the 98 dimensional feature set
extracted from the audio material by AAFE v.1.0.4 and 256 feature vectors per file for training against 64
feature vectors per file for testing (see experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-ClassifierComparison
in table 10.1 in appendix B (starting on page 197)). The results of this classifier comparison are
presented in table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Detection performance (κ values) for three different classifiers on the same audio steganalysis problem
(see experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-ClassifierComparison, results adapted from [Kraetzer08a])
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
κ for libSVM 0.10 0.31 0.45 0.28 0.27 0.92 0.48 0.28 0.27
κ for NaiveBayes 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.04
κ for MLRM 0.07 0.08 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.96 0.16 0.16 0.08
For libSVM the average κ over all nine IH algorithms is 0.37 (0.28 in average for the five steganog-
raphy algorithms and 0.49 for the watermarking algorithms). The NaiveBayes shows an average κ of
0.15 (0.07 on steganography and 0.25 on watermarking). The MLRM classifier shows an average κ of
0.21 (0.10 for steganography and 0.34 for watermarking). All three classifiers show significant results
(κ > 0) in the performed two-class classifications of the data hiding algorithms. The best classified
algorithm for all three classifiers is AW1 with κ > 0.92 (equivalent to a classification accuracy above
95%). Summarising the results for the steganography and watermarking algorithms it can be seen
that the watermarking algorithms show for all three classifiers a higher statistical detectability than the
steganography algorithms, as expected from the different focus in the algorithm design.
These first classifier performance comparisons presented in [Kraetzer08a] are extended in [Kraetzer10]
by an in-depth analysis for three selected information hiding (IH) algorithms. As a point-of-reference,
the performance of all 74 supervised classification techniques implemented in WEKA (v.3.6.1) us-
ing the global as well as the segmental features in a classical two-class setup is evaluated. Ta-
ble 5.10 summarises the results for the global features for 10-fold stratified cross-validation on the
set aats389 as well as independent training with aats389 and testing with testset24 (see experimental
setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary).
Table 5.10: Detailed comparison of the detection performances achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 global
features – overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary)
10-fold strat. cross-
validation
Training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3 AS1 AW1 AS3
Maximum achieved κ value 0.72 0.85 0.38 0.15 0.50 0.19
Maximum achieved accuracy 86.15% 92.68% 68.94% 57.29% 75.00% 59.38%
Time duration (s) 598.7 603.8 617.3 222 191 180
Performance histogram:
Errors 13 14 14 13 13 13
0.00 ≤ κ < 0.04 (50 ≤ accuracy < 52%) 24 8 11 55 9 16
0.04 ≤ κ < 0.20 (52 ≤ accuracy < 60%) 32 1 9 6 2 45
0.20 ≤ κ < 0.40 (60 ≤ accuracy < 70%) 2 1 40 0 34 0
0.40 ≤ κ < 0.60 (70 ≤ accuracy < 80%) 0 6 0 0 16 0
0.60 ≤ κ < 0.80 (80 ≤ accuracy < 90%) 3 24 0 0 0 0
0.80 ≤ κ < 1.00 (90 ≤ accuracy < 100%) 0 20 0 0 0 0
The results presented in table 5.10 show the following: the highest achieved maximum κ values in
cross-validation and training and testing are seen for AW1 (κ = 0.85 and 0.5 respectively). AS3 shows
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in average the second best result, while AS1 ranks last – confirming our previous findings under similar
test setups (e.g. in 5.10). With an average duration a little bit over 600 seconds on our reference test
machine, for all tests the cross-validation performs only 3-times slower than the training and test. In
all tests the same set of about 13 classifiers (in two cases 14) are not able to successfully generate a
decision. The following reasons for this error behaviour are identified: some classifiers terminate with an
error stating that they have not enough memory to complete the task, some classifiers are terminated
after 12 hours to keep the overall test duration limited (the time for those terminated is not included
in the timings presented in table 5.10 and table 5.11), others are cost sensitive classifiers which would
not run without a cost file, which could not be modelled for this test.
The lower six rows in table 5.10 basically form histograms of how many classifiers achieved κ values in
the corresponding ranges. Again AW1 shows the best performance: in cross-validation for 20 classifiers
κ > 0.8 was achieved, with a maximum at κ = 0.85 (weka.classifiers.trees.LMT ).
Generally, the results in the training and testing setup are lower than in the cross-validation, this
seems to be due to the lower correlation between the test and training data in this case – for a de-
tailed discussion of the different relevancies achieved in this application scenario by cross-validation
and two-set training and testing see section 5.1.1. The good results found for AS1 in cross-validation
(weka.classifiers.lazy.IB1 κ = 0.70, weka.classifiers.lazy.IBk κ = 0.70 and weka.classifiers.lazy.KStar
κ = 0.72) could not be confirmed in independent training and testing.
Similar to the results for the global features in table 5.10 above, table 5.11 shows the summary of
the classifier detection performance for the segmental features for 10-fold stratified cross-validation on
aats389 as well as training with aats389 and testing with testset24.
Table 5.11: Detailed comparison of the detection performances achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 segmen-
tal features – overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup
Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary)
10-fold strat. cross-
validation
Training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3 AS1 AW1 AS3
Maximum achieved κ value 0.88 0.93 0.41 0.00 0.79 0.22
Maximum achieved accuracy 94.19% 96.47% 70.36% 50.12% 89.48% 61.22%
Time duration (s) 104467.5 86056.2 113349.6 30870.0 35852.1 54521.3
Performance histogram:
Errors 31 29 35 29 27 31
0.00 ≤ κ < 0.04 (50 ≤ accuracy < 52%) 35 0 1 45 0 20
0.04 ≤ κ < 0.20 (52 ≤ accuracy < 60%) 3 8 26 0 11 17
0.20 ≤ κ < 0.40 (60 ≤ accuracy < 70%) 0 3 11 0 1 6
0.40 ≤ κ < 0.60 (70 ≤ accuracy < 80%) 1 1 1 0 4 0
0.60 ≤ κ < 0.80 (80 ≤ accuracy < 90%) 0 3 0 0 31 0
0.80 ≤ κ < 1.00 (90 ≤ accuracy < 100%) 4 30 0 0 0 0
As with the global features above, AW1 shows the best detectability with 30 classifiers achieving a
κ > 0.8 in cross-validation. In general, the segmental features seem to outperform the global features
in terms of the achieved classification performance, i.e. more higher detection performances are visible
in the comparison between the corresponding histograms. Like already shown for the global features,
the good results for four classifiers on AS1 in cross-validation could not be verified with independent
training and testing.
If the results for the global and segmental features are compared directly, besides the slight overall
increase in the classification accuracy, two additional facts are noticeable: the number of classification
algorithms which cannot fulfil the classification task (row ‘error’ in the tables) more than doubles and
the time duration for the tests increase by at least two magnitudes. The former is due to the increased
memory requirement for the segmental features (by factor 20 in comparison to the global features) and
a corresponding increase of the number of ‘out of memory errors’ from WEKA, while the latter is due
to the much more complex training and testing tasks at hand and thereby more timeouts at the defined
12 hour timeout.
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If clustering, as the second general approach to classification, is considered for audio steganalysis,
the results can be summarised as: even though clustering is in some cases able to achieve significant
detection performance in classes-to-clusters evaluations (here, as highest value κ = 0.45 is achieved by
WEKAs SimpleK-means on AW1) the detection performance achieved in clustering is by far outper-
formed by the accuracies achieved in supervised classifications. Due to this fact a detailed discussion
of the clustering results is omitted here.
Re´sume´ for this section: The application scenario specific classifier comparison for audio steganalysis
shows that the choice of the classifier has indeed a very strong influence on the outcome of the detection.
In [Kraetzer08a] it is shown that, under certain circumstances, WEKA classifiers are able to outperform
the SVM classifier libSVM (which is in many publications on steganography considered to be the expert
classification engine for this two-class classification problem) in terms of practically achieved detection
performances. This point highlights why it is so important to perform application scenario specific
performance comparisons. The initial work presented within this section is extended in section 8.2.1 by
the presentation of details on ongoing work on application scenario based classifier benchmarking for
audio forensics applications.
5.1.5 Feature selection for audio steganalysis
In [Kraetzer08b] a first feature selection is performed on the steganalysis approach considered here.
This first feature selection is implemented by single feature classification – a naive approach which does
not take into account that feature combinations might be more powerful than individual features. The
only fact established by these evaluations is that different features are relevant for each of the tested
IH algorithms.
Here, the feature selection concept and design introduced in section 4.1.2 is applied to the three IH al-
gorithms in experimental setups AS-Feature-Selection-GF and AS-Feature-Selection-SF (see table 10.1
in appendix B (starting on page 197)).
Global features
None of the global features computed by AAFE v.2.0.5 shows any significance for AS1, therefore the
results for this algorithm are omitted in the feature ranking results presented in table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Ranking of the 10 best global features for AW1 and AS3, based on the fused rankings computed by
the five selected feature selectors (see experimental setup AS-Feature-Selection-GF )
AW1 AS3
Final rank Feature Average
ranking
Feature Average
ranking
1 gfzcr total 1 gfLSBflip AV E 1
2 gfzero cross rate AV E 2 gfLSBrat AV E 2
3 gfsp bw AV E 3.8 gfzcr total 3
4 gfentropy AV E 4.4 gfzero cross rate AV E 4.4
5 gfsp centriod AV E 5.2 gfsp bw AV E 5
6 gfsp irregularity AV E 5.6 gfentropy AV E 6
7 gfsp entropy AV E 6.6 gfsp centriod AV E 8.6
8 gfsp rolloff AV E 7.4 gfRMS amplitude AV E 9
9 gfenergy AV E 9.6 gfenergy AV E 9.6
10 gfRMS amplitude AV E 10.6 gfsp rolloff AV E 10.2
The best performing features for AW1 (the zero-crossing features the average spectral bandwidth and
the average entropy) imply strong noise behaviour of the embedding operation of this algorithm, while
AS3 causes a strong impact to the least significant bits of the audio samples (LSB flipping rate and
LSB ratio).
113
Chapter 5. Investigations for Application Scenario 1: Audio Steganalysis
Segmental features
The detection performance on AS1 is rather low when using the segmental features. Nevertheless,
since κ values larger than 0 are achieved in section 5.1.4, the feature selection results returned for this
algorithm are included in table 5.13. If the average ranking is considered for the individual features, it
can be seen that it is extremely high in comparison to the other two IH algorithms. This is resulting
from the fact that the five individual feature selectors used here in this fused ranking show strongly
differing rankings.
Table 5.13: Best 30 segmental features for AS1, AS3 and AW1, based on the fused rankings computed by the five
selected feature selectors (see experimental setup AS-Feature-Selection-SF )
AS1 AW1 AS3
Final
rank
Feature Average
ranking
Feature Average
ranking
Feature Average
ranking
1 sfspec 146 69 sfspec 369 2.2 sfentropy 14.24
2 sfspec 168 74.8 sfspec 363 3 sfLSBrat 15.56
3 sfspec 143 76.8 sfspec 360 4.6 sfzero cross rate 16.28
4 sfspec 151 77.8 sfspec 368 4.8 sfd2MFCC 1 16.52
5 sfspec 149 78.2 sfspec 365 5.2 sfmedian 16.68
6 sfspec 147 78.4 sfspec 370 7 sfsp entropy 17.08
7 sfspec 148 81.8 sfspec 350 10 sfMFCC 1 18.36
8 sfspec 145 84.6 sfspec 362 10 sfspec 122 18.92
9 sfspec 163 86 sfspec 371 12.2 sfspec 124 19.64
10 sfspec 144 86.4 sfspec 358 12.8 sfsp bw 19.84
11 sfspec 160 86.8 sfspec 355 13.4 sfspec 107 20.04
12 sfspec 134 87.2 sfspec 356 14.2 sfspec 95 20.28
13 sfspec 164 89.4 sfspec 361 15.4 sfspec 109 20.96
14 sfspec 150 92 sfspec 364 15.6 sfspec 140 21.52
15 sfspec 167 92 sfspec 373 16 sfspec 123 21.6
16 sfspec 142 92.6 sfspec 357 16.4 sfspec 117 21.8
17 sfspec 155 92.6 sfspec 366 19 sfenergy 22.32
18 sfspec 161 93.4 sfspec 344 19.2 sfRMS amplitude 22.52
19 sfspec 137 93.6 sfspec 341 19.6 sfFMFCC 1 22.64
20 sfspec 135 94.4 sfspec 343 19.6 sfspec 1 22.8
21 sfspec 138 94.6 sfspec 372 20.4 sfspec 82 23
22 sfspec 169 96.6 sfspec 359 21.2 sfspec 98 23.56
23 sfspec 136 97.8 sfspec 348 21.4 sfspec 97 23.84
24 sfspec 165 99.2 sfspec 367 23 sfspec 6 24.44
25 sfspec 158 99.6 sfspec 352 25 sfspec 8 24.92
26 sfspec 162 100.2 sfspec 353 27.6 sfsp rolloff 25.56
27 sfspec 141 100.4 sfspec 354 29 sfspec 2 25.88
28 sfspec 139 103 sfspec 335 30 sfspec 3 26.6
29 sfspec 224 103.8 sfspec 339 30 sfspec 4 26.76
30 sfspec 140 104.2 sfspec 347 30 sfspec 5 26.84
For AW1 the 30 most significant features are, similar to AS1, all frequency-domain features derived
from the energy in certain frequency bands (14.4 kHz to 16.1 kHz). This is plausible, because it is well
within the frequency range used by the algorithm for embedding and rather unlikely to be interfering
with many of the contents used in the evaluations (like speech signals). The plausibility is fostered by
the strong agreement of the five involved feature selectors, which expresses itself in the small values
returned for the average ranking.
While AS1 and AW1 show only frequency-domain features in the top 30 list, for AS3 a mix of time-,
frequency- and Mel-cepstral-domain features can be observed.
In table 5.14 the 25 worst performing features for each algorithm are identified. For AS1 and AW1, most
of these are frequency-domain features, while AS3 shows here mainly Mel-cepstral-domain features. One
further interesting fact is the strong agreement between the five individual feature selectors in case of
AW1 (see the column ‘Average ranking’ for AW1, where the vales are close to the range 566 to 590 of
the final rank). In the case of AS1 the agreement is weaker but still significant, while for AS3 a much
stronger agreement is shown, implying that the empirical approach to feature selection used within this
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thesis is not performing optimally and should be accompanied in future work by methods from analytical
statistics or inferential statistics (i.e. analysis of variance).
Table 5.14: Worst 25 segmental features for AS1, AS3 and AW1, based on the fused rankings computed by the
five selected feature selectors (see experimental setup AS-Feature-Selection-SF )
AS1 AW1 AS3
Final
rank
Feature Average
ranking
Feature Average
ranking
Feature Average
ranking
566 sfspec 354 489.4 sfspec 436 541.6 sfd2MFCC 4 206.2
567 sfspec 345 489.8 sfformant I1 542.8 sfspec 491 206.52
568 sfspec 359 490.6 sfformant U1 543 sfd2MFCC 5 206.72
569 sfspec 349 492.4 sfformant U2 544.4 sfd2MFCC 2 207.36
570 sfspec 348 494.6 sfformant A1 546.2 sfMFCC 4 208.16
571 sfspec 335 496 sfformant O2 547.2 sfsp base freq 208.64
572 sfspec 318 496.4 sfspec 441 547.6 sfd2MFCC 8 208.8
573 sfspec 334 497.2 sfspec 454 547.6 sfMFCC 6 208.96
574 sfspec 325 500.8 sfspec 482 547.8 sfd2MFCC 6 209.72
575 sfspec 336 502 sfspec 453 548.6 sfd2MFCC 7 210.12
576 sfspec 388 504.6 sfspec 511 548.6 sfMFCC 3 210.64
577 sfspec 390 505 sfspec 408 550.2 sfd2MFCC 12 211.04
578 sfspec 322 506.2 sfspec 455 550.4 sfd2MFCC 9 211.32
579 sfspec 380 507.6 sfsp base freq 553.6 sfMFCC 5 212.24
580 sfspec 327 508 sfspec 23 555.2 sfd2MFCC 11 212.64
581 sfspec 326 510 sfformant A2 556.8 sfMFCC 13 213.36
582 sfspec 343 512 sfspec 443 557.2 sfd2MFCC 10 213.84
583 sfspec 323 515.6 sfspec 461 557.4 sfMFCC 8 214.6
584 sfspec 324 517.4 sfspec 37 558.2 sfsp irregularity 215.12
585 sfspec 344 518.8 sfspec 25 559.2 sfd2MFCC 13 215.6
586 sfspec 347 519.2 sfMFCC 12 559.4 sfMFCC 11 215.72
587 sfspec 338 520.6 sfformant E2 570.2 sfMFCC 10 218.16
588 sfspec 339 521 sfsp bw 574.8 sfMFCC 7 219.16
589 sfspec 351 521.6 sfformant Singer 576.2 sfMFCC 9 219.56
590 sfspec 341 524.6 sfformant I2 578.8 sfMFCC 12 220.68
PCA-based estimation of the number of uncorrelated features for each classification problem
In experimental setup AS-Feature-Selection-SF/GF-PCA the principal component analysis (PCA) based
estimation of the number of uncorrelated features is performed for global and segmental features as
described in section 4.1.2 to evaluate the feature (in-)dependency for the performed audio steganalysis.
After the PCA, for all three IH algorithms the transformed feature space for the global features is reduced
from the original 17 to 11 dimensions. If the same PCA is performed for the segmental features, the
results vary slightly for the three different IH algorithms considered AS3 shows with 159 dimensions in
the transformed feature space the smallest correlation between the original features, while the results
for AS1 (144) and AW1 (148) are close together. In summary it can be said that the feature space of
the segmental features shows for all three IH algorithms a strong correlation. The PCA is capable to
reduce the dimensionality of the feature space to 25% (which would significantly reduce the time for
the classification) while at the same time keeping its expressive power at 95% of the expressive power
of the original. Nevertheless, it should be remembered here that the expressive power (i.e. the detection
performance) strongly varies between the three evaluated IH algorithms (see section 5.1.4).
Feature selection by feature ranking – the domain knowledge generated
For AS1 not much can be derived in terms of domain knowledge from the results presented. As shown
in section 5.1.4 the detection performance achieved is extremely low, this leads to the realisation that
the currently used features are not suited to allow for the detection of this algorithms on multi-genre
audio signals. Here, future research should be invested into analyses on specific genres of audio signals
(e.g. speech only content – where more promising detection results have been achieved here). This
might lead also to the design of new features that can be used to detect this algorithm.
The results for AW1 show a strong effect of the embedding in mid-to-high frequencies, which is con-
sistent with the upper and lower frequency limits set for the embedding algorithm. It is also consistent
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with the embedding strategy that the formant features as well as very high frequencies are not affected
by the embedding.
For AS3 a wide range of features seems to be relevant for the detection. The performed ranking indi-
cates good results for time-domain features, frequency-domain features as well as the fist coefficients
in MFCCs, FMFCCs and the second-order derivative MFCCs.
Re´sume´ for this section: For the performed audio steganalysis evaluations, global as well as segmental
features show relevance. For all three IH algorithms evaluated different features show relevance, i.e. a
set of ‘best features’ cannot be named for this application scenario.
The varying levels of agreement between the fused feature selectors reduce the confidence in this feature
selection strategy applied here, which in turn implies a need for future research to look into analytical
statistics and significance analysis for feature selection.
Due to a strong correlation in the feature space, the performed PCA is capable of reducing the di-
mensionality of the feature space to 25% while maintaining 95% of the original detection performance.
Even though the resulting decreased time required for the classifications after the PCA is of limited
interest for research, it will be a huge influence factor once audio steganalysis would be implemented
into security mechanisms.
5.2 Steganalysis specific influences to the SPR process
An important task for the audio steganalysis approach introduced within this thesis is to determine
the influences of the steganalysis setup to the achievable detection performance. Following the design
for the evaluations introduced in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, here the influences of the algorithm and
embedding domain, the key scenario, the context dependency between training and testing as well as
the dimensionality of the classification setup (two-class or multi-class) are considered.
5.2.1 Embedding domain and algorithm identification
In [Kraetzer07b] a model-cross evaluation on model significances is performed to investigate whether
similarities between the embedding algorithms can be seen by training a model for the detection of one
algorithm and testing it against a different algorithm. The results of these evaluations (experimental
setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-CrossEval) are shown in adapted versions in table 5.15.
Table 5.15: Results (κ value) for the cross-algorithm evaluation using the feature set SFstd&FMFCC y-Axis:
training material – x-Axis: test material; experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2007IH-CrossEval – The
embedding domains are: T=time, F=frequency and W=wavelet – see section 4.2.1)
↓ Training AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
Embedding domain T T W T T F W T W
AS1 0.244 0.038 0.219 0.137 0.149 0.056 0.235 0.122 0.060
AS2 0.052 0.244 0.240 0.189 0.150 0.335 0.155 0.208 0.033
AS3 0.080 0.117 0.459 0.179 0.182 −0.107 0.293 0.168 0.142
AS4 0.084 0.130 0.263 0.244 0.225 −0.016 0.229 0.222 0.016
AS5 0.072 0.065 0.252 0.211 0.241 0.018 0.265 0.200 0.029
AW1 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.025 0.982 0.005 0.000 0.007
AW2 0.070 0.063 0.311 0.153 0.168 −0.142 0.497 0.130 0.097
AW3 0.110 0.185 0.262 0.216 0.212 0.013 0.220 0.252 0.028
AW4 0.058 0.060 0.315 0.078 0.092 −0.126 0.251 0.078 0.278
The results in imply that table 5.15 models not only significant for one algorithm but for ‘similarity
classes’ – i.e. cases where Kappa values larger than 0 are achieved off the main diagonal. The arising
problem is that some of these implied similarities are not intuitive. An example for an intuitive similarity
is the case of AS4 and AS5 which are different versions of Steghide with only slightly modified embed-
ding strategies. One example for an unexpected similarity is the model for the time-domain algorithm
AW3, which achieves also an extremely high detection performance for the wavelet-domain algorithm
AS3.
An example, where a model created for one algorithm works quite well for all other algorithms in the
116
5.2. Steganalysis specific influences to the SPR process
same embedding domain is the model for AW4. Unfortunately, this is not true for most of the cases –
an embedding domain detection seems to be infeasible with this evaluation setup.
In general one further insight can be derived from this investigation: Most of the models trained show
a very low discriminatory power if it comes to the task of distinguishing between different embedding
algorithms. The only exception is the model trained for AW1, for which the second highest result in
the corresponding row in table 5.15 has a Kappa value of 0.025. For all other cases there exist test
cases off the main diagonal, which return κ > 0.2. The implication is, that a model based algorithm
identification with the current approach seems to be possible only in very specific cases.
When considering single feature-based algorithm identification instead of a large set model-based ap-
proach, the results presented in [Kraetzer08b] imply that it might be possible to identify the embedding
domain or even the embedding technique used for the creation of a set of stego objects. In that paper,
it is stated that frequency domain features are strongly affected by the evaluated frequency-domain
embedding strategies and could be used to distinguish between time-domain embedding on one hand
and frequency-domain as well as wavelet-domain embedding on the other hand.
Re´sume´ for this section: The similarities presented for the detection of stego objects embedded by
one algorithm using models generated for a different algorithms provide a strong argument against the
usual two-class modelling of steganalysis. The ideal forensic audio steganalysis process (as discussed
in section 3.1.1) requires, amongst others, a reliable identification of the used embedding domain and
algorithm. This cannot be achieved with the methods evaluated here. Even though the embedding
domain or even the algorithm used might be correctly identified possible in very specific cases, fu-
ture research work has to be invested into feature-based algorithm identification, to close in on the
requirements for the ideal forensic audio steganalysis process.
5.2.2 Key scenario in steganography – influence to steganalysis
In [Kraetzer09a] a set of three data hiding algorithms (AS1, AS3 and AW1 – for algorithm descriptions
see section 4.2.1) is used to generate training and test data for the estimation of the key scenario on the
detection performance achieved (see experimental setup AS-KraetzerSPIE2009-KeyScen). Each of the
three algorithms is working in a different domain: AS1 is a time-domain LSB algorithm, AS3 a wavelet-
domain algorithm and AW1 a frequency-domain spread spectrum technique. For the embedding two
different key selection strategies are compared. The first (‘fixed key’) uses exactly one predefined key
(UniversityOfMagdeburg) for the generation of the stego objects used as training and test files – i.e.
in all files the message is embedded using the same key. The second key selection strategy (‘variable
key’) uses the MD5-hash value of the filename for each file in a test set as the key for embedding –
therefore it uses for each file in the test set a unique key. All files used in the evaluations are marked by
the data hiding algorithms with 100% embedding strength, the message to be embedded is an ASCII
version of Goethes’ ‘Faust’.
The results achieved in this experiment show a rather small impact of the key selection strategies tested
on the classification results. Only in 5 out of the 30 direct comparisons between fixed and variable
key the difference in the achieved detection accuracy is larger than 2% (for details see [Kraetzer09a]).
Table 5.16 compares the best detection performances achieved for both key scenarios.
Table 5.16: Best detection performance achieved for two different key scenarios (training set: aats389 Part1 test
set: testset24 ; adapted from [Kraetzer09a] – see experimental setup AS-KraetzerSPIE2009-KeyScen)
fixed key variable key
Algorithm Detection per-
formance (κ)
Feature extractor & classifier Detection per-
formance (κ)
Feature extractor & classifier
AS1 0.042 AudioRS & SimpleLogistics 0.084 AudioRS & NaiveBayes
AS3 0.500 AAFE & ADABoost 0.542 AAFE & ADABoost
AW1 0.792 AAFE & ADABoost 0.792 AAFE & ADABoost
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Re´sume´ for this section: The results presented imply that the choice of the embedding key has only a
very limited impact on the detection performance achieved in steganalysis. Nevertheless, if future work
achieves the implementation of reliable detectors for audio steganalysis, the impact of the key selection
should be re-evaluated together with other embedding parameters (e.g. the embedding strength and
embedding strategy).
5.2.3 Classification using content selection as well as content dependent and
independent training and testing
In [Kraetzer07a] significantly better results for audio steganalysis are achieved for AAFE v.1.0.3 on the
speech only test-set longfile in comparison to the multi-genre test-set aats389 (experimental setups
AS-Kraetzer2007SPIE-longfile versus AS-Kraetzer2007SPIE-summary). The difference in the detec-
tion performance on those two sets is most significant for AS1, with κ = 1 (for a ratio of 2200 to
400 feature vectors per file for training and testing and the time-domain features and the FMFCCs
in AAFE v.1.0.3 on the test-set longfile) to κ = 0.142 (ratio of 64 to 16 feature vectors per file and
only the time-domain features on test-set aats389). Unfortunately, this investigation mixes two dif-
ferent influencing factors: the scaling of the classification accuracy with increasing model sizes (see
section 5.1.2) and the content dependency of the steganalysis approach. As a result of this realisation,
these results are the motivation to perform more generalisable investigations on the content dependency.
In [Kraetzer08a] we consider two different setups for the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based
audio steganalysis approach: a setup where we know the semantical characteristics of the channel
under observation (cover dependent training and testing) and a setup where those characteristics are
unknown (cover independent training and testing). The first setup could be created by introducing
with content classification an additional, semantical pre-processing to the steganalysis process pipeline.
An alternative description of these two setups can be give using the degree of contextual correlation63
between the training and test sets. For the first setup, the contextual correlation is very high, while
in the second case with a very high probability a low correlation would be achieved. The relevance of
cover dependent training and testing is illustrated in [Kraetzer08a] on the example of VoIP steganaly-
sis, where a channel with known semantical characteristics (i.e. human speech in VoIP-enabled Internet
telephony) is considered.
Channel specific cover dependent training on the example of VoIP steganalysis
Table 5.17 shows the results for a libSVM-based classification and cover dependent training and testing
(using as feature set all 98 segmental features computed by AAFE v.1.0.3) for a speech-only VoIP-
like setup and a multi-genre audio test set. For the speech-only evaluations, the audio test set ahss1
containing only human speech, which is assumed to be the usual content in VoIP communications, is
used for training and large models are generated keeping only 1200 samples per file of this test set for
testing. As a result the detection performance for all nine algorithms is in the range [0.102, 1], with
κ > 0.8 for six algorithms.
Table 5.17: Detection performance (κ values) for cover dependent training and testing for libSVM (experimental
setup AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-ContentDependent) – results adapted from [Kraetzer08a]
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
speech 0.896 0.550 0.996 0.102 0.206 1.000 0.802 0.938 1.000
multi-genre audio 0.104 0.306 0.454 0.276 0.274 0.922 0.482 0.280 0.266
When comparing the results presented in table 5.17 for speech-only and multi-genre material, significant
differences in the detection performances achieved can be seen. The models generated on the speech
63No formalisation on the degree of correlation between sets of audio material is performed in this thesis. Instead it is
assumed that, e.g. two sets of human speech signals show a higher degree of correlation than while speech signals and
white noise, or speech and violin music.
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set seem to be much more effective in audio steganalysis on speech material than their multi-genre
counterparts on multi-genre audio.
Cover independent training and testing – an extreme case
To show which impact a wrong assumption on the channel characteristics may have on the detection
performance, table 5.18 compares cover independent (row 1) and cover dependent tests (row 2). As
described in experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2008SPIE-ContentInDependent, the model for the cover
independent tests is generated for each algorithm using ahss1. Therefore, this model is trained only
on marked and unmarked speech signals. The model for the cover dependent tests is generated for
each algorithm using ref10 by applying on the marked and unmarked versions of ref10 a split 80%:20%
and using the 80% for training of the model and the remaining 20% as test material against both
generated models are tested.
Table 5.18: Detection performance (κ values) for cover independent (row 1) and cover dependent (row 2) libSVM
classification using all 98 features from AAFE v.1.0.4; models generated on ahss1 and ref10 test
material generated from ref10 adapted from [Kraetzer08a]
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AW1 AW2 AW3 AW4
Model generated on ahss1 0.034 0.032 −0.018 0.030 0.084 0.126 0.018 −0.034 0.018
Model generated on ref10 0.334 0.416 0.832 0.440 0.512 0.890 0.636 0.512 0.748
A comparison of the results in table 5.18 shows that the cover dependent training and testing (average
detection performance over all nine algorithms: κ = 0.592) performs for all nine algorithms better
than the cover independent training and testing (average κ = 0.032). The differences in detection
performances between both setups are rather large, highlighting the significance of correct training
material selection.
Re´sume´ for this section: The results presented in this section highlight two different facts: the impact
of the channel specific characteristics to the classification and the need to train models adapted to the
application context. Selected audio contents (speech) seem to allow for better detection performances
for the introduced statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based audio steganalysis approach.
Furthermore, the results imply that a model generated for one type of audio content performs sig-
nificantly worse if applied for the classification on different content. As a consequence, the channel
specifics characteristics (in the example evaluations presented here: speech in VoIP steganography)
should be reflected in the training. Future work in this field should consider the integration of content
analysis as a pre-processing operation into SPR-based steganalysis approaches to enable the shift from
cover independent to cover type dependent training and testing.
5.2.4 Two-class vs. multi-class setups
In experimental setup AS-D-SF-multiClass, instead of a classical two-class setup a multi-class setup as
motivated by [Provos02] is implemented. This is ignoring the general trend in the state-of-the-art in
this field which mostly models the steganalysis problem as a strictly two-class detection problem. The
results of this experiment, which uses five exemplary classifiers selected from WEKAs portfolio on basis
of their performance in classifier selection (see section 5.1.4), are summarised in table 5.19.
Table 5.19: Multi-class (unmodified cover, AS1, AS3 and AW1) steganalysis results for global end segmental
features (AAFE v.2.0.5) – based on experimental setup AS-D-SF-multiClass
Global features Segmental features
Classifier κ value κ value
trees.J48 0.313 0.395
functions.Logistic 0.362 0.355
rules.OneR 0.077 0.262
trees.DecisionStump 0.196 0.300
trees.RandomTree 0.197 0.258
The results presented in table 5.19 show that the for all five exemplary selected classifiers detection
performances of κ > 0 can be achieved. The results are not as good as for the two-class setup for
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AW1, but with maxima of κ = 0.362 for the global features and κ = 0.395 for the segmental features
they are still promising.
Table 5.20 and table 5.21 show the confusion matrices for the global and segmental features in ex-
perimental setup AS-D-SF-multiClass classified by the trees.J48 implementation of WEKA. As can
be seen, the results follow the same general trend as shown in the classifier selection performed in
section 5.1.4: AW1 contributes the best detection performance to the evaluation, while AS1 causes an
extremely high number of misclassifications.
Table 5.20: Confusion matrix for experimental setup AS-D-SF-multiClass, global features classified with trees.J48
↓ Training AS1 AW1 AS3 original
AS1 105 11 42 97
AW1 24 216 13 6
AS3 89 12 141 23
original 168 11 30 59
Table 5.21: Confusion matrix for experimental setup AS-D-SF-multiClass, segmental features classified with
trees.J48
↓ Training AS1 AW1 AS3 original
AS1 881 79 412 3071
AW1 139 4900 132 113
AS3 768 132 2710 1420
original 2111 78 400 2026
Re´sume´ for this section: As already discussed by [Provos02], steganalysis in practice would be a
multi-class detection problem (one class for each possible embedding method) trying to answer a two
class decision problem (steganographic communication present or not). Even though the evaluations
on multi-class realisations of audio steganalysis performed within this thesis are of very limited nature,
they show that such a realisation might be possible in practice. Future work should be invested into
the question of multi-class steganalysis (i.e. algorithm identification), extending the dimensionality
of the decision problem and comparing it to networks of more typical two-class algorithm specific
steganography detectors trying to solve the same problem. The corresponding evaluations would have
to compare both approaches with regard to their detection performance as well as their scaling behaviour.
5.3 Persistence of the patterns against selected post-processing
operations
The plausibility of audio steganalysis has to verify the influence of (malicious or non-malicious) au-
dio signal processing operations on the classification behaviour. The motivation for this consideration
in found in the fact that especially pieces of music undergo rather dramatic modifications between
their recording and the roll-out on a CD. One example for such modification is the custom to ‘im-
prove’ singers voices with artificial reverberation. Table 5.22 summarises the results of an experiment
from [Kraetzer10], where we train classifiers for three different data hiding algorithms (AS1, AS3 and
AW1) and then apply for each these algorithms the ‘5 best’ classifiers in the set onto the segmental
and global features extracted from a set of completely unmarked audio material that underwent signal
modifications (MP3 conversion and de-noising). An identification of those ‘5 best’ classifiers is given
in section 8.2.1. For a more detailed description of the performed evaluation we refer to [Kraetzer10].
A value of κ = 1 in table 5.22 indicates that the complete test material was rightfully classified
as unmarked by the corresponding feature extractor and classifier combination. A value of κ = 0
(equivalent in this two-class setup to an accuracy of 50%) implies that the classifier achieves a similar
detection performance as a simple guessing at the correct class would return. A value of κ = −1 means
that the classifier produced false alarms on every input sample. Summarising the evaluation results, it
can be stated the de-noising operation output is in nine out of 15 test cases with the global features
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found 100% (κ = 1) correct to be ‘not marked’, in four other cases κ value is above 0.8, while for nine
cases negative κ values indicate false alarms rates higher than in the case of simply guessing whether
the file is an unmodified cover or not.
Table 5.22: Detection performance (κ values) for the global- and segmental features and the best 5 clas-
sifiers from the classifier comparison in [Kraetzer10] for each algorithm (see experimental setup
AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF/GF-singleClass)
Modification Classifier AS1 AW1 AS3
global
features
segmental
features
global
features
segmental
features
global
features
segmental
features
MP3 encoding best 0.136 0.073 0.545 0.023 0.273 −0.664
2nd 0.136 −0.818 0.409 0.539 0.909 0.423
3rd 1.000 −0.070 0.273 0.130 −1.000 −1.000
4th 0.909 −0.861 0.545 0.523 0.136 −1.000
5th 1.000 −1.000 −0.591 0.511 0.455 −1.000
de-noising best −0.409 0.079 1.000 0.998 0.591 0.923
2nd −0.409 −0.790 0.909 0.675 1.000 −0.133
3rd 1.000 0.000 0.682 0.3014 1.000 −1.000
4th 1.000 −0.965 0.818 0.421 1.000 −1.000
5th 1.000 −1.000 1.000 0.551 1.000 −1.000
For the MP3 encoding the picture is worse, with only two classifiers achieving κ = 1 and two further
classifiers performing at κ > 0.8. For this modification, 10 classifiers return negative κ values.
It has to be stated that the segmental features seem to perform significantly worse in these tests if it
comes to plausibility against common signal modification operations. None of the 30 segmental test
cases summarised in table 5.22 reaches κ = 1, while eight cases show a false alarm rate of 100%
(κ = −1).
Re´sume´ for this section: As implied by the test results presented in this section, SPR-based audio
steganalysis seems to be negatively influenced by other audio signal processing operations. Therefore, if
its application as a specialised integrity verification mechanism is considered, the implementation of the
mechanism should undergo extensive plausibility evaluations against other audio signal modifications
(encoding, re-sampling, etc.) that are likely in the considered application field.
In this investigation, two different types of features are compared: global and segmental audio features.
In section 5.1.4 the segmental features show a higher detection performance (paid for by higher com-
putational complexities in feature extraction and classification). Here, the global features seem to be
less severely influenced by the signal modifications. Nevertheless, while global features can only give
a class assignment (i.e. an indication whether an audio signal is a stego object or not) for a complete
file, segmental features might be used to identify which part of the file was modified and which was
kept unchanged. These facts imply that a combination (i.e. by decision-level fusion) of both might be
beneficial to the overall audio steganalysis problem.
5.4 Summary of the findings for audio steganalysis
In section 3.3 the tasks for the practical investigations performed within this thesis are defined. In this
summarising section, the results for the audio steganalysis application scenario are first projected onto
these investigation tasks. In the second step performed here, the results achieved are reflected under
consideration of the evaluation criteria for forensic investigations derived within this thesis from the
Daubert standard (see section 2.2 and its subsections).
5.4.1 Projection of the results onto the defined investigation tasks
The first step required in the investigations is to establish some empirical ground truth (investigation
task A, as an precising statement for research objective 1 – see section 3.3) to show that the application
scenario of audio steganalysis (as it is considered within this thesis) can actually be solved by statistical
pattern recognition (SPR).
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The fact that audio steganalysis can be classified with this SPR-based approach and with a detec-
tion performance much better than the probability of guessing correctly was first demonstrated by us
in [Kraetzer07a] for a set of nine IH algorithms. This result is verified within this thesis in section 5.1.1.
Results achieved vary for the different IH algorithms under investigation between a detection perfor-
mance of κ = 0 (for the algorithm AS1) and κ > 0.9 (AW1), strongly depending on the evaluated
algorithm, the used features, the evaluation strategy and the used classifier. Using the mapping between
Kappa values and statistical confidence introduced in section 4.1.4, these results range from a ‘poor’
to a ‘fair to good’ statistical confidence.
This investigation task is supposed to contain also an answer on what ‘sufficient’ means in terms of
required training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes. In regard to this question, only a
concept for addressing this problem (see section 5.1.2) as well as some first estimations on required set
sizes can be given. For the evaluations performed, only for a very narrow application scenario – the
observation on speech channels – it was possible to estimate what sufficient ‘sufficient’ means. Here,
a rough estimate is presented for five chosen IH algorithms at 400 feature vectors per reference file, a
figure which would be much too large for the training multi-content or even general-purpose classifier
models.
Regarding the tendency for overfitting, section 5.2.3 strongly implies that content dependency in the
training and testing has a huge influence on the achieved classification accuracies. Like all other em-
pirical results presented here for audio steganalysis, these facts would have to be verified in future work
with a larger number of audio steganography algorithms to extend the degree to which these results
can be generalised.
Based on the results of the performed audio steganalysis investigations, the summarising
statement for investigation task A for this application scenario is: The results presented here
imply that statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based audio steganalysis is possible, if suitable features
can be found that are affected by the embedding process of the audio steganalysis algorithm under
investigation.
The second part of this statement is motivated on the fact that for one of the algorithms in the test set
it (AS1) it is not possible to achieve a successful detection for multi-genre content, while this algorithm
was detectable when embedding in specific content (here speech). Obviously, the algorithms to be
detected have to registered (i.e. models have to be trained for them), otherwise the detection approach
used here would not work sufficiently. As shown in section 5.2.1, this training might be performed
for an embedding domain or strategy, rather than the steganographic algorithm using this embedding
strategy. The progress made within this thesis on that regard has to be substantiated in future work.
Another important point made on investigation task A is the fact that in section 5.2.4 it is shown
that a discussion of two-class vs. multi-class setups for steganalysis is indeed necessary. In practice,
steganalysis would be a multi-class detection problem (one class for each possible embedding method)
trying to answer a two class decision problem (steganographic communication present or not). Even
though the evaluations on multi-class realisations of audio steganalysis performed within this thesis are
of very limited nature, they show that such a realisation might be possible or even required in practice.
This is contradicting the current trend in the state-of-the-art to trivialise steganalysis as a two-class
detection problem.
With this statement and its counterpart for microphone forensics in section 6.5.1, research objective 1
(resp. research challenge (a)) is answered positively.
The investigations performed within thesis show significant influences from parametrisations of the
components of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline, the setup of the steganalysis appli-
cation scenario as well as from potential post-processing operations. These influences are discussed in
the summaries on investigation tasks B and C, which both focus on the question how adequately the
application scenarios can be implemented with the introduced approach (research challenge c)), below.
The investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influences to the statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) process (investigation task B) look into the influences arising from different
instantiations of the SPR pipeline. This application task is mainly fuelled by two realisations: first, that
the process of statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is a powerful but complex method, and second, that
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many different classification algorithms (as core component of the SPR process) exist, which allow for
a successful detection of steganographic embedding into audio material.
One important statement is made in this thesis on the nature of the classification problem encountered
in steganalysis. While most publications in the state-of-the-art model it as a two-class problem, a small
number of publications strongly argue that steganalysis is a two-class decision problem build upon a
multi-class detection problem (see e.g. [Provos02]). In this thesis both general modelling approaches
(two-class and multi-class) are implemented. The results imply for both detection performances signif-
icantly better than guessing. Nevertheless, future work would have to be invested into a more detailed
investigation on the pros and cons of both modelling approaches.
The complex SPR process can be considered as a four component processing pipeline (see section 2.4).
In the following the evaluated influences to those four components are discussed:
• Pre-processing: the pre-processing operations have been restricted in this thesis to the absolute
minimum (mostly windowing with a fixed window size)
• Feature extraction: the features are the enabling part of the pattern recognition method. If they
allow the distinction between pattern and background and between different patterns, then a
successful application of this method is possible. Here, with the AAFE and known good audio
feature extractor is chosen for the most part of the investigations performed.
• Feature selection: this component complements the feature extraction by identifying the sig-
nificant features and therefore allowing for the removal of the insignificant ones. The feature
selection concept presented in this thesis is considered significant as well as representative for
audio steganalysis because it is applied to a large multi-genre audio test set used as basis for a
range of different information hiding (IH) algorithms covering the different embedding domains
(time-, frequency- and wavelet domain). For each of the evaluated algorithms, the feature selec-
tion identified different segmental features as being relevant.
The results of a PCA performed on the feature space of 590 segmental features computed by
AAFE version 2.0.5 imply that for audio steganalysis within this feature space only about 150
independent dimensions exist (see section 5.1.5). For the global features the PCA identifies
11 independent dimensions in the 17 different features. A reduction of the feature space to
uncorrelated features would significantly reduce the runtime of the classifiers.
• Classification: As stated above on the methodology and solution concept used in this thesis (see
e.g. section 3.1.3), the choice of classifiers is for this thesis is restricted to the application of already
existing classifiers as implemented in WEKA (version 3.6.1), presumably showing very different
performance in terms of classification accuracy achieved and computation time requirements.
Here, an application specific benchmarking scheme for existing classifiers is introduced, aiming at
the identification of suitable classifiers for the audio steganalysis application scenario. The results
of this classifier selection are presented in detail in section 5.1.4. Results for the application
of clustering-driven classification show that this approach is outperformed by the supervised
techniques. Supervised classification can be successfully used for audio steganalysis but so far
no feature extractor / single classifier combination has been found that wields perfect results (a
detection performance of κ = 1, preferably at a low computational run-time).
The summarising statement for investigation task B is: The results for the supervised classification
evaluations presented in section 5.1.4 show that: The detectability of an information hiding algorithm
in audio steganalysis strongly depends of the availability of suitable features. For some of the evaluated
algorithm (especially AW1) the used feature set allow for the reliable detection of the impact of the
embedding function. For other algorithms (especially AS1) no such features are currently implemented
in the used feature extractor.
This implies, together with the context dependency identified, that the approach would have to be
adapted and optimised (in terms of channel and steganographic embedding strategy assumptions) prior
to any field application.
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The investigations on influences outside the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) process on the perfor-
mance of the scheme (investigation task C) focus on selected, common audio signal post-processing
operations. Regarding these common audio signal post-processing operations, the investigations per-
formed in section 5.3 show a negative effect on the SPR-based audio steganalysis approach. Therefore,
if its application as a specialised integrity verification mechanism is considered, the implementation of
the mechanism should undergo extensive plausibility evaluations against other audio signal modifica-
tions (encoding, re-sampling, etc.) that are likely in the considered application field or counter-forensics
that might be used by the operators of a steganographic channel.
The summarising statement for investigation task C is: The SPR-based audio steganalysis ap-
proach introduced here is not only sensitive to the steganographic message embedding but potentially
also to other signal modifications (non-malicious and malicious alike). Since the approach is following
the same methodology as the majority of approaches in the state-of-the-art in this field, it might be
important to evaluate such sensitivity and plausibility evaluations also for other approaches found in
the literature.
With the summarising statements for investigation tasks A, B and C for both exemplary selected appli-
cation scenarios (audio steganalysis and microphone forensics), part of the question raised by research
challenge (c) on how adequately the application scenarios can be implemented with the introduced
approach is answered. The other part of this answer is given in the comparison with the state-of-the-art
in both application scenarios in chapter 7.
5.4.2 Reflection on the evaluation criteria derived from the Daubert standard
The summary table presented below is derived from table 3.2 in section 3.3. Here, the progress made
within this thesis in the application scenario of audio steganalysis in regard to the criteria derived from
the FRE rule 702 and the Daubert standard is summarised.
Table 5.23: Progress made in this thesis for audio steganalysis – projection onto the Daubert criteria
Criterion Description / Progress made
FREC0
Description ([LLI10a]): “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”
Progress made: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that
can be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
FREC1
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation (which leads to the corresponding expert testimony) is
“based upon sufficient facts or data”
Progress made: Case specific, the only significance arises due to the fact that the term “sufficient”
has to be manifested into training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes. Here, a rough
estimate is presented for five chosen IH algorithms and the application specialisation on speech
content. With those restrictions a model size of 400 feature vectors per reference file seems to be
sufficient. Unfortunately this figure cannot be generalised due to the strong content dependency
of the introduced approach. Therefore, the question what “sufficient” means for the composition
of the training data for audio sets that are not limited to speech data is still an open question to
be answered by future research.
FREC2
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation is based upon “reliable principles and methods”, prefer-
ably scientific methodology and knowledge
Progress made: Chapter 2 as well as sections 3.1, 3.2 and chapter 4 of this
thesis are dedicated to establish the fact that the two exemplary selected au-
dio forensic methods are implemented as deterministic processes using the decades
old and well accepted methodology of statistical pattern recognition (SPR).
The fact that the audio steganalysis application scenario can indeed be solved by SPR is
successfully addressed in section 5.1.1.
FREC3
Description ([LLI10a]): the (forensic) methods are applied “reliably to the facts of the case”
Progress made: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that
can be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.23 – Continued
Criterion Description / Progress made
DC1
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested
– that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for
reliability”; summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method) must be
empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”
Progress made: This criterion imposes the most important task to the practical investigations
performed within this thesis: The main part of chapter 5 is dedicated to exactly this goal, trying
to establish within which limits the proposed media forensic methods can give plausible results.
It has to be admitted that the size of the experiments performed might still lack generalisability
but the methodology and evaluation concepts show that there are ways for objectively challenging
the introduced approach.
DC2
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication”; with “publication” meaning ‘open publication’
Progress made: This criterion is not translated into tasks but instead requires the author to
interact with the scientific community relevant for the chosen application scenario. To address
this criterion this thesis is submitted for (peer) review, as have been the accompanying journal,
conference and workshop papers on the work on the audio steganalysis application scenario. The
reviewer comments received have helped shaping the described approach as well as its evaluations.
DC3
Description ([LLI10b]): “the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied”
Progress made: It has to be admitted that the size of the experiments performed might still
lack generalisability, but the detection performances achieved in evaluations on two-class as well
as multi-class setups for audio steganalysis against multiple steganographic tools are promising.
Nevertheless, they would have still have to be improved to achieve detection performances and
corresponding error rates that are fit for application in court cases. Additionally, any application in
court might require the implementation of the ideal forensic steganalysis process as it is described
in section 3.1.1, explicitly binding the (digital piece of) evidence to the court case.
DC4
Description ([LLI10b]): “the existence and maintenance of standards and controls”
Progress made: The task that would be derived from this criterion would be the compilation of
the work into standards together with or within a standardisation body. This complex process is
outside the scope of this thesis, no progress made in this regard.
DC5
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community”
Progress made: This criterion is similar to DC2 in its meaning and in the fact that it is not
translated into tasks, no progress made in this regard.
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6
Investigations for Application Scenario 2:
Microphone Forensics
This chapter is dedicated to the experimental evaluation of the performance of an instantiation of the
introduced general-purpose SPR-based audio forensics approach for microphone forensics. It is struc-
tured along the investigation tasks A) to C) defined in section 3.3.
The empirical ground truth requested in investigation task A) is established for the microphone foren-
sics approach developed in this thesis in section 6.1. For the performed investigations, this section shows
the statistical relevance of the introduced solution approach as well as provide required knowledge for
the following evaluations.
In section 6.2 the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influences to the statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) process is considered by investigations on the different degrees of freedom
in the recoding process identified above in section 3.2.3 (recording environment, microphone orientation
in reference to the source of sounds64, the mounting of the microphone and content influences).
The investigation task C) (Influences to the performance of the scheme, which are outside the
SPR process) is split for microphone forensics into two parts: In section 6.3 influences from assumedly
non-malicious modifications (here normalisation, MP3 conversion and de-noising as well as playback
recording) are considered, while section 6.4 considers with audio file composition an attack scenario for
microphone forensics.
Finally, the major results of the investigations performed within this chapter are summarised in sec-
tion 6.5, including a mapping of the progress made on this application scenario to the Daubert criteria
as specified in section 2.2 and its subsections.
As usual for a dissertation project in the field of computer science, in compliance with Daubert criterion
DC2 (“whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication” [LLI10b])
and to give other researchers / reviewers the chance to dispute the theory and its application (Daubert
criterion DC5 “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity” [LLI10b]), parts of the results presented in this chapter have been previously published in workshop
and conference proceedings. The corresponding papers are (in chronological order):
• 2007:
– [Kraetzer07c] presented at the 9th ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Security 2007 in
Dallas, Texas, USA, September 20th-21st, 2007.
• 2009:
– [Kraetzer09b] presented at the 11th ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Security 2009 in
Princeton, NJ, USA, September 7th-8th, 2009.
– [Buchholz09] presented at the 11th Information Hiding Conference 2009 in Darmstadt, Ger-
many, June 7th-10th, 2009.
64Only singular sound sources are used here, the evaluation of the impact of multiple sound sources to microphone
forensics is reserved for future work.
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• 2011:
– [Kraetzer11] presented at the Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics XIII, IS&T /
SPIE Electronic Imaging 2011 in San Francisco, CA, USA, January 23th-27th, 2011.
• 2012:
– [Kraetzer12b] presented at the Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics XIV, IS&T /
SPIE Electronic Imaging 2012 in San Francisco, CA, USA, January 22th-26th, 2012.
The major results from these publications are recapitulated in the following sections, where they are
further substantiated and accompanied by additional investigations as necessary.
6.1 Establishing some empirical ground truth for the used micro-
phone forensics approach
Prior to the extensive investigations performed in the following sections, some empirical basis has to
be established here. On one hand, this is done to show that microphone forensics can actually be
solved by statistical pattern recognition and that the performed empirical evaluations are of statistical
significance, on the other hand, it allows the following investigations to be accelerated (e.g. by using
only classifiers or features that have been identified as suitable in the performed classifier and feature
selection).
6.1.1 Intra-class (intra microphone class) classifications
One of the most fundamental required basic investigations is the observation of the detection perfor-
mance of an extensive number of classifiers in intra-class classifications on sets of identical microphones.
One of these two evaluations is using the recording set of condenser microphones RS4 Rode and the
other one using the set of dynamic microphones RS4 Beyer. By the usage of these two sets, repre-
sentative candidates of these two most prominent microphone classes are selected for evaluation in
an intra-class setup considering sets of identical microphones. The experimental setups65 Mic-01 and
Mic-02 (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) summarise the practical setups for these
evaluations.
Excerpts out of the results for these experiments are presented in table 6.1 and table 6.2 – the complete
summaries are presented in section 6.1.3.
From the overall set of 74 (supervised) classification algorithms, for the set of four identical Rode
condenser microphones experimental setup Mic-01 a maximum Kappa value of κ = 0.678 (equals a
classification accuracy of 75.88% in this four-class classification problem) is achieved under the given
constraints66. In summary, over all ten considered recording environments (rooms), 23 of the classifiers
perform with an average detection performance of κ > 0.467 (accuracy> 60% in this 4-class problem).
Table 6.1: Detection performances better than κ = 0.467 (accuracy> 60%) for the experimental setup Mic-01
Average over all 10 recording environments
Maximum achieved κ value 0.678
Maximum achieved accuracy 75.88%
Classifiers with: 0.467 ≤ κ < 0.733 (60 ≤accuracy< 80%) 23
Classifiers with: 0.733 ≤ κ < 0.867 (80 ≤accuracy< 90%) 0
Classifiers with: κ ≥ 0.867 (accuracy≥ 90%) 0
The results for the set of four identical Beyerdynamics dynamic microphones in the similarly conducted
experiment Mic-02 are even better: a maximum Kappa value of κ = 0.767 (classification accuracy of
65The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified by underlined and italic font setting (e.g. Mic-01)
– they are resolved in appendix B (audio steganalysis) and C (microphone forensics).
66Some classifiers are excluded due to their computation time behaviour (timeout set at 60h) – nevertheless these
classifiers have shown in some preliminary test significant accuracies.
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82.51%) is achieved under the given constraints and 31 of the classifiers perform over all ten considered
recording environments (rooms) with an average detection performance of κ > 0.467 (accuracy> 60%
in this 4-class problem). Four of the classifiers perform better than κ = 0.867 (an accuracy better than
80%). More details on these experiments are discussed in section 6.1.3.
Table 6.2: Detection performances better than κ = 0.467 (accuracy> 60%) for the experimental setup Mic-02
Average over all 10 recording environments
Maximum achieved κ value 0.767
Maximum achieved accuracy 82.51%
Classifiers with: 0.467 ≤ κ < 0.733 (60 ≤accuracy< 80%) 27
Classifiers with: 0.733 ≤ κ < 0.867 (80 ≤accuracy< 90%) 4
Classifiers with: κ ≥ 0.867 (accuracy≥ 90%) 0
Re´sume´ for this section: The investigation results presented in this section can be summarised
as follows: Notwithstanding the fact that all classifiers are used in default parametrisation – which
has to be assumed to be sub-optimal (a fact which would require more detailed considerations on
classifier optimisation and -generation, which are outside the scope of this thesis) – the detection
performance results achieved in the intra-class recording classifications can be considered significant.
If the agreement-to-statistical-confidence mapping introduced in section 4.1.4 is used, the best results
presented above would be in the ranges of substantial or almost perfect agreement (cf. [Landis77]),
equivalent to fair to good or even good statistical confidence. As a result it seems to be possible to
distinguish between recordings made by different microphones of the same brand and model and in the
experiments a sufficiently large number of different classifiers are capable of doing so.
6.1.2 Number of feature vectors in training and the detection performance
Addressing the question of statistical significance for the performed experimental validations here
first the impact of the number of feature vectors per used file is evaluated. Table 6.3 (adapted
from [Kraetzer07c]; experiment Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM – see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on
page 201)) shows exemplary the impact of the scaling of the number of input feature vectors on the
classification accuracy for room R01. In the two cases of Bayesian classification the increasing of the
number of feature vectors per file results in increasing classification accuracy on the microphones. The
best result is found with κ = 0.522 in the case of weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes with 10-fold strat-
ified cross-validation and 800 vectors per file. Both cases of Bayesian classification (percentual split
(66%) and 10-fold cross-validation) show very similar results.
Table 6.3: Detection performance κ for room R01 for different numbers of vectors computed per file used
for training and testing for three exemplary selected classifiers (adapted from experimental setup
Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM as used in [Kraetzer07c])
Number of feature vectors
Classifier 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
NaiveBayes (66%) 0.466 0.468 0.482 0.503 0.512 0.510 0.519 0.518
NaiveBayes (10-fold cross-valid.) 0.433 0.468 0.486 0.497 0.504 0.514 0.520 0.522
SimpleKMeans 0.229 0.211 0.254 0.210 0.224 0.199 0.221 0.207
The other nine rooms in experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM show the same behaviour as R01
in the scaling tests, therefore a detailed description of the results for each room is omitted here. Con-
cluding the results of the Bayesian classification, it can be stated that even for small numbers of feature
vectors for training significant detection performance results are achieved. Since the average results
increase with the increasing number of vectors per file, future work will have to be investigated into
investigations on optimal training set sizes.
The results of the clustering using SimpleKMeans in experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM are
with a maximum κ of 0.254 lower than the results from the Bayesian classification but still far higher
than a random classification on five equally distributed classes (i.e. κ = 0). If their scaling behaviour
is evaluated for increasing numbers of feature vectors used per file they show, in contradiction to the
Bayesian classification, no increase in the classification accuracy.
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A similar test run on RS4 Beyer (experimental setup Mic-03 – see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on
page 201)) for recording location R01 shows similar results for the scaling of the accuracy of supervised
classification techniques. Table 6.4 and table 6.5 show the scaling behaviour of the classification
results achieved by four randomly selected classifiers in 10-fold stratified cross-validation on vector
fields containing between 100 and 800 feature vectors per file recorded on basis of the reference set
ref10 (equals overall numbers between 4000 and 32000 vectors in 10-fold stratified cross-validation).
Table 6.4: Scaling of the detection performance κ and detector runtime of four selected classifiers (default parametri-
sations, 10-fold stratified cross-validation) on RS4 Beyer (R01) with 100, 200, 300 and 400 vectors per
reference file; exp. setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM
Number of feature vectors
Classifier 100 200 300 400
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.157 (20s) 0.165 (40s) 0.174 (61s) 0.173 (83s)
functions.Logistic 0.632 (1372s) 0.680 (2530s) 0.704 (3708s) 0.710 (5852s)
meta.RandomSubSpace 0.641 (352s) 0.685 (773s) 0.723 (1188s) 0.728 (1650s)
trees.RandomForest 0.552 (38s) 0.594 (83s) 0.615 (127s) 0.639 (173s)
Table 6.5: Scaling of the detection performance κ and detector runtime of four selected classifiers (default parametri-
sations, 10-fold stratified cross-validation) on RS4 Beyer (R01) with 500, 600, 700 and 800 vectors per
reference file; exp. setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM
Number of feature vectors
Classifier 500 600 700 800
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.178 (106s) 0.184 (136s) 0.187 (171s) 0.187 (216s)
functions.Logistic 0.718 (7608s) 0.728 (10797s) 0.726 (13850s) 0.731 (16948s)
meta.RandomSubSpace 0.740 (2131s) 0.742 (2638s) 0.747 (3201s) 0.762 (3738s)
trees.RandomForest 0.653 (226s) 0.661 (278s) 0.662 (332s) 0.676 (385s)
The results presented in table 6.4 and table 6.5 show, apart from some small glitches, a steadily increase
of the detection performance achieved. The strongest increase can be seen for all classifiers when the
input vector field size is increased from 100 to 200 feature vectors per reference file. At the same
time, the duration of the evaluations increases linearly. For the classifier with the longest duration
(functions.Logistic) the test duration increases from 1372 seconds for 100 feature vectors per reference
file to 16948 seconds at 800 feature vectors per reference file.
Re´sume´ for this section: While the increasing model size slightly increases the detection performance
achieved, it also shows a strong impact to the run-times required. Already with small set sizes of 100
feature vectors per reference file significant results are presented by the exemplary chosen classifiers
in 10-fold stratified cross-validation. By increasing the set size from 100 feature vectors per reference
file to 200 the detection performance achieved shows a significant increase, which is less strong for
the following increases. At the same time the required computation increases strongly. From the tests
performed here, it is assumed, based on the results shown above, that a training set size of 200 feature
vectors per reference file (resulting for the 10 chosen references in about in 2000 representative feature
vectors per microphone) is suitably enough for the evaluations. At that size for each of the four micro-
phones of RS4 Beyer and with a dimensionality of 590 attributes per vector WEKAs implementation of
a multilayer-perceptron returned k > 0.8 (accuracy of more than 85%) at an inacceptable high compu-
tation time of more than 100 hours on the test machine67. Any further increase results in only slightly
better classification accuracies and strongly worse run-times. Future work will have to be investigated
into investigations on optimal (regarding detection performance as well as throughput considerations)
training (and test) set sizes (see section 8.2.1).
67A Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 CPU 3GHz with 4 GB RAM machine running Microsoft Windows XP, WEKA v.3.6.1 on
Java SE 6 (32-bit Windows) with 1.6 GByte allocated RAM for each WEKA instance (i.e. classifier, clusterer, PCA or
feature selector).
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6.1.3 Application scenario specific classifier selection for microphone forensics
Here, a summarising review on the detection performance of existing classification algorithms on se-
lected microphone forensics tasks is given for this thesis. The practical observations are limited to the
performance of the classification algorithms currently implemented in the renown data mining suite
WEKA (v.3.6.1) and one feature extractor (AAFE).
In general with (supervised) classification and clustering two different approaches to classification exist
(see section 2.4.4). It has been established in [Kraetzer07c] that both approaches can be applied in
microphone forensics, but to a different extend of success. The evaluations performed in [Kraetzer07c]
indicate that (supervised) classification outperforms clustering for microphone as well as room / record-
ing environment classification. These observations are substantiated within this thesis – see below
where all clustering and classification algorithms implemented in WEKA (v.3.6.1) are reviewed for mi-
crophone classification and section 6.2.1, where the performance of a selected clusterer and selected
classification algorithms are reviewed as representative candidates for room / environment classification.
The table 6.6 below averages the detection performance results taken from [Kraetzer07c]. The κ values
are computed in the experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM for all ten recording locations evaluated
in this experiment, a fixed number of feature vectors per file (800) and using representative candidates
for supervised classification (NaiveBayes) and clustering (K-means).
Table 6.6: Detection performance (κ values) for all ten recording locations, NaiveBayes classification and KMeans
clustering applied (experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM, adapted from [Kraetzer07c])
R01 R02 R03 R04 R05 R06 R07 R08 R09 R10 Avg.
NaiveBayes
(66%)
0.517 0.611 0.526 0.667 0.603 0.615 0.618 0.685 0.650 0.696 0.619
NaiveBayes (10-
fold cross-valid.)
0.522 0.620 0.533 0.680 0.608 0.616 0.629 0.689 0.656 0.700 0.625
SimpleKMeans 0.207 0.184 0.226 0.169 0.270 0.212 0.227 0.295 0.167 0.127 0.208
For the Bayesian classifier the Kappa values achieved are in the range [0.517, 0.700], depending on the
recording location. Both cases of Bayesian classification show very similar results. With κ = 0.517
the lowest detection performance in the Bayesian microphone classification is found in the case of R01
(which is a large, quiet office). Noisy environments, like R04 and R08 (a noisy lab and a busy outside
parking lot), seem to have a positive effect on the classification performance (second and third highest
results). The best microphone classification in this experiment with κ = 0.7 is achieved on the material
recorded in a small stone stairwell with a strong echo (R10).
For the clustering using SimpleKMeans, the results are in the range [0.127, 0.295]. These results are
much lower than the ones achieved with Bayesian classification on the same test material, but neverthe-
less they are still by far better than ‘guessing’ at the result (κ = 0), therefore they are still considered
significant within this work. In this case the worst result with κ = 0.127 is computed for the recordings
made in R10 (the stairwell, which was the best case in the Bayesian classifications). With κ = 0.295
the best result is given for R05 (a large lecture hall).
Within this thesis an additional evaluation on this matter is performed, to verify the basic assumption
established in [Kraetzer07c] that the detection performance achieved in clustering is by far outper-
formed by the accuracies achieved in supervised classifications.
For these conclusive evaluations on clustering subsets from the RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer test sets
are evaluated because the corresponding intra-class evaluations propose the biggest challenge in mi-
crophone identification and therefore should allow giving an estimation on the worst case performance
of the clustering methods as mechanisms applicable in the field. The following representative setups
Mic-Clustering-RodeR01 and Mic-Clustering-BeyerR01 are used. The setup uses a smaller number
of feature vectors per reference (only 200 instead of the 800 in Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM – for a dis-
cussion of the impact of training/test set sizes see section 6.1.2) but the vectors are of much higher
dimensionality (590 instead of 63), since a newer version of the AAFE is used (v.2.0.5 instead of v.1.0.3).
Table 6.7 summarises the detection performance achieved in the application of all of WEKAs eight
clustering algorithms using the experimental setup Mic-Clustering-RodeR01 .
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Table 6.7: Detection performance on RS4 Rode in R01 with 200 features vectors of 590 dimensions per file (ref10)
for all 8 clustering algorithms in WEKA (v.3.6.1); experimental setup Mic-Clustering-RodeR01
Clustering algorithm κ value
cobweb n.a. – timeout (12h)
DBScan −0.057
EM 0.059
FarthestFirst 0.044
FilteredClusterer −0.049
MakeDensityBasedClusterer 0.024
OPTICS n.a. – crash error
SimpleKMeans 0.031
In two out of the eight test cases the (for weka.clusterers.cobweb and weka.clusterers.OPTICS) the
evaluations are terminated with an error. In the first case the defined timeout of 12 hours is hit, in
the second case WEKA crashed with an ‘error 0’ error at 1.5 GB allocated RAM. For the other six
cases the results shown confirm the observations made in [Kraetzer07c] on the detection performance
of clusterers: the κ values achieved in this application scenario and on the used test material / feature
set combination is much too close to 0 (i.e. the probability of guessing) to be of any use.
Table 6.8 shows the in general same performance for Mic-Clustering-BeyerR01 as table 6.7 does for
Mic-Clustering-RodeR01 : the same two clustering algorithms terminate with an error and the rest
performers in average slightly, but not much, above the probability of guessing (i.e. κ = 0).
Table 6.8: Detection performance on RS4 Beyer in R01 with 200 features vectors of 590 dimensions per file (ref10)
for all 8 clustering algorithms in WEKA (v.3.6.1); experimental setup Mic-Clustering-BeyerR01
Clustering algorithm κ value
cobweb n.a. – timeout (12h)
DBScan −0.021
EM 0.102
FarthestFirst 0.033
FilteredClusterer 0.075
MakeDensityBasedClusterer 0.090
OPTICS n.a. – crash error
SimpleKMeans 0.056
The same evaluations are run again in this thesis, using a different feature set (experimental setup
Mic-Clustering-RodeR01-selectedfeatures – table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) to sub-
stantiate the results and to eliminate the presumption that a too high dimensional feature representation
might influence the classification negatively68. From the recording set RS4 Rode the room R01 is se-
lected as a representative material. From the 590 dimensional segmental features set computed by
AAFE v.2.0.5 the 20 most significant ones are selected (see section 6.1.4).
Table 6.9: Detection performance on RS4 Rode in R01 with 200 features vectors of 20 dimensions
per file (ref10) for all 8 clustering algorithms in WEKA (v.3.6.1); experimental setup
Mic-Clustering-RodeR01-selectedfeatures
Clustering algorithm κ value
cobweb 0
DBScan 0
EM 0.035
FarthestFirst 0.007
FilteredClusterer 0.024
MakeDensityBasedClusterer 0.027
OPTICS n.a. – crash error
SimpleKMeans 0.024
The results presented for the reduced feature set shown in table 6.9 indicate the same outcome as the
observations presented above. The application of clustering algorithms as classification mechanisms
seems to have no benefit for the microphone forensics application scenario considered within this thesis.
68Also known as ‘curse of high dimensionality’ [Bellman61].
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Due to the large number of supervised classification algorithms in WEKA (74 in the used version
3.6.1) it is hardly feasible to run all experiments within this thesis with all classifiers. Therefore, the
experimental validations presented are usually carried out using only a subset of all available classi-
fication methods. Considerations on the required application scenario specific classifier selection are
presented below, to act as a point of reference for the other microphone forensics evaluations within
this thesis. First ideas for a benchmarking of classification approaches, which outside the actual scope
of this thesis, are presented in section 8.2.1.
To allow for some generalisability of the observations made here, extensive intra-class practical evalua-
tions close to the constraints imposed by WEKA (maximum locatable memory within the used 32-Bit
Java runtime environment) are performed using the complete 590 dimensional feature space provided by
the segmental features69 in AAFE v.2.0.5. With the two audio recording sets RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer
introduced in section 4.3.1 two representative sets for classifier performance evaluation exist for usage
within this thesis. On these two sets all 74 classifiers available in WEKA v.3.6.1 are used in 10-fold
stratified cross-validation to determine those who are most suitable for the microphone forensics ap-
proach pursued here. The required experimental tests are run on vector fields with 8000 feature vectors
(4 microphones times 200 feature vectors per reference file times 10 references) with a dimensionality
of each feature vector of 590. Each test is run on 10 sets of recordings (one for each recording location)
for each of the two microphone sets.
The Unix ‘time’ command is used to measure the time duration of each combination of model gener-
ation and classification. A timeout of 60 hours is defined at which a classifier is terminated if it has
not finished until that point. The overall run time for these experiments on the reference machine for
the test set RS4 Rode was about 3405 hours including timeouts or 1005 hours without the classifiers
which resulted in timeouts. The overall run time for the RS4 Beyer was with 3179 respectively 779
hours shorter. This fact and the higher detection performance achieved on the material from RS4 Beyer
imply that it proposes a somewhat easier intra-class pattern recognition problem than the microphone
classification on RS4 Rode.
Classifier selection for suitability in microphone forensics on RS4 Rode
Summarising the results on RS4 Rode generated by using the experimental setup Mic-01 (see table 11.1
in appendix C (starting on page 201)), it is shown in table 6.10 that the evaluated classifiers show a
strong variation in their classification behaviour regarding the achieved accuracies.
Table 6.10: Comparison of the detection performances achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 segmental features –
overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup Mic-01 – see table 11.1
in appendix C (starting on page 201))
Average over all 10 recording locations
Maximum achieved κ value 0.678
Maximum achieved accuracy 75.88%
Time duration without timeouts (s) 361953.1
Duration including timeout test cases (s) 1225953.1
Performance histogram:
Errors 18
0.00 ≤ κ < 0.04 (25 ≤accuracy< 28%) 9
0.04 ≤ κ < 0.20 (28 ≤accuracy< 40%) 12
0.20 ≤ κ < 0.40 (40 ≤accuracy< 55%) 6
0.40 ≤ κ < 0.60 (55 ≤accuracy< 70%) 11
0.60 ≤ κ < 0.80 (70 ≤accuracy< 85%) 17
0.80 ≤ κ < 1.00 (85 ≤accuracy< 100%) 0
In 18 out of the 74 cases the classification attempt terminated with an error. The following er-
roneous behaviours are observed: In two cases (bayes.BayesNet, trees.BFTree) the error is of the
type ‘memory error’, in three cases (bayes.ComplementNaiveBayes, bayes.NaiveBayesMultinomial, and
bayes.NaiveBayesMultinomialUpdateable) ‘Numeric exception’, in one case (functions.LibLINEAR) it is
69In preliminary tests the 17 global features also extracted by AAFE v.2.0.5 have been used as input for all 74 classifiers
in WEKA and none of those features showed and significance in this application scenario.
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‘liblinear’, in one case (functions.LibSVM) it is ‘libsvm’, in four cases (functions.MultilayerPerceptron,
rules.DTNB, trees.LMT and trees.NBTree) ‘timeout’, in two cases (meta.CostSensitiveClassifier as well
as meta.MetaCost) it is of type ‘Cost file’, in one case (meta.GridSearch) ‘Unsupported Attribute’ and
in four cases (all four weka.classifiers.mi.* classifiers) ‘Format exception’.
For the 56 non-error cases summarised in table 6.10 nine can be considered as ‘just guessing’ at the
true class of a sample (κ at about 0) and therefore completely unsuitable for microphone forensics.
The other classifiers in their default parametrisations show detection performances up to κ = 0.678
(average over all ten rooms for weka.classifiers.meta.RotationForest). The top 20 of the classifiers for
the experimental setup Mic-01 (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) are identified in
table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Ranking by κ value of the best 20 classifiers for experiment Mic-01 – see table 11.1 in appendix C
(starting on page 201))
Ranking Classifier κ value Avg. runtime (s)
Best meta.Decorate 0.694 51399.65
2nd meta.RotationForest 0.678 14012.96
3rd rules.PART 0.65 6994.95
4th meta.EnsembleSelection 0.649 33735.9
5th trees.J48graft 0.646 2083.03
6th trees.RandomForest 0.641 129.4
7th rules.JRip 0.637 4163.79
8th meta.MultiClassClassifier 0.634 1491.73
9th trees.J48 0.634 1832.22
10th trees.SimpleCart 0.629 2061.17
11th functions.SimpleLogistic 0.627 20974.18
12th trees.REPTree 0.619 395.28
13th meta.RandomSubSpace 0.617 2018.56
14th functions.Logistic 0.616 1726.59
15th meta.Bagging 0.611 3123.13
16th meta.END 0.611 9900.37
17th functions.SMO 0.605 2289.37
18th meta.ClassificationViaRegression 0.598 3137.65
19th meta.Dagging 0.557 169.91
20th meta.RandomCommittee 0.534 164.61
While the classifiers presented in table 6.11 show similar κ values, their runtime strongly varies. This fact
motivates the first considerations on a benchmarking strategy for SPR-driven audio forensics presented
in section 8.2.1.
Classifier selection for suitability in microphone forensics on RS4 Beyer
Summarising the benchmarking results on RS4 Beyer generated by using the experimental setup Mic-02
(see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)), it can be seen (cf. table 6.10 and table 6.12) that
the experimental results are similar in distribution but marginally better than those discussed above for
Mic-01 .
Table 6.12 summarises the achieved classification accuracies for this experiment. It can be seen that
not only the maximum achieved detection performance is higher but also more individual classifiers
perform better, with 23 classifiers in the range 0.6 ≤ κ < 0.8, which is achieved on the Rode material
only in 17 cases. The erroneous behaviour of 18 classifiers noted is exactly the same (also for the same
reasons) as discussed in detail for Mic-01 .
Table 6.12: Comparison of the detection performances achieved with the AAFE v.2.0.5 segmental features –
overview over all 74 WEKA (v.3.6.1) classifiers (using experimental setup Mic-02 – see table 11.1
in appendix C (starting on page 201))
Average over all 10 recording locations
Maximum achieved κ value 0.767
Maximum achieved accuracy 82.51%
Time duration without timeouts (s) 280287.7
Duration including timeout test cases (s) 1144287.7
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 6.12 – Continued
Average over all 10 recording locations
Performance histogram:
Errors 18
0.00 ≤ κ < 0.04 (25 ≤accuracy< 28%) 8
0.04 ≤ κ < 0.20 (28 ≤accuracy< 40%) 8
0.20 ≤ κ < 0.40 (40 ≤accuracy< 55%) 8
0.40 ≤ κ < 0.60 (55 ≤accuracy< 70%) 7
0.60 ≤ κ < 0.80 (70 ≤accuracy< 85%) 23
0.80 ≤ κ < 1.00 (85 ≤accuracy< 100%) 0
The top 20 of the classifiers for the experiment Mic-02 (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on
page 201)) are identified in table 6.13.
Table 6.13: Ranking by κ value of the best 20 classifiers for experiment Mic-02 (see table 11.1 in appendix C
(starting on page 201))
Ranking Classifier κ value Avg. runtime (s)
Best meta.RotationForest 0.780 8788.1
2nd meta.EnsembleSelection 0.73738333 12684.6
3rd trees.FT 0.73615 2561.5
4th functions.SimpleLogistic 0.736 23375
5th meta.MultiClassClassifier 0.72748333 3509.7
6th functions.Logistic 0.72196667 2459.8
7th meta.RandomSubSpace 0.7213 759.6
8th meta.Bagging 0.7181 1261.6
9th meta.END 0.71738333 4879.3
10th meta.Decorate 0.71366667 27355.2
11th meta.ClassificationViaRegression 0.71111667 3450.6
12th functions.SMO 0.7077 3528.3
13th meta.Dagging 0.66533333 384
14th meta.RandomCommittee 0.65845 93.9
15th rules.PART 0.64321667 3305.4
16th trees.RandomForest 0.64181667 564.6
17th trees.J48graft 0.63236667 900.5
18th rules.JRip 0.63045 3869.1
19th trees.SimpleCart 0.61851667 1986.2
20th trees.REPTree 0.61408333 152
Comparing table 6.13 to the classifier ranking presented in table 6.11 for Mic-01 it can be seen that 18
out of the top 20 are present in both tables. The differences are trees.FT (3rd for Mic-02 , but 32th
for Mic-01) and trees.J48 (21th in Mic-02 and 9th in Mic-01). Interestingly both are decision tree
classifiers, a class which contains 12 out of WEKAs overall 74 classifiers, but which shows no signifi-
cant influence in the first ten ranks of the classifier rankings presented above. Like in the case of the
Rode microphones, the runtime of the classifications shows extreme differences between the different
classifiers.
Re´sume´ for this section: The performed practical investigations imply that WEKAs clustering algo-
rithms are of no use for the microphone forensics presented here. Even if the number of clusters (here
the number of microphone classes) for the audio material is known in advance (an unlikely scenario in
practice) the detection performance achieved here is barely above κ = 0 and thereby much lower than
the performance of the supervised classification approaches on the same material. Since the results for
the clustering are generally worse for the microphone detection than the results for supervised classi-
fication, the discussions in [Kraetzer07c] and all our other papers on microphone forensics as well as
within this thesis, are limited to the usage of supervised classification. As a result of this section, for
all further experimental validations conducted within this thesis the table 6.11 and table 6.13 can be
used as a reference for choosing suitable classifiers. In those two tables the two most dominant classes
of WEKA classifiers in this set are meta.* classifiers and functions.*, all other classes show only limited
significance.
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6.1.4 Feature selection for microphone forensics
Regarding the question of usable features [Kraetzer07c] does show with its achieved results for inter-
device analysis (for the used test set, classification techniques and selected audio features) that feature
selection in microphone forensics seems to have no positive impact on the achieved detection perfor-
mance, but it reduces computation times and generates domain knowledge.
In addition to the actual classification tests in [Buchholz09], a principal component analysis (PCA) is
conducted in this paper to establish suitable parameters for the pre-processing performed (a threshold
for silence detection). The outcome of the PCA shows a significant redundancy in the feature set used,
implying that a feature space reduction might be possible without decreasing the classification perfor-
mance. If the same PCA is conducted on the 590 dimensional feature vector generated by AAFE v.2.0.5
then 187 transformed components are identified as being responsible for 95% of the sample variance
(on the RS4 Rode subset for recording location R01). A reduction of the dimensionality of the feature
space would result in a significant decrease of the computation power required for the classification and
would therefore strongly beneficial for the introduced approach.
Within this thesis, these first results on feature selection and feature (in-)dependency from [Kraetzer07c]
and [Buchholz09], are further substantiated. To do so, two sets of intra-class classifications are per-
formed and suitable features identified by feature ranking.
Segmental versus global features
In preliminary tests the 17 global features also extracted by AAFE v.2.0.5 have been used as input
for all 74 classifiers in WEKA and none of those features showed any significance (i.e. κ values larger
than 0) in this application scenario. Therefore those global features are neglected for the microphone
forensics observations in the rest of this thesis.
Feature selection by feature ranking - the generation of domain knowledge
The feature selection on segmental features for their suitability in microphone forensics is performed
as described in section 4.1.2. For the practical realisation of this feature selection process, as two
independent information sources the recording sets RS4 Beyer and RS4 Rode are chosen (see experi-
mental setup Mic-Feature-Selection) because their material is best suited for generalisable intra-class
evaluations.
In table 6.14 the 30 best segmental features are identified as the output of this feature selection pro-
cedure.
Table 6.14: Best 30 segmental features, based on the fused rankings computed on RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer (see
experimental setup Mic-Feature-Selection)
Feature RS4 Rode
Average rank
RS4 Beyer
Average rank
Arithmetic mean Final rank
sfd2FMFCC 1 2.08 1.06 1.57 1
sfd2FMFCC 2 2.6 2.72 2.66 2
sfd2FMFCC 13 4.18 11 7.59 3
sfd2FMFCC 10 14.42 9.06 11.74 4
sfd2FMFCC 3 18.18 5.48 11.83 5
sfd2FMFCC 5 14.7 9.74 12.22 6
sfd2FMFCC 4 18.26 6.34 12.3 7
sfd2FMFCC 11 18.02 6.68 12.35 8
sfd2FMFCC 12 19.22 5.94 12.58 9
sfd2FMFCC 9 19.98 12.46 16.22 10
sfd2FMFCC 6 20.24 13.04 16.64 11
sfd2FMFCC 8 22.34 12.02 17.18 12
sfd2FMFCC 7 22.62 12.08 17.35 13
sfFMFCC 3 16 27.94 21.97 14
sfFMFCC 12 15.9 28.32 22.11 15
sfspec 11 20.14 24.98 22.56 16
sfRMS amplitude 19.06 26.78 22.92 17
sfFMFCC 10 13.46 33.1 23.28 18
sfFMFCC 5 13.66 33.16 23.41 19
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 6.14 – Continued
Feature RS4 Rode
Average rank
RS4 Beyer
Average rank
Arithmetic mean Final rank
sfFMFCC 1 20.64 29.76 25.2 20
sfFMFCC 4 15.86 39.88 27.87 21
sfFMFCC 11 15.7 40.16 27.93 22
sfFMFCC 2 22.94 34.84 28.89 23
sfenergy 19.54 38.44 28.99 24
sfFMFCC 9 18.1 41.76 29.93 25
sfsp entropy 14.72 46.76 30.74 26
sfFMFCC 6 18.54 42.98 30.76 27
sfspec 12 32.48 32.62 32.55 28
sfzero cross rate 48.7 17.16 32.93 29
sfsp rolloff 22 49.1 35.55 30
The results summarised in table 6.14 imply that the second-order derivative filtered MFCCs clearly
outperform every other class of features. The 13 features within this class occupy the 13 highest ranks
within the fused ranking, followed by 10 further FMFCC-features within the next 17 ranks. This implies
that the microphone influence in recording – the intrinsic pattern – manifests itself the strongest in
higher order cepstral-domain features, while time-domain features, which are the natural domain of the
audio signal, do not play a strong role in the classification, since they are influenced to strongly by the
recorded content.
If only the 20 best features are used in classification on the four-class evaluations on this test material
(experimental setups Mic-01 vs. Mic-RS4 Rode-Best20Features-only), the classification accuracy drops
in average for about 7.11% in comparison to the full feature set. Four classifiers, which originally hit
the 60 hour timeout boundary defined for Mic-01 , have no problem to keep below that boundary when
using only 20 features instead of the full set of 590.
In contrast to the best ranking features presented above, table 6.15 bellow identifies the 25 worst
performing segmental features. Here all formants as well as the two LSB features are found in the list
of the least contributing segmental features.
Table 6.15: Worst 25 segmental features, based on the fused rankings computed on RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer (see
experimental setup Mic-Feature-Selection)
Feature RS4 Rode
Average rank
RS4 Beyer
Average rank
Arithmetic mean Final rank
sfMFCC 10 502.9 554.22 528.56 566
sfspec 4 520.9 545.14 533.02 567
sfspec 22 537.48 537.04 537.26 568
sfspec 24 528.22 548.46 538.34 569
sfmedian 533.76 554.58 544.17 570
sfspec 1 551.12 544.16 547.64 571
sfspec 5 540.3 560.26 550.28 572
sfsp bw 551.62 559.3 555.46 573
sfmean 564.08 552.8 558.44 574
sfsp centriod 569.3 551.68 560.49 575
sfsp irregularity 567.48 560.1 563.79 576
sfsp base freq 573.74 556.14 564.94 577
sfLSBrat 564.1 570.08 567.09 578
sfformant Singer 578.74 566.64 572.69 579
sfformant A1 578.76 571.9 575.33 580
sfLSBflip 573.26 577.68 575.47 581
sfformant I2 579.08 576.34 577.71 582
sfformant E2 578.66 578.18 578.42 583
sfformant U2 576.88 581.7 579.29 584
sfformant E1 576.62 584.32 580.47 585
sfformant O2 578.68 583.8 581.24 586
sfformant A2 578.58 584.34 581.46 587
sfformant O1 579.26 584.38 581.82 588
sfformant U1 579.4 584.24 581.82 589
sfformant I1 581.04 586.42 583.73 590
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The results in table 6.15 indicate a very bad performance of the formant features. All 11 of them
are found in this list. Also, a large percentage of the time-domain features is present in this set,
including the two LSB-based features. This supports the assumption formulated above that time-
domain features, which are computed in the natural domain of the audio signal, do not play a strong
role in the classification, since they are influenced to strongly by the recorded content.
Impact to classifier run-time
As mentioned above, if only the 20 best features are used in classification on the test material the classifi-
cation accuracy drops slightly in comparison to the full feature set. By the same feature space reduction,
the average computation time is reduced by factor 32.7 (the feature space is reduced at the same time
by 59020 = 29.5, so a simple estimation would assume a roughly linear dependent relationship between
the decrease of the dimensionality of the vector space and the decrease in required computation power).
Re´sume´ for this section: Findings presented in [Kraetzer07c] on the general impact of feature selection
are confirmed here. The feature selection indeed allows reducing the computation cost required in this
microphone forensics approach while achieving similar classification accuracies.
The feature ranking presented in this section is considered significant as well as representative for
microphone forensics because it was performed independently on two intra-class test sets of statistically
significant sizes, composed from microphones of the two most common microphone classes (dynamic
and condenser microphones). I.e. by the selection of representative and statistically significant training
and test sets a generalisable answer is derived for the whole microphone forensics problem.
In the comparison of segmental versus global features it shows that the global features provided here by
the used feature extractor AAFE v.2.0.5 are of no use for the introduced microphone forensics approach,
while the segmental features achieve significant classification accuracies for selected classifiers.
Regarding the feature independency of the segmental features the investigations performed here show
that they are strongly correlated, which implies strong potential for feature selection. In the feature
selection evaluations performed this strong potential is confirmed: the impact to classifier runtime is
rather dramatic – the classification process is speed up by a factor of about 30 while keeping the
classification accuracies achieved on a nearly constant level.
Since the procedure ranks the features by their benefit in classification, this ranking then can be used to
derive domain knowledge about the considered classification problem. The evaluations imply that the
microphone influence in recording – the intrinsic pattern – manifests itself the strongest in higher order
cepstral-domain features, while time-domain features do not play a strong role in the classification,
since they are influenced to strongly by the recorded content.
6.2 Evaluation of different influences (degrees of freedom) in the
recording process
One of the most important tasks for the microphone forensics approach introduced within this thesis is
to determine which of the degrees of freedom in the recording of a sound has an impact to the achievable
detection performances and therefore directly on the practicability of the approach. Following the design
for the evaluations introduced in section 4.3.1, here the influences of the room / recording environment,
the orientation and mounting as well as the recorded content are considered.
6.2.1 Influence of the recording environment
Regarding the room / recording environment identification question [Kraetzer07c] does show with its
achieved results for inter-device analysis (for the used test set, classification techniques and selected
steganalysis features) that room / recording environment classification is also possible but with a
much smaller accuracy than microphone classification. The results that lead to this observation are
recapitulated here and supplemented by additional experiments. Since it was shown in section 6.1.3
that clustering and (supervised) classification show different performance, the evaluations in this section
also consider these two classification approaches differently.
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Clustering
Table 6.16 summarises the tests performed in experiment Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM for the SimpleKMeans
clustering. In this table, the average detection performance κ is computed in recording environment
classification is given for the material recorded by each of the four microphones. The resulting κ values
are in the range of [0.011, 0.183] for the clustering using SimpleKMeans. The results are in general
significantly lower than the results presented below for exactly the same test setup and supervised
classification in table 6.17.
Table 6.16: Detection performance (κ value) for all four microphones in RS1 and for different numbers of vec-
tors computed per file and the SimpleKMeans clusterer (experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM;
adapted from [Kraetzer07c])
Vectors per recording
Microphone 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
M1 0.152 0.106 0.056 0.037 0.069 0.034 0.069 0.073
M2 0.160 0.108 0.094 0.104 0.113 0.106 0.137 0.119
M3 0.183 0.068 0.081 0.076 0.066 0.058 0.064 0.071
M4 0.092 0.046 0.030 0.041 0.011 0.026 0.014 0.029
(Supervised) Classification
Table 6.17 summarises the tests performed for the evaluation of the supervised classification part of
the experiment Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM. In this table the κ value for all rooms is given for the material
recorded by each microphone. The results in table 6.17 are in the range of [0.155, 0.350] for the
Bayesian classifier.
Table 6.17: Detection performance (κ value) achieved in room classification for all four microphones and for differ-
ent numbers of vectors computed per file and Bayesian classification with 10-fold cross-validation
and percentage split (66 to 34%) (experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM; results adapted
from [Kraetzer07c])
Vectors per recording
Microphone Mode 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
M1 perc. split 66% 0.231 0.155 0.160 0.175 0.171 0.169 0.164 0.179
cross-validation 0.240 0.166 0.166 0.168 0.167 0.168 0.173 0.176
M2 perc. split 66% 0.338 0.276 0.285 0.292 0.290 0.292 0.304 0.294
cross-validation 0.350 0.295 0.288 0.290 0.292 0.296 0.299 0.299
M3 perc. split 66% 0.230 0.198 0.208 0.206 0.207 0.206 0.203 0.209
cross-validation 0.247 0.203 0.202 0.204 0.206 0.207 0.209 0.210
M4 perc. split 66% 0.303 0.216 0.223 0.217 0.211 0.204 0.214 0.214
cross-validation 0.317 0.234 0.220 0.216 0.213 0.211 0.215 0.218
When analysing the results for the Bayesian classifier, it can be seen that the test files recorded using
the M2 microphone (a simple headset) allow for the most precise classification of the rooms. Here,
with κ = 0.350 the best detection performance (in the case of the NaiveBayes classifier using 10-fold
cross-validation) is found when using 100 feature vectors from each file. An interesting observation in
the Bayesian tests is the scaling of the detection performance with increasing number of feature vectors
per file. For all tests if the number of feature vectors considered is increased from 100 to 200 the
detection performance drops slightly, if the number of feature vectors considered is increased further,
no significant change in the detection performance can be noticed (i.e. it stays roughly constant).
When comparing in the evaluations on experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM the results for one
microphone in all 10 rooms for the example of M2 with 100 vectors per file and Bayesian classification
using percentual split (see table 6.18) it can be seen that the results for a correct classifications (principal
diagonal of the confusion matrix in table 6.18) are very inhomogeneous for the rooms.
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Table 6.18: Normalised confusion matrix for the M2 microphone, 100 vectors computed per file and the NaiveBayes
classifier using percentual split (66%) for set generation (experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2007ACM)
R01 R02 R03 R04 R05 R06 R07 R08 R09 R10
R01 0.63 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.00
R02 0.03 0.49 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02
R03 0.13 0.08 0.55 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.00
R04 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.52 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.02
R05 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.04
R06 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.02
R07 0.14 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.00
R08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.54 0.13 0.05
R09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.27 0.07
R10 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.19
The results on the main diagonal are in the range of [0.12, 0.63] with an average of 0.404. In seven
of the ten cases the highest classification result is achieved for the room the recording was made in.
In the other three cases (R05, R06 and R10) a different room wrongly achieves the highest number
of classifications. From table 6.18 also rooms showing mutually similar and dissimilar behaviour can
be deduced. An example for mutually similar rooms is found with R03 and R07 where on one hand
the vectors recorded in R03 are classified in 55% of the cases belonging to R03 and 18% belonging to
R07 while on the other hand the vectors recorded in R07 are classified 47% belonging to R07 and 34%
belonging to R03. An example for a set of dissimilar rooms is composed e.g. by R01 and R08. There
the number of vectors recorded in R01 and falsely classified as recorded in R08 is equal 0% and vice
versa.
To substantiate the results for room / recording environment identification another set of experi-
ments is run in this thesis, using different test recordings and an extended feature set (see the setup
Mic-Room-Classification-RS4-Selections in table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)). From the
list of best microphone forensics classifiers (see section 6.1.3) one Bayesian, one function, one meta-
classifier and one tree are chosen for these classifications70. The test is run on 200 feature vectors per
reference file.
The results for these evaluations, using one microphone out of the two recording sets RS4 Rode (mi-
crophone M16) and RS4 Beyer (M20), are presented in table 6.19.
Table 6.19: Detection performance (κ values) for room classification using microphones M16 and M20 and four
selected classifiers (experimental setup Mic-Room-Classification-RS4-Selections)
Source microphone
Classifier M16 M20
weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes 0.125 0.132
weka.classifiers.functions.SMO 0.354 0.404
weka.classifiers.meta.RandomCommittee 0.316 0.363
weka.classifiers.Trees.RandomForest 0.298 0.351
The results presented for room classification in table 6.19 can be summarised as follows: the detection
performance achieved is significant, showing in some cases a Kappa value of κ > 0.35 (equivalent to
accuracies of more than 40% in this 10-class classification problem). Nevertheless, the results achieved
with the extended feature set of 590 dimensions (of AAFE v.2.0.5) are nearly in the same range as the
results shown in table 6.17 for the lower dimensional feature set (of AAFE v.1.0.3).
Verification of a microphone against a model generated for a different room
To show how strong the influence of the room really is in the microphone classifications, it has to be
evaluated what happens when the initial hypothesis about the used room / recording environment in
such a test is wrong.
70For many of WEKAs classifiers this set size with its 1 microphone times 200 vectors times 10 references times 10
rooms times 590 (dimensionality of the feature vector) is already to large at 1.5 GB allocated main memory, therefore
classifiers had to be selected which were still capable of performing the task at hand.
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Table 6.20 summarises the results of tests on the recording environment (or room) influence using
experimental setup Mic-Room-Classification-RS4-WrongRoom (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting
on page 201)) with a wrong and a true hypothesis on the used room / recording environment. In case
of the wrong hypothesis the recordings are made in R01 and tested against material recorded in R06.
For the true hypothesis on the room both, training- and test material have been recorded in R06.
Table 6.20: Detection performance (κ values) for microphone classification – selected classifiers under a
wrong and a true hypothesis on the used room / recording environment (experimental setup
Mic-Room-Classification-RS4-WrongRoom)
Classifier Model: R01 Model: R06
Classifier Test material: R06 Test material: R06
weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes −0.128 0.218
weka.classifiers.functions.SMO 0.565 0.760
weka.classifiers.meta.RandomCommittee 0.469 0.695
weka.classifiers.Trees.RandomForest 0.379 0.683
The results in table 6.20 show a significant drop in the detection performance achieved in case of the
wrong hypothesis on the recording location. For the four selected classifiers the strongest drop occurs
for weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes where κ drops from 0.218 down to −0.128, which is even lower
than the probability of guessing correctly (i.e. κ = 0). For the other three classifiers the drop is less
severe but they also show a strong decrease in their detection performance.
Re´sume´ for this section: The evaluations on room / environment classification presented first
in [Kraetzer07c] have been substantiated here by further experimental validation. Room classifica-
tion is obviously possible, but with the current feature extractor and classifiers available it seems to be
performing less good than microphone classification. Further work should extend the observations in
this direction.
If a microphone is verified against a model generated in a wrong (different) room then the detection
performance drops significantly as shown above. It can therefore be stated that the room / recording
environment is a very strong influence on the recording behaviour of a microphone.
6.2.2 Orientation influence testing
For the experimental observations on the influence of the impact of the orientation of a microphone
two different recording sets (RS7 and RS8 – see experimental setups Mic-Orientation Impact RS7
and Mic-Orientation Impact RS8 in table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) are generated
especially for this purpose. Here, first RS7 is used to evaluate, for the applied method of statistical
pattern recognition based microphone classification using segmental features, the impact of rotating a
microphone by steps of 45◦ in the xy-plane. Then RS8 is used to describe the impact of rotating a
microphone by 180◦ in yz-plane.
To show how strong the influence of microphone orientations is, in comparison to the inter-microphone
distance of different microphones of the same brand and model, two simple experiments are constructed
(both described in experimental setup Mic-Orientation Impact RS7). For RS7, the recordings made
at eight differently orientated positions with the microphone M22 are used in evaluations as test ma-
terial against a model generated by a selected classifier (weka.classifiers.meta.RandomSubSpace) on
RS4 Beyer in R06 as well as on the same references (ref2, silence and a pure sinoid). The test hypoth-
esis for both tests is: ‘The candidate material is recorded by M22.’ If the accuracy achieved is equal or
better than the results achieved by the classifier in the intra-class evaluations on RS4 Beyer, it can be
assumed that the orientation is of limited impact to the microphone classification.
The average detection performance of weka.classifiers.meta.RandomSubSpace for all ten reference sig-
nals in RS4 Beyer (R06 ; 590 dimensional feature vector) is κ = 0.76 (accuracy=81.86%). For the
silence reference recorded in recording set RS7 (and tested against the model generated from the cor-
responding RS4 Beyer material) a detection performance of κ = 1.0 is achieved. For the sinoid the
detection performance is also κ = 1.0. The orientation seems to have no influence on the microphone
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classification problem, since the inter-microphone difference, even for microphones of the same brand
and model, is higher than the differences between the recordings of one microphone in different orien-
tations.
Another fact is highlighted by these results: RS4 and RS7 use the same microphones and hardware
setup (room (R06), reference sounds, loudspeaker and soundcard) but between the times of recording
lies a temporal distance of one year. Based on the perfect classification results achieved, it can be
deduced from those evaluations that the statistical patterns which allow for the classification of the
microphones show for this time span no aging behaviour / no significant change over time.
To show how strong the influence of microphone orientations is in RS8, the same experiments on the
inter-microphone distance of microphones of the same brand and model versus different orientations
described above for RS7 are also run on RS8 (see Mic-Orientation Impact RS8). The two different
orientations used in the recording are ‘head up’ and ‘head down’, i.e. standing upright and a rotation
by 180◦ in yz-plane.
Like in the tests on RS7, for both references recorded in recording set RS8 (and tested against the
model generated from the corresponding RS4 Beyer material) a detection performance of κ = 1.0 is
achieved.
Re´sume´ for this section: The orientation seems to have no influence to the microphone classification
problem, since the inter-microphone difference, even for microphones of the same brand and model, is
higher than the differences between the recordings of one microphone in different orientations.
Based on the perfect classification results achieved with a recently recorded test set on a training set
recorded one year ago, it can be assumed from those evaluations that the statistical patterns which allow
for the classification of the microphones show for this time span no aging behaviour / no significant
change over time. Nevertheless, long term observations on this matter would be required using time
spans of at least 5 to 10 years to allow for any generalisation on this fact.
6.2.3 Mounting influence testing
To show how strong the influence of microphone mounting changes is, in comparison to the inter-
microphone distance of different microphones of the same brand and model, two simple experiments are
constructed (both described in experimental setup Mic-Mounting Impact RS9). The eight recordings in
different mountings of the microphone M22 used for the generation of RS9 are used in these tests as test
material against a model generated by a selected classifier (weka.classifiers.meta.RandomSubSpace) on
RS4 Beyer in R06 and on the same references (silence and sinoid; ref2). The test hypothesis for both
tests is: ‘The candidate material is recorded by M22.’ If the detection performance achieved is equal
or better than the results achieved by the classifier in the intra-class evaluations on RS4 Beyer, it can
be assumed that the mounting is of limited impact to the microphone classification.
For the silence reference recorded in recording set RS9 (and tested against the model generated from
the corresponding RS4 Beyer material) a detection performance of κ = 1.0 is achieved. For the sinoid
the detection performance is κ = 0.86. The misclassifications are limited to exactly one mounting
position (position 4, the microphone lying flat on the table). For this position all 200 corresponding
feature vectors in this test are misclassified as originating from M23 instead of M22. Mounting position
4 is the position where physically the assumedly strongest impact to the vibration behaviour of the
microphone occurs – all other positions use some sort of microphone clamp mounted on a tripod, while
for mounting position 4 the microphone is lying on a table which can be assumed to vibrate with the
reference signal if this is strong enough, which is very well illustrated in figure ash which shows the
intra-class distribution for the feature sfenergy for M22. The figure 6.1 shows that the energy values
for mounting position 4 are much larger than for all other mounting positions, which implies (due to
the fact that no other environmental change happened between the recordings in the used anechoic
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chamber) that the table reverberates with the reference signal and that the microphone absorbs part
of this reverberation into the recorded signal.
Figure 6.1: Distribution of values for the feature sfenergy on the harmonic (sine) signal in RS9
Re´sume´ for this section: The mounting only seems to have influence in specific cases, where the
vibration behaviour of the microphone is strongly influenced, like in the case where a microphone
lies directly on a vibrating surface like a table. Otherwise, the inter-microphone difference, even for
microphones of the same brand and model, seems to be higher than the differences between the
recordings of one microphone in different mountings.
6.2.4 Classification using content selection as well as content dependent and
independent training and testing
The experiments in [Kraetzer07c] are conducted using time-, frequency- and cepstral-domain features
on context insensitive audio content evaluations. Another approach using content selection was ex-
amined in our laboratory with a master thesis [Dohnal08] using the test set RS2 containing seven
different microphones and using only Fourier coefficients as frequency-domain features. It aims mainly
at the noise component Nmic(f) in equation 2.4 in the context model for microphone recordings (see
section 2.3.2). The template matching used in [Dohnal08] turned out to be inadequate for the classifi-
cation of high-dimensional feature vectors71, but these first results were a motivation to conduct further
research on the evaluation of content selection as pre-processing for feature extraction and classification.
In [Buchholz09] we use the Fourier features and silence threshold strategy introduced in [Dohnal08]
together with WEKAs advanced classification techniques. The results are presented and discussed in
detail in [Buchholz09] and are summarised here.
The classification results for coef =2048 (experimental setup Mic-BKD2009 – see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)) are given in table 6.21, while the results for the evaluations using coef =256
frequency coefficients are given in table 6.22. The second column in the two tables gives the percentage
of the recorded audio material which is considered in the feature extraction (due to the fact that it is
below the defined threshold based content selection). With an increasing (silence) threshold thresh it
is obvious that the percentage of the material considered (because the contents of the corresponding
window is completely below thresh) increases (e.g. form 47.5% of the overall material for coef =2048
and thresh =0.0 to 67.6% for the same coef and thresh =0.025).
71The best reported detection performance in [Dohnal08] was κ = 0.536 (accuracy = 60.26%) for a window size
of 2048 samples and an amplitude silence-threshold of 0.25 (for a detailed discussion of the window size and silence-
threshold parameters see [Buchholz09]). Even for that parameter combination, our best classification result is κ = 0.862
(an accuracy of 88.2%), while our optimal result is obtained with a silence threshold of 0.35 (indicating that the new
approach is less context sensitive) with κ = 0.924 (accuracy of 93.5%).
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Table 6.21: Detection performance (κ value) for coef =2048 (experimental setup Mic-BKD2009 ; adapted
from [Buchholz09])
Threshold
thresh
Percentage of
samples
NaiveBayes SMO SimpleLogistic J48 IB1 IBk
(2-nearest
neighbour)
0.010 47.5% 0.257 0.473 0.474 0.364 0.455 0.438
0.025 67.6% 0.334 0.609 0.638 0.424 0.619 0.591
0.050 78.6% 0.367 0.724 0.736 0.538 0.704 0.663
0.100 86.8% 0.354 0.762 0.778 0.551 0.766 0.705
0.250 97.3% 0.381 0.862 0.862 0.634 0.798 0.769
0.350 99.7% 0.250 0.890 0.924 0.669 0.865 0.830
0.400 100.0% 0.259 0.861 0.908 0.697 0.868 0.833
0.500 100.0% 0.210 0.804 0.851 0.729 0.862 0.830
1.000 100.0% 0.210 0.804 0.851 0.729 0.862 0.830
Table 6.22: Detection performance (κ value) for coef =256 (experimental setup Mic-BKD2009 ; adapted
from [Buchholz09])
Threshold
thresh
Percentage of
samples
NaiveBayes SMO SimpleLogistic J48 IB1 IBk
(2-nearest
neighbour)
0.010 64.6% 0.290 0.447 0.596 0.409 0.540 0.496
0.025 80.8% 0.339 0.575 0.720 0.523 0.707 0.671
0.050 87.5% 0.302 0.577 0.736 0.545 0.707 0.665
0.100 95.2% 0.293 0.677 0.804 0.556 0.712 0.676
0.250 99.6% 0.306 0.698 0.854 0.670 0.808 0.745
0.350 99.7% 0.292 0.701 0.868 0.629 0.802 0.741
0.400 100.0% 0.272 0.705 0.890 0.690 0.850 0.795
0.500 100.0% 0.218 0.652 0.816 0.701 0.846 0.811
1.000 100.0% 0.218 0.652 0.816 0.701 0.846 0.811
The first fact to be observed is that the number of samples for which not a single window falls within the
amplitude threshold and which thus can only be classified by guessing is quite high even if the thresh-
old thresh used is set as low as 0.1 of the maximum amplitude – a value at which the audio signal
definitely still contains a high portion of audible audio signal in addition to the noise. For all classifiers,
the classification accuracy drops sharply when choosing even lower thresholds. This result is to be ex-
pected since with decreasing threshold, the number of audio samples without any acceptable windows
at all increases sharply and thus the classification for more and more samples is based on guessing alone.
For most classifiers, the optimal classification results are obtained with a threshold that is very close to
the lowest threshold at which features for all recordings in the test can be extracted (i.e. each record-
ing has at last a single window that lies completely below the threshold). This, too, is reasonable.
For a lower threshold, an increasing number of samples can only be classified by guessing. And for
higher thresholds, the amount of signal in the FFT results increases and the amount of noise decreases.
Since our classification in these observations is based on analysing the noise spectrum Nmic(f) in equa-
tion 2.4, this leads to lower classification accuracy as well. However, the decline in accuracy even with a
threshold of 1 (i.e. every single sample window is considered) is by far smaller than that of low thresholds.
The classification results for the two window tested sizes do not differ much. The NaiveBayes classifier
yields better results when using smaller windows and thus fewer attributes. For all other classifiers,
the results are usually better for the bigger window size, owing to the fact that a bigger number of
attributes allows for the samples to differ in more ways.
The overall best classification results are obtained with the SimpleLogistic classifier, with κ = 0.924 (at
coef =2048) and κ = 0.890 (for coef =256). However, for very high thresholds that allow a louder
audio signal (as opposed to noise) to be part of the extracted features, the IB1 classifier performs better
than the SimpleLogistic one.
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One notable odd behaviour is the fact that for very small thresholds the percentage of correctly classified
samples exceeds the percentage of samples with valid windows, i.e. samples that can be classified. This is
due to the behaviour of the classifiers to in essence guess the class for samples without valid attributes.
Since this guess is likely to be correct with a probability of one seventh for seven microphones, the
mentioned behaviour can indeed occur.
Inter-Microphone Differences
To analyse the differences in microphone detection performance between the individual microphones
the detailed classification results for the test case with the most accurate results (SimpleLogistic,
coef =2048, threshold thresh =0.35) are shown in a confusion matrix in table 6.23.
The results are rather unspectacular. The detection performance varies only slightly, between κ = 0.879
and 0.964 (number of correct classifications, i.e. detection performance, in table 6.23 between 0.861 and
0.960). Similar microphones from the same manufacturer (M7 and M8) even get mixed up less often
as is the case with other microphone combinations. The only anomaly is the frequent misclassification
of the M9 as the M2. This may be attributed to these two microphones sharing the same transducer
technology, because otherwise, their purpose and signal quality differ considerably.
Table 6.23: The confusion matrix for the test case SimpleLogistic, coef = 2048, thresh = 0.35
M2 M5 M3 M6 M7 M8 M9
M2 0.875 −0.320 −0.333 −0.333 −0.333 −0.333 −0.221
M5 −0.320 0.933 −0.320 −0.320 −0.320 −0.320 −0.333
M3 −0.292 −0.333 0.861 −0.263 −0.320 −0.333 −0.320
M6 −0.333 −0.333 −0.320 0.960 −0.320 −0.333 −0.320
M7 −0.320 −0.333 −0.320 −0.304 0.917 −0.320 −0.320
M8 −0.333 −0.333 −0.333 −0.333 −0.320 0.931 −0.277
M9 −0.305 −0.333 −0.305 −0.333 −0.320 −0.320 0.917
The results of this content selection approach can be directly compared to the results presented for
single classifier classifications without content selection on the same test material (RS2) presented
in table 6.24 below. Table 6.24 summarises the classification results from [Kraetzer09b] achieved
with experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2009ACM-single-classifier on RS2 (see table 11.1 in appendix C
(starting on page 201)). In these evaluations 200 feature vectors of 98 dimensions (AAFE v.1.0.3, see
experimental setup Mic-Kraetzer2009ACM-single-classifier) are computed per reference file.
Table 6.24: Detection performance (κ values) of two selected classifiers on RS2 (see experimental setup
Mic-Kraetzer2009ACM-single-classifier) – adapted from [Kraetzer09b]
R01 R02 R03 R04 R05 R06 R07 R08 R09 R10
SimpleLogistic
avg. κ
0.704 0.659 0.771 0.736 0.698 0.780 0.707 0.742 0.741 0.735
J48 avg. κ 0.727 0.704 0.850 0.762 0.706 0.808 0.713 0.768 0.820 0.770
Table 6.24 shows for general classification on RS2 using the functions.SimpleLogistic classifier a best
Kappa value of κ = 0.78 (with an average of κ = 0.727). The content selection approach limiting its
observations to silent parts shows for the two evaluated window sizes and the functions.SimpleLogistic
classifier κ = 0.924 and κ = 0.890 respectively (see table 6.21 and table 6.22).
In this case the content selection based frequency-domain approach seems to perform better than the
general approach.
A different picture can be seen if the performance of the trees.J48 classifier is evaluated. Here, ta-
ble 6.24 shows for the general classification on RS2 a best detection performance of κ = 0.820 (with
an average of κ = 0.763) while the observations restricted to parts show only κ = 0.701 and κ = 0.729
for the two evaluated window sizes (see table 6.21 and table 6.22).
To clearly answer the question whether the content selection based microphone forensics using only
frequency-domain features introduced in [Buchholz09] technically outperforms the general-purpose ap-
proach considered within this thesis, three further sets of investigations have to be performed to consider
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the two different sources of influence to the classification: first, the impact of content selection in
content dependent training, and second, the generalisation (content dependency) of models generated
for one specific type of content in classification on another type of content. After these two content
related questions are answered, as a third point the performance of frequency domain features
(which are the only type of features considered in [Buchholz09]) in comparison to a mixed set of time-,
frequency- and cepstral-domain features is investigated.
For the first of those three required evaluations, two experiments are run to establish empirical knowledge
about the content influence on the classification. In the experiments Mic-Content-Selectivity-01
and Mic-Content-Selectivity-02 (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) for material from
RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer recorded in room R01 the classification performance on silence and speech
references are separately measured using three classifiers from the top 20 classifiers (see section 6.1.3,
from each of the most significant classifier classes one representative candidate is chosen). Here, the
performances of content-adapted classifier models on similar content are evaluated. The tests are run
in 10-fold stratified cross-validation on 200 and 800 feature vectors per reference and using the 20 most
significant features only (see section 6.1.4).
The results achieved with experimental setup Mic-Content-Selectivity-01 on RS4 Rode in R01 (see
table 6.24) show, for the silence reference, very similar results for all three classifiers and the tested
vector field sizes. All those κ values are in the range [0.669, 0727]. On the speech material the
classifications show a tendency towards better classification results for larger vector fields. The most
significant observation in this experiment is nevertheless the rather dramatic difference between the two
content classes. While the speech results are barely above the probability of guessing correctly (i.e.
κ = 0), the silence results are much better.
Table 6.25: Detection performance (κ value) for silence and speech signals recorded with RS4 Rode in R01, best
20 features, three selected classifiers (out of the top 20, all using 10-fold stratified cross-validation;
experimental setup Mic-Content-Selectivity-01)
Content Feature vectors per file Feature set Classifier κ value
Silence 200 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.727
800 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.700
200 best 20 meta.dagging 0.698
800 best 20 meta.dagging 0.669
200 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.703
800 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.704
Speech 200 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.016
800 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.032
200 best 20 meta.dagging 0.026
800 best 20 meta.dagging 0.043
200 best 20 trees.RandomForest −0.002
800 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.057
When the experiment described above is repeated on material from RS4 Beyer in R01 similar tendencies
are shown in table 6.26. The rather dramatic difference between the two content classes remains.
Table 6.26: Detection performance (κ value) for silence and speech signals recorded with RS4 Beyer in R01, best
20 features, three selected classifiers (out of the top 20, all using 10-fold stratified cross-validation;
experimental setup Mic-Content-Selectivity-01)
Content Feature vectors per file Feature set Classifier κ value
Silence 200 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.618
800 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.610
200 best 20 meta.dagging 0.558
800 best 20 meta.dagging 0.567
200 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.573
800 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.613
Speech 200 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.115
800 best 20 functions.Logistic 0.131
200 best 20 meta.dagging 0.082
800 best 20 meta.dagging 0.082
200 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.187
800 best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.217
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The results presented for the content selection can be summarised therefore as follows: the content
seems to have a strong influence on the detection performances achieved, even when using classifier
models trained on the same type of content. Therefore, a content identification in pre-processing and
a corresponding model selection might strongly improve the performance (in terms of accuracy) of a
microphone identification scheme.
For the second of those three required evaluations also two experiments are run to establish empir-
ical knowledge about the content dependency between training and testing. In the experi-
ments Mic-Content-Independency-01 and Mic-Content-Independency-02 (see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)) for material from RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer recorded in room R01 the
classification performance of models generated on one specific content class (silence) in classification
of completely different content (speech), and vice versa, are evaluated. For reasons of comparabil-
ity the same three classifiers and the same features are used as for Mic-Content-Selectivity-01 and
Mic-Content-Selectivity-02 . The tests are run in with selected training sets on 200 and 800 feature
vectors per reference.
The results achieved on RS4 Rode in R01 (see table 6.27) show for the content independent training
and testing devastating results: nearly all achieved detection performances are as low as the probability
of guessing (i.e. κ = 0). Only the result for the Trees.RandomForest classifier trained on speech and
tested on silence achieves a detection performance which is with κ = 0.298 significantly better than
guessing. A verification of the results with 800 feature vectors per reference for both recording sets
also returned very similar results than in the case of 200 feature vectors per reference file.
Table 6.27: Detection performance (κ value) for RS4 Rode in R01, best 20 features, three selected classi-
fiers (out of the top 20, specified test sets) 200 feature vectors per file; experimental setup
Mic-Content-Selectivity-01
Training material Test material Feature set Classifier κ value
Silence Speech best 20 functions.Logistic 0.034
best 20 meta.dagging 0.033
best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.028
Speech Silence best 20 functions.Logistic 0.000
best 20 functions.Logistic 0.000
best 20 meta.dagging 0.298
When the experiment described above is repeated on material from RS4 Beyer in R01 similar tendencies
are shown in table 6.28. A verification of the results with 800 feature vectors per reference for both
recording sets also returned very similar results than in the case of 200 feature vectors per reference
file.
Table 6.28: Detection performance (κ value) for RS4 Beyer in R01, best 20 features, three selected clas-
sifiers (out of the top 20, specified test sets) 200 feature vectors per file; experimental setup
Mic-Content-Selectivity-01
Training material Test material Feature set Classifier κ value
Silence Speech best 20 functions.Logistic 0.063
best 20 meta.dagging 0.052
best 20 trees.RandomForest 0.045
Speech Silence best 20 functions.Logistic 0.007
best 20 functions.Logistic 0.000
best 20 meta.dagging 0.180
These results can be summarised therefore as follows: if the content used for training and testing is
completely different in its characteristics (completely independent content classes are used), then the
classification model will result in very low detection performances. The same conclusion for the training
material selection can be drawn as for the content selectivity considerations above: a content identifi-
cation in pre-processing and a corresponding model selection might strongly improve the performance
(in terms of κ values) of a microphone identification scheme.
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The third question to be evaluated for the approach from [Buchholz09] is the choice of features
(frequency-domain features versus mixed domains feature sets). Here, just a brief summary of the
results of the feature selection for microphone forensics performed in section 6.1.4 is given: from
the 590 features in the segmental feature vector computed by AAFE v.2.0.5 530 are computed in
frequency-domain, including a 512 Fourier coefficient spectrogram similar to those used as feature set
in [Buchholz09], but in the top 30 of these 590 features only two frequency-domain features are found.
This mismatch in those numbers speaks strongly against a paramount performance of frequency-domain
features.
Re´sume´ for this section: The investigations on content selection in content dependent training
and content independent training and testing performed within this section show that the introduced
approach might benefit from a content identification in pre-processing and a corresponding model se-
lection. The implementation of such a pre-processing scheme, which involves the solution of another
audio pattern recognition task – reliable content classification – is outside of the scope of this thesis
and reserved for future research.
Notwithstanding the quite good detection performances achieved with the context sensitive approach
from [Buchholz09] and the additional observations on the impact different classes of content (here
speech vs. silence), the idea of performing content removal (e.g. by silence detection) is discarded
for the remaining investigations in this thesis. Technically such a content selection (e.g. by silence
thresholding) might improve the detection performance achieved, but the restriction imposed thereby
on the audio signals that can undergo such microphone forensics is considered to be too severe to be
useful in field applications. With these restrictions, the introduced general-purpose approach would
lose the feature which distinguished it from the majority of the approaches in the current state-of-the-
art: its general applicability (see the description of the shortcomings of the current state-of-the-art in
section 2.6.2. I.e. for authentication purposes such a silence thresholding would prevent the processing
of recordings were no such ‘silence’ would be present in sufficient quantities. For composition detection
purposes in integrity verification, a context removal seems even more contra productive because normally
loud parts are ‘mixed in’ to change the meaning of an audio data stream and not silence. Therefore,
further investigations on content removal are abandoned for the rest of this thesis and reserved for
future work.
6.3 Persistence of the microphone pattern under selected post-
processing operations and playback recording
As mentioned in the design considerations on the required evaluations in microphone forensics in sec-
tion 4.3.1 selected, relevant signal modifications as common post-recording influences to the recorded
signals are evaluated here. Further investigations summarised in this section address the question
whether the microphone response function based traces used here for microphone forensics survive a
playback recording.
6.3.1 Normalisation
Normalisation is a fairly common audio signal post-processing operation. Since it is an amplitude scaling
operation in time domain, normalisation is considered here to be a representative for all such operations.
The models used in the evaluations performed here are trained on original recordings and then used
to classify material that underwent normalisation (with the normalisation factor computed indepen-
dently for each file). The experimental setup Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Beyer describes those tests (see
table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)). A second set of practical evaluations is performed
using the same procedure and the RS4 Rode recording set (see Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Rode).
For the experiment Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Beyer , from each recorded and normalised file the first and
second set of 200 feature vectors are computed and used as two distinct test sets. Table 6.29 compares
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the detection performances achieved on these test sets against the accuracy achieved in 10-fold cross-
validation on the first set of 200 feature vectors per file on original data.
Table 6.29: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and normalised audio data for RS4 Beyer
in R01 (experimental setup Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Beyer)
Classifier κ on original data κ on normalised data
(1st test)
κ on normalised data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.175 0.061 0.090
functions.SMO 0.680 0.576 0.562
meta.RandomCommittee 0.637 0.329 0.279
trees.RandomForest 0.615 0.332 0.285
The results in table 6.29 show a rather strong impact of the normalisation operation to the achieved
detection performances. The result remains for all four exemplary tested classifiers above the probability
of guessing (i.e. κ > 0), but for the NaiveBayes and the SMO the accuracy drops slightly and for the
RandomCommittee and RandomForest rather strongly.
To verify those results the same test is run again on the recordings of the four Rode microphones in
RS4 Rode (see Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Rode).
Table 6.30: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and normalised audio data for RS4 Rode
in R01 (experimental setup Mic-Normalisation-RS4 Rode)
Classifier κ on original data κ on normalised data
(1st test)
κ on normalised data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.201 0.058 0.070
functions.SMO 0.583 0.490 0.513
meta.RandomCommittee 0.515 0.245 0.250
trees.RandomForest 0.493 0.204 0.229
The results in table 6.30 show a similar impact of the normalisation of the test material as in ta-
ble 6.29 on the classification performance achieved in this microphone forensics classification. Like
for the RS4 Beyer recordings, the detection performances achieved after normalisation are much lower
than the results achieved by these four exemplary selected classifiers on original material.
Re´sume´ for this section: In the classification using models trained on original recordings against
test material which underwent normalisation, a negative impact of this post-processing procedure on
the detection performance can be observed. Nevertheless, the classification with the exemplary chosen
classifiers after this time-domain modification still leads to detection performances which are significantly
better than the probability of guessing correctly. This implies that frequency-domain and cepstral-
domain features, which are rather unaffected by time-domain normalisation, contribute strongly to the
classification behaviour, an observation which is consistent with the observation on the best performing
features in microphone forensics (see section 6.1.4).
6.3.2 MP3 conversion
The MP3 conversion is one of the most widely used audio signal post-processing operations. Here, it is
applied with a common bit rate of 128kBit/s (using the LAME codec72) to show the impact of this data
reduction to the classification performance achieved in microphone forensics. The models used in those
evaluations are trained on original (never-compressed) recordings and then used to classify material that
underwent MP3 conversion. The experimental setup Mic-MP3conversion-RS4 Beyer describes those
tests (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)). For verification of the results, a second set
of practical evaluations is performed using the same procedure and the RS4 Rode recording set (see
Mic-MP3conversion-RS4 Rode).
72 http://lame.sourceforge.net/
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For the experiments from each recorded and MP3 encoded file the first and second set of 200 feature
vectors are computed and used as two distinct test sets. Table 6.31 compares the classification accuracies
achieved on these test sets against the accuracy achieved in 10-fold cross-validation on the first set of
200 feature vectors per file on original data.
Table 6.31: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on orig-
inal material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and MP3 encoded audio data for
RS4 Beyer in R01 (experimental setup Mic-MP3conversion-RS4 Beyer)
Classifier κ on original data κ on MP3 data
(1st test)
κ on MP3 data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.175 0.165 0.209
functions.SMO 0.680 0.665 0.659
meta.RandomCommittee 0.637 0.679 0.615
trees.RandomForest 0.615 0.651 0.585
The results in table 6.31 show no negative impact of the MP3 conversion of the test material on the
classification performance achieved in this microphone forensics classification. The detection perfor-
mance achieved after MP3 conversion is very close to the result achieved by these four exemplary
selected classifiers on original material.
To verify those results the same test is run again on the recordings of the four Rode microphones in
RS4 Rode (see Mic-MP3conversion-RS4 Rode).
Table 6.32: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on orig-
inal material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and MP3 encoded audio data for
RS4 Rode in R01 (experimental setup Mic-MP3conversion-RS4 Rode)
Classifier κ on original data κ on MP3 data
(1st test)
κ on MP3 data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.201 0.187 0.219
functions.SMO 0.583 0.567 0.606
meta.RandomCommittee 0.515 0.546 0.553
trees.RandomForest 0.493 0.552 0.541
The results in table 6.32 show also no negative impact of the MP3 conversion of the test material on the
classification performance achieved in this microphone forensics classification. Like for the RS4 Beyer
recordings, the detection performance achieved after MP3 conversion is very close to the result achieved
by these four exemplary selected classifiers on original material.
Re´sume´ for this section: In the investigations using models trained on original recordings against test
material which underwent MP3 conversion, no negative impact of this encoding can be observed. The
conversion seems to have no impact on the patterns which are used in this statistical pattern recognition
(SPR) based approach for microphone forensics. This observation is consistent with the observation on
the best performing features in microphone-forensics, which seem to be (see section 6.1.4) higher-order
cepstral-domain features, which are rather unlikely to be changed by MP3 conversion.
6.3.3 De-noising by re-quantisation
With the impact of de-noising (here by re-quantisation) another common signal modification for recorded
audio signals is evaluated for its impact on the classification performance achieved by the introduced
statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based microphone forensics approach. Like for the impact ob-
servations on normalisation and MP3 conversion, the models used in those evaluations are trained on
original recordings and are then used to classify material that underwent targeted signal modifications
(here de-noising by re-quantisation). The experimental setup Mic-Denoise-RS4 Beyer (see table 11.1
in appendix C (starting on page 201)) describes those tests. A second set of practical evaluations is
performed using the same procedure and the RS4 Rode recording set (see Mic-Denoise-RS4 Rode).
For the experiments from each recorded and re-quantised file the first and second set of 200 feature
vectors are computed and used as two distinct test sets. Table 6.33 compares the classification accuracies
150
6.3. Persistence of the microphone pattern under selected post-processing operations and
playback recording
achieved on these test sets against the accuracy achieved in 10-fold stratified cross-validation on the
first set of 200 feature vectors per file on original data.
Table 6.33: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and re-quantised data for RS4 Beyer in
R01 (exp. setup Mic-Denoise-RS4 Beyer)
Classifier κ on original data κ on test data
(1st test)
κ on test data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.175 0.192 0.232
functions.SMO 0.680 0.195 0.209
meta.RandomCommittee 0.637 0.518 0.472
trees.RandomForest 0.615 0.436 0.397
The results in table 6.33 vary rather strongly for the four exemplary chosen classifiers. For the Naive-
Bayes no negative impact by this signal modification is observed. Instead its relatively low detection
performance seems to be improved by the re-quantisation. For the other three classifiers a strong de-
cline of the detection performance is observed.
For verification purposes the same test is run again on the recordings of the four Rode microphones in
RS4 Rode (see Mic-Denoise-RS4 Rode).
Table 6.34: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and re-quantised data for RS4 Rode in
R01 (exp. setup Mic-Denoise-RS4 Rode)
Classifier κ on original data κ on test data
(1st test)
κ on test data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.201 0.216 0.237
functions.SMO 0.583 0.303 0.351
meta.RandomCommittee 0.515 0.365 0.389
trees.RandomForest 0.493 0.339 0.378
If the results presented in table 6.34 are compared to those in table 6.33 the same overall trend can be
observed: for the Bayesian classifier no negative impact can be seen while the degradation in classifi-
cation accuracies for the other three exemplary chosen classifiers is strongly visible.
Re´sume´ for this section: In the classification, using models trained on original recordings against test
material which underwent de-noising by re-quantisation, the impact appears to be classifier dependent.
For the four exemplary chosen classifiers, one did show no negative impact by this signal modification,
for the other three a strong degradation of the achieved classification accuracy is noticeable. It can be
assumed that the latter behaviour is more characteristic for this modification. This would be consistent
with the observation on the best performing features in microphone forensics, which seem to be (see
section 6.1.4) higher-order cepstral-domain features. The de-noising by re-quantisation has a rather
strong impact on the spectrogram of the audio signal and this influence also influences those higher-order
cepstral-domain features derived from the frequency-domain representation.
6.3.4 An exemplary combination of signal processing operations
After the impact of the single signal processing operations is investigated in the previous three sub-
sections, here an exemplary selected combination of these processing operations and its impact is
evaluated.
The models used in those evaluations are trained on original recordings and then used to classify material
that underwent first de-noising, then normalisation and third MP3 conversion. The experimental setup
Mic-MultiProcessing-RS4 Beyer (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201)) describes those
tests. For verification purposes, a second set of practical evaluations is performed using the same
procedure and the RS4 Rode recording set (see Mic-MultiProcessing-RS4 Rode).
For the experiments from each recorded and re-quantised, normalised and MP3 encoded file the first
and second set of 200 feature vectors are computed and used as two distinct test sets. Table 6.35
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compares the classification accuracies achieved on these test sets against the accuracy achieved in
10-fold cross-validation on the first set of 200 feature vectors per file on original data.
Table 6.35: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and re-quantised, normalised and MP3
encoded data for RS4 Beyer in R01 (exp. setup Mic-MultiProcessing-RS4 Beyer)
Classifier κ on original data κ on test data
(1st test)
κ on test data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.175 0.023 0.045
functions.SMO 0.680 0.379 0.446
meta.RandomCommittee 0.637 0.165 0.195
trees.RandomForest 0.615 0.155 0.198
The results in table 6.35 show, in comparison to the results presented for single processing operations,
that for most cases the influence of the combined signal processing (de-noising, normalisation and MP3
conversion) imposes a stronger disturbance to the microphone-intrinsic recording-pattern. The only
exception is the SMO classifier where the detection performance after the combined signal processing
is better than after a de-noising only (compare SMO results in table 6.33 and table 6.35).
For verification purposes the same test is run again on the recordings of the four Rode microphones in
RS4 Rode (see Mic-MultiProcessing-RS4 Rode).
Table 6.36: Detection performance (κ value) for four exemplary selected classifiers and models generated on original
material run against original data (in 10-fold cross-validation) and re-quantised, normalised and MP3
encoded data for RS4 Rode in R01 (exp. setup Mic-MultiProcessing-RS4 Rode)
Classifier κ on original data κ on test data
(1st test)
κ on test data
(2nd test)
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.201 0.039 0.044
functions.SMO 0.583 0.357 0.412
meta.RandomCommittee 0.515 0.119 0.140
trees.RandomForest 0.493 0.108 0.138
If the results presented in table 6.36 are compared to those in table 6.35, the same overall trend can be
observed: the combined signal processing in the majority of the cases disturbs the microphone intrinsic
recording pattern classified here stronger than as in case of single signal processing operations.
Re´sume´ for this section: Even after the rather strong impact of the combined signal processing, the
detection performance remains for three of the four tested classifiers (the SMO, RandomCommittee
and RandomForest) significantly better than the probability of guessing correctly (i.e. κ = 0).
Further investigations on signal post-processing influences are strongly recommended for future research
to establish a close estimation of the robustness of the microphone-intrinsic recording-pattern used in
the introduced approach for the microphone authentication and thereby of the plausibility of the whole
approach.
6.3.5 Playback recording
In [Kraetzer12b] the influence of playback recording on the introduced microphone forensics ap-
proach is investigated (see table 11.1 in appendix C (starting on page 201); experimental setup
Mic-SPIE2012-Double-Recording). Summarising this paper, it has to be stated first that it presents a
very high detection performance for microphone classification in single recording evaluations on the
used recording set RS16. For the recordings with six different microphones (two of them being of the
same brand and type) the detection performance on recorded speech is in average about κ = 0.989
(equivalent to an accuracy of 99.14% or an error rate of 0.86%).
This result is much better that the performance shown in our previous papers (see e.g. table 6.13 in
section 6.1.3 where a set of four identical microphones achieves a best value of κ = 0.780 in classifier
selection). The very good detection performance is assumed here to be due to the rather strong record-
ing characteristics of the microphones used in RS16 (mostly headsets and low-quality devices), the
perfect recording conditions (R06 ; a sound-proof, anechoic chamber) and the limitation of the recorded
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content to human speech (instead of multi-genre audio). If normalisation is applied to the recorded
content as audio signal post-processing (prior to training and testing), the detection performance de-
creases to κ = 0.981 (an average error of 1.44%) – confirming the fact established in section 6.3.1
that normalisation influences the introduced statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based microphone
forensics approach.
For the investigations of playbacks, the results presented in [Kraetzer12b] imply that the traces left
by both microphones involved in the recording process are still to some extend detectable for our ap-
proach. If the same microphone is used for the initial and playback recording, the achieved detection
performance for the six microphones set decreases to κ = 0.841 (equivalent to an error rate of 11.91%).
If the audio material is normalised between initial and secondary recording, the detection performance
drops to κ = 0.677 (an error rate of about 24.24%). Here, the misclassifications are more or less
randomly distributed. The playback recording with the same microphone seems to somehow decrease
the clarity of the microphone pattern as perceived by using our audio feature set.
Regarding the investigations on the audio material that is initially recorded by one microphone, played
back via loudspeaker and is then re-recorded with a different microphone, we see an even stronger
influence of normalisation: Without normalisation the results show a strong tendency (267 out of 300
test cases; 89.00% – see [Kraetzer12b]) for a positive indication on the correct two microphones. Only
11 cases (3.67%) give two microphones of which one was actually not involved and only 22 cases
(7.33%) make completely wrong assignments. With the normalisation involved, only 108 out of 300
test cases (36.00%) for this test set show a positive indication on the correct two microphones. With
152 cases (50.67%) the classifiers indicate two microphones, with one of them actually not involved
and only 40 cases (13.33%) make completely wrong assignments. Based on these results, it has to be
assumed that the normalisation (with a different factor for each file) makes the classifier model more
complex, i.e. decreases its detection performance.
Re´sume´ for this section: The results presented for the investigations on a test set of six microphones
recording human speech (and its playback) imply that playback detection by the introduced microphone
forensics approach is possible. Without post-processing of the recorded sound prior to playback, in the
tests 89.00% positive indications are achieved on the two correct microphones. If post-processing is ap-
plied in the form of normalisation, this percentage significantly drops to 36.00% while another 50.67%
of the tests indicate two microphones, of which one has actually not been involved in the recording and
playback recording process.
For the overall application scenario of microphone forensics, these results imply that a playback attack
has a strong influence on the detection performance, if it is not detected prior to the performed
microphone authentication. Therefore, future work should be invested into an updated design for a
microphone forensics scheme which incorporates context analysis like playback detection and content
class (i.e. speech, music, etc.) analysis prior to the actual source authentication operations.
6.4 Investigations on composition detection
The evaluation design for microphone forensics in section 4.3.1 addresses the question of composition or
mesh-up detection. Generally, two distinct types of scenarios are here identified in this context: a) the
audio data stream, into which other data is pasted into, originates from a known microphone and b) the
audio data stream, into which other data is pasted into, originates from an unknown microphone. The
first scenario is the more likely one in microphone forensics, where we usually assume that we intend
to verify the identity of a source microphone. Nevertheless, the performance of the statistical pattern
recognition (SPR) based forensics approach used within this thesis on the less likely second scenario is
also evaluated here to show its limitations.
Four different tests are performed in this composition detection evaluation:
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• Microphone recordings of one known microphone made in different locations composed into one
stream
• One known microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known microphone
• One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known microphone
• One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different unknown microphone
The evaluations performed here extend our initial considerations on playback recording influences in
microphone forensics as published in [Kraetzer11].
Test 1: Microphone recordings of one known microphone made in different locations composed
into one stream
This experiment is implemented by experimental setup Mic-Composition-1 (see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)). In terms of the classification problem at hand, this test is assumed to be the
hardest problem in this microphone forensics approach. As shown in section 6.2.1 the room / recording
environment has a strong influence on the classification performance, nevertheless the microphone used
for the ‘patched-in’ material is the same as the one for the original recordings. Figure 6.2 shows the
results for this experiment (Mic-Composition-1) and the four exemplary selected classifiers.
Figure 6.2: Mic-Composition-1 test results (upper half original, lower half pasted in material)
The colour-coding in figure 6.2 has the following meaning: A green field in the upper half of the figure
(the ‘original’ half) denotes a true positive (TP) in the classification of this feature vector, i.e. the
feature vector is classified correctly as belonging to the microphone M22. A yellow field in the upper
half of the figure corresponds to a false negative (FN), i.e. the feature vector is classified wrongly as
belonging to M20, M21 or M23.
A green field in the lower half of the figure (the ‘patched-in’ or ‘impostor’ half) denotes a true nega-
tive (TN) in the classification of this feature vector, i.e. the feature vector is rejected correctly as not
belonging to the microphone M22 (as it is registered in the model for the room / recording environment
R01). A red field in the lower half of the figure denotes a false positive (FP), i.e. the feature vector is
classified wrongly as belonging to the microphone M22.
The intention of this colour coding (which is consistently used for all three evaluations where the audio
data stream, into which other data is pasted into, originates from a known microphone) is to mark all
true classifications (TP and TN) in green and the false classifications in yellow (FN) and red (FP).
As can be seen in figure 6.2 and in table 6.37 the performance of the used classifiers strongly differs.
The NaiveBayes classifier produces an extremely high (98% on the original half) false negative rate on
the original half of the test material, while its FP rate on the impostor part is with only 4% very good.
The SMO shows in comparison to the Bayesian classifier a better, but still imperfect, FN rate. The
RandomCommittee and RandomForest classifiers achieve in this test a perfect classification behaviour
on the original half (100% TP) with FP-rates of 8% and 18% respectably on the impostor part. The
detection performance achieved in the overall evaluations (see table 6.37) could be used very well to
rank the classifiers according to their performance.
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Table 6.37: Detection performance (κ value) and statistical errors for the exemplary classifications on
Mic-Composition-1
Classifier κ value TP FN TN FP
bayes.NaiveBayes −0.02 2% 98% 96% 4%
functions.SMO 0.62 70% 30% 92% 8%
meta.RandomCommittee 0.92 100% 0% 92% 8%
trees.RandomForest 0.82 100% 0% 82% 18%
Test 2: One known microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known microphone
This experiment is implemented by experimental setup Mic-Composition-2 (see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)). The setup of this second test on the ‘mesh-up’ detection seems to be quite
unlikely, for it assumes that the microphone which recorded the material to be inserted into an audio
data stream is also registered in the classification models, something that an attacker/manipulator
would try to avoid. Nevertheless, this test is performed to evaluate the detection performance of the
approach under this assumption.
Figure 6.3 shows the results for the experiment Mic-Composition-2 and the four exemplary selected
classifiers. The same colour coding scheme is applied as in figure 6.2 above. Therefore all true
classifications (TP and TN) are marked in green and the false classifications in yellow (FN) and red
(FP).
Figure 6.3: Mic-Composition-2 test results (upper half original, lower half pasted in material)
As can be seen in figure 6.3 and in table 6.38, the performance of the used classifiers on the original
part shows exactly the same performance as in figure 6.2 above. This is due to the fact that the
same models are used here for the classification of the same material – all four classifiers work in a
deterministic way.
Differences can be seen in the performance on the impostor part (the lower half in figure 6.3; material
from M23 claimed to originate from M22). Here, the performance is strongly increased, as had to
be expected for this rather unlikely scenario. The RandomCommittee and RandomForest classifiers
achieve perfect classification performance on original as well as impostor material while the SMO
classifier returns significant but less than optimal results. The NaiveBayes classifier achieves a detection
performance of κ = 0 in this two-class evaluation.
Table 6.38: Detection performance (κ value) and statistical errors for the exemplary classifications on
Mic-Composition-2
Classifier κ value TP FN TN FP
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.00 2% 98% 98% 2%
functions.SMO 0.66 70% 30% 96% 4%
meta.RandomCommittee 1.00 100% 0% 100% 0%
trees.RandomForest 1.00 100% 0% 100% 0%
Test 3: One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different known micro-
phone
This experiment is implemented by experimental setup Mic-Composition-3 (see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)). The setup for this evaluation would be the rather most likely in recording
authentication: material originating from an unknown source is pasted into an audio data stream
generated by a registered microphone.
Figure 6.4 shows the results for the experiment Mic-Composition-3 and the four exemplary selected
classifiers. The same colour coding scheme is applied as in figure 6.2 above. Therefore all true
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classifications (TP and TN) are marked in green and the false classifications in yellow (FN) and red
(FP).
Figure 6.4: Mic-Composition-3 test results (upper half original, lower half pasted in material)
The performance in the original part (see figure 6.4 upper half and table 6.39) is exactly the same as
for the previous tests. For the impostor part (the lower half in figure dfghs; material from M8 claimed
to originate from M22) a good to very good detection performance is achieved by all four classifiers.
Nevertheless, the Bayesian classifier achieves only a κ value of 0.02 which would disqualify this classifier
from practical application in composition detection.
Table 6.39: Detection performance (κ value) and statistical errors for the exemplary classifications on
Mic-Composition-3
Classifier κ value TP FN TN FP
bayes.NaiveBayes 0.02 2% 98% 100% 0%
functions.SMO 0.68 70% 30% 98% 2%
meta.RandomCommittee 0.94 100% 0% 94% 6%
trees.RandomForest 0.92 100% 0% 92% 8%
Test 4: One unknown microphone pasted into a stream of completely different unknown
microphone
This experiment is implemented by experimental setup Mic-Composition-4 (see table 11.1 in appendix
C (starting on page 201)). Like the setup of the second test on the ‘mesh-up’ detection, this setup
seems to be rather unlikely; nevertheless, this test is performed to evaluate the performance of the
approach. Here it is assumed that material should be verified for mesh-ups for which the sensor is not
registered. This situation would be avoided by a person performing sensor forensics – in this field it is
generally assumed that the sensor to be authenticated is available to the examiner.
Figure 6.5 shows the results for the experiment Mic-Composition-4 and the four exemplary selected
classifiers. Here, a different colour coding has to be applied than in the previous mesh-up tests. All
four microphones in the used classification model are assigned one colour (M20 = blue, M21=orange,
M22=magenta, and M23=cyan) classification result for each of the 100 frames in the test material is
marked in this colour coding.
Figure 6.5: Mic-Composition-4 test results (upper half original, lower half pasted in material)
In figure 6.5 the upper half is representing the first unknown or impostor microphone (M2 from RS2
room R01) and the second half is the other one (M3 from RS2 room R01). Since the classification
model used was trained on different recording material from completely different microphones here in
this evaluation the stability of the decisions can be used to evaluate the performance of the microphone
forensics approach. The higher the change rate and the shorter the average sequence length in the
classifications, the better the classification under these circumstances.
For the upper half the NaiveBayes classifier shows here a very bad performance. All frames are in-
sistently classified as belonging to M21. Here a correct classification was of course not possible since
the correct microphone was not available in the model but this insistence is implying a wrong certainty
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of the classifier. This wrong sense of certainty can be eliminated by taking the average classification
detection performance of the used classifier into account, which for the NaiveBayes is about κ = 0.4
in the tests performed in section 6.1.3.
The RandomCommittee and RandomForest classifiers show a much better performance in these two
tests presented here. They show in table 6.40 a change rate of more than 25 out of 50 with an average
sequence length of smaller than two consecutive frames. These values are much closer to maximum
entropy than the values for the SMO or NaiveBayes classifiers, which implies that these (known good
classifiers) are run on impostor material.
Table 6.40: Change rate and average sequence length for the experiments in Mic-Composition-4
Classifier change rate average sequence length
first half (M2) bayes.NaiveBayes 0 50
functions.SMO 20 2.380952381
meta.RandomCommittee 26 1.851851852
trees.RandomForest 36 1.351351351
second half (M3) bayes.NaiveBayes 10 4.545454545
functions.SMO 17 2.777777778
meta.RandomCommittee 34 1.428571429
trees.RandomForest 28 1.724137931
Re´sume´ for this section: In the evaluations performed here on composition detection, it is shown for
strongly limited setups that the mixing of audio recordings into another recorded audio signal can be very
well detected by some classifiers. Of interest is the fact that from the four exemplary chosen classifiers
for the evaluations here the SMO, which is performing quite well in all other microphone forensics
evaluations (see e.g. section 6.1.3) shows a dissatisfactory performance. The RandomCommittee and
RandomForest classifiers do show here a very good performance if the microphone used in the generation
of the audio data stream into which other data is pasted into is registered in the classification models.
In fact, it seems not to matter much for their performance whether the material pasted into the original
stream originates from a registered or unknown microphone.
In case none of the two sources for a mesh-up is registered, it is shown here for a small example that
the change rate and average sequence length can be used to tell that a wrong model is used and,
since a different tendency for classification of the individual feature vectors can be observed, that a
composition is likely. Nevertheless, these facts should be subjected to further research to substantiate
these findings.
6.5 Summary of the findings for microphone forensics
In section 3.3 the tasks for the practical investigations performed within this thesis are defined. In this
summarising section, the results for the microphone forensics application scenario are first projected
onto these investigation tasks. In the second step performed here, the results achieved are reflected
under consideration of the evaluation criteria for forensic investigations derived within this thesis from
the Daubert standard (see section 2.2 and its subsections).
6.5.1 Projection of the results onto the defined investigation tasks
The first step required in the investigations is to establish some empirical ground truth (investigation
task A, as an pre´cising statement for research objective 1 – see section 3.3) to show that the applica-
tion scenario of microphone forensics (as it is considered within this thesis) can actually be solved by
statistical pattern recognition (SPR).
The fact that microphones can be classified with this SPR-based approach and with an detection
performance much better than the probability of guessing correctly was first demonstrated by us
in [Kraetzer07c] for inhomogeneous recording sets and verified here with intra-class classifications on sets
of identical microphones in section 6.1.1. The best results achieved have show a detection performance
of κ close to 1 on strongly inhomogeneous microphone sets of low quality microphones (κ = 0.989
on RS16, see section 6.3.5). In more realistic setups for sets of four identical microphones, detection
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performances of κ = 0.678 for the Rode condenser microphones and κ = 0.767 for the Beyerdynamics
dynamic microphones (RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer ; see section 6.1.1) are achieved. Using the mapping
between Kappa values and statistical confidence introduced in section 4.1.4, these results represent a
‘fair to good’ statistical confidence.
This investigation task is supposed to contain also an answer on what ‘sufficient’ means in terms of
required training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes. Here, due to the limited amount of
available recording hardware, only a concept for answering this question (see section 6.1.2) as well as
first estimations on required set sizes can be given. For the evaluations performed, a training set size of
200 windows (computed over 1024 audio sample values each) per considered recorded content (genre)
already achieves close to optimal results73 for most classifiers used here. If the amount of recorded
material used in training is more than these (about) 5 seconds audio material per considered genre, the
tests performed show only small improvements on the classification performance, while the computation
time for model generation and classification strongly increases.
Regarding the tendency for overfitting, section 6.2.4 strongly implies that content dependency in the
training and testing has a huge influence on the achieved classification accuracies. Like all other em-
pirical results presented here for microphone forensics, these facts would have to be verified in future
work with much larger microphone sets to extend the degree to which these results can be generalised.
Based on the results of the performed microphone forensics investigations, the summarising
statement for investigation task A for this application scenario is: The results presented here im-
ply that statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based microphone identification is possible, if the degrees
of freedom in the recording process can be controlled.
The second part of this statement is based on the fact that certain degrees of freedom in the recording
process (especially the recording environment, the mounting of the microphone and content influences)
have to be considered in the generation of the registration data (training data set and / or reference
model) for microphone authentication. Obviously, microphones to be identified have to registered (i.e.
models have to be trained for them), otherwise the identification approach used here, like many other
reference-based authentication approaches, would not work.
With this statement and its couterpart for audio steganalysis in section 5.4.1, research objective 1 (resp.
research challenge (a)) is answered positively.
The investigations performed within thesis show significant influences from parametrisations of the com-
ponents of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline, the different degrees of freedom in the
recording process as well as from potential post-processing operations. These influences are discussed
in the summaries on investigation tasks B and C, which both focus on how adequately the application
scenarios can be implemented with the introduced approach (research challenge c)), below.
The investigations on the impact of application scenario specific intrinsic influences to the statistical
pattern recognition (SPR) process (investigation task B) look into the influences arising from different
instantiations of the SPR pipeline.
This application task is mainly fuelled by two realisations: first, that the process of statistical pattern
recognition (SPR) is a powerful but complex method, and second, that many different classification
algorithms (as core component of the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) process) exist, which allow
for a successful classification of recorded audio samples as belonging to a source microphone.
The complex SPR process can be considered as a four component processing pipeline (see section 2.4).
In the following the evaluated influences to those four components are discussed:
73From the tests performed here it is assumed, that a training set size of 200 feature vectors per reference file (resulting
for 10 chosen references in about in 2000 representative vectors per microphone) is suitably enough for the evaluations.
At that size for each of the four microphones of RS4 Beyer and with a dimensionality of 590 attributes per vector
WEKAs implementation of a multilayer-perceptron achieved an detection performance of κ > 0.8 at an inacceptable high
computation time of more than 100 hours on the used test machine (a Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 CPU 3GHz with 4 GB RAM
machine running Microsoft Windows XP, WEKA v.3.6.1 on Java SE 6 (32-bit Windows) with 1.6 GByte allocated RAM
for each WEKA instance). Any further increase results in only slightly better (but not perfect) classification accuracies
and strongly worse run-times.
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• Pre-processing: the pre-processing operations have been restricted in this thesis to the absolute
minimum (mostly windowing with a fixed window size)
• Feature extraction: the features are the enabling part of the pattern recognition method. If they
allow the distinction between pattern and background and between different patterns, then a
successful application of this method is possible. Here, with the AAFE and known good audio
feature extractor is chosen for the most part of the investigations performed.
• Feature selection: this component complements the feature extraction by identifying the signifi-
cant features and therefore allowing for the removal of the insignificant ones. The feature selection
concept presented in this thesis is considered significant as well as representative for microphone
forensics because it is applied independently on two intra-class test sets of statistically significant
sizes, composed from microphones of the two most common microphone classes (dynamic and
condenser microphones).
The results of a PCA performed on the feature space of 590 segmental features computed by
AAFE version 2.0.5 imply that for microphone forensics within this feature space only 187 inde-
pendent dimensions exist (see section 6.1.4). By the reduction of the feature space to the 20
most relevant ones, the classification process is speed up by a factor of about 33 while keeping
the detection performance achieved on a nearly constant level. Since the used procedure ranks
the features by their benefit in classification, this ranking then can be used to derive domain
knowledge about the considered classification problem. The evaluations imply that the micro-
phone influence in recording – the intrinsic pattern – manifests itself the strongest in higher order
cepstral-domain features, while time domain features, which are closest to the natural domain
of the audio signal, do not play a strong role in the classification, since they are influenced to
strongly by the recorded content. The global features computed by AAFE version 2.0.5 do not
show any significance in this application scenario.
• Classification: As stated above on the methodology and solution concept used in this thesis (see
e.g. section 3.1.3), the choice of classifiers is for this thesis is restricted to the application of already
existing classifiers as implemented in WEKA (version 3.6.1), presumably showing very different
performance in terms of classification accuracy achieved and computation time requirements.
Here, an application specific classifier selection for existing classifiers is introduced, aiming at the
identification of suitable classifiers for the microphone forensics application scenario. The results
of this classifier selection are presented in detail in section 6.1.3. They show that clustering-driven
classification seems to be of no use for the microphone forensics approach used here. Even if the
number of clusters (here the microphone classes) for an audio data stream is known in advance
(an unlikely scenario in microphone identification as well as composition detection) the detection
performance is barely above κ = 0 (i.e. the probability of guessing correctly) and much lower
than the performance of the supervised classification approaches on the same material. Supervised
classification can be successfully used for microphone identification but so far no feature extractor
/ single classifier combination has been found that wields perfect results (a detection performance
of κ = 1, preferably at a low computational run-time).
The summarising statement for investigation task B is: The results for the intra-class classifica-
tions on sets of identical microphones in section 6.1.3 show clearly that: Notwithstanding the fact that
all classifiers are used in default parametrisation – which has to be assumed to be sub-optimal (a fact
which would require more detailed considerations on classifier optimisation and -generation, which are
outside the scope of this thesis) – the results achieved in the intra-class recording classifications can be
considered significant. I.e. it is not only possible to distinguish between recordings made by different
models of the same brand and model, but also a sufficiently large number of different classifiers are
capable of doing so with the evaluated setup for the SPR pipeline.
Nevertheless, the different specific intrinsic influences to the SPR process have a strong impact on
the achieved detection performance and would have to be adapted and optimised prior to any field
application.
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The investigations on influences outside the statistical pattern recognition process on the performance
of the scheme (investigation task C) focus on two distinct sets of influence factors: the degrees of
freedom in the recording process and selected, common audio signal post-processing operations.
Regarding the degrees of freedom in the recording process, the evaluations on room / recording
environment classification presented first in [Kraetzer07c] are substantiated in this thesis by further
experimental validation. Recording environment classification is obviously possible, but with the cur-
rent feature set and classifiers combinations it seems to be performing less good than microphone
authentication. If a microphone is run against a model generated in a wrong (different) room then the
detection performance decreases. It can therefore be stated that the room / recording environment is
a very strong influence on the recording behaviour of a microphone.
As the second degree of influence investigated, the microphone orientation seems to have no influence
to the microphone classification problem, since the inter-microphone difference, even for microphones
of the same brand and model, is higher than the differences between the recordings of one microphone
in different orientations. It can therefore be assumed that the influence of the orientation factor Or
introduced for the recording context model in section 2.3.2 is indeed very small (or since this influence is
modelled as a multiplicative influence it is assumed to be rather close to 1 with a small variance). Based
on the perfect classification results achieved with a recently recorded test set on a training set recorded
one year ago, it can be assumed from those evaluations that the statistical patterns which allow for the
classification of the microphones show for this time span no aging behaviour, i.e. no significant change
over time. It can therefore be assumed that, like for the orientation influence, the aging factor Age
introduced for the recording context model is also very small. Nevertheless, long term observations on
this matter would be required using time spans of at least 5 to 10 years to allow for any generalisation
on this fact.
From the degrees of freedom, the mounting only seems to have influence only in specific cases, where
the vibration behaviour of the microphone is strongly influenced, like in the case where a microphone
lies directly on a vibrating surface like a the top of the desk on which also the playback loudspeaker
is standing. Otherwise the inter-microphone difference, even for microphones of the same brand and
model, is higher than the differences between the recordings of one microphone in different mountings.
The mounting factor Mount for the context model would therefore be modelled with a mean of 1 but
with a larger variance than the orientation and aging factors.
As the last degrees of freedom investigated, the content dependency shows the following results:
Notwithstanding the quite good classification accuracies achieved with the context sensitive approach
from [Buchholz09] and the additional observations on the impact different classes of content (here
speech vs. silence) the idea of performing content removal (e.g. by silence thresholding) is discarded
for this thesis. Technically such a content selection might improve the detection performance achieved,
but the restrictions imposed thereby are considered to be too severe to be useful in field applications.
For identification purposes such a thresholding would prevent identification of recordings were no such
‘silence’ would be present in sufficient quantities. For composition detection purposes a context removal
seems even more contra productive because normally loud parts are ‘mixed in’ to change the meaning
of an audio data stream and not silence. Therefore, this approach is abandoned for the rest of this
thesis instead the context-insensitive, general-purpose approach introduced by [Kraetzer07c] is pursued
further.
Nevertheless, the tests on content selection in content dependent training as well as content independent
training and testing performed within this thesis show, that the introduced approach might benefit from
a content identification in pre-processing and a corresponding model selection. The implementation of
such a pre-processing scheme, which involves the solution of another audio pattern recognition task –
reliable content classification – is outside of the scope of this thesis and reserved for future research.
Regarding the selected, common audio signal post-processing operations considered within this the-
sis for their influence on the introduced microphone forensics approach, the investigations performed in
section 6.3 show that the microphone forensics approach remains useful even after those post-processing
operations. Neither the individual operations (normalisation, MP3 conversion and de-noising) nor the
chosen exemplary combination tested are able to completely remove the microphone characteristics
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used which lead in this approach to a correct classification.
The results presented for the investigations on playback detection imply that the introduced approach is
to some extend resilient to this attack. A playback attack seems to have a strong negative influence on
the detection performance but the tests performed still show a tendency to detect that two microphones
actually involved in the recording process. Here, in many cases at least one of the microphones actually
involved in the recording process is correctly identified. If normalisation of the signal is performed
in between playback and recording, this additional influence has a significant negative impact on the
detection performance. For the overall application scenario of microphone forensics, these results imply
that a playback attack has a strong disturbing impact on the detection performance if it is not detected
prior to the performed microphone authentication.
Regarding the composition detection investigations performed in section 6.4 it can be stated that it
seems to be possible to detect a composition of recorded signals, as long as the microphone used
for the recording of the major part in the recording is registered in the classifier model. It is shown
here, that for strongly limited setups the mixing of audio recordings into another recorded audio signal
can be very well detected by some classifiers. Of interest is the fact that from the four exemplary
chosen classifiers for the evaluations the SMO, which is performing quite well in all other microphone
forensics evaluations (see e.g. section 6.1.3) shows here a dissatisfactory detection performance. From
the other exemplary evaluated classifiers, RandomCommittee and RandomForest do show here a very
strong performance if the microphone used in the generation of the audio data stream into which other
data is pasted into is registered in the classification models. In fact it seems not to matter much for
their performance whether the material pasted into the original stream originates from a registered or
unknown microphone.
In case none of the two sources for a composition (mesh-up) is registered, it is shown here for a small
example that the change rate and average sequence length can be used to tell that a wrong model is
used and, since a different tendency for classification of the individual feature vectors can be observed,
that a composition is likely.
The summarising statement for investigation task C is: There are a lot of influence factors to
microphone forensics that are located outside the statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline. To
address the questions of plausibility and generalisibility these influence factors have to be identified and
their impact has to be investigated. The context model for the microphone recording process presented
in this thesis in section 2.3.2 is an important first step in these regards. It has to be fine-tuned in future
work and accompanied by attack models for non-malicious or malicious (anti-forensic) modifications to
the recorded audio signal.
With the summarising statements for investigation tasks A, B and C for both exemplary selected appli-
cation scenarios (audio steganalysis and microphone forensics), part of the question raised by research
challenge (c) on how adequately the application scenarios can be implemented with the introduced
approach is answered. The other part of this answer is given in the comparison with the state-of-the-art
in both application scenarios in chapter 7.
6.5.2 Reflection on the evaluation criteria derived from the Daubert standard
The summary table presented below is derived from table 3.2 in section 3.3. Here, the progress made
within this thesis in the application scenario of microphone forensics in regard to the criteria derived
from the FRE rule 702 and the Daubert standard is summarised.
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Table 6.41: Progress made in this thesis for microphone forensics – projection onto the Daubert criteria
Criterion Description / Progress made
FREC0
Description ([LLI10a]): “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”
Progress made: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that
can be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
FREC1
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation (which leads to the corresponding expert testimony) is
“based upon sufficient facts or data”
Progress made: Case specific, the only significance arises due to the fact that the term “sufficient”
has to be manifested into training and testing (application / evaluation) set sizes. Here, the
experiments performed imply that a small amount of audio material (a few seconds of recordings)
seem to be enough for verification (see section 6.1.2). Nevertheless, the question what “sufficient”
precisely means for the composition of the training data for arbitrary size multi-class problems is
still an open question to be answered by future research.
FREC2
Description ([LLI10a]): the investigation is based upon “reliable principles and methods”, prefer-
ably scientific methodology and knowledge
Progress made: Chapter 2 as well as sections 3.1, 3.2 and chapter 4 of this
thesis are dedicated to establish the fact that the two exemplary selected au-
dio forensic methods are implemented as deterministic processes using the decades
old and well accepted methodology of statistical pattern recognition (SPR).
The fact that the microphone forensics application scenario can indeed be solved by SPR
is successfully addressed in section 6.1.1.
FREC3
Description ([LLI10a]): the (forensic) methods are applied “reliably to the facts of the case”
Progress made: Since this criterion is case specific for the law case at hand, the only thing that
can be done within this thesis is to raise the awareness for its existence.
DC1
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested
– that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether
it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for
reliability”; summarised more precisely in [USC93] as “the theory or technique (method) must be
empirically testable, falsifiable and refutable”
Progress made: This criterion imposes the most important task to the practical investigations
performed within this thesis: The main part of chapter 6 is dedicated to exactly this goal, trying
to establish within which limits the proposed media forensic methods can give plausible results.
It has to be admitted that the size of the experiments performed might still lack generalisability
but the methodology and evaluation concepts show that there are ways for objectively challenging
the introduced approach.
DC2
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication”; with “publication” meaning ‘open publication’
Progress made: This criterion is not translated into tasks but instead requires the author to
interact with the scientific community relevant for the chosen application scenario. To address
this criterion this thesis is submitted for (peer) review, as have been the accompanying conference
and workshop papers on the work on the microphone forensics application scenario. The reviewer
comments received have helped shaping the described approach as well as its evaluations.
DC3
Description ([LLI10b]): “the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied”
Progress made: It has to be admitted that the size of the experiments performed might still
lack generalisability, but the detection performances achieved in evaluations on sets of identical
microphones are promising. Nevertheless, they would have still have to be improved to achieve
detection performances and corresponding error rates that are fit for application in court cases.
Additionally, the combination with other techniques (e.g. the ENF-based approach discussed in
section 2.6.1) might raise the chance to successfully pass a Daubert hearing.
DC4
Description ([LLI10b]): “the existence and maintenance of standards and controls”
Progress made: The task that would be derived from this criterion would be the compilation of
the work into standards together with or within a standardisation body. This complex process is
outside the scope of this thesis, no progress made in this regard.
DC5
Description ([LLI10b]): “whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community”
Progress made: This criterion is similar to DC2 in its meaning and in the fact that it is not
translated into tasks, no progress made in this regard.
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Scenarios
The solution of decision problems by statistical pattern recognition (SPR) requires mainly three things:
first, features which allow the distinction between the possible pattern classes, second, a classification
mechanism that can perform this distinction based on the features and a predefined rule set (the model),
and third, a number of training samples that describe the decision problem sufficiently well to act as
basis of reference for the generation of the model.
This thesis proposes a general-purpose audio forensics approach that provides solutions for the first and
second point, together with the means necessary (here the feature and classifier selection strategies
discussed) for the adoption to the two exemplary selected application scenarios. The third point can-
not be addressed by any generalised concept. Here, an application scenario specific modelling of the
decision problem, the classification problem, possible influence factors in the application field as well as
potential countermeasures has to be performed.
For the evaluation of the performance of a solution approach it actually means, on one hand, the in-
troduction of a suitable performance metric (as done within this thesis in accordance with the specified
research objective 2 by application of the Kappa statistics used extensively in chapters 5 and 6 for
detection performance evaluations) and, on the other hand, the definition of suitable training and test
sets, the definition of the setup of the SPR-pipeline, the execution of the evaluations and considerations
on the plausibility of the results.
The prospects of the introduced general-purpose audio forensics approach are obvious: as long as the
patterns to be distinguished leave a discernible impact in the used feature space, it can easily be adapted
to any new problem. The consequences of the adaptation are the description of the classification prob-
lem in terms of training sets, the application as a classification or decision engine, the performance
and plausibility evaluations and finally the addressing of the Daubert criteria (including publication,
discussion in the community, standardisation efforts, etc.).
Limitations to the applicability of the general-purpose approach might arise from different aspects.
These include potential issues like:
• The modelling of the dimensionality of the classification problem to be solved (i.e. all potential
classes of patterns have to be known in advance and training sets have to sufficiently describe
the problem)
• Lack of features allowing to distinguish the patterns sufficiently (leading to too high error rates)
• Lacking plausibility (influence factors outside the application scenarios have an influence to the
detection process, i.e. actual influences to the process are not sufficiently modelled)
• Lacking performance (detection performance or system throughput to low for the intended prac-
tical application)
Research objective 4 (as formulated in section 1.3) as well as the investigation task D) derived from
this objective (see section 3.3) aim at showing the prospects and current limitations of the introduced
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general-purpose audio SPR forensics approach. The question behind research objective 4 is: How large
are steps required to adapt the general-purpose approach to a specific application scenario, like the two
exemplary chosen for this thesis?
The actual adaptations of the introduced general-purpose approach have been described in chapters 4, 5
and 6 of this thesis. Below the outcome of both application scenario specific adaptations is compared:
first, to show that both adaptations are adequate (in terms of similar detection performance as the state-
of-the-art in the corresponding fields; research challenge (c) as defined in section 1.2), and second, to
perform a summary and comparison of the results achieved (addressing research objective 4 as well as
investigation task D)).
7.1 Detection performance and plausibility achieved
The detection performance remains the most important evaluation criterion for any statistical pattern
recognition (SPR) approach. Here, first the detection performances are compared separately for the
two application scenarios with the corresponding state-of-the-art. In section 7.1.3 the detection perfor-
mances are compared between both addressed application scenarios to address investigation task D) as
defined in section 3.3.
7.1.1 Comparison to the results presented in the state-of-the-art in audio
steganalysis
First of all, it has to be mentioned that it is difficult to compare the performance of different audio
steganalysis schemes. The corresponding research community in audio watermarking, steganography
and steganalysis seems to be reluctant to exchange their algorithms (or even audio test sets, sets of
stego objects or marked files). There are some benchmarking activities like StirMark Benchmark for
Audio (SMBA)74 which are capable of performing statistical analyses on audio material that could be
used for audio steganalysis, but these tools lack practical acceptance by the community. In general,
equivalents to open completions like BOWS, BOWS2 or BOSS (see section 2.5.1) hosted by researchers
and organisations active in image data hiding are still missing in the research field of audio data hiding
to which audio steganalysis belongs.
For the reasons mentioned above, a fair comparison with other publications in this field is hardly possible.
If the mere detection performances are compared (on the basis of strongly differing audio sets) then
the detection performance achieved here (between κ = 0 and κ = 1; equivalent to a range of detection
accuracies between 50% and 100% in an equally distributed two-class problem) would be in a similar
range as the results presented by [O¨zer03], [Altun05] or [Liu08].
What differentiates the results presented in this thesis from most publications in the state-of-the-art are
the considerations on: required model sizes, the content dependency in training and testing, feature and
classifier selection strategies, plausibility against some common audio signal modifications, comparisons
of two-class and multi-class setups and, last but not least, the simple fact that here a general-purpose
tool set is used instead of a highly specialised steganalysis detector.
7.1.2 Comparison to the results presented in the state-of-the-art in micro-
phone forensics
The comparison with the state-of-the-art in this application scenario has to be performed based on the
three categories of approaches identified in section 2.6.1: the electric network frequency (ENF) based
approach, the time-domain local phenomena (reverberations) based approach and the microphone re-
sponse based pattern recognition approach.
For the ENF approach, as the most mature in the set Grigoras et al. demonstrate extremely low error
rates on impressively large data sets. Therefore, it is assumed by Grigoras that for ideal circumstances
74http://wwwiti.cs.uni-magdeburg.de/˜alang/smba.php#smba get; [Lang07]
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the error rate for authentication is known. Other authors like Brixen argue that under non-ideal cir-
cumstances (see e.g. [Brixen08b]) or even under the assumption of counter-forensics the rates are not
known and that reliable means for integrity verification based on the ENF still have to be devised.
A direct comparison to the time-domain local phenomena (reverberations) based approach of [Malik10]
is impossible, since that paper lacks an evaluation of the approach introduced. Nevertheless, the main
problem of that approach is its requirement for the existence of usable reverberations in the audio signal.
Without such reverberations in the audio signal it will completely fail, a weakness that is not shared by
the microphone forensics approach introduced in this thesis.
Within category of the microphone response based pattern recognition approaches, which the work
introduced here shares with other authors like [Garcia-Romero10] and [Malik12], all performed eval-
uations show similar setups (especially in terms of the number of microphones used, which usually
varies between four and eight) and detection performances achieved in controlled condition, closed-set
experiments. Even though the results for those small sets of recordings cannot directly compared75,
it has to be assumed that the performance of the approach introduced here and the works described
in [Garcia-Romero10] and [Malik12] show equivalent error rates, as long as the rather severe require-
ments for the two template matching based approaches (speech signals or silence, see section 2.6.2)
are met. The approach introduced here does not impose such severe requirements on the recorded
content. It even survives to some extend influences imposed by common audio signal post-processing
operations (like normalisation, blind de-reverberation, MP3 conversion, etc.), a fact that distinguishes
the introduced approach not only from its template matching counterparts but also from the ENF-based
approach.
In summary, it can be said that the results presented in this thesis are differentiated from the publications
in the state-of-the-art especially by the considerations on: different influences in the recording process,
required model sizes, content dependent and independent evaluations, feature and classifier selection
strategies, the plausibility against some common audio signal modifications and, last but not least,
the simple fact that here a second instantiation of the same general-purpose tool set is used as in the
steganalysis application scenario.
7.1.3 Comparison between the two application scenarios
A comparison between audio steganalysis, which is a research field strongly researched since the 1990s,
and the much younger field of digital microphone forensics is hard. Both application scenarios have
completely different goals if it comes to the security aspect primarily considered (integrity for audio
steganalysis versus authenticity for microphone forensics).
What they share is the fact that they can be solved by means of pattern recognition. But also in
this solution approach we see strong differences: steganalysis is in most works of the state-of-the-art
modelled as a two-class decision problem76, while microphone forensics is most commonly agreed upon
as a multi-class decision problem aiming at microphone identification.
The main contribution of this thesis is the introduction of a general-purpose statistical pattern recog-
nition (SPR) based audio forensics approach, which is capable of addressing both application scenarios
successfully. While the results achieved with the introduced approach are well within the ranges shown
in the corresponding state-of-the-art (see sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2), the variance in the results achieved
in the results is much higher in audio steganalysis. This implies that this application scenario provides
the much tougher classification problem – which is easily understandable, considering the fact that au-
dio steganalysis (or information hiding in general) aims at transparent and undetectable modifications
of the cover objects.
75It has to be assumed that the detection performance is strongly influenced by the quality of the used microphones.
Low quality microphones have a stronger noise footprint and should therefore simplify the pattern recognition problem.
76It has to be acknowledged that there are some authors (like Provos et al. in [Provos02] who argue in favour of a
multi-class modelling of the practical steganalysis problem.
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Regarding the evaluations performed here, the evaluation set sizes as well as the evaluation setups vary
between both application scenarios: For audio steganalysis the evaluation set size is strongly influenced
by the small number of audio steganography algorithms freely available. The evaluated influences are
focussing on steganography specific aspects like key scenario or used embedding domain.
For microphone forensics the most severe limitations to the evaluations performed within this thesis are
imposed by the extent of the recording setups that could be implemented. Like in the state-of-the-art
in this field (especially [Garcia-Romero10] and [Malik12]) the used set sizes do not exceed eight mi-
crophones, which is a physical boundary imposed by current soundcards. Application scenario specific
aspects for microphone forensics are the recording process specific influence factors as well as the com-
position detection considerations.
The main point here is that, even if a general-purpose audio forensic approach can be applied without
strong changes to different application scenarios, the evaluation performed has to be adapted to the
specifics of applications field. Furthermore, it will not show the same performance in all application
scenarios, which is within this thesis well illustrated with the detection performance for the steganalysis
on the algorithm AS1, which only for specific cover signals achieved a Kappa value of κ > 0. The results
presented for the performance in both application scenarios highlight the importance of two issues that
are ignored in many of the state-of-the-art publications on the chosen application scenarios: the fitting
(the correlation between material for training and the application or classification) and the plausibility
(the resilience against non-malicious signal modifications as well as potential counter-forensics).
7.2 Achieved forensic compliance
Obviously, a single PhD thesis cannot achieve the tasks of making a forensic method Daubert compliant
and acceptable in court cases. The goals pursued within this thesis in terms of forensic compliance
have are: one hand, to raise the awareness within the corresponding research communities, and on the
other hand, to investigate into the current degree of maturity within both application scenarios.
For the application scenario of audio steganalysis, the number of publications in the state-of-the-
art is too large to perform a one-on-one comparison as done for microphone forensics in table 2.1
(section 2.6.2). The main points that distinguish the work performed on audio steganalysis in this
thesis can be summarised on basis of section 5.4.2 as:
• The discussion of steganalysis as a forensic problem (which therefore has to acknowledge the
criteria of the Daubert standard).
• Investigations on training set sizes required to address the pattern recognition problem sufficiently
(criterion FREC1).
• An in-depth discussion of the complete statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline as method-
ological basis and different instantiations thereof as evaluation designs (criterion FREC2).
• Practical investigations on two-class and multi-class setups for audio steganalysis (criterion DC1).
• Detection performance and plausibility considerations (criterion DC3).
Since the number of approaches in the state-of-the-art in microphone forensics is currently very
limited, the complete one-to-one comparison performed in table 2.1 in section 2.6.2 can be extended to
compare the introduced approach with the forensic performance of the existing approaches. The result
of this extension is shown in table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Using the Daubert criteria (see section 2.2) for comparison of the existing microphone forensics ap-
proaches and the results achieved for this application scenario within this thesis
electric network
frequency (ENF)
time-domain
local phenomena
(reverberations)
microphone response based pattern recognition
Initial publica-
tion:
Initial publica-
tion:
Initial publica-
tion:
Initial publica-
tion:
Initial publica-
tion:
[Grigoras03] [Malik10] [Garcia-Romero10] [Malik12] [Oermann05]
(theory) &
[Kraetzer07c]
(solution ap-
proach)
FREC0: the ex-
pert’s scientific,
technical, or
other special-
ized knowledge
will help the
trier of fact to
understand the
evidence or to
determine a
fact in issue
criteria, that cannot be answered in general, because they are related to the specific
court case under consideration
FREC1: the
investigation
is based upon
sufficient facts
or data
FREC2: the
investigation is
based upon re-
liable principles
and meth-
ods, prefer-
ably scientific
methodology
and knowledge
Rather ma-
ture, considered
in [Bijhold07]
Only a concept
not tested
Pattern recogni-
tion / template
matching
Pattern recogni-
tion / template
matching
Pattern recogni-
tion / SPR
FREC3: the
methods are
reliably applied
to the facts at
hand
criterion, that cannot be answered in general, because it is related to the specific court
case under consideration
DC1: “whether
the expert’s
technique or
theory can be
or has been
tested”
yes, large scale
tests (see
e.g. [Grigoras05])
no yes, limited
closed-set ex-
periments (two
sets with eight
microphones
each)
yes, limited
closed-set ex-
periments (one
set with eight
microphones)
yes, limited
closed-set ex-
periments (sets
between 4 and
7 microphones,
incl. setups with
devices of the
same brand and
model)
DC2: “whether
the technique or
theory has been
subject to peer
review and pub-
lication”
Publication
count: >20
Publication
count: 1
Publication
count: 1
Publication
count: 1
Publication
count: 6
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 7.1 – Continued
electric network
frequency (ENF)
time-domain
local phenomena
(reverberations)
microphone response based pattern recognition
DC3: “the
known or po-
tential rate of
error of the
technique or
theory when
applied”
for ideal circum-
stances the error
rate for authenti-
cation is known,
for integrity
verification it is
not known under
non-ideal cir-
cumstances (see
e.g. [Brixen08b])
or even under the
assumption of
counter-forensics
the rates are not
known
no only for two
small sets and
under ideal
(speech only)
circumstances
only for a
small set and
under ideal
(environmental
noise generated
with a 12-
inch fan only)
circumstances
only for two
small sets, con-
sidering different
influences in
the recording
process, different
recording con-
texts as well as
selected signal
post-processing
operations
DC4: “the exis-
tence and main-
tenance of stan-
dards and con-
trols”
European Net-
work of Forensic
Science Insti-
tutes (ENFSI)
Forensic Speech
and Audio
Analysis Work-
ing Group
(FSAAWG)
guidelines on
ENF analysis
in forensic au-
thentication
of digital evi-
dence [Grigoras09]
no no no no
DC5: “whether
the technique
or theory has
been generally
accepted in
the scientific
community”
supporting ar-
guments: large
number of pub-
lications and
citations, applied
also for video
recordings, docu-
ment [Bijhold07]
compiled by
forensic experts
from different
police forces for
an INTERPOL
Forensic Science
Symposium –
opposing argu-
ments: context
dependency, does
not work for
DC powered de-
vices, [Brixen08b]:
“In praxis, ap-
proximately
40-60% of the
digital record-
ings in question
contain traceable
ENF”
supporting ar-
guments: none
known – oppos-
ing arguments:
context depen-
dency, [Gupta12]:
“Currently, this
measure has
been successfully
applied to syn-
thesized audio
with assumptions
that cannot be
fulfilled by most
real-world sig-
nals”. [REW11]:
hindered by com-
mon signal post-
processing opera-
tions (e.g. blind
de-reverberation)
performed in
many applica-
tion scenarios,
like audio /
video conferenc-
ing, hands-free
telephone, etc
supporting ar-
guments: none
known – oppos-
ing arguments:
context depen-
dency (speech
only)
supporting ar-
guments: none
known – oppos-
ing arguments:
only tested
with one kind
of recording
content (envi-
ronmental noise
generated with
a 12-inch fan)
supporting ar-
guments: none
known – oppos-
ing arguments:
detection perfor-
mance strongly
dependant on
the availability
of suitable mod-
els (i.e. strong
correlation be-
tween training
and test material
required)
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The main points that distinguish the work performed on microphone forensics in this thesis can be
summarised on basis of section 6.5.2 and table 7.1 as:
• The discussion of steganalysis as a forensic problem (which therefore has to acknowledge the
criteria of the Daubert standard) – this consideration was so far restricted to the electric network
frequency (ENF) approach developed by Grigoras et al.
• Investigations on training set sizes required to address the pattern recognition problem sufficiently
(criterion FREC1),
• An in-depth discussion of the complete statistical pattern recognition (SPR) pipeline as method-
ological basis and different instantiations thereof as evaluation designs (criterion FREC2),
• Practical investigations on different influence factors to the recording process as well as on the
context (in)dependency of the SPR-based approach (criterion DC1),
• Detection performance and plausibility considerations (criterion DC3)
If the progress made in both application scenarios is compared, then the reflections on the evaluation
criteria derived from the Daubert standard (see sections 5.4.2 and 6.5.2 respectively) show strong
similarities between both application scenarios. Nevertheless, the progress is assumedly higher for the
microphone forensics application scenario which is still much younger, in term of scientific maturity,
than the audio steganalysis counterpart.
For the former, the main achievement is the introduction of a solution method which shows less
severe recording content restrictions than the current state-of-the-art and the consideration of post-
processing operations is rather new to the application field. For the latter, the consideration as a forensic
mechanism is a new angle onto steganalysis. The practical results presented here outdo most of the
state-of-the-art, because they integrate plausibility as well as two-class versus multi-class considerations.
Nevertheless, the work performed here is hardly capable of moving the whole application scenario closer
to the requirements of the ideal forensic audio steganalysis process (see section 3.1.1) – which would
be required to get steganalysis results accepted as relevant for the case at hand by a judge presiding
any court case.
For microphone forensics the main achievement is the introduction of a solution method which shows
less restrictions than the state-of-the-art in terms of content restrictions. Even though it is more tolerant
in theory, the evaluations performed show that the SPR-approach strongly relies on the availability of
suitable models (or training material).
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Summary, Conclusions, Ongoing and Future Work
This chapter presents in section 8.1 a summary of the results of this thesis and the conclusions that
can be drawn from these results. To avoid redundancy, a detailed re-iteration of the generalisation of
the results (as performed in chapter 7) as well as a summary of the main contributions of the thesis
(presented in section 1.4) is omitted here. Instead the considerations include a projection of general
lessons learned onto similar application scenarios in the image domain (here, image steganalysis and
camera forensics).
Section 8.2 discusses, with the benchmarking of statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based approaches
and information fusion, two topics from ongoing research work that are based on the outcome of this
thesis.
In section 8.3 possible directions for future work are summarised.
8.1 Summary and conclusions
In this thesis a general-purpose statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based audio forensics approach is
introduced. It is implemented using a new designed, high dimensional set of easy to compute audio
features and existing classification techniques from the renowned data mining suite WEKA [Hall09].
The answers generated by the solving the investigation tasks derived in section 3.3 from the research
challenges and objectives for this thesis (see sections 1.2 and 1.3) can be summarised into short state-
ments as follows:
For research challenge (a) – ‘Existence of a generalised SPR approach for audio forensics’ – the suc-
cessful application of the introduced approach to the exemplary selected scenarios of audio steganalysis
and microphone forensics shows that a generalised statistical pattern recognition (SPR) approach as an
adaptable solution concept for media forensics is indeed possible.
Regarding research challenge (b) – ‘Applicable performance measures’ – the considerations made
within the thesis on detection performance evaluations using Kappa statistics already provide a metric
that outperforms the dominant choice in the state-of-the-art in both application scenarios (i.e. the
detection accuracy) in terms of interpretability and comparability. In section 8.2.1 below, one possible
extension of this metric towards a benchmarking scheme is discussed as current, ongoing work.
For research challenge (c) – ‘Adequate implementation of mechanisms for the chosen application sce-
narios’ – the evaluation results presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 show that the developed instantiations
are capable of performing adequately (with similar detection performance as the state-of-the-art ap-
proaches in the corresponding research fields) in both application scenarios (see sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2
respectively).
In the performed evaluations specific influence factors to the performance of the approach are consid-
ered. These include approach intrinsic influences (e.g. from audio features computed or classification
algorithms used) as well as external influences (like the embedding domain or key scenario used in
steganography or specific influences in the recording process in microphone forensics). One special
class of external influences considered are the resilience of the solutions for steganalysis and micro-
phone forensics against selected, common audio signal post-processing operations. These evaluations
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aim specifically at the plausibility of the approach. They establish the fact that such post-processing
operations can indeed influence the detection performance achieved and have to be evaluated and com-
pensated prior to any intended field application of such a SPR-based security mechanism.
A further important point within this thesis is the application of the Daubert standard as a projection
surface for the estimation of the forensic conformity of the introduced approach. The goal here has
never been to try to make the solutions Daubert compliant – this is not achievable with one PhD thesis.
Instead it is shown here how the criteria of the standard can be used to estimate the maturity of a
forensic approach. Despite the fact that neither the universal audio steganalysis nor the microphone
forensics approach introduced within this thesis will be able to pass a Daubert hearing anytime soon,
the work performed within this thesis makes important steps into this direction.
Lessons learned that would similarly apply to similar application scenarios considering other
media types (e.g. in image steganalysis and camera forensics)
Audio signal analysis receives in the field of media forensics much less attention than image analysis. This
can be very well illustrated by comparing audio steganalysis and its image counterpart or microphone
forensics to digital camera forensics. In both compared examples the numbers of publications are much
higher for the image domain, strongly implying a higher maturity of the approaches for that domain
(see the analyses on the state-of-the-art in section 2.5 and 2.6 where also image domain counterparts
are briefly reflected).
Nevertheless, there some lessons learned in this thesis, that would similarly apply to image steganalysis
or camera forensics, despite the higher maturity of the approaches in these fields:
• In general:
– Statistical pattern recognition (SPR) is a complex process that does not only consist of
the feature extraction and classification components. Here, also other process components
should receive attention in research. This is especially true for feature selection, which would
allow the deduction of information about a signal modification (and the pattern it imposes
to the signal) from the data under analysis.
– Any pattern recognition (PR) approach is strongly influenced by the used training and testing
material (and the contextual correlation between both sets). Here, statistically significant,
representative and openly available sets would be required for any fair comparison of results.
– Fair evaluation would also require metrics that allow a better comparison of the results of
different tests. A first step into this direction could be the abandoning of the classification
accuracy for something like the Kappa statistics used within this thesis.
– For any forensic application, the impact of malicious (counter-forensics) and non-malicious
signal post-processing should be integrated into plausibility considerations for any analysis
approach. This is already done in some publications but yet not in general.
– The Daubert criteria are of importance for anyone doing research in forensics, including
media forensics.
• For image steganalysis:
– There exists more than one good classification approach. Right now SVMs dominate the
research in image steganalysis, here it might be beneficial to investigate also other classifiers.
– Any steganalysis attempt should be aware of the two-class vs. multi-class discussion raised
by Provos et al. in [Provos02] as well as the high probability that an decryption problem
is attached to the steganalysis (see the discussion of the ideal forensic audio steganalysis
process in section 3.1.1).
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• For camera forensics:
– The currently most mature77 approach in this field is the PRNU-based approach introduced
by Jessica Fridrich and her group (see e.g. [Goljan09]). It might be possible that even such
a rather mature approach could be enhanced in its performance (e.g. numbers of cameras
that can be distinguished, resilience to changing environmental conditions, etc.) by the
application of SPR instead of distance based template matching.
8.2 Selected topics from ongoing research work
In [Kraetzer09a] it is shown that some of WEKAs classifiers are able to outperform the SVM classifier
libSVM (which is in many publications on steganography considered to be the expert classification en-
gine for this application scenario) in terms of practically achieved accuracies. This points out why it is
so important to run application scenario based benchmarking statistical pattern recognition (SPR)
based mechanisms. First ideas on such benchmarking can be derived from the research work presented
for both application scenarios in chapters 5 and 6. These first ideas are presented in section 8.2.1. The
main concept is the extension of classifier selection criteria from classification accuracy based evalua-
tions to something more practically relevant, in [Kraetzer10] we introduce a first single quality function
driven benchmarking based on accuracy and runtime. This very first quality function simply computes
the quotient of accuracy and runtime. It is within [Kraetzer12a] substituted by the more complex (and
fairer) quality function, which is, with slight modifications, here also adapted for microphone forensics.
Within this thesis, these benchmarking efforts for different instantiations of the introduced general-
purpose, statistical pattern recognition (SPR) driven audio forensics approach are summarised and the
required next steps for future work are outlined.
Information fusion, as the second topic in the ongoing work, is focusing on combination strategies
for the output of individual expert systems info a combined statement. During the research work
on this thesis, initial considerations on information fusion in the application scenarios of audio ste-
ganalysis and microphone forensics have been published by the author in a small number of papers
like [Kraetzer09a], [Kraetzer10] and [Kraetzer09b]. To completely cover the immensely complex topic
of information fusion for SPR-based security mechanisms is outside the focus of this thesis. Neverthe-
less, the author considers this topic to be of huge importance for this research field, motivating the
presentation of corresponding research results in section 8.2.2.
8.2.1 Throughput analysis as a step towards benchmarking
Benchmarking, focusing on making systems comparable, focuses on the projection of system properties
onto certain predefined indicators. Intuitive approaches result in one identifier describing the system
performance. In this case a quality function is used to generate from the (complex) system description,
presented by weighted performance indicators, the one figure that typifies its performance rating. To-
gether with a comparison scheme description (e.g. ‘the bigger the figure, the better’), this figure can
then be used to compare multiple systems or to determine the discrepancy between a system and a
defined goal.
The alternative to this intuitive single-figure approach is a multi-figure benchmarking scheme. Here,
either due to the system complexity or to a lacking precise application goal definition, the system per-
formance is projected by a set of functions onto a tuple of predefined indicators. For this alternative
approach, a more complex comparison scheme description might be necessary for the identification of
the best candidate in a number of alternative approaches that undergo comparison in benchmarking.
77In the Daubert hearings of the law case United States of America v. Nathan Allen Railey (United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, August 2nd, 2011), the method got accepted for the first time as forensic
evidence. The FBIs Forensic Audio, Video, and Image Analysis Unit (FAVIAU) established in the Daubert hearings that
this approach meets all necessary criteria and the presiding judge furthermore decided that this evidence (or more precisely
the FBI expert testimony based on this media forensic analysis) could be accepted into the trial.
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Despite the fact that the compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and Daubert standard
compliance can be considered to be the general aim for any forensic technique, these criteria are not
the only performance indicators that determine whether a specific mechanism will ever be applied in an
investigation. Further characteristics of a technique also determine its suitability for practical applica-
tion and have therefore to be integrated in a benchmarking methodology. In this thesis, the focus
is set on already measurable technical aspects (like detection performance and runtime requirements),
reserving organisational aspects, like e.g. costs estimation, for future considerations.
As stated in the analysis of the state-of-the-art in research on the two chosen application scenarios
in chapter 2, the classification accuracy (the ratio between true classifications and all classification
attempts in a supervised classification) is currently in both fields the dominating performance metric.
To overcome the limitations of the accuracy in terms of comparativeness, a naive design for a gain-
to-cost-ratio based metric between detection performance (as gain) and runtime78 required (runtime
complexity as cost), which has to be considered to be fairer than only the accuracy, could look for a
two-class setup with equally distributed classes like (see [Kraetzer12a]):
q =
{
accuracy
runtime if accuracy > 0
0 if accuracy = 0
 8.1
If the accuracy of the classifier is better than guessing (i.e. 50% in this equally distributed two-class
problem), then its classifier throughput performance q is determined by the accuracy achieved on a
fixed sized classification problem divided by the classifiers runtime (combined training and testing
times) on this problem for a selected test machine79. The measurement unit of this computation would
be percentage of true (positive and negative) classifications per second, which is, for the standardised
set sizes, a simplified version of the more intuitive ‘percentage of correctly classified files per second’
ratio.
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that this simple metric is hardly applicable in practice, unfair and
its result hard to interpret. We have to consider it hardly applicable because it assumes, on one hand,
that we have always equally distributed classes, and, on the other hand, that no classification perfor-
mance worse than guessing (in this example 50% accuracy) is possible. These two assumptions are
rather unlikely in practice. From a scientific point this naive metric is also unfair, because it does not
compare the classification algorithms but instead compares their implementations. Therefore, a rather
well suited algorithm implemented in an interpreted language might be ranked lower than a less suitable
algorithm implemented directly in machine code, only because the latter can be executed much faster.
For the same reason, results achieved on different computers would not be directly comparable. From
the practical point of view these two points, which would be considered as unfair by scientists, would
be a desired characteristic of the detection system. The person wanting to install a steganographic
channel detector to observe communications or data exchanges would exactly look for the fastest im-
plementation as well as the most suitable (in most cases the fastest) computer to run the detector.
Another point, which makes this concept not exactly unfair but instead inept to handle certain bench-
marking problems, is the fact that the accuracy, if used directly, is not suitable for comparisons
between different classification problem classes. For example the direct comparison of the classification
performance in a two-class classification problem (i.e. the classical hypothesis testing for a assumable
steganographically modified channel) and a 4-class problem (i.e. steganographic algorithm identification
on a set of three algorithms (plus unmodified covers) that might have been applied, see e.g. the work
of Provos and Honeyman summarised in section 2.5.2) would lead to completely misleading results,
because in the equally distributed two-class problem the probability of guessing correctly is two times
higher (i.e. 50%, while in an equally distributed 4-class problem an accuracy of 50% would already be
78In theory, the runtime of a forensic method could be ignored. As long as it achieves its goals, we would not
care whether it takes seconds, minutes, hours, days, or in some cases even years, to accomplish the task. In practice,
nevertheless fast forensic methods are preferred for obvious reasons.
79The runtime is the execution time of the classifier on a given classification problem (training and testing) measured
in seconds (for this thesis using the Unix time() command [The Open Group08]).
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a rather good indicator, being 25% away from the probability of guessing correctly in this case). This
point basically implies a strong need for normalisation of results.
For the interpretability of the results, the accuracy is expressed as a percentage between 0 and 100%
and the runtime is given in seconds and is not bounded. Therefore the result is not normalised in any
way so that the actual distance from an ‘optimal’ performance is hard to figure out. Also, the notion
of the runtime used here combines the training and the testing times (while in a field application the
models would be in many cases assumed to have been trained in advance) of a classifier. Since the
ratio between training and testing times varies strongly between individual classifiers, the usage of this
combined time might be enormously unfair for application scenarios where the classifier can be trained
in advance, i.e. where the characteristics of the expected cover objects and steganographic embedding
techniques are known a priori and appropriate training material can be supplied for training. In other
application scenarios, where the models could not be trained in advance (due to a lack of knowledge
regarding the cover material and/or techniques to be expected or if appropriate training material is
missing – see e.g. [O¨zer03] where the ‘unmarked cover’ version of an audio file is estimated/predicted
by using de-noising on the assumed stego object), this modelling of the runtime would be the only
suitable approach.
The points mentioned above lead to a redesign of our naive gain-to-cost-ratio based metric q for
benchmarking purposes. In the modified metric we still use for the run-time the time required for the
classifier (because the ultimate goal would be the practical application in tools and in this case a faster
implementation of an algorithm is better than a slower implementation). Additionally, we introduce a
fixed timeout-boundary, after which a classifier working on a problem is automatically considered unfit
for this problem independent of the classification accuracy he might have achieved in the end. This
timeout serves two purposes: first, it makes algorithm benchmarking evaluations more feasible by faster
removing candidates which would in any case unsuitable for practical application, and second, it allows
to generate a normalised runtime description.
time =
runtime
timeout
 8.2
Equation 8.2 shows the normalised runtime description (time) used for an improvement of the quality
function for the throughput analysis. The runtime is the execution time of the classifier on a given
classification problem (training and testing) measured in seconds (for this thesis using the Unix time()
command [The Open Group08]). The timeout is the timeout-boundary predefined for this investiga-
tion. Since the execution of the classifier is terminated at timeout, the resulting time is a variable
devoid of a unit in the range [0,1].
For the measurement of the classification gain for fair performance evaluation within this thesis it is
proposed to use the Kappa statistics instead of the accuracy (see section 4.1.4). By using Kappa
statistics, it is possible to construct for classification-based investigations a degree of closeness of
measurements of a quantity to its actual (true) value that is exempt from the influence of the probability
of guessing correctly. To construct the new quality metric qnew for the benchmarking work in this thesis,
the (normalised) Euclidean distance between time and an inverted κ is computed. This inversion has to
be performed since the time, as introduced in equation 8.2, is a ‘the-bigger-the-worse’ and metric and
the Kappa statistics κ is be a ‘the-bigger-the-better’ metric. The metric qnew is therefore computed
as:
qnew =
1√
2
√
time2 + (1− κ)2
 8.3
Since time is bounded in the range [0,1] and κ is assumed to yield results in the range [0,1], the
Euclidean distance has to be normalised with
√
2. The result of this computation qnew is, like time, a
‘bigger-the-worse’ metric in the range [0,1]. It describes the distance of a current performance from the
‘optimal’ point, which would be a forensic decision machine that gives a perfect classification (κ = 1) in
an extremely short time-span (time = 0). Therefore a classification result which is very bad (equal to
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the probability of guessing, κ = 0) and finishes only shortly before the timeout-boundary (time = 1)
would be as far as possible from this optimal point with qnew = 1 in this case. The threshold for
suitable classifiers is moved by the normalisation performed to the value of 1√
2
, i.e. classifiers that only
guess at the result but do so very fast are located exactly at this boundary. In case of extremely unlikely
Kappa values (i.e. κ < 0) the metric still works well, resulting in values for qnew that could be larger
than 1.
Summarising the benefits of this new performance metric qnew, it can be said that:
• It takes the runtimes of the classifier/detector implementations into account, which is closer to
the practical requirements for such a system (i.e. faster implementations would be preferred over
slower implementations with the same detection power).
• It efficiently removes classifiers that are per definition unsuitable from the list of candidates by
defining a timeout boundary for the execution time.
• It allows for an intuitive performance description by using as a metric a normalised distance from
an easy to understand ‘optimal’ operation point.
• It allows for a direct comparison between classifications of different class-sizes (e.g. two-class
problems and 4-class problems).
• It is independent of the composition of the training and test set sizes (i.e. they do not have to
be equally distributed)
The drawbacks of this metric can be summarised as follows:
• It is dependent of the machine it is run on. This drawback could easily be compensated by
computing a time correction factor between different machines to make their runtime results
directly comparable.
• It is strongly dependent of the training and test sets used, because they directly influence the run-
time as well as the Kappa values achieved – it has to be made sure that these sets are representative
for the application scenario. As a result, the values computed for qnew are only comparable within
one application scenario and still lack comparability between different application scenarios.
• For the selection of methods for the implementation of a security mechanism, it would have to
be accompanied by another value or set of values for precise throughput description (e.g. the
processing speed in feature vectors per second – which could be given separately for training and
testing in case the training can be performed a priori).
For the integration of the metric qnew into the benchmarking methodology, a precise transfer function
SFQClassifier() has to be defined for every detector in the benchmark. Examples for such transfer
functions are described in the following for the considered application scenarios of audio steganalysis
and microphone forensics.
Application of the proposed benchmarking scheme for audio steganalysis
In this application scenario specific discussion on the classifier benchmarking methodology four different
instantiations of the transfer function SFQClassifier() are compared. These four example instantiation
differ in the feature space used in the classification (AAFE v.2.0.5 all 17 global features vs. all 590
segmental features) and in the test strategy (10-fold stratified cross-validation vs. training and testing
with independent sets).
All four instantiations use in this application scenario a timeout of 12 hours (43200s) and the large-scale
multi-genre set aats389 designed by Lang et al. ([Lang07]) especially for audio benchmarking purposes.
Example instantiation 1: Based on experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary ,
for the three exemplary selected IH algorithms and all 74 supervised classifiers implemented in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) a benchmarking value is computed as:
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qnewclassifier = SFQclassifier(qnew, Alg,GFall, timeout = 12h, cv, aats389)
 8.4
The index for the transfer function is the classifier (with its parametrisation, which is here kept for all
classifiers to the default setting). The metric used by the transfer function is qnew (as introduced with
its Euclidean distance measurement above). Additional parameters supplied to the transfer function are
the IH algorithm Alg, the feature set used (here GFall – all 17 global features of AAFE v.2.0.5), the
defined timeout boundary (here 12h) and the test method for the classifier (here cv, 10-fold stratified
cross-validation on the audio test set aats389).
Figure 8.1 shows, for the three exemplary selected IH algorithms AS1, AS3 and AW1 and all 74
classifiers the achieved benchmarking performances in a time-duration vs. κ diagram. The point (0,1)
in this diagram is the reference for the optimal performance. A classifier close to this point would
deliver a close to perfect detection performance in a very short time-duration.
As can be seen, in this test only four classifiers exceed the 100s time-duration mark. It is also evident in
this figure that the detection performance achieved by the classifiers strongly differs between the three
IH algorithms. An summarising value for all 74 classifiers could be expressed by the centre of gravity
of the achieved κ values for each algorithm).
Figure 8.1: Time duration vs. κ diagram for all 74 classifiers and the 17 global features in AAFE v.2.0.5 in 10-fold
stratified cross-validation (experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary)
Example instantiation 2: Based on experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary ,
for the three exemplary selected IH algorithms and all 74 supervised classifiers implemented in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) a benchmarking value is computed as:
qnewclassifier = SFQclassifier(qnew, Alg,GFall, timeout = 12h, trte, aats389 + testset24)
 8.5
The metric used, the IH algorithms, the feature set and the timeout boundary for this instantiation
are inherited from instantiation 1 above. Only the test method is changed to independent training and
testing (trte) with the audio test set aats389 for training and testset24 for testing.
Figure 8.2 shows the same diagram-like figure 8.1 for the test case of two-set training and testing. In
comparing the two figures two things are obvious: on one hand the average computation time required
for the classifications decreases in this test mode, on the other hand the centres of gravity of the
achieved κ values for the three algorithms move away from the optimum point in the upper left corner,
as a result of the decreased classification performance in this test cases.
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Figure 8.2: Time duration vs. κ diagram for all 74 classifiers and the 17 global features in AAFE v.2.0.5 in inde-
pendent training and testing (experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary)
Table 8.1 identifies (based on AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-GF-singleClass-summary) the best five classifiers
for each algorithm and the global features. In contrast to most of the state-of-the art in research in
this field, the best algorithms are here not determined by looking only on the classification accuracies
achieved but instead by the ratio between the detection performance of a classifier and the time it
requires for the decision. This is based on the observation that in practical application a faster decision
is sometimes much more valuable than a much slower but slightly more accurate answer.
Table 8.1: Identification of the five classifiers for each IH algorithm with the lowest distance from the optimal
performance, 10-fold stratified cross-validation as well as two-set training and testing using global features
(the value in brackets identify the distance value qnew)
10-fold stratified cross-validation
AS1 AW1 AS3
Best clas-
sifier
lazy.Kstar (0.198) trees.LMT (0.106) trees.LADTree (0.438)
2nd lazy.Ibk (0.212) meta.RotationForest (0.113) meta.Decorate (0.445)
3rd lazy.IB1 (0.212) trees.FT (0.113) trees.BFTree (0.453)
4th trees.RandomForest (0.488) functions.MultilayerPerceptron
(0.113)
meta.ClassificationViaRegression
(0.453)
5th rules.Nnge (0.559) meta.EnsembleSelection (0.120) trees.LMT (0.453)
two-set training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3
Best clas-
sifier
rules.OneR (0.601) trees.RandomForest (0.354) meta.ClassificationViaRegression
(0.573)
2nd trees.RandomTree (0.651) meta.Bagging (0.354) meta.RandomCommittee
(0.601)
3rd meta.LogitBoost (0.665) meta.RotationForest (0.354) trees.FT (0.601)
4th trees.RandomForest (0.665) meta.ClassificationViaRegression
(0.368)
trees.RandomForest (0.615)
5th rules.ConjunctiveRule (0.679) trees.SimpleCart (0.368) rules.OneR (0.615)
In case of the 10-fold stratified cross-validation, the best classifier for AS1 (lazy.Kstar) achieves with
qnew = 0.198 about half the quality rating as the best classifier for AW1 (trees.LMT, qnew = 0.106),
simply because it takes about two times the time to reach a decision with a similar κ value.
Example instantiation 3:
Based on experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary , for the three exemplary
selected IH algorithms and all 74 supervised classifiers implemented in WEKA (v.3.6.1) a benchmarking
value is computed as:
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qnewclassifier = SFQclassifier(qnew, Alg, SFall, timeout = 12h, cv, aats389)
 8.6
The setup is nearly identical to the one described in equation 8.1 for instantiation 1. The only deviation
is the choice of segmental features instead of global features. Here the feature set SFall is used,
containing all 590 segmental features computed by AAFE v.2.0.5.
Figure 8.3 shows the time-duration vs. κ diagram for all 74 classifiers and the three IH algorithms AS1,
AS3 and AW1. Again, the point (0,1) in this diagram is the reference for the optimal performance. A
classifier close to this point would deliver a close to perfect κ value in a very short time-duration.
Figure 8.3: Time duration vs. κ diagram for all 74 classifiers and the 590 segmental features in AAFE v.2.0.5 in
10-fold stratified cross-validation (experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary)
Example instantiation 4: Based on experimental setup AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary ,
for the three exemplary selected IH algorithms and all 74 supervised classifiers implemented in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) a benchmarking value is computed as:
qnewclassifier = SFQclassifier(qnew, Alg, SFall, timeout = 12h, trte, aats389 + testset24)
 8.7
This setup mimics the one in instantiation 3 but exchanges the evaluation strategy to trte – independent
training (on aats389) and testing (on testset24).
Figure 8.4 shows the time-duration vs. κ diagram for this instantiation.
Figure 8.4: Time duration vs. κ diagram for all 74 classifiers and the 590 segmental features in AAFE v.2.0.5 in
independent training and testing (AS-Kraetzer2010SPIE-SF-singleClass-summary)
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Like in the examples for the global features presented above, the direct comparison between the 10-fold
stratified cross-validation and the two-set training and testing (figures 8.3 and 8.4) shows faster but
less accurate performance in the two-set training and testing.
Table 8.2: Identification of the five classifiers for each IH algorithm with the lowest distance from the optimal
performance, 10-fold stratified cross-validation as well as two-set training and testing using segmental
features (the value in brackets identify the distance value qnew)
10-fold stratified cross-validation
AS1 AW1 AS3
Best clas-
sifier
lazy.Ibk (0.085) meta.RandomSubSpace (0.057) trees.J48graft (0.445)
2nd trees.RandomForest (0.092) rules.PART (0.057) meta.OrdinalClassClassifier
(0.445)
3rd trees.RandomTree (0.092) trees.REPTree (0.064) trees.J48 (0.445)
4th meta.RandomCommittee
(0.106)
meta.Bagging (0.071) meta.END (0.453)
5th rules.OneR (0.318) trees.J48graft (0.071) meta.RandomCommittee
(0.460)
two-set training and testing
AS1 AW1 AS3
Best clas-
sifier
rules.OneR (0.706) functions.Logistic (0.148) trees.J48graft (0.552)
2nd bayes.NaiveBayesUpdateable
(0.706)
meta.MultiClassClassifier
(0.148)
meta.RandomCommittee
(0.552)
3rd trees.RandomForest (0.706) meta.RandomSubSpace (0.156) meta.OrdinalClassClassifier
(0.559)
4th meta.Dagging (0.706) rules.PART (0.559) trees.J48 (0.559)
5th lazy.Ibk (0.706) functions.SMO (0.559) meta.END (0.559)
Table 8.2 identifies, similar to table 8.2 above, the best five classifiers for each algorithm and the
segmental features in AAFE v.2.0.5. Since the classification times for the segmental features are – due
to their much larger and more numerous feature vectors – higher than for the global features used, the
achieved distances from the optimum are much higher, even if similar κ values are. In the case of AS1
and the training and testing with independent sets, no classifier achieves κ values significantly larger
than 0. Therefore, all corresponding benchmarking values are close to
√
2 or higher (see figure 8.4
where these values are placed on the x-axis of the diagram).
Application of the proposed benchmarking scheme for microphone forensics
In this application scenario specific discussion on the classifier benchmarking methodology introduced
above, one instantiation of the transfer function SFQClassifier() is presented for the microphone
forensics application scenario. This example uses the AAFE v.2.0.5 set of 590 segmental features and
10-fold stratified cross-validation as summarised in experimental setup Mic-01 . For the experiment on
the RS4 Rode set, containing recordings made with four identical microphones, a timeout of 60 hours
(216,000s) is defined. Based on experimental setup Mic-01 , for all 74 supervised classifiers implemented
in WEKA (v.3.6.1) a benchmarking value is computed as:
qnewclassifier = SFQclassifier(qnew, SFall, timeout = 60h, cv,RS4 Rode)
 8.8
The index for the transfer function is the classifier (with its parametrisation, which is here kept for all
classifiers to the default setting). The metric used by the transfer function is qnew (as introduced with
its Euclidean distance measurement above). Additional parameters supplied to the transfer function are
the feature set used (here SFall, all 590 segmental features of AAFE v.2.0.5), the timeout boundary
(here 60h) and the test method for the classifier (here cv; 10-fold stratified cross-validation on the
audio test set RS4 Rode).
Table 8.3 summarises the top 20 of the classifiers for the experiment Mic-01 , ordered by qnew.
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Table 8.3: Ranking by quality of the best 20 classifiers for experiment Mic-01
Ranking Classifier κ Avg. runtime (s) qnew
Best meta.RotationForest 0.678 14012.96 0.23226358
2nd meta.MultiClassClassifier 0.634 1491.73 0.25884715
3rd meta.RandomSubSpace 0.617 2018.56 0.2709025
4th meta.EnsembleSelection 0.649 33735.9 0.27165665
5th functions.Logistic 0.616 1726.59 0.27158783
6th functions.SimpleLogistic 0.627 20974.18 0.27254168
7th meta.Bagging 0.611 3123.13 0.27525448
8th meta.END 0.611 9900.37 0.27696737
9th functions.SMO 0.605 2289.37 0.27940771
10th meta.ClassificationViaRegression 0.598 3137.65 0.28444245
11th meta.Dagging 0.557 169.91 0.3132488
12th meta.RandomCommittee 0.534 164.61 0.3295122
13th rules.PART 0.650 6994.95 0.24854449
14th meta.Decorate 0.694 51399.65 0.27409998
15th trees.J48graft 0.646 2083.03 0.25040867
16th trees.RandomForest 0.641 129.4 0.25385169
17th rules.JRip 0.637 4163.79 0.25704143
18th trees.J48 0.634 1832.22 0.25887058
19th trees.SimpleCart 0.629 2061.17 0.26242338
20th trees.REPTree 0.619 395.28 0.26941079
In comparison to a classifier selection strategy that is based only on the detection performance (i.e. κ
value; cf. table 6.11 in section 6.1.3), here classifiers that achieve a good detection performance with a
short runtime are rising higher in the ranking. A good example is the classifier meta.MultiClassClassifier
which, due to its rather short runtime is ranked 2nd best in table 8.3, while achieving only rank 8 in
table 6.11. This ranking seems to be closer to the requirements for practical implementation of secu-
rity mechanisms and is therefore considered within this thesis to be a first step in the direction of a
benchmarking scheme.
Feature selection down to the 20 most significant features is applied (as performed in section 6.1.4),
the classifier quality qnew improves for the experimental setup Mic-RS4 Rode-Best20Features-only in
average by 0.094, due to the much stronger decrease of the runtime of the evaluations in comparison
to the drop in the κ values.
Figure 8.5: Time duration vs. κ diagram for RS4 Rode 10-fold cross-validation with all 74 classifiers in WEKA
v.3.6.1; red: all 590 segmental features (averages over R01 -R10); blue: best 20 segmental features
only (R01 ; experimental setup Mic-RS4 Rode-Best20Features-only)
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Figure 8.5 shows the time duration vs. κ diagram for the complete set of 590 features (RS4 Rode
average for 10-fold cross-validations in R01 -R10 ; experimental setup Mic-01) and the best 20 features
(RS4 Rode average for 10-fold cross-validation in R01 ; Mic-RS4 Rode-Best20Features-only). The
results for the 590 dimensional set are marked in red, the results for the 20 dimensional set in blue.
It can be clearly seen that the centre of gravity for the 20 dimensional feature space is closer to the
optimum (the point (0,1), i.e. the upper left corner in this diagram), while the 590 dimensional set
achieves higher κ (at the cost of dramatically increased costs in computation times).
Future directions on benchmarking
In the theoretical considerations at the begin of this section, the drawbacks of the benchmarking metric
qnew introduced here have been summarised as: the dependence on the computation power of the
machine the benchmark is run on, the dependence on the used training and test sets (size, representa-
tiveness) as well as the lacking support for the direct identification of fast mechanisms.
Regarding the first of these points, one possible solution might be the introduction of a descriptor for
the machine speed. For the second point, future work will have to be invested into investigations on
optimal (regarding detection performance as well as throughput considerations) training (and test) set
sizes. This is due to the fact that the training and test set composition and size directly influence both
indicators used in the benchmarking approach introduced above. For fair benchmarking, the system per-
formance would have to be measured under predefined set sizes. Furthermore, the definition of standard
set sizes would be an important step to make the benchmarking results comparable between different
application scenarios. Regarding the third of the drawbacks mentioned above, the solution alternative
would be to move away from single-figure benchmarking to more complex multi-figure benchmarking,
as introduced by Lang in [Lang07] for audio watermarking benchmarking.
Further research in this field should include considerations on benchmarking strategies for classifiers
which are not implemented into the same run-time environment. Furthermore, other performance
indicators, besides the detection performance and the runtime, should be integrated in the benchmarking
scheme. Good first candidates for such integration would be indicators on plausibility and forensic
compliance, like the ones considered within this thesis. For each of these indicators, a corresponding
transfer function would be required for the integration into a benchmarking metric. For some indicators,
like e.g. the Daubert-compliance, the design of such a transfer function will be a hard research challenge.
8.2.2 Information fusion
Information fusion has the goal to determine the best set of experts (or expert systems) in a given
problem domain and devise an appropriate function that can optimally combine the decisions rendered
by the individual experts (cf. [Ross06], [Kuncheva04]). Information fusion is a science that is also known
by other names. The most prominent are: evidence pooling, ensemble methods, expert combination or
classifier combination. Within the focus of this thesis there exist two different approaches to informa-
tion fusion that have to be distinguished: the signal processing approach (i.e. practical considerations
motivated by application examples of fusion in other research fields) and the decision theory approach.
In the following two subsections initial considerations are presented or both approaches to show how
the work presented within this thesis could benefit from information fusion.
Fusion in the SPR process and post classification fusion
One of the research fields where applied signal processing and statistical pattern recognition methods are
extensively employed in combination with information fusion is the fields of biometrics. Having emerged
in the 1960s and early 1970s (see e.g. Atal [Atal74] for biometric speaker verification/identification),
biometrics achieved a level of maturity from which other (similar) pattern recognition problems could
benefit. The idea of a knowledge transfer from biometrics to the application scenarios considered within
this thesis is not a new one. One early attempt on the transfer of the fusion concept into steganalysis
is presented by Kharrazi et al. [Kharrazi06].
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From the numerous fusion concepts, known in biometrics for pattern recognition processes, two dif-
ferent ones shall be briefly considered here. The first one was presented by Sanderson and Pali-
wal [Sanderson02] in 2002 and is used in a simplified version in the considerations by Kharrazi et al.
[Kharrazi06]. It uses a model which distinguishes into pre-classification and post-classification infor-
mation fusion. Pre-classification fusion refers in this context to combining information prior to the
application of any classifier (or matching algorithm), while in post-classification the information is com-
bined after the decisions of the classifiers have been obtained.
In [Kharrazi06] Kharrazi et al. limit themselves to three different operations: First, the transfer of the
aforementioned fusion model from biometrics to the image steganalysis domain, second the practi-
cal evaluation of the impact of a fusion of three different steganalysers (two universal, one algorithm
specific) on the classification performance for two image steganography techniques (with the fusion
results presented ranging from worse than the best individual technique to better than all techniques –
depending on the tested algorithm), and third, the question whether the fusion of steganalysers might
lead to the same classification results as a truly ‘global’ universal steganalyser (trained with a training
set containing samples for all available steganographic techniques). In the test results of the third
presented evaluation a reduction of the classification result by choosing an universal or fused detector
instead a of specific one is seen (results achieved are between 3 and 7% worse), while at the same time
it is indicated that the scalability of the steganalysis increases (complexity decreases).
The second fusion approach to be mentioned here is the one used by Ross, Nandakumar, and
Jain [Ross06]. In this approach a five level fusion model (sensor-, feature-, match-, rank- and decision-
level fusion) is employed. This latter fusion approach by Ross et al. has a finer granularity and incorpo-
rates (amongst other benefits) a more appropriate model for dynamic classifier selection. This fusion ap-
proach is formalised and visualised for the field of biometric research by Oermann et al. in [Oermann06].
It is enhanced here by adding the corresponding signal processing operations between the fusion levels
(see figure 8.6).
Figure 8.6: Overview of the five signal processing steps and the five different fusion levels (based on Oermann
et al. [Oermann06])
The five fusion levels [Ross06] (sensor-, feature-, match-, rank-, and decision-level fusion) used in this
model with their corresponding signal processing operations (signal acquisition at sensor level, feature
computation, classification/matching, ranking and decision making) can be summarised as follows
(note: detailed examples on how fusion on these levels is performed in biometrics are presented by Ross
et al. [Ross06]):
• Sensor-level fusion: Entails the consolidation of evidence presented by multiple sources of raw
data before they become subject to feature extraction.
• Feature-level fusion: Involves consolidating the evidence presented by different feature sets of
the same source. The following requirements for feature-level fusion have to be considered: The
features have to be related (i.e. really belong to one source), they must be of the same type (e.g.
a variable length and a fixed length feature set should not be joined), and should be considered
under the knowledge of the course-of-dimensionality problem (i.e. the number of samples for a
training set has to reflect the number of features).
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• Match-level fusion (also known as score-level fusion or classification-level fusion): A fusion
on matching score level implies a consolidation of matching scores (respectively classification
results) gained from separate comparisons/classification of reference data and test data for each
source. Because fusion on this level is the most commonly applied technique it biometrics it
incorporates a separate chapter in the work of Ross et al. [Ross06].
• Rank-level fusion: Which is of importance especially for identification problems, has the goal to
consolidate the ranked outputs of individual classification systems in order to derive a consensus
rank for each identity known.
• Decision-level fusion: if a fusion is applied on decision-level then each subsystem draws com-
pletely autonomous decisions, which are then combined. The operator for this decision combina-
tion could be Boolean functions (like logical AND or OR), (weighted) majority voting, Bayesian
decisions, etc.
Within the work on this thesis, this second fusion approach has been used for initial considerations
on the integration of information fusion into the introduced general-purpose statistical pattern recog-
nition (SPR) approach for audio forensics. The work of Ross et al. in [Ross06] is favoured in these
considerations over the work by Sanderson and Paliwal [Sanderson02] applied by previously by Kharrazi
et al. in [Kharrazi06] for steganalysis, because its finer granularity allows for a more flexible process
integration.
Application of information fusion for audio steganalysis
In [Kraetzer10] a limited-scale experiment on sensor-level fusion is performed. In the performed ex-
periment, a second audio input (a second sensor) is emulated by de-noising the original. The fusion
operation is then the subtraction of both sensor signals. Thus, the emulated sensor fusion outputs the
‘noise’ component of the original audio signal after content removal (for details see [Kraetzer10]).
The results presented in [Kraetzer10] (using all of WEKAs 74 classifiers, global as well as segmental
features computed by AAFE v.2.0.5 and 10-fold stratified cross-validation on aats389 as well as training
with aats389 and testing with testset24) show, for the three investigated information hiding algorithms
(AS1, AS3 and AW1), similar detection performances as the evaluations without the (content removal
performing) sensor-level fusion. The basic idea of using such a content removal for content influence
elimination in audio steganalysis seems to be a very promising one.
In [Kraetzer09a] match-level and decision-level fusions are performed for the introduced statistical pat-
tern recognition (SPR) based audio steganalysis approach. The results presented in this paper show a
small increase in detection performance by the performed match-level fusion, while the decision-level
fusion-results are identical to those without fusion (for details see [Kraetzer09a]). This work is ex-
tended in [Kraetzer10] by further considerations on match-level fusion for segmental features and a
new decision-level fusion for global features. While the results of the on match-level fusion for seg-
mental features confirm the small improvement in the detection performance already demonstrated
in [Kraetzer09a]. The new decision-level fusion for global features alone shows no positive impact, but
if both are combined in an additional mixed-level fusion, the detection performance is again increased
by a small amount (for details see [Kraetzer10]).
Re´sume´ for the fusion considerations on audio steganalysis is: The sensor-level fusion presented
in [Kraetzer10] seems to be a good way of reducing the contend dependability in steganalysis. After
the (rather crude) sensor-level fusion performed in the tests, the content influence is reduced dramati-
cally, while the subsequent classifications show similar classification accuracies. Here further and more
sophisticated methods for content removal/de-noising should be tested in future research. Since the
sensor-level fusion tested here is basically a content removal or anonymisation of the data, the benefit
of this operation would be that it would pave the road for the outsourcing of the computationally
burdensome tasks of feature extraction, model generation and classification to a third party (e.g. a
commercial service with more computational power).
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The practical results achieved in fusion with the introduced statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based
audio steganalysis approach show little to no improvement in the actual detection performance. This
is consistent with the results on fusion obtained by Kharazzi et al. in [Kharrazi06], where the fusion
accuracies are also only in few test cases better than the non-fused results. Nevertheless, future research
should be invested into the application of fusion techniques in steganalysis, because it might allow for
an efficient combination of application-specific detectors into a scheme for universal steganalysis.
Application of information fusion for microphone forensics
In [Kraetzer09b] we focussed on the benefits of post-classification fusion for the discussed instantiation
of the general-purpose audio forensics approach for microphone forensics. In that paper we introduced
a set of potential fusion operators for match-, rank- and decision-level fusion.
The table 8.4 summarises the investigation results presented in [Kraetzer09b] on the influence of infor-
mation fusion to the detection performance of the used statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based
microphone forensics approach.
Table 8.4: Average κ values for microphone forensics for selected classifiers without and with fusion (averages over
the results computed for the ten recording locations R01 -R10 ; for a precise description of the used
experimental setups see [Kraetzer09b])
RS1 RS2
(average κ over all 10
recording locations)
(average κ over all 10
recording locations)
without fusion SimpleLogistics 0.784 0.727
J48 0.829 0.763
Match-level fusion 0.691 0.614
Rank-levelfusion 1.000 1.000
Decision-level fusion 0.967 0.966
Summarising the investigation results for all fusions tested in [Kraetzer09b], it can be said that the
rank-level fusion performed there shows the strongest impact on the detection performance achieved.
It increases the performance for both test sets to κ = 1. The decision-level fusion performs not as good
as the rank-level fusion, but with an average κ > 0.96 still better than the corresponding classifications
without fusion. The performed match-level fusion reduces the classification performance in comparison
to the single classifiers, which can be, at least partially, contributed to the modelling of the fusion
operator as a majority voting decision with equal weights. Here, in case of different statements for the
two used classifiers, the fusion decision deadlocked, which illustrated very well the need for appropriate
fusion operator designs.
Besides the detection performance considerations, in [Kraetzer09b] also confidence estimation func-
tions for post-classification fusion are introduced. An accuracy of 100% or a κ value of 1 for a
fusion-based system does not tell much about its applicability in real world investigations. Due to the
implications of the Daubert standard, not only its detection performance would have to be known,
but also a confidence has to be determined as a measure how far the fusion decision is away from the
complex decision boundary. In [Kraetzer09b] some prototypical confidence functions are introduced for
the tested fusion operators. Our results in that paper show that for test cases with similar detection
performances different system confidences could be achieved.
Re´sume´ for the fusion considerations on microphone forensics is: In the exemplary selected
investigations on post-classification fusion presented in detail in [Kraetzer09b] and summarised here,
the following three facts are shown: a) a fusion operation designed to suite the classification problem at
hand can indeed increase the detection performance achieved in microphone forensics; b) the estimation
of the confidence/trust put into a fusion decision is a non-trivial problem which still holds a lot of
potential for future research; c) post-classification fusion can dramatically increase the complexity of
the classification process in microphone forensics, which opens opportunities for future research on low
complexity fusion operators and the balancing between classification accuracy increase on one hand and
complexity scaling on the other hand.
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Alternative directions on information fusion
The progress made in the field of information fusion in recent years is very well illustrated by text-books
on this topic (like e.g. [Kuncheva04]) as well as high-quality survey-papers in well established journals
(like e.g. [Atrey10]). One prominent current trend in this field is the application of the Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory [Shafer76] for fusion considerations (cf. [Atrey10]). This theory generalises
Bayesian theory to relax its restriction on mutually exclusive hypotheses. Furthermore, it uses belief
and plausibility values to represent the evidence and their corresponding uncertainty. In [Fontani11]
Fontani et al. demonstrate the application of the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory for the combination
of manipulation detection tools in media forensics. The analysis of this technique leads to the realisation
that it relies in the modelling of the plausibility values strongly on assumptions for the certainty of the
systems that are to be combined in the fusion. In [Fontani11] the authors simply state on that fact:
“[...] we also assume to have some information (possibly image dependent) about tools reliability (for
instance such an information could derive from experimental evidence)”. In the opinion of the author
this assumption would have to be substantiated by the existence of suitable benchmarking strategies
for such tools, imposing to the benchmarking considerations presented in section 8.2.1 of this thesis an
additional requirement, extending the detection performance driven considerations.
8.3 Possible directions for future work
Two major points for future work on the general-purpose statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based
audio forensics approach can be identified: On one hand, this would be the transfer to other appli-
cation scenarios, to investigate to which extent it can be adapted to research fields like e.g. voice
recognition, speech recognition, speaker recognition, audio coder verification, gunshot characterisation,
audio signal quality verification, etc. On the other hand, it would have to be accompanied by detailed
juristic analyses. Since the author possesses absolutely no legal training, all legal considerations made
within this thesis (especially on the Daubert standard) are therefore layman’s interpretation of freely
available material, which are made to the best of the author’s knowledge. The intention behind the
work on forensic compliance performed here is to derive a performance metric for research in the field
of audio forensics. If the content of this thesis is intended to be used in any legal proceedings, the
reader must consult appropriate legal counsel for the corresponding jurisdiction.
Accompanying these two rather broad important points, in the following more specific potential exten-
sions are presented. For reasons of accessibility they are structured into remarks on possible extensions
of the introduced approach, potential alternatives in methodology and concepts in audio steganalysis
and microphone forensics as well as benchmarking considerations:
Possible extensions of the introduced approach
• Pre-processing: The usage of more sophisticated (instead of simple windowing) pre-processing
methods should increase the distance between the patterns to be detected and the back-
ground signal. In the cases of the two application scenarios considered within this thesis an
inverted form of noise removal (as briefly addressed in section 6.2.4 with silence detection) might
be used to deduce the influence of the cover or recorded signal in the classification.
• Feature extraction:
– The features are the main issue in any pattern recognition approach. The introduced ap-
proach might strongly benefit from an extension of the feature space by additional
context insensitive features (e.g. from [Peeters04] or [Mathieu10]). Also, adapted ver-
sions of existing features might be used to improve the detection performance on specific
classes, e.g. if the features are shaped to detect specific characteristics of a certain pattern
like LSB-features that acknowledge the fact that the steganographic algorithm Publimark
only embeds its payload into every third LSB.
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– Additionally, the implementation of higher-level (semantical) content analysis80 into au-
dio features would assumedly increase the detection performance significantly. The downside
is that the time and computation power required in feature extraction might also show a
strong increase.
• Feature selection: An extension of the work on feature selection performed within this thesis
would be the usage of methods form analytical statistics (e.g. variance analysis or factor analysis)
to determine the relationships within the feature space as well as the exact influence of each
feature to the patterns detected. This would for example help to improve the context model for
the recording process discussed in section 2.3.2.
• Classification: Within this thesis the classifier parameter optimisation has been omitted. It is
obvious that such parameter optimisation (e.g. by grid search through the parameter space) will
be able to improve the detection performance (at the cost of immense computation power spent
for the determination of the optimal parameter settings). Also the design of new, specialised
classification algorithms for the discussed classification problems might be a promising research
field.
• Evaluation:
– The results achieved for audio steganalysis as well as microphone forensics would have to
be verified in future work with larger evaluation sets. These extended evaluations would
have to verify the statements on the detection performance and (re-)address the questions
of sufficient model sizes and scaling behaviour of the introduced approach.
– The integration of content analysis should be considered to enable an automatised shift
from cover independent to cover type dependent training and testing.
– The number of evaluations performed for plausibility investigations is limited within this
thesis to a practically feasible number. The idea is here to establish the concept for both
application scenarios and reserve more detailed analyses with more common audio signal
post-processing operations for future work.
– The determination of the precise error rates (as required by the Daubert standard) and
the estimation of the achievable security levels for the introduced audio forensics methods
require extensive benchmarking (see the statements on benchmarking of SPR-based security
mechanisms below).
Alternatives in methodology and concepts in audio steganalysis
• Signal preparation: For future research on this approach, the consideration of further information
hiding algorithms as well as further embedding parameters (e.g. embedding strength) might be
important to enhance the generalisability of the statements made.
• Creation of multi-level detection schemes: In trying to get closer to Daubert compliance, an
important step would be to combine networks of two-class classifiers with multi-class classifiers,
e.g. to use the first ones to identify the embedding method/domain (e.g. LSB) and the latter ones
to identify the actual tool that was used to embed the data (i.e. perform multi-class steganalysis
with the goal of algorithm identification). This could prepare the systems for an attempt to
extract (and potentially decrypt) the message embedded and thereby create the binding to the
case at hand that would be required for an admission as evidence in a law case.
Alternatives in methodology and concepts in microphone forensics
• Signal preparation: For future research on this approach, the consideration of larger record-
ings sets, created under strongly varying influence factors, would be important to enhance the
generalisability of the statements made.
80Like provided by the Freesound audio analysis API hosted by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. See:
http://www.freesound.org/docs/api/analysis index.html
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• Extension of the context model for the recording process: The context model for the
recording process introduced in section 2.3.2has to be extended, fine-tuned in future work and
accompanied by attack models for non-malicious or malicious (anti-forensic) modifications to the
recorded audio signal.
• Recording integrity verification: It should be established how reliable means for audio signal
integrity verification can be achieved using the SPR-based approach proposed in this thesis in
combination (fusion) with other approaches from the state-of-the-art in this field (especially
the ENF-based work from [Rodr´ıguez10]). The idea is that this combination with other approaches
for editing operation detection (see [REW11]) can be used to perform a ‘scene-analysis’ (i.e. scene
segmentation) on edited audio signals prior to authentication of the sources used for the scenes
in a potential composition.
Benchmarking of statistical pattern recognition (SPR) based security mechanisms
• The basis for any advanced benchmarking considerations would be a complete mathematical
formalisation of the media forensic process considered. Some of the work performed within this
thesis (e.g. the context model for the recording process, see section 2.3.2) are already backed by
such a formalisation. These parts could be used as initial points for the development of a general
formalisation and process model.
• The next step to be considered in future work on benchmarking of statistical pattern recogni-
tion (SPR) based audio security mechanisms should be the extension of the considerations on
benchmarking metrics into a fully developed and fair benchmarking scheme for practical appli-
cation. Such benchmarking would be a necessity basis for large-scale usage in communication
security. Similar fields of research on communication security already have benchmarking meth-
ods in place. Two examples for such initiatives to be mentioned here are the National Institute
of Standards and Technology’s (NIST, see http://www.nist.gov/itl/biometrics/index.cfm) work
on Biometrics as well as the European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research (EICAR, see
e.g. www.eicar.org/) with its work on malware detection. Alternatives for performance metrics,
to be used in this context, should extend the work described in sections 4.1.4 and 8.2.1, e.g.
by incorporating different weights for the false positive and false negative error rates into a fair
benchmarking scheme, because their proportion is in most cases equivalent to the security (false
negative ratio) and usability (false positive ratio) of the approach.
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Appendix A: Audio Features used in AAFE
This appendix gives detailed descriptions on the features used in the composition of the three different
versions of the AMSL Audio Feature Extractor (AAFE) used throughout the thesis. An overview of
the features and the mapping to the three major releases AAFE (versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5) is
performed in section 4.1.1.
The mathematical feature descriptions are based on the formalisation of audio signal representations
given in section 2.3.1.
9.1 Segmental features
All segmental features are computed for a window with index i (and channel k) of the sampled, quan-
tised and windowed digital audio signal Ski (see the formalisation of digital audio signals in section 2.3.1).
Empirical variance (time-domain feature):
In [Dittmann07] the empirical variance (sfev) is described as the statistical dispersion of the samples in
a window of size w of the audio signal. The feature indicates how the sample values are spread around
the arithmetic mean. It is computed for the samples ski,j of a given window with index i and a specific
channel k of the sampled, quantised and windowed digital audio signal Ski as:
sfev =
1
n
w∑
j=1
(
ski,j − sfmean
)2  9.1
Where w is the number of samples in the window, j is the sample-in-the-frame index (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w)
for the i-th window in this channel of the stream. The feature sfmean represents the arithmetic mean
of the samples in this window (see below).
The feature is included in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4.
Covariance (time-domain feature):
In [Dittmann07] the covariance is described as follows: “In probability theory and statistics, covariance
is the measure of how much two random variables vary together (as distinct from variance, which
measures how much a single variable varies). If two variables tend to vary together (that is, when one
of them is above its expected value, then the other variable tends to be above its expected value too),
then the covariance between the two variables will be positive. On the other hand, if when one of them
is above its expected value, the other variable tends to be below its expected value, then the covariance
between the two variables will be negative.”
Here the covariance feature sfcv is computed for
w
2 pairs of samples from one window S
k
i . For the
expected value, the arithmetic mean of all values in the window (sfmean) is used:
sfcv =
1
n
w∑
j=1
(
ski,j − sfmean
) · (ski,j−1 − sfmean)  9.2
The feature is included in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4.
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Entropy (time-domain feature):
In information theory, the Shannon entropy or information entropy is a measure of the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the development of a random variable. The feature sfentropy is computed in [Dittmann07]
as follows: For each window Ski of the sampled, quantised and windowed digital audio signal a his-
togram H of the occurring values is generated. In the next step, the value for each position in the
histogram is divided by the window size resulting in a new histogram entry H¯histpos. Equation 9.3
shows the computation of sfentropy from the H¯histpos values.
sfentropy = −
∑
H¯histpos
H¯histpos log2
(
H¯histpos
)  9.3
The feature is included in this form in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
LSB ratio (time-domain feature):
The feature sfLSBrat describes the ratio between the value ‘0’ and value ‘1’ least significant bit (LSB)
values of a sample within a window of the audio material. It is computed for a window Ski with samples
ski,j , where j is the sample-in-the-frame index (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w), i is the frame-index and k is the
channel, as:
sfLSBrat =
∑w
j=1 LSB0(s
k
i,j)∑w
j=1 LSB1(s
k
i,j)
 9.4
The functions LSB0(s
k
i,j) and LSB1(s
k
i,j) are used to count the occurrences of ‘0’s and ‘1’s in the LSB
values. They are defined as:
LSB0(s
k
i,j) =
{
1 if LSB(ski,j) = 0
0 if LSB(ski,j) = 1
 9.5
LSB1(s
k
i,j) =
{
0 if LSB(ski,j) = 0
1 if LSB(ski,j) = 1
 9.6
The helper function LSB() in equations 9.5 and 9.6 returns the LSB-value of a sample with sample-in-
the-frame index j (frame-index i and channel k).
The feature is included in this form in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
LSB flipping rate (time-domain feature):
The feature sfLSBflip counts the number of flips of the least significant bit (LSB) values within the
window Ski (window size w, samples s
k
i,j with sample-in-the-frame index j (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w),
frame-index i and channel k). It is computed as:
sfLSBflip =
w−1∑
j=1
∣∣LSB(ski,j)− LSB(ski,j+1)∣∣  9.7
Here, LSB() is again the helper function already used in equations 9.5 and 9.6 above.
The feature is included in this form in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
Mean of samples in time domain (time-domain feature):
The feature sfmean computes the arithmetic average for the samples in the window. It is computed
for the window Ski (window size w, samples s
k
i,j with sample-in-the-frame index j (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w),
frame-index i and channel k) as:
sfmean =
1
w
w∑
j=1
ski,j
 9.8
The feature is included in this form in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
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Median of samples in time domain (time-domain feature):
In case that the window size w is odd, the feature sfmedian returns the value of the
w+1
2 -th element of
an ordered array of size w, containing all samples of the window Ski . In case w is even, the arithmetic
mean of the values of two elements in the middle of the array (indices w2 and
w+1
2 ) is returned.
sfmedian =
arraySortw+12 (S
k
i ) if length of w is odd
1
2
(
arraySortw
2
(Ski ) + arraySortw+1
2
(Ski )
)
if length of w is even
 9.9
The helper function arraySortpointer() sorts the samples s
k
i,j in the window S
k
i by their value and allows
access to the entries in the sorted array by using the index pointer.
The feature is included in this form in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
Zero-cross-rate (time-domain feature):
The feature sfzero cross rate computes the zero-crossing-rate for a window S
k
i (window size w, samples
ski,j with sample-in-the-frame index j (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w), frame-index i and channel k) of the audio
signal, i.e. how often the signed time-domain value changes from values above ‘0’ to values below ‘0’.
It is computed as:
sfmedian =
1
2
w∑
j=2
∣∣sgn(ski,j)− sgn(ski,j−1)∣∣  9.10
sgn(ski,j) =
{
1 if ski,j ≥ 0
−1 if ski,j < 0
 9.11
The helper function sgn() identifies the sign of an element and maps it to ‘1’ for positive values and
‘−1’ for negative values.
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Energy (time-domain feature):
The feature sfenergy estimates the energy in a window of the sampled, quantised and windowed digital
audio signal Ski (window size w, samples s
k
i,j with sample-in-the-frame index j (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w),
frame-index i and channel k) as:
sfenergy =
√∑w
j=1(s
k
i,j)
2
w
 9.12
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
RMS amplitude (time-domain feature):
The feature sfRMS amplitude root mean square (RMS) amplitude is a more traditional description of
the energy in an audio window of the sampled, quantised and windowed digital audio signal Ski (window
size w, samples ski,j with sample-in-the-frame index j (j ∈ N; 1 ≤ j ≤ w) than sfenergy. Both features
are strongly correlated. The RMS amplitude is computed as:
sfRMS amplitude =
1
w
√√√√ w∑
j=1
(ski,j)
2
 9.13
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Formants (frequency-domain features):
[Kraetzer08a] describes the set of formant features as follows: “Distinguishing frequency components
of human speech and of singing are called formants. The information required by humans to distinguish
between vowels can be represented purely quantitatively by the frequency characteristics of the vowel
sounds [Duncan88] such as provided by the so called formants. Most often the two first formants are
enough to disambiguate the vowel [Duncan88]. These two formants are primarily determined by the
191
Chapter 9. Appendix A: Audio Features used in AAFE
position of the tongue.
With the measurements of the spectral energy in the frequency bands representing the first two formants
for each English vowel as well as the so called singer formant, a first frequency domain based feature
set is added to the AAFE v.1.0.4.”
The feature sfformant ∗ computes the arithmetic mean of all frequency bins in the frequency range
[low,up] describing the formant. Table 9.1 shows the frequency bounds for the 11 formants (five times
two for the five vowels plus the singer formant) computed here. Based on these frequency bounds, the
AAFE features sfformant ∗ are computed window-wise as:
sfformant ∗ =
1
num coef(low, up, coef)
∑
low≤h≤up
yki,h
 9.14
In equation 9.14 yki,h (channel k, frame-index i and coefficient-in-the-frame index h (h ∈ N; 1 ≤ h ≤
coef)) are the frequency coefficients in the spectrogram Y ki resulting from a FFT on an audio window
of the sampled, quantised and windowed digital audio signal Ski and low and up are the lower and
upper frequency bound of the considered formant (see table 9.1). The function num coef() computes
the number of frequency bins in the range [low,up] by considering the FFT size coef .
Table 9.1: Frequency ranges for the vowel and singer formants (taken from [Kraetzer08a])
Formant Lower frequency bound (low) [Hz] Upper frequency bound (up) [Hz]
sfformant A1 800 1200
sfformant A2 1300 1500
sfformant E1 400 600
sfformant E2 2200 2600
sfformant I1 200 400
sfformant I2 3000 3500
sfformant O1 400 600
sfformant O2 900 1100
sfformant U1 200 400
sfformant U2 700 900
sfformant Singer 2800 3400
These features are included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE versions 1.0.4 and 2.0.5.
Bark scale spectrogram (frequency-domain features):
The Bark scale is computed by Zwicker [Zwicker61] by the projection of the normal spectrogram Y ki onto
a non-linear frequency domain scale consisting of 24 frequency bands spectrogram Bki (unit [Bark]).
The 24 features sfBark 1 to sfBark 24 are each computed as the arithmetic mean of all frequency bins
yki,h of Y
k
i between two consecutive Bark in B
k
i . The computation of this mean is equivalent to the
one performed for the formants as described above (for details see [Kraetzer08a]).
These features are included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 1.0.4. In AAFE
version 2.0.5 the Bark scale spectrogram is replaced by a higher resolution linear-scale spectrogram.
Spectral centroid (frequency-domain feature):
The feature sfsp centroid describes the mass center of a spectrum. Here the method from [Eisenberg08]
for the computation of this feature is applied:
sfsp centroid =
∑coef
h y
k
i,h · fr(h)∑coef
h y
k
i,h
 9.15
In this equation, fr(h) is the frequency belonging to coefficient-in-the-frame index h (h ∈ N;
1 ≤ h ≤ coef).
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral flux (frequency-domain feature):
The feature sfsp flux (a.k.a. spectral fluctuation) represents the variation of the spectrum between
consecutive windows. It is computed as:
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sfsp flux =
∣∣∣∣∣
coef∑
h=1
yki,h − yki−1,h
∣∣∣∣∣  9.16
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral roll-off (frequency-domain feature):
The spectral roll-off sfsp rolloff is described (e.g. in [Smaragdis09] and [Lerch08]) as the frequency
band at which the cumulated spectral energy exceeds a specified threshold. In [Lerch08] this threshold
is defined as 85% of the overall spectral energy, in other publications (e.g. [Smaragdis09]) this value is
defined as 90% or even 95% of the overall spectral energy. Here, 85% of
∑coef
h=1 y
k
i,h is used for each
window with window index i in channel k.
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral bandwidth (frequency-domain feature):
The spectral bandwidth sfsp bw describes the width of the frequency range in which contains 90% of
the overall spectral energy (
∑coef
h=1 y
k
i,h) of a window with index i in channel k. The upper and lower
boundaries of this range are iteratively determined to exclude 5% of the spectral energy on each of the
two ends of the spectrum.
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral smoothness (frequency-domain feature):
The spectral smoothness sfsp smoothness describes the continuity (or discontinuity) of the spectrum of
a window of the audio signal. It is computed here as:
sfsp smoothness =
coef−1∑
h=2
∣∣∣∣∣yki,h − yki,h−1 + yki,h + yki,h+13
∣∣∣∣∣  9.17
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral irregularity (frequency-domain feature):
Like sfsp smoothness, the spectral irregularity sfsp irregularity is describing the continuity of the spec-
trum. Here the definition of [Luck08] is used for the computation:
sfsp irregularity =
∑coef
h=2
(
yki,h − yki,h−1
)2
sfRMS amplitude
 9.18
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Spectral entropy (frequency-domain feature):
For the computation of the entropy of the spectrum (sfsp entropy) the description given in [Luck08] us
used:
sfsp entropy = −
∑coef
h=1 y
k
i,h · ln yki,h
ln coef
 9.19
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Base frequency (frequency-domain feature):
The feature sfsp base freq computes the base frequency for the signal within one window of the audio
material. Here an extremely simple approach to base frequency determination is used:
sfsp base freq = max({yki,1, · · · , yki,coef})
 9.20
This feature is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
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Linear spectrogram (frequency-domain features):
The majority of the frequency-domain features computed in AAFE v.2.0.5 are presenting a 512-bin81
linear spectrogram sfspec ∗ (features sfspec 1, · · · , sfspec 512). The features represent the energy within
the corresponding frequency bin:
sfspec h = y
k
i,h
 9.21
This set of features is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5. It replaces
the lower resolution Bark scale spectrogram from AAFE version 1.0.4.
Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) (cepstral-domain features)
An extremely detailed description of the computation of the MFCC computation for AAFE version 1.0.3
is given in [Dittmann07].
Originally, the cepstrum was defined by Bogert, Healy and Tukey in 1963 [Bogert63]. The term
itself is an anagram of the word spectrum. Basically, a cepstrum is the result of taking the Fourier
transform (FT) or short-time Fourier analysis [Allen77] of the decibel spectrum as if it were a signal.
The cepstrum can be interpreted as information about the rate of power change in different spectrum
bands. The cepstrum Kki for is computed here from a window S
k
i as:
Kki = FT
(
log
(
FT
(
Ski
)))  9.22
For the work described in this thesis, only a real cepstrum [Dittmann07] is considered since the feature
of invertability provided by a complex cepstrum is not required in the analysis performed. A modified
version of the cepstrum, the Mel-cepstrum is considered by [McEachern94] as an excellent feature vector
for representing the human voice and musical signals. This consideration led to the idea in [Dittmann07]
to transfer corresponding Mel-cepstrum based features to speech steganalysis.
For the computation of the Mel-cepstrum, the spectrum is usually first transformed using the Mel
frequency bands. The result of this transformation is called the Mel-spectrum and is used as the input
of the second FT computing the Mel-cepstrum represented by the Mel frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs) which are used as sfMFCC 1 to sfMFCC 28 in AAFE v.1.0.3 and 1.0.4. The complete
transformation for the input time-domain signal Ski is described in equation 9.23.
{sfMFCC 1, · · · , sfMFCC 28} = FT
(
MelScaleTransformation
(
FT
(
Ski
)))  9.23
In equation 9.23 the helper function MelScaleTransformation() performs the required Mel-scale trans-
form of the spectrum.
Figure 9.1 shows the complete transformation procedure for a FFT based Mel-cepstrum computation
as introduced by Thrasyvoulou and Benton in [Thrasyvoulou03] in 2003. Alternative approaches found
in literature use linear prediction based based Mel-cepstrum computation. A detailed discussion about
which transformation should be used in which case is given by Thrasyvoulou et al. [Thrasyvoulou03].
From these discussions it is obvious that the FT based approach suffices the means of audio feature
extraction for forensic purposes pursuit in this thesis.
81To be more precise, the feature extractor returns coef
2
frequency coefficients for a window of w samples, but since
all considerations within this thesis have been made with the default window size of 1024 samples, this feature subset
contains for all evaluations 512 features.
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Figure 9.1: FFT-based Mel-cepstrum computation adapted from Thrasyvoulou et al. [Thrasyvoulou03]
For the AAFE versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 the pre-emphasis, framing and windowing, Fourier transform,
filter-bank based Mel-transform and second Fourier transform are designed on basis of the concepts of
Thrasyvoulou et al. [Thrasyvoulou03]. For precise implementation description for the MFCC computa-
tion used in AAFE version 1.0.3 and detailed information about alternatives in the computation of the
cepstrum the author refers to [Dittmann07].
In AAFE version 2.0.5 the computation of the MFCCs is done by using the corresponding MATLAB
function mfcc() from the Auditory Toolbox maintained by Malcolm Slaney82. This function returns for
the provided audio data 13 MFCCs. To denote the differences in the MFCCs computed by the different
versions of AAFE, the MFCCs extracted by the MATLAB-based version 2.0.5 are denoted as sfMFCC 1
to sfMFCC 13.
Filtered Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (FMFCCs) (cepstral-domain features)
In [Kraetzer07a] a modification of the Mel-cepstral based signal analysis is introduced for AAFE version
1.0.3. It is based on the application scenario of VoIP steganalysis and the basic assumption that a VoIP
communication consists mostly of speech communication between human speakers. This, in conjunction
with the knowledge about the frequency limitations of human speech (see e.g. Fastl et al. [Zwicker90]),
led to the idea of removing the speech relevant frequency bands (the spectrum components between
200 and 6819.59 Hz) in the spectral representation of a signal before computing the cepstrum.
This procedure returning the FMFCCs (filtered Mel frequency cepstral coefficients; sfFMFCC 1 to
sfFMFCC 28) is shown in figure 9.2.
This procedure, which enhances the computation described by equation 9.23 by a filter step, returns
the FMFCCs (sfFMFCC 1 to sfFMFCC 28 in AAFE versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4) and is expressed in
equation 9.24.
Figure 9.2: Computation of the FMFCCs (adapted from [Kraetzer07a])
{sfFMFCC 1, · · · , sfFMFCC 28} = FT
(
BandFilter
(
MelScaleTransformation
(
FT
(
Ski
))))  9.24
82See https://engineering.purdue.edu/˜malcolm/interval/1998-010/
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In equation 9.24 the helper function BandFilter() performs the required removal of the audio content
between 200 and 6819.59 Hz.
For AAFE version 2.0.5 the original C/C++ implementation from version 1.0.3 is replaced by a MAT-
LAB implementation. For this purpose the function mfcc() from the Auditory Toolbox maintained by
Malcolm Slaney83 is enhanced by a filtering operation in the frequency domain representation of the
signal, prior to the Mel-scale filtering and the second Fourier transform. This computation returns for
the provided audio data 13 FMFCCs, denoted sfFMFCC 1 to sfFMFCC 13.
Second-order derivative MFCCs (cepstral-domain features)
In AAFE version 2.0.5, in addition to the normal MFCCs, also the second-order derivative MFCCs
introduced in [Liu09] are computed (sfd2MFCC 1 to sfd2MFCC 13):
{sfd2MFCC 1, · · · , sfd2MFCC 13} = FT
(
MelScaleTransformation
(
FT
(
d2 Ski
d2 nT
)))  9.25
For a detailed description of the computation process the author refers to [Liu09].
This set of features is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
Second-order derivative FMFCCs (cepstral-domain features)
Equivalent to the second-order derivative MFCCs described above, also second-order derivative FMFCC
are computed by AAFE version 2.0.5:
{sfd2FMFCC 1, · · · , sfd2FMFCC 13} = FT
(
BandFilter
(
MelScaleTransformation
(
FT
(
d2 Ski
d2 nT
))))
 9.26
This set of features is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
9.2 Global features
The global features introduced for AAFE v.2.0.5 consists of the total zero-crossing-rate gfzcr total
for the complete audio signal and arithmetic averages of all considered windows for the following seg-
mental features: the eight AAFE version 2.0.5 time-domain features (sfentropy, sfLSBrat, sfLSBflip,
sfmean, sfmedian, sfzero cross rate, sfenergy, sfRMS amplitude) as well as the spectral centroid, spectral
rolloff, spectral bandwidth, spectral smoothness, spectral irregularity, spectral entropy, base frequency
and spectral flux (sfsp centroid, sfsp rolloff , sfsp bw, sfsp smoothness, sfsp irregularity, sfsp entropy,
sfsp base freq and sfsp flux).
The elements of the global features vector are therefore denoted as: gfzcr total, gfentropy AV E ,
gfLSBrat AV E , gfLSBflip AV E , gfmean AV E , gfmedian AV E , gfzero cross rate AV E , gfenergy AV E ,
gfRMS amplitude AV E , gfsp centroid AV E , gfsp rolloff AV E , gfsp bw AV E , gfsp smoothness AV E , as well
as gfsp irregularity AV E , gfsp entropy AV E , gfsp base freq AV E and gfsp flux AV E .
This set of features is included in this form only in the feature vectors of AAFE version 2.0.5.
83See https://engineering.purdue.edu/˜malcolm/interval/1998-010/
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Appendix B: Experimental Setups for the Audio
Steganalysis Application Scenario
This appendix summarises the experimental setups used for the practical investigations on the audio
steganalysis application scenario in chapter 5 and section 8.2.1.
Originally, this summary on the training and test data, classifiers and features used in every experimental
setup84, which is given in table 10.1, was part of section 4.2. It has been placed in this appendix to
improve the accessibility of the core chapters of this thesis.
Table 10.1: Summary of the experimental setups for audio steganalysis
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / clus-
terers
Feature set(s)
AS-
Kraetzer2007SPIE-
summary
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 64 feature vectors
per file of the set
aats389
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 16 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set aats389
libSVM default
parametrisation
all 63 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.1.0.3
vs. only time-
domain features vs.
only time-domain
features and the
FMFCCs of AAFE
v.1.0.3
AS-
Kraetzer2007SPIE-
longfile
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 2200 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set longfile
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 400 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set longfile
all 63 segm. feat. of
AAFE v.1.0.3
AS-
Kraetzer2010SPIE-
GF-singleClass-
summary
• Original material and material marked with
AS1, AS3 and AW1
• 10x stratified cross-validation vs. separate
training and test set
• 40 feature vectors per file of the set aats389
for training and cross-validation
• 40 feature vectors per file of the set testset24
for testing
all 74 in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) imple-
mented supervised
classifiers in default
parametrisations
all 17 global feat. of
AAFE v.2.0.5
AS-
Kraetzer2010SPIE-
SF-singleClass-
summary
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Continued on Next Page. . .
84The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified in those chapters by underlined and italic font
setting (e.g. Mic-01).
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Table 10.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / clus-
terers
Feature set(s)
AS-
Kraetzer2010SPIE-
SF/GF-singleClass
• Original material and material marked with
AS1, AS3 and AW1
• Post-processing by MP3 conversion and de-
noising
• 40 feature vectors per file of the set aats389
for training
• 40 feature vectors per file of the set testset24
for testing
best 5 (for all
feature set / IH
algorithm combi-
nation) out all 74
in WEKA (v.3.6.1)
implemented super-
vised classifiers in
default parametrisa-
tions
all 590 segm. feat.
vs. all 17 global
features of AAFE
v.2.0.5
AS-D-SF-scaling • Original material and material marked with
AS1, AS3 and AW1
• 10x stratified cross-validation
• 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, and 32 feature vectors
per file of the set aats389
weka.classifiers.* :
• trees.J48
• functions.Logistic
• rules.OneR
• trees.DecisionStump
• trees.RandomTree
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
AS-D-SF-
multiClass
• Original material and material marked with
AS1, AS3 and AW1
• 18 feature vectors per file of the set aats389
for percentage split (66%/34%)
all 590 segm. feat.
vs. all 17 global
features of AAFE
v.2.0.5
AS-
Kraetzer2007IH-
scaling
• Original mate-
rial and material
marked with all
nine IH algorithms
(default param.)
• 16, 64 and 256
feature vectors
per file of the set
aats389
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 4, 16 and 64 feature
vectors per file (disjunc-
tive with training mate-
rial) of the set aats389
libSVM default
parametrisation
only time do-
main features and
FMFCCs of AAFE
v.1.0.3
AS-
Kraetzer2007IH-
scaling VoIP
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 400 and 2200 fea-
ture vectors per file
of the set longfile
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 400 and 2200 feature
vectors per file (disjunc-
tive with training mate-
rial) of the set longfile
AS-
Kraetzer2007IH-
unmarked
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 256 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set aats389
• Original (i.e. un-
marked) material
• 64 feature vectors per
file of the set aats389
AS-Kraetzer2007IH • Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 256 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set aats389
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 64 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set aats389
AS-
Kraetzer2007IH-
CrossEval
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 256 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set aats389
• One model trained
for every IH algo-
rithm
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 64 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set aats389
• Testing of all models
against any test data set
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 10.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / clus-
terers
Feature set(s)
AS-
Kraetzer2008SPIE-
VoIP
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 15000 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set ahss1
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 1200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set ahss1
all 98 segm. feat. of
AAFE v.1.0.4
AS-
Kraetzer2008SPIE-
ContentDependent
• Original mate-
rial and material
marked with all
nine IH algorithms
(default param.)
• speech
data(ahss1) vs.
multi-genre data
(aats389)
• Original material and
material marked with
all nine IH algorithms
(default param.)
• speech data(ahss1)
vs. multi-genre data
(aats389) (disjunctive
with training material)
AS-
Kraetzer2008SPIE-
ContentInDependent
• Original material and material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (default param.)
• Percentage split (80% : 20%)
• speech data(ahss1) vs. multi-genre data
(ref10)
AS-
Kraetzer2008SPIE-
ClassifierComparison
• Original material
and material marked
with all nine IH
algorithms (default
param.)
• 256 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set aats389
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 256 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) of the
set aats389
libSVM and
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.MLRM
(all in default
parametrisation)
AS-Feature-
Selection-GF
• Original material and material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (default param.)
• 256 feature vectors per file of the set aats389
none feature selection
on the 17 global
features of AAFE
v.2.0.5 (evaluators
used: ChiSquare-
dAttributeEval,
FilteredAttributeE-
val, InfoGainAt-
tributeEval, On-
eRAttributeEval,
SymmetricalUncer-
tAttributeEval
from WEKA ver-
sion 3.6.1; search
method used:
Ranker
AS-Feature-
Selection-SF
feature selection on
the 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
(evaluators used:
ChiSquaredAttribu-
teEval, FilteredAt-
tributeEval, Info-
GainAttributeEval,
OneRAttributeEval,
SymmetricalUncer-
tAttributeEval
from WEKA ver-
sion 3.6.1; search
method used:
Ranker
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 10.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / clus-
terers
Feature set(s)
AS-Feature-
Selection-SF/GF-
PCA
PCA on the 17
global features vs.
590 segm. feat. of
AAFE v.2.0.5
AS-
KraetzerSPIE2009-
KeyScen
• Original material
and material marked
AS1, AS3 and AW1
(default param.)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file of the
set aats389 Part1
• Two key scenar-
ios (‘fixed key’ and
‘variable key’)
• Original material and
material marked with all
nine IH algorithms (de-
fault param.)
• 200 feature vectors per
file of the set testset24
libSVM and
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.Simple-
Logistics
• lazy.ADABoost
• trees.J48
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 98 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.1.0.4 and
the global 19 fea-
tures of AudioRS
200
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Appendix C: Experimental Setups for the
Microphone Forensics Application Scenario
This appendix summarises the experimental setups used for the practical investigations on the micro-
phone forensics application scenario in chapter 6 and section 8.2.1.
Originally, this summary on the training and test data, classifiers and features used in every experimen-
tal setup85, which is given in table 11.1, was part of section 4.3. It has been placed in this appendix to
improve the accessibility of the core chapters of this thesis.
Table 11.1: Summary of the experimental setups for microphone forensics
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / cluster-
ers
Feature set(s)
Mic-01 • RS4 Rode (10 reference files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M16, M17, M18, M19) and each of
the 10 rooms (R01, R02, ..., R10)
• 10x stratified cross-validation
all 74 in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) imple-
mented supervised
classifiers in default
parametrisations
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-02 • RS4 Beyer (10 reference files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M20, M21, M22, M23) and each of
the 10 rooms (R01, R02, ..., R10)
• 10x stratified cross-validation
all 74 in WEKA
(v.3.6.1) imple-
mented supervised
classifiers in default
parametrisations
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-
Kraetzer2007ACM
• RS1 and original files from ref10 (10 reference
files)
• 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700 and 800 fea-
ture vectors per file for all of the 4 microphones
(M1, M2, M3, M4) and each of the 10 rooms
(R01, R02, ..., R10) plus original files
• 10-fold stratified cross-validation and percent-
age split (66% to 34%) for NaiveBayes and
classes to clusters evaluation for SimpleKMeans
weka.classifiers.bayes.-
NaiveBayes,
weka.clusterers.Sim-
pleKMeans in
default parametrisa-
tions
all 63 segm. feat. of
AAFE v.1.0.3
Mic-03 • RS4 Beyer (10 reference files; set ref10)
• 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700 and 800
feature vectors per file for all of the 4 micro-
phones (M20, M21, M22, M23) and each of the
10 rooms (R01, R02, ..., R10)
• 10x stratified cross-validation
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.Logistic
•meta.RandomSub-
Space
• trees.RandomForest
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Continued on Next Page. . .
85The experimental setups used in chapters 5, 6 and 8 are identified in those chapters by underlined and italic font
setting (e.g. Mic-01).
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Table 11.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / cluster-
ers
Feature set(s)
Mic-Feature-
Selection
• RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer (10 reference files;
set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 2x4
microphones (M16, M17, M18, M19 and M20,
M21, M22, M23) and each of the 10 rooms (R01,
R02, ..., R10)
none feature selection on
the 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
(evaluators used:
ChiSquaredAttribu-
teEval, FilteredAt-
tributeEval, Info-
GainAttributeEval,
OneRAttributeEval,
SymmetricalUncer-
tAttributeEval
from WEKA ver-
sion 3.6.1; search
method used:
Ranker
Mic-RS4 Rode-
Best20Features-
only
• RS4 Rode (10 reference files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M16, M17, M18, M19) in R01
• 10x stratified cross-validation
all 74 in WEKA
implemented super-
vised classifiers in
default parametrisa-
tions
best 20 (see sec-
tion 6.1.4)
Mic-Composition-1 • RS4 Beyer (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M23) in R01
• “original half” 50 fea-
ture vectors (disjunctive
with training material)
from M22 in R01
• “impostor half” 50
feature vectors (disjunc-
tive with training mate-
rial) from M22 in R06
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.SMO
•meta.RandomCom-
mittee
• trees.RandomForest
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-Composition-2 • “original half” 50 fea-
ture vectors (disjunctive
with training material)
from M22 in R01
• “impostor half” 50
feature vectors (disjunc-
tive with training mate-
rial) from M23 in R01
Mic-Composition-3 • “original half” 50 fea-
ture vectors (disjunctive
with training material)
from M22 in R01
• “impostor half” 50
feature vectors (disjunc-
tive with training mate-
rial) from M8 (RS2 in
R01)
Mic-Composition-4 • “first half” 50 feature
vectors (disjunctive with
training material) from
M2 (RS2 in R01)
• “second half” 50 fea-
ture vectors (disjunctive
with training material)
from M3 (RS2 in R01)
Mic-Denoise-
RS4 Rode
• RS4 Rode (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18,
M19) in R01
• RS4 Rode (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18, M19)
in R01 after de-noising
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 11.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / cluster-
ers
Feature set(s)
Mic-Denoise-
RS4 Beyer
• RS4 Beyer (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M22) in R01
• RS4 Beyer (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22, M22)
in R01 after de-noising
Mic-
MP3conversion-
RS4 Rode
• RS4 Rode (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18,
M19) in R01
• RS4 Rode (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18, M19)
in R01 after MP3 con-
version
Mic-
MP3conversion-
RS4 Beyer
• RS4 Beyer (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M22) in R01
• RS4 Beyer (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22, M22)
in R01 after MP3 con-
version
Mic-Normalisation-
RS4 Rode
• RS4 Rode (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18,
M19) in R01
• RS4 Rode (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18, M19)
in R01 after normalisa-
tion
Mic-Normalisation-
RS4 Beyer
• RS4 Beyer (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M22) in R01
• RS4 Beyer (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22, M22)
in R01 after normalisa-
tion
Mic-
MultiProcessing-
RS4 Rode
• RS4 Rode (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18,
M19) in R01
• RS4 Rode (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M16, M17, M18, M19)
in R01 after de-noising,
normalisation and MP3
conversion
Mic-
MultiProcessing-
RS4 Beyer
• RS4 Beyer (10
reference files; set
ref10)
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M23) in R01
• RS4 Beyer (10 refer-
ence files; set ref10)
• 200 feature vectors
per file (disjunctive with
training material) for all
of the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22, M23)
in R01 after de-noising,
normalisation and MP3
conversion
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 11.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / cluster-
ers
Feature set(s)
Mic-Content-
Selectivity-01
• RS4 Rode 1 reference file silence vs. 2 ref. files
speech from ref10
• 200 vs. 800 feature vectors per file for all of the
4 microphones (M16, M17, M18, M19) in R01
• 10-fold stratified cross-validation
weka.classifiers.* :
• meta.dagging
• functions.Logistic
• trees.RandomForest
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-Content-
Selectivity-02
• RS4 Beyer 1 reference file silence vs. 2 ref. files
speech from ref10
• 200 vs. 800 feature vectors per file for all of the
4 microphones (M20, M21, M22, M23) in R01
• 10-fold stratified cross-validation
Mic-Content-
Independency-01
• RS4 Rode 1 reference file silence vs. 2 ref. files
speech from ref10
• 200 vs. 800 feature vectors per file for all of the
4 microphones (M16, M17, M18, M19) in R01
• training on speech and testing on silence and
vice versa
Mic-Content-
Independency-02
• RS4 Beyer 1 reference file silence vs. 2 ref. files
speech from ref10
• 200 vs. 800 feature vectors per file for all of the
4 microphones (M20, M21, M22, M23) in R01
• training on speech and testing on silence and
vice versa
Mic-
Kraetzer2009ACM-
single-classifier
• RS2 all 10 reference files from ref10
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 7 mi-
crophones (M2, M5, M3, M6, M7, M8, M9) in
R01
• Percentage split 80% / 20%
weka.classifiers.* :
• trees.J48
• functions.simple-
Logistics
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 98 segmental
features of AAFE
v.1.0.4
Mic-BKD2009 • RS2, content: ref10 without the two speech
signals
• Pre-processing: windowing (coef = 2048 vs.
coef = 256), silence detection (silence thresh-
olds thresh tested: 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2,
0.225, 0.25, 0.5 and 1 for coef = 256 and 0.01,
0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5, and 1 for
coef = 2048) for all of the 7 microphones (M2,
M5, M3, M6, M7, M8, M9) in R01
• Percentage split 80% / 20%
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.SMO
• functions.simple-
Logistics
• trees.J48
• lazy.IB1
• lazy.IBk
(all in default
parametrisation)
spectrogram with
coef = 256 vs.
coef = 2048
Mic-
Orientation Impact -
RS7
• RS4 Beyer ref2
references
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file and ori-
entation for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M23) in R06
• RS7 ref2 references
• 200 feature vectors per
file for M22 in R06
• Eight orientations with
45◦ offset in the xy-
plane
weka.classifiers.meta.-
RandomSubSpace in
default parametrisa-
tion
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-
Orientation Impact -
RS8
• RS8 ref2 references
• 200 feature vectors
per file for M22 in R06
• Two orientations with
180◦ offset in the yz-
plane
Mic-
Mounting Impact -
RS9
• RS4 Beyer ref2
references
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file and ori-
entation for all of
the 4 microphones
(M20, M21, M22,
M23) in R06
• RS9 ref2 references
• 200 feature vectors per
file for M22 in R06
• Eight different mount-
ings/fixings for the mi-
crophone
Mic-Clustering-
RodeR01
• RS4 Rode all 10 reference files from ref10
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M16, M17, M18, M19) in R01
• Classes to clusters evaluation
all 8 clustering al-
gorithms in WEKA
v.3.6.1 in default
parametrisations
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 11.1 – Continued
Setup Training material Test material Classifiers / cluster-
ers
Feature set(s)
Mic-Clustering-
BeyerR01
• RS4 Beyer all 10 reference files from ref10
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M20, M21, M22, M23) in R01
• Classes to clusters evaluation
Mic-Clustering-
RodeR01-
selectedfeatures
• RS4 Rode all 10 reference files from ref10
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 4 mi-
crophones (M16, M17, M18, M19) in R01
• Classes to clusters evaluation
sfd2FMFCC 1,
sfd2FMFCC 2,
sfd2FMFCC 13,
sfd2FMFCC 10,
sfd2FMFCC 3,
sfd2FMFCC 5,
sfd2FMFCC 4,
sfd2FMFCC 11,
sfd2FMFCC 12,
sfd2FMFCC 9,
sfd2FMFCC 6,
sfd2FMFCC 8,
sfd2FMFCC 7,
sfFMFCC 3,
sfFMFCC 12,
sfspec 11,
sfRMS amplitude,
sfFMFCC 10,
sfFMFCC 5,
sfFMFCC 1
Mic-Room-
Classification-
RS4-Selections
• parts of RS4 Rode and RS4 Beyer all 10 ref-
erence files from ref10
• 200 feature vectors per file for all of the 2 mi-
crophones (M16 and M20) in all 10 recording
environments
• 10x stratified cross-validation
weka.classifiers.* :
• bayes.NaiveBayes
• functions.SMO
• meta.Random-
Committee
• trees.Random-
Forest
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
Mic-Room-
Classification-
RS4-WrongRoom
• RS4 Beyer ref10
references
• Training 1: 200
feature vectors per
file for all of the 4
microphones (M20,
M21, M22, M23) in
R01
• Training 2: 200
feature vectors per
file for all of the 4
microphones (M20,
M21, M22, M23) in
R06
• RS4 Beyer ref10 ref-
erences
• 200 feature vectors
(disjoint with training 2)
per file for M22 in R06
Mic-SPIE2012-
Double-Recording
• RS16 ProbM01
live speech refer-
ences
• 200 feature vec-
tors per file for all of
the 6 microphones
(M33, M34, M35,
M36, M37 and
M38) in R06
• RS16 ProbM01 playback
(RS16 ProbM01 after
playback with a Yamaha
MSP 5 high-quality
monitor speaker)
• with vs without nor-
malisation
• 200 feature vectors
per file for all of the
6 microphones (M33,
M34, M35, M36, M37
and M38) in R06
weka.classifiers.* :
•meta.RotationForest
• meta.MultiClass-
Classifier
•meta.RandomSub-
Space
• meta.Ensemble-
Selection
• functions.Logistic
(all in default
parametrisation)
all 590 segm. feat.
of AAFE v.2.0.5
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